Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. 6 1978

078686

078.686

078686

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

(Formerly 'The Philosophical Quarterly')

RT-01262

Journal of
Pratap Centre of
Philosophy, Amalner
& Department of Philosophy,
Poona University, Poona

17-X-78

New Series

Volume VI
No. 1
October 1978

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University of Poona

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

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Articles in this Journal are indexed in the **Philoso 's Index, U. S. A.**

Articles for publication and all communications m be Addressed to The Editor, Indian Philosophical Qua ly, University of Poona, Poona 7, India.

Subscription may be sent to
Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly (by Cash) or University of Poona, "Indian Philosophical Quarterly" (by cheque). Change of Address and/or non-receipt of the Journal may be intimated within a month of date of Publication.

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THE PROBLEM OF MEANINGFULNESS

In the inner world of man language is perhaps the most powerful machinery through which theoretical activities like representation, hypothesising, reasoning can be most fruitfully and smoothly carried out and certain kind of rapport be established with the outer world. But language poses a challenge in so far as making use of that complex machinery inevitably demands certain degree of freedom, imagination and ingenuity on the part of the user of language, for there is every possibility that the user of language may misuse the freedom and ingenuity entrusted upon him to make the best use of language. A communicator may misuse his freedom and ingenuity by constructing indeterminate or even meaningless expression. Such possibility of misuse of language is ingrained in the very nature of language. Though language with a certain insight has been compared to a game like chess and construction of particular expression with a particular move in a game, giving the impression that, as if there is no scope for arbitrariness in 'linguistic moves', yet the comparison must not be stretched too far. This comparison is correct only so far as it draws attention to the fact that both language and game are something mere 'possibilities', while the 'moves' in the both (construction of a particular sentence, moving the knight.....................) are something concrete. It is only in the particular move, that a language and a game 'show' what they are really like. The comparison is also correct so far as both construction of expressions and making of 'moves' are governed by certain rules. But in other respects languages and games are significantly different from one another. Whereas a game of chess is a self-contained system of rules, language, in spite of being governed by rules, is not a self-contained system and barring certain preliminary disputes no significant dispute about construction and interpretation of linguistic expression can be settled with reference to rules. Indeed, the rules of language can only be of a flexible kind because unlike a game of chess, in language there are innumerable possible moves, innumerable ways of making the moves. How can we frame rigid rules for the 'infinite'? It is not even theoretically possible to count the number of possible expressions in a language. Also unlike a game a language grows and develops to meet various human requirements. (Observation of many philosophers about 'human nature' of language seems to be substantially correct).[1] And what is still more important is the fact that the human requirements which a living language has to fulfil is governed by ever expanding dimension of knowledge, experience and other human activities. It is not only that our knowledge, experience, etc., expand uninterruptedly, it is also true that we feel the growing need to represent those activities in order to reflect over them. Consequently, there is a corresponding expansion and development of language to cope with the expanding dimension of knowledge and activities.[2] Now for a growing and developing language there can be neither a fixed number of expressions, nor a fixed manner of constructing expressions (as it is the case with 'moves' in a game). A speaker or a writer often feels the need of constructing new kinds of sentences, apart from mere coining of new words and phrases. This is particularly true of construction of new hypotheses about frontier region of human knowledge. But it is left mostly to the ingenuity of the communicator in what better way he can express the new situation, new ideas and experiences. In this aspect construction of linguistic expression is comparable to the complexity and freedom involved in artistic activities. It is no wonder then that often arbitrary or meaningless expressions occur in the course of human communication! But can we reconcile ourselves to the fact that meaningless expressions are often constructed and leave the matter as it is? Is there no way of ascertaining the meaningfulness of a given linguistic expression, *at least when it is challenged by the receiver — by a listner or a reader?* Conceive of a situation where some heated dialogue is going on centring round 'modern art', 'worth of spiritualism in modern age'. . . . . and each participant is accusing others of uttering non-sensical expressions, but each participant at the same time claiming of his utterances to be perfectly meaningful. Ryle, for instance, wanted to silence the libertarians just by saying that to say that 'voluntary action is a free action' is to make a non-sensical utterance, (*The Concept of Mind*) not just to make a false statement. What a hellish affair it would be if we cannot come to some agreement about the maningfulness or meaninglessness of this utterance by the libertarians? Of course it may not be always possible to arrive at a perfect agreement as to the definite meaning of an expression, ambiguity may be a universal phenomenon with all linguistic expressions. There may be no actual meaning of a given expression, all expressions may mean 'more or less', there being always a possibility of expressing ourselves better or deciphering the same expression more accurately. But from all this it does not follow that no *agreement as to even the meaningfulness of a given-word, sentence.......is possible.* It is quite possible that we are not very sure about the meaning of a statement though the statement appears meaningful, 'a part of space cannot move to a part of space'. Therefore if human communication is to be really something significant then we must be able to say of any linguistic expression at least that, *it is meaningful or meaningless, whether or not the meaning of the expression is clear.* But then the problem arises: what is it for an expression to be meaningful? how can one be satisfied that an expression is meaningful? It is of course not easy to grasp what is actually being asked in these questions. Is it a problem of defining 'meaningfulness' or the problem of enumerating the marks of meaningfulness? The way the general problem of meaning is posed by the many distinguished philosophers of language it is not clear whether they are thinking of certain marks of meaningfulness or certain way of giving a definition of meaningfulness. *But it is of vital importance to clear it out whether the real significant problem about the concept 'meaning' is the problem of 'definition' or the 'marks' of meaningfulness.* For it is very doubtful if a non-circular or non-stipulative definition of meaningfulness is possible. This doubt appears to be genuine even if we do not take seriously the general apprehension about the possibility of a strict non-stipulative definition of meaningfulness owing to the indeterminate character of linguistic construction.[3] But other considerations tell against such a possibility. The concept of 'meaning' like the concept of 'truth' is a primitive one, it is difficult to think, what can be simpler than the concept of meaning or the concept of 'meaningfulness' in terms of which 'meaningfulness' can be defined. The attempt to define 'meaningfulness' in terms of, for instance, 'linguistic expression', 'intention and belief' (Grice) or in terms of 'synonymy' already presupposes the concept of meaningfulness. We can not comprehend what it is to have belief without language or meaningful expression. It is only when something is said or articulated in language that the question of believing something arises. But various formulations of the general problem of meaningfulness (a second order problem) *are rarely able to spell out whether the problem about meaningfulness is a problem of definition or a problem of marks of meaningfulness.* Austin writes that the general question which we want to ask about 'meaning' is best phrased as "what is the meaning of (the phrase) 'what is the meaning of (word) "X" ? ?' ?" Alston formulated the meaning question: "How must one expression be related to another in order that one can be exhibited in a specification of the other?" Or "What is it for two expressions to be synonymous"? Surely these are round about ways of putting the second order question about meaning. However, it is possible to raise the problem about marks of meaningfulness in a more straightforward way. We talk of a linguistic expression being meaningful in contrast to some combination of letters or words that appear arbitrary to us, we also talk of a particular expression having this or that meaning. Or we say, 'this expression is meaningful' and also we say, 'I can follow the meaning of this expression'. Here we can distinguish two different ways of talking about 'meaning' or making statements about meaning (meaning statement). To say, 'I know the meaning of "......" etc. is to make a first order statement about meaning and to say "......" is meaningful etc. is to make a second order statement about meaning. Thus there are two types of questions. (1) What is the meaning of 'X' (an expression)? (2) What do we signify when we say that 'X' 'Y' . . . . (any expression) are meaningful? A lexicographer is interested in the question of the first kind, but we are interested in the question of the second kind. Of course these two questions are related, an answer to the question, 'what is the meaning of 'X'' may be necessary to justify the meaningfulness of 'X'. To be meaningful an expression must have a meaning. Yet these two questions must be kept distinct, for we may be quite sure about the meaningfulness of an expression, not about the exact meaning of the expression. Also meaning of an expression may be more or less clear, but an expression can be just meaningful or meaningless.

In the question (2) we are concerned with the 'marks' of meaningfulness, why it is that we say of some expression 'X' that it has some meaning or other? We may think of meaningfulness as detectable through certain characteristics (linguistic characteristics) which are exhibited by only certain form of combination of letters or words etc. A particular form of combination of letters, words which exhibit certain linguistic characteristics are meaningful expression, i.e., are instances of bearer of meaning.[4] When some linguistic expression is presented to us in the form of speech or writing we may at once apprehend it to be meaningful. We may intuit that 'architecture is frozen music' is meaningful, whereas, green colour tastes sweet, is meaningless. We may just have a feeling of meaning in 'architecture is frozen music', we may not be able to give an immediate reason why it is so. To a less imaginative person it may even appear to be meaningless. But he also may not be in a position to say why this expression appears to be meaningless. But it is untrue to say that people do not have any reaction at all to these two expressions or that they intuit no characteristics of those expressions. Actually, people intuit different kinds of 'linguistic characteristics' as if in a flash. A native speaker gets himself acquainted with different linguistic characteristics (some of which may be even innate) through a long process of language habit, but now can see at a flash whether some of these linguistic characteristics or similar one is present in this — 'architecture is frozen music', novel form of expression. Much of imaginative faculty and experience are necessary in order to be able to intuit certain linguistic characteristics in such a novel form of expression, like 'music is frozen architecture'. But the fact is that *it is possible to point out certain 'linguistic characteristics' as marks or criteria (Sufficient or necessary) for justifying the intuition of 'meaningfulness'*. However, what is really problematic is: to reveal these linguistic characteristics through a meticulous analysis of what is involved in certain linguistic expressions (arbitrarily selected) supposed to be meaningful; and simultaneously by trying to determine what is wrong with certain linguistic expressions supposed to be meaningless (Green idea sleeps furiously).

But is it even possible to identify certain marks of meaningfulness? Certain marks (linguistic characteristics) of linguistic expression through which we can justify an expression to be meaningful? Wittgenstein may be interpreted to have raised a serious objection even to such a humble attempt, not to speak of defining 'meaning'. The recent literature on meaning, however, shows[5] no cognizance of Wittgenstein's objection, but we feel Wittgenstein's objection must be seriously considered. In the dictum 'do not ask for the meaning (what meaningfulness is) but use', this objection is sounded. For by 'use' of linguistic expressions Wittgenstein understands 'multiplicity of uses' and even this multiplicity is said to be some thing not fixed, but "new types of language, new language game comes into existence and others become obsolete and get forgotten". Passage 10 of P. I. also suggests that all the 'uses' are very much unlike one another. Wittgenstein's comparison of language with an 'ancient city', or a 'maze', suggests the impossibility of even describing marks of meaningfulness, for like an ancient city or a maze it is 'unknown and unknowable'. He goes to the extreme to suggest that there is nothing common in different appearances of linguistic expressions, "What confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print".[6] 'What is common in all meaningful expressions is merely the heard sound or seen printing', that is, the token! There is no common characteristic that we may hope any meaningful expression should display. He says that in order to show that language displays some essential features we must be able to classify expressions. But uses of linguistic expressions being so diverse, no classification other than arbitrary one seems possible. His manner of speaking suggests, as if, every linguistic expression is a class by itself, a unitary affair. Generally, we speak of meaning of an expression being vague. But Wittgenstein says that even the second order statement about meaning is vague. " 'Make sense' (and also 'does not make sense') is vague and will have different senses in different cases".[7] If first order statement about meaning is vague and also the second order statement, then third order statement about meaning must also be vague. Will not there be complete failure of communication or at least fruitful communication?

But on the other hand philosophers of language like Mill, Frege, Russell had attempted to classify linguistic expressions and draw our attention to different kinds of linguistic features like 'reference', 'predication', 'belief — conditions'. These features of lasguage are thought to be something determinate; and 'meaningfulness' has been attempted to be identified in terms of these linguistic characteristics. Against Wittgenstein their points of view may receive our immediate attention. It may be said that in the case of linguistic expression that does not display some common linguistic feature, peoples' *intuition of linguistic expressions as meaningful or meaningless will go unaccounted for*. It would be a mystery why some new kind of expression appears to be meaningful while other not.

But a different interpretation of Wittgenstein is possible, an interpretation which will make him appear less radical about the possibility of identifying linguistic characteristics of meaningfulness. General passages of P.I. suggest that Wittgenstein is looking at language not as something piecemeal but as a whole, his comparison of language with a game and the description of game as complicated net-work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing suggests the idea that language is a unitary thing, a pattern or net-work, where the particular linguistic expressions are constituents that make up the whole patterns. But if language is a pattern surely it is not something without a form. To understand what is a game *we cannot limit ourselves to looking haphazardly at some moves only.* We should look at as many moves as possible; we should not look at the game in a piecemeal way, but as a whole. Then a game will appear not as sum total of arbitrary moves but as a *kind of system or pattern.* The same is true of a language (Of course the comparison between the language and game may not be very much accurate because though there are different kinds of games it is doubtful if there are different kinds of language. Can English language and Bengali language be treated as different kinds of language in the way the game of chess and the game cricket are treated as different?) However, in comparing language with a game Wittgenstein's chief motive is to pin-point the 'Pattern-aspect' of language. Though no common linguistic character runs through every linguistic expression, there is family resemblance of linguistic characteristics. Thus if ABC, DEF, GHI, JKL, MNO, PQR are linguistic expressions and a, b, are linguistic characteristics then two linguistics (a, b) are present in the four expressions in the following way.



The six expressions are kept within a rectangle to give hint that they constitute a family, no one linguistic characteristic is running through all the linguistic expressions though each of the characteristics may be present in common but only in a limited number of expressions is. *But this way of looking at language as unitary thing, a net-work, though gives language a dinsinct unity of its own, would not help us to justify the meaningfulness of a particular expression with reference to this pattern-aspect.* It would be impossible to determine the meaningfulness of an expression by trying to find out the coherence between the particular expression and the language which is supposed to be a pattern or net-work. For language as a whole pattern or 'net-work' is never given to us, there being no fixed numbers of possible expressions. It is only in imagination that we can think of language as a complete pattern. In fact language is some thing incomplete unlike a game which is comparatively a complete system. We have already pointed out that language is some thing which 'grows' and develops to meet human requirements.[8] We accept it firmly that language has a development, it proceeds more and more towards a pattern of an ideal scheme. There is such a distinction as less developed language and more developed language. Thus, whereas we can determine if a particular move in a game is correct or incorrect by trying to accommodate it in the pattern of a particular game, *a linglistic expression cannot be similarly judged by comparing it with a given pattern of language, for language as a complete pattern is not available to us. So how can we campare a particular expression with something not given as a complete thing?* But in some phases of his mind Wittgenstein seems to believe in the possibility of language having a different kind of unity. Some passages of P. 9 (pages 92, 108, 122) suggest that he believes language to have some essential characteristics which are not so far 'digged out', or 'language is identified with wrong essence'. "For they see in essence not something that already lies open to view ...... but something that lies beneath the surface". He seems to maintain, at least implicitly that there is 'some thing' which lies within the language and which we can see when we look deeply into the nature of language. He also seems to say that to understand the essence of language we must look 'how proposition really works', not that language has no essence. Also we should consider Wittgenstein's remark about 'misuse of language', his frequent complaint that 'our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity' (PI 122). He often grumbles that our intelligence is bewitched by use of language, *but our intelligence can be bewitched by wrong use of language*. And if there is such a thing 'wrong use of language', there must be 'right use of language'. Also Wittgenstein's distinctions (though rather evasory) between 'surface grammar' and 'depth grammar',[9] suggests the possibility of an ideal or right use of language. But to believe in right or ought-to-be-form of language is but one step to believing in certain kind of 'logic of language'. James Bogen observes "it is hard to believe that a man who promises us a perspicuous representation of grammar (PI 122) did not crave order unity of language.[10] If the alarm raised against the possible misuse of language, is not just a false cry then we cannot but imagine that use of linguistic expressions must have certain inner logic of their own. And actually we find that Philosophers like Ryle consistently with his raising of alarm against misuse of language, tried *to discover different elements of correctly used expressions*. Ryle's paper 'Categories' needs at once be mentioned here. Ryle, for instance, speaks of different kinds of 'sentence factors' and shows how category mistake occurs when trying a sentence-factor in a sentence where it has no place.[11] Ryle also says "to say something senseless is to betray silliness, muddleheadedness. . . . ."[12] His article 'Systematically Misleading Expressions' tacitly suggests that there is possibility of constructing 'non-misleading' expressions. And in 'Philosophical Argument' Ryle consistently and candidly speaks of every proposition having a 'logical power', on the strength of which porpositions are variously related with one another in the way of being compatible, incompatible etc. Similarly, we must take into consideration the activities of some ordinary-language philosophers. Austin, for instance, has introduced various kinds of linguistic acts (Locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary). His believing that only certain form of expression (Performatory) can be happy or unhappy and only certain form of expression (constative) true or false suggests clearly that form of proposition has *some logic of its own. Thus it is not all arbitrary, how we say some thing significantly or meaningfully or communicate successfully with fellow beings, give a threat, command, with the help of language.* One thing that may stand in the way of imagining that there is a logic or laws of saying things meaningfully, is that we cannot conceive what may possibly be that logic or laws. It cannot be just analytical nor physical laws, like the laws of gravitation. But other possibilities may be there. We can think that inner logic of meaningful assertion may be something similar to law of 'mind'. Mental world is not completely identifiable with the physical, but it has its own law not exactly like the physical laws, e.g., the enjoyment of the beauty of music. It is quite possible to imagine that a principle of meaningful assertion has some thing to do with both mental and physical world. There is the physical world and the representation of that physical world through symbols is a fact of different kind in the way artistic activity is different from the 'laws of planetary motion'. But as artistic activity being different from purely physical fact does not imply that artistic activity is not governed by certain laws or logic, representative activity being different from physical phenomena does not suggest that it has no peculiar logic of its own.

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NOTES

1. Cf. Sapir in "Culture, Language and Personality".
2. 'represent' means many things besides 'recording', to use language for 'greeting' is also to involve in representative activity. We can conceive of a situation when

there was no activity called 'greeting' in human society and no language of greeting was practised. This shows that language also grows and develops.

3. See page 2.
4. Linguistic characteristic is not identifiable with physical characteristic like 'redness' of coral island. The linguistic characteristic is something which is the product of interaction of the physical (the outer world) and the mental (our way of looking at the world and trying to represent it in a certain way) and are exhibited by the meaningful expressions in certain extra linguistic content (the settings of utterances, the identity of the speaker....). For insance, it is most important linguistic characteristic that meaning can be expressed only through a medium or the bearer of meaning (The problem of the bearer of meaning is as intricate as the problem of 'the bearer of truth'. I simply identify the bearer of meaning with 'expression-universal, particular sentence, word etc. being the instances of the 'expression-universal'). Similarly the duality of subject and predicate is a characteristic of certain linguistic expression and when we understand a linguistic expression to be meaningful, we intuit this syntactic aspect. Or a meaningful expression may have the characteristic feature of yielding the belief or dis-belief, truth or falsity....But it is beyond my scope here to peruse the matter any further.
5. Philosophical investigation 18. (paragraphs)
6. *Ibid.*, 10.
7. G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein's Lecture in 1930-1933, p. 249.
   Printed in 'Classics of Analytic Philosophy' (ed.) by R. R. Ammerman.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
9. Philosophical Investigations 664, this remark is of course not elaborated by him.
10. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language, p. 3.
11. Logic and Language, Vol. II.
12. Use, Usage & Meaning by G. Ryle.

COMMUNICATION AS INESSENTIAL TO ART

I wish to suggest that the concept of communication, as we take it in life, is not really essential to art; and that it perhaps even falsifies what art is. I do not deny that the concept is important. It has been so in the history of aesthetics, and also in what may be called the philosophy of education. Thinkers have looked upon art as a means of bringing us all a little closer together, and even as a way to propagate some basic values — moral, religious or merely humane.

But consider what such thinking implies. It makes two assumptions: first, that art is a kind of *language* and can, therefore, function as a means of communication; and, secondly, that the usefulness of art lies in its commitment to meet the moral and religious needs of society at large. Such at least is the view of Tolstoy in whose well known work, '*What Is Art*', 'communication' is the key word.[1] The purpose of this paper, however, is not to examine Tolstoy's view of art, in particular. What I propose to do is rather something general: to examine, at some length, the view of art as a kind of language; and further, to show what difficulties arise from using the term 'communication' in relation to art.

A normal instance of communication implies two things: (i) the separability of *what* is communicated from its medium; and, (ii) a deliberate intention behind (or before) the act of communication in respect of the nature and meaning of what is communicated. The latter is conjoined with the idea of unrelaxing control over what happens in both the creation and contemplation of art. Let me explain:

Consider, for instance, a letter which communicates a message. Obviously, what the letter does is *merely* to convey the message; and, after it has done so, it ceases to have any further values (except perhaps in cases involving some legal matter). Quite often, we even destroy the letter after appropriating its message; and as we do this, I may add, the message itself remains quite unharmed. Contrariwise, the message may not be clear or complete even when the letter is received and remains quite intact. On such occasions, we may need clarification and ask for what the writer really intended to say.

Such need and concern, it is clear, presuppose that what is sought to be communicated is always fully intended, more or less clearly. It is indeed a precondition of successful communication that what is sought to be communicated is clearly visualized and formulated *before* the process of communication is set afoot. But for this, how could it be possible to communicate *the same* message over *different* media — like teleprinter, telegram and the radio — and may be in different language without any loss of meaning?

(It may here be protested that the specificity of the means or medium employed in such cases is very likely to affect what is communicated. To this my reply would be that the change that can here occur relates not to the message as such, but to the way it is received by the addressee. Thus, as against the content of a letter, a telegraphic message *seems more urgent to us*. I must here add that, in everyday communication, even this impression of urgency is intended, and in that sense preplanned.)

I can indicate one other way to focus, in repect of all communication, the relatively definite nature of the content (or message) and its separability from the medium of communication. It is quite normal to get our *own* communications corrected, modified or amplified *by others*. This is possible just because language is used only as a tool which merely conveys, and must faithfully transmit *what I intend to communicate*.

And now I may turn to protest. If this is what 'communication' is and implies in everyday life, can art at all be regarded 'communication' in any acceptable sense of the word? I do not wish to deny that *some* art may be said to *communicate* this or that idea. (This seems specially true of artistic prose.) My concern is rather with questions that are at once more basic and general. Can communication be regarded as a defining characteristic of art? May this question be answered affirmatively from the viewpoints of artistic criteria, excellence and experience? Is it demanded by the very concept of art that it should communicate?

Before I can attempt to answer these questions, some general remarks on the nature of art, its making and experience are likely to be of help. Art has been defined in very many ways, and people have objected to the very possibility of art's being definable. A part of this turmoil, as we are told today, is due to a lack of clarity as to what exactly the term 'art' is meant to signify, — the object of art or the process of its being made. Now, though I concede that the clarity in question is quite necessary, I must hasten to add that rigid adherence to any one side would only hinder access to the rich and varied spirit of art. Surely, the work of art cannot (with impunity) be considered in total isolation from the process which precedes and brings it forth. (A birth is a bliss *because* of the anteceding labour.) The creation of art is of course not identical with the way we contemplate or judge it. But a consideration of the art process can give us helpful insights for a proper understanding of our experience and evaluation of art. I indeed believe that all talk about communication as the essence of art has to heed the two viewpoints: that of the work of art and that of its *making*. Further, we have here to reflect along two main lines of inquiry:

A. *What* does art communicate?

B. And, if it is true that all art communicates, what exactly is the *manner* of communication?

The latter may be put as a *philosophical* question.

What does it *mean* to say that all art communicates?

In answer to the first of these, we may say that art communicates ideas or feelings. We shall have occasion to deal with this reply, later. At the moment, however, let me deal with the second query. *How* does art communicate?

Can ideas or feelings be communicated without the artist's having intended to do so? Does the painter have (or formulate) some *definite* ideas or feelings before he sets out to make a painting? Here, we must turn to the evidence of fact, to the actual situation of a work's being created. Most modern painters would say that they didn't quite know what exactly they were going to paint. At any rate, no artist would hazard the remark that he had fully visualised, in all its minuteness, what his painting was going to be like. The painter may well feel some kind of an 'urge' or 'itching' before he begins working. But, between this 'blind insistence' and the finished work the whole creative process occurs; and this is a process of struggling *to find* what would really satisfy — and so is rarely, if ever, foreknown to — the artist. It is, further, an activity during which he is often only led by the suggestiveness of that itself which he is able to realize, piecemeal, on the canvas rather than by any choice of his own. The process is, in short, quite unpredictable. This is indeed why it consummates in the artist's delight of discovering himself in his work.

If we compare all this with the features of everyday communication, the following *differences* emerge:

(i) Quite unlike communication, art is gratuitous.

(ii) A prior and clear formulation of what exactly is to be conveyed characterises communication, *but not art,* generally.

(iii) As a natural corollary to (ii), no two works of art can be the same.[2] Further, whereas ordinary communication is repeatable — and also translatable into different languages — art recalcitrates all this. What is implicit in my argument here is the widely shared view that a far greater measure of freedom and spontaneity characterizes the creation of art than is provided for in the notion of mere communication.

Here, however, I foresee some protests. May not art be both free *and a way to communicate?* Admitting that

I am free *while* creating — and not at all determined by a pre-fixed intent behind the *act* of creation — could it not yet be held that *the work* (as completed) *is* communicative of, say, some feelings? To this my rejoinder would be roughly as follows:

If the work is believed to *convey* a message or meaning with effect, what, I demand, may be said to happen *after* the supposed communication has taken place? Does the work lose all significance, and *so* remain from now on? We must say 'yes' in case it is merely a way to communicate; for its function is now over. And we have further to say, what is clearly silly, that the mind can dwell on the meaning of a work as quite *disembodied* from its medium or material.[3]

I here feel impelled to buttress my argument with additional comment, in relation to painting; for, this is the art I am intimately familiar with. Consider any painting, of even fair merit. Do we put it away, or destroy it on the plea that we *have received* what it *had* to say? Do we not go to it again for a closer look, *to actively open ourselves up* to its magic rather than only passively receive what it is said to communicate? And do we not often seek to possess and cherish it, as we pay for it, as a perennial invitation to feel and imagine in ever richer ways? We do not merely hang it on the wall of our study; we commune with it. It is not without point that sensitive art lovers speak of a painting's 'interiority'. Even like a person, it needs repeated contact, intimacy, a sharing, even (I would say) an exchange of being. How otherwise do we explain the fact, known to most of us, that the self-same painting may at once *acquire* newer meanings and *reveal* new ways of feeling and imagining *in us*, and add ever *new* dimensions to our experience, on different occasions? A painting may be cherished as a lifelong companion and *never* seem stale.

It is this thought of its evergrowing — and may I say, liberating — impact on us that leads me to dwell a little more on art *as experienced;* and to heighten its contrast with a mere means of communication:

Considered as a norm, communication enjoins that there should be maximum correspondence between what is sought to be communicated at the source and that which is delivered or had at the receiving end. In other words, not only should the message as such be fixed and definite, but it should reach the receiver wholly unaltered. Now, if a work of art merely communicates something, do different persons receive the *same* 'message' from it? We must answer in the negative. The fact rather is that the self-same person may react differently to the same work on different occasions. Art indeed is no language at all. It is not, I insist, a system of symbols with fixed meanings; and is therefore unsuited to the ends of communication as commonly understood.[4]

Further, and this again is a known truth which 'the communication theory' does not provide for, both artistic creation and experience need imagination and perceptiveness in ample measure. A work of art not only liberates, but chastens and elevates the imagination. This it achieves by virtue of its insistence on freedom from preconceptions and set intent, and on an active openness to receive intimations of value in unsuspected ways. It therefore conduces to our growth on the inside. In communication, on the other hand, the ideal is to ensure that *nothing* is left to one's imagination, for the use of this faculty may easily alter the original intention. What here heightens the otherness of art from communication is the fact that the trained onlooker (or the rasika) may even be able to see such qualities in the work as go unnoticed by others, including the artist himself; and, what is more, be *commended* for such imaginativeness,— an attitude which communication wholly prohibits.

Finally, I turn to the question of the *what* of communication. What is it that art may be said to communicate? We may answer: ideas or feeling. Now, if we say that a painting communicates ideas, we at once invite the protest that this does not help us *distinguish* art from what is not art; for, things quite other than art (say, a letter) may also communicate ideas. The other alternative is to say that art communicates feelings. But, to this my protest is ready and clear:

Consider two cases of communicating feelings. First, 'this letter communicates Arun's feelings of sorrow at the sudden demise of Karuna'. Second, 'of all his works, it is this painting which communicates sorrow best'. Now, a little reflection here brings out the following:

1. The letter purports to communicate somebody's (in this case Arun's) feelings and is specific in the sense of being caused by a particular mishap (in this case, the death of Karuna).

2. So, one would be rightly encouraged to ask, does the painting too communicate the feelings of the artist *himself?* To say that it does, would commit us to the view that the painting is a mere *carrier* of (individual) feelings, — a view against which I have already given my grounds of protest. If, on the other hand, the feeling (said to be) communicated is ascribed *only* to the painting (and, not to the painter), how do we ensure that a one-one correspondence exists between *this* and *my knowledge* of it? In such a situation, the cognitive role of art suggested by the use of the term 'communication' would require us to look for some criteria of testability and verification.

In the triple linkage of 'art', 'feeling' and 'communication', we may well be able to reach some agreement as to what 'art' is intended to designate; but any talk about 'feeling' in relation to art only gets muddled if we speak also of 'communication'. If 'feeling' is to be restored to its rightful place in the region of art, as made and as contemplated, I would suggest that we do away with the use of the word 'communication'. For, its use would suggest that in art *the same* 'feelings' are there as occur in life, whereas the need (on the other hand) is that we have to provide for the *distinction* between the two realms of art and life. How else can we ascribe 'feeling' to: the abstracts of Kandinsky, the pure space constructions of Mondrian (Victor Boogie-Woogie) or the rectangles and circles of Ben Nicholson

(Painted Relief), to give only a few examples.[5] Such works, to be sure, have a 'feel' about them; but to assert that they 'communicate' feelings would only be to commit the clear mistake of suggesting that the 'feeling' that they 'have' or 'give' is identical with feelings that we experience only in life.

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NOTES

1. 1896; translated by Aylmer Maude in 1905.
2. I shall not go into the question as to the status of 'fakes' and 'copies' of the original works of art.
3. I may here refer to the protest that Reid (L.A.), makes (though mistakenly), against Mrs. Susanne K. Langer's 'too sharp division between medium and creation'. *Meaning in the Arts*, George Allen & Unwin, London (1969), p. 83.
4. The distinction between presentational and discursive symbols has been well brought out by Mrs. Susanne K. Langer in her book *Philosophy in a New Key*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1957).
   I am also aware that Gillo Dorfles insists that 'art can also be discursive'. *Communication and symbols in the work of art*. J.A.A.C., Vol. XV, No. 3, (March, 1957), p. 291.
5. The '*static*' element in the works of the latter two artists can hardly be said to 'communicate' anything.

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WHO IS THE REAL HUME IN THE DIALOGUES?

The *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* has three participants, Cleanthes, Philo and Demea with Pamphilus as narrator, who comments on the 'careless scepticism of Philo', 'the accurate philosophical turn of Cleanthes', and 'the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of Demea'. This comment of Pamphilus, coupled with his personal review of the whole conversation 'that Philo's principles are more probable than Demea's; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer the truth', has led some to believe that Cleanthes represents the personal views of Hume in the *Dialogues*. I wish to argue that it is Philo who has the highest claim to representing Hume.

Claims of Demea

Of all the participants, Demea is farthest from the real Hume. Demea represents the rationalist approach to religion and is in favour of an a priori argument to God as a necessary existence. Demea is surprised by Cleanthes' argument from design which proceeds from an empirical basis, and retorts: "What? No demonstration of the being of a God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability?"[1] Demea later (Part ix) states his argument which proceeds as: Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence. In proceeding from effects to causes we have two alternatives: either to accept an infinite series of causes and effects or to have recourse to some 'ultimate cause that is necessarily existent'. The first supposition is considered by Demea to be absurd. It is therefore concluded that there is an ultimate cause, the Deity, who is necessarily existent.

It is obvious that with an argument such as this, Demea can hardly claim to represent Hume. For given Hume's principles, the argument falls to the ground. Hume took care of the Demean approach in the *Treatise* where he repudiated the truth of Demea's premise 'whatever exists must have a cause or reason of existence'.[2] For Hume, the idea of cause is distinct, and therefore separable, from that of the effect, so that there cannot be any demonstration that nothing is without a cause. The necessity of any cause cannot therefore be demonstrated, this demonstration being dependent on the previous one. Furthermore the refutation of the argument by Cleanthes is distinctively Humean.[3] "I shall begin with observing", Cleanthes says, "that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being whose existence, is demonstrable..'*

Claims of Cleanthes

Cleanthes' claims to representing Hume are without doubt better than Demea's, but not as good as Philo's. Cleanthes produces what is historically known as the argument from design to prove God's benevolence, wisdom, goodness etc., and argues from principles consistent in a large measure with Hume's. Yet he (Cleanthes) does not represent, as I shall try to show, Hume whose position is quite different from Cleanthes'.

Cleanthes, as we have just noted, has some common ground with Philo which each can employ against Demea with the other's complete assent. This is why it did not matter whether Philo or Cleanthes refuted Demea, provided the refutation was acceptable to both. When the *Dialogues* open we find Philo pointing out the benefits and advantages of pursuing principles of scepticism in the sciences as well as in theology. The scepticism Philo is speaking about is not Pyrrhonic scepticism but limited scepticism which does not recommened universal doubt and suspension of all judgment but only demands that we become 'sensible of the weakness, blindness and narrow limits of human reason' and proportion our assent to the precise degree of evidence. Cleanthes has no objection to following these principles in theology. Indeed both Cleanthes and Philo agree that experience and inferences based upon experience are the sole basis of justified belief. Both are so far following Hume in his views. But there is a big difference between Cleanthes and Philo. Cleanthes believes, as Philo does not, that by the exercise of natural faculties of our sense and understanding we can know or infer the attributes of God. "Our ideas", Philo maintains, "reach no farther than our experience. We have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism, you can draw the inference yourself".[4] The latter, as I hope to show, represents Hume more truly than the former.

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* This should not lead us to think that Cleanthes is Hume, some of whose principles Cleanthes shares with Philo.

If Cleanthes is Hume, then Hume becomes convicted of a belief in a benevolent, wise and good God. But in view of his considered philosophical position, his opposition to basing morality on religion, his assault on revealed religion in 'Of Miracles' and on the Christian religion in his Natural History of Religion, and biographical evidences which point towards an absence of any theistic belief, the above interpretation appears to be highly gratuitous. Hume may not have been a dogmatic atheist, denying with a priori certainty the existence of any God, but he was by all accounts an atheist certainly by Christian standards. Boswell, who held an interview with Hume just before he died, reports: "He (Hume) said he never had entertained any belief in Religion since he began to read Locke and Clarke".[5] Mossner's comment on this interview is that "although Hume had been amusing himself somewhat at Boswell's expense, there is no reason to suspect that he had been telling the strict truth about his own beliefs".[6] Mossner also identifies the 'sceptic' in "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State" (Sec. XI, *Enquiry*) as "surely Hume himself".[7] This is very significant, for the argument, also presented in the form of a dialogue between a fellow Athenian and Epicurus, the sceptic who mounts an attack on the argument from design, is the precursor of the Dialogues, not only in form but in content too. Mossner's interpretation appears to me to be absolutely right, being most consistent with Hume's avowed philolsophical position.

The fact that Hume had many liberal minded clergymen of Edinburgh as his friends has given rise to some speculation as to his possible theistic leanings. This friendship was possible, not because of religious beliefs shared in common, but, as Carlyle, who used to share this company, explains, because of the fact that "they (the clergymen) best understood his notions and could furnish him with literary conversation".[8] In view of Hume's extremely sociable and amicable nature and his sophisticated literary tastes, such friendship seems quite natural. Hume was a philosopher, but amidst all his philosophy, he was a man too.

If Hume had wanted Cleanthes to represent his personal views, he would not have left Philo's objections to Cleanthes' position unanswered. Pamphilus' favourable review at the conclusion of the conversation fails to replace this requirement. For in the absence of a solid defence of Cleanthes' position, any review, however favourable to Cleanthes, becomes vacuous, particularly when the review is done by one under the tutelage of Cleanthes. When confronted with Philo's serious objection that if it be granted that the cause of the universe is a mind, then a further cause of this mind is also required, Cleanthes fails to provide a fitting answer to the objection but makes an irrelevant remark: "The whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its creator..... You ask me what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; this concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry". I cannot imagine how such a character possibly can represent so thorough consistent and critical philosopher as Hume.

Philo's Claims

If any of the characters in the *Dialogues* is representing Hume, it is Philo who can put forward some legitimate claim. For it is he who alone argues consistently from Humean principles and beliefs. Philo's philosophical scepticism is precisely Hume's, the principles of which he employs against both Cleanthes and Demea. Tactically, Philo has a superior position to those of Demea and Cleanthes. Philo argues with Cleanthes against Demea and against Cleanthes with Demea. This would not be possible without some measure of common ground with Cleanthes and Demea. We have noted the common principles Philo shares with Cleanthes. Supposing Philo represents Hume, it seems strange that Philo has any common ground with Demea who has Malebranche on his side.

Philo, however, sides with Demea while at the same time subverting his position, subtly though. Philo's alliance with Demea does not detract from his philosophical scepticism, but gives him an ally in his assault on the position of Cleanthes. Philo subverts Demea's position while appearing to be conformable to it, but Demea fails to appreciate the full measure of Philo's assault. Thus when Demea has quoted Malebranche in his favour, Philo replies: After so great an authority, Demea,..... as that which you have produced, and a thousand more, which you might produce, it would appear *ridiculous* in me.... to express my approbation of your doctrine".[9] Philo deserves to be taken seriously and literally here. It would indeed be ridiculous for a philosophical sceptic like Philo to express appreciation of Malebranche. Philo then goes on to subvert the argument very subtly, without Demea's realizing it. For reasonable people. Philo argues, the question is not about the being but only the nature of the Deity. "The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the orginal cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection".[10] Philo appears to concede this to Demea but immediately subverts what he concedes. "But as all perfection is entirely relative", Philo continues, "we ought never to imagine, that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose, that his perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, thought, design, knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him". Why justly? Not because the Deity possesses those attributes but "because these words are honourable among man, and we have no other language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we think, that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension; and is *more the object of worship in the temple*, than of disputation in the schools" [11, Italics mine].

But what does all this amount to? Philo has reduced the attributes of God to our subjective ascriptions without any basis in experience. For Philo, for whom ideas reach no farther than experience, this means that there is no rational basis for any belief in God. He therefore relegates God to the temple as an object of faith. Demea, who agrees with Philo in denying experience to be any basis for inference concerning the Deity, is satisfied with Philo's apparent declaration of faith and fails to work out the implication of Philo's assertion from principles of his philosophical scepticism. But faith for Philo, as for Hume, is a synonym for superstition. In the concluding paragraph of Sec. X of the *Enquiry* Hume writes:

> "We may conclude, that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."

So faith, for Hume, is compatible with what is contrary to reason, experience and custom. So it is for Philo too, although there are passages where Philo seems to speak in favour of faith and final causes, but, as N. K. Smith shows,[12] Philo has also taken care to subvert such admissions. Here we find a contrast to Kant who really tried to find a way to God through faith after being convinced of the futility of the rational approach to God. When Hume or Philo speaks of faith, he does not mean to, like Kant, take faith as a way to God. Neither Philo nor Hume dogmatically asserts with a priori certainty that God does not exist. Philo characterizes, to the glee of Demea, God as 'incomprehensible' and in so doing represents the personal views of Hume who says:

> "The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of superstition to another, set them aquarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy".[13]

It seems to me that Philo represents Hume not merely by virtue of his philosophical position and belief, but by virtue of technique as well. This method of subtle subversion of an argument without being too noisy about it is characteristic of Hume. Hume does not start with rejecting ideas prevalent in common philosophical parlance. On the contrary, he creates the false impression of being conformable to them and when the reader has accepted his *bona-fides*, he gradually subverts the ideas he wants to. Hume in this respect presents a contrast to Descartes who starts with doubting only to bring back what he previously doubted. Philo represents Hume so completely that he has emulated Hume's method of subtly subverting an argument.

A word about the claims of Pamphilus, whose appreciation of Cleanthes shows that he endorses the position of

Cleanthes. The claims of Pamphilus therefore collapse with those of Cleanthes.

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NOTES

1. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (ed. N. K. Smith), p. 143.
2. *Treatise of Human Nature* (ed. Selby-Bigge), pp. 79-80.
3. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (ed. N. K. Smith), p. 189.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.
5. E. C. Mossner. *The Life of David Hume*, p. 597.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 598.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
9. *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (ed. N. K. Smith), p. 142.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.
13. *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, Vol. 4 (ed. Green and Grose), p. 363.

TRUTH AND LANGUAGE
A WITTGENSTEINIAN ANALYSIS

1. In this paper an attempt has been made to raise some fundamental questions regarding the concept of truth.

The questions prominently sought to be discussed are as follows:

I. What does the truth of a statement consist in?
II. Is agreement of a statement with fact at all meaningful?
III. Is truth-predication of statements logically superfluous?

For the analysis of these problems we have adopted the Wittgensteinian model as it promises to provide fresh insights into the problem.

2. In our language it is mainly the statements which are said to be either true or false. The statements are made in order to state or report something and to communicate it to others. So in a fact-stating and communicative language statements carry meaning and are also capable of being true or false. In recent years the propositions, held by the logicians as alone capable of being true and false, have been subjected to criticism. W. V. Quine, for instance, has argued that the propositions as the so-called meanings of the sentences are abstract entities, and have been surreptitiously introduced into our discourse as the "shadows of the sentences".[1] According to him, sentences are sufficient to convey meaning and objective information, and, therefore, are alone capable of being true and false. The ordinary language philosophers like Strawson and Austin have been equally insistent on rejecting propositions. They have, however, accepted statements, and not sentences, as the units of language to be predicated as true or false. As Austin has made it clear, statements are 'made' in language to report a situation, and sentences are only 'used' for the purpose.[2] The same sentence may be used in making different state-

ments as different sentences may be used in expressing the same statement. Thus he comes to the conclusion that the statements as the meanings of the sentences are alone capable of being true and false.

The controversy regarding the relation among propositions, sentences and statements is pointless if we keep in mind that truth-predicates are applicable to the sentences only when these are statements or propositions, conveying some objective reference to a fact or state of affairs. Statements as well as propositions are sentences when they are expressed in language. There cannot, therefore, be propositions or statements which are not expressed linguistically as sentences. However, all sentences are not statements or propositions, since many sentences e.g. interrogative, imperative and exclamatory, etc., do not state anything. So it can at least be concluded that only statements or propositions as having some objective reference to fact or situation are capable of being true and false.

Wittgenstein used both propositions and statements in this sense, but had never accorded, except in the *Tractatus*, any pre-eminent place to propositions and also to statements in our discourse as he realised that what matters in language is not the propositions themselves, but the use of language, or what he called the 'language-game'[3]. A language-game, according to him, means a set of linguistic practices and conventions, involving a system of language and a form of human behaviour interwoven into each other. Therefore he called language-games and the forms of language they represent 'forms of life'[4], which means that language is not merely a syntactical structure consisting of propositions, but also a form of human action.

Wittgenstein's 'game model' analysis, moreover, has brought into sharp focus the view that language is a system,[5] and that it is a system of propositions[6] 'woven into the fabric of human life. This establishes a holistic view of language replacing the atomistic conception so much espoused by logicians and analysts alike. In the new model language is presented as an organic structure of propositions. Therefore individual propositions are deemed important only within the system. Again, as Wittgenstein views it, it is only within a language-game or a language-use that statements or propositions originate and that they have their determinate function therein. Language-games therefore provide the point of reference or framework of application to the statements.

3. Now against this backdrop the question as to what the truth of a statement consists in can be discussed. As we have already seen, a statement is always about a situation; that is, it is about the world. It says something about the world, or it represents a state of affairs. Take, for example, the statement "Snow is white"; it states that snow is white, and thus it says something about a situation, snow-being-white. Now this statement is true because actually snow is white. Here, the statement is truly representing or reporting the state of affairs it is designed to represent. The statement would have been false if snow were actually green, and so there would have been no successful representation of the state of affairs.

The truth-claim of the above statement seems very simplistic, as it seems to rely on the simple ground of successful representational function. But how does a statement like the above arise at all? It is not an isolated expression, nor is it a casual reporting of a situation. Even if it were taken to be so, its meaning and function would not be divulged unless we go into the occasion or the operation — conditions in which it originated. That is why we have to look into the 'use' of the statement in our language and life. Or, in other words, we have to find out the language-game in which the statement has been occasioned. No statement is an isolated event, it is a part of a system of statements under-determined by an operating language-game. A statement is assertable only within a language-game, if by the latter we mean the whole set of operational conditions in which a form of language comes into use.

Therefore the truth of a statement cannot be determined by its function of successfully representing a situation.

Its successful representation of a state of affairs is relative to the kind of use or operational methods laid down for it. Without going into these conditions, we cannot pronounce the judgment that truth-claim of a statement is guaranteed by its successful representational function. As it is obvious, the truth-claim of a statement is related to the kind of framework of operation, brought into action in the making of the statement. Since the statement is not frame-work-free, it has to be conceded that its entire function of representing a situation will be dependent on the modes of operation of the framework. That is to say, the truth-conditions of the statement must be guaranteed by the operational conditions of the framework itself. These operational conditions themselves are what may be called the assertion-conditions of the statements, since the very possibility of a statement being made is determined by the language-use or language-game operating. Wittgenstein writes,

> The *truth* of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference.[7]

This obliquely refers to the fact that truth-claim of statements is dependent on the system of language.

Let us analyse the statement 'Snow is white' on these lines. This statement operates within a language-game involving our system of colour-language. Therefore it is meaningful only in our Colour-language-game. This language-game, according to our method of analysis, provides the assertion-conditions of the above statement and so also its truth-conditions. Take the statement as S and the language-game as LC (C — stands for colour). Then S is true, because it is assertable in LC. That is, St ('t' for true) because it is LCSa ('a' for assertable). In other words, St is a function of LCSa. The truth-conditions are thus made dependent on the assertion-conditions of the statement.

Now the question may be raised: Are the assertion-conditions sufficient to guarantee the truth-conditions of a statement? The answer is: The assertion-conditions are the necessary, if not the sufficient, grounds of the truth of a statement. In order that a statement be true, it must, first of all, be asserted in a language-game, and must conform to the operation-rules of the game. The operation-rules themselves are responsible for the intelligibility of the statement, and the form of life associated with it is the ultimate frame of reference, which must guarantee the asserted move of the statement. Wittgenstein says,

> The *truth* of my statements is the test of my *understanding* of these statements.[8]
>
> That is to say: if I make false statements, it becomes uncertain whether I understand them.[9]

Wittgenstein makes it quite clear that the very fact that a statement is intelligible or possible in a language-game shows that it must be true.

4. Thus the truth-conditions of the statements are controlled by their semantical conditions. But the semantical conditions apparently are not themselves sufficient to guarantee truth of statements, because the statements have reference to the world, which is itself an important component of a truth-claim. This truth-component needs analysis as it has been a source of puzzle for philosophers. Now the question arises: how shall we take this reference to the world at all? Austin and Quine, for example, have unquestioningly accepted this reference to the world as the tacit mode of operation of any fact-stating language. Austin writes that "when a statement is true, there is, of course, a state of affairs which makes it true".[10] But what can we mean by "makes true" here? Does it mean that a state of affairs makes a statement true, because it was not so earlier? Then how can a statement which was not true earlier be made true later? So it is better that we do not use the phrase 'make true'.

The whole difficulty has been due to the unquestioned view that there stands a gulf between statement or proposition and state of affairs or fact it represents. This is a myth perpetuated by the empiricists. Now, to be precise, what is a state of affairs or fact which the statement represents?

The state of affairs itself is not a non-linguistic situation because, if it were so, it would not be intelligible and so referable even. That is why the state of affairs has to be linguistically interpreted and made to conform to the representational symbolism. The state of affairs is "propositionalised"[11] here. As a result, the proposition and the state of affairs do not stand apart, but are identical. Therefore it is misleading to say that a statement 'represents' a state of affairs and that its truth lies in the statement's being in 'agreement' with the latter. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, the whole idea of 'agreement' is out of place here. He writes,

> The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here.[12]

In Wittgenstein's method of analysis the concept of reality of world has undergone a drastic change. According to him, reality or the world does not stand apart from language, because reality *is* itself as it *is found* in our language-game. That is, reality is itself a move[13] in our language-game and is known as it is presented therein. So there cannot be any extra-linguistic reality, since such a concept is totally unintelligible and so nonsense.

Now if the world is itself a move in the language-game, that is, if the state of affairs is itself a proposition, there cannot be any sensible talk of agreement of language and reality, or of proposition and fact. There is logical identity between the two, and so we can conclude that the factual component of a truth-claim is non-different from its semantic component. As we have already seen, the assertion-conditions of a statement are necessary for the statement being true; now we see that the assertion-conditions themselves are sufficient to guarantee the factual conditions of the statement. This being so we see no difference between the assertion-conditions or the semantical conditions and the factual conditions or the non-linguistic conditions of a truth-claim. It is in this identity that the truth of a statement lies. This identity is the only agreement possible. Wittgenstein writes,

> What does this agreement consist in if not in the fact that what is evidence in these language-games speaks for our proposition?[14]

That is, the very fact that our language-game speaks for a proposition, and nothing goes against it, suffices to establish that the proposition is true. This indirectly speaks for the identity of the semantic and the factual grounds of the truth of statements in our language.

The conclusion that truth lies in the identity between the assertion-conditions and factual conditions of a statement may appear absurd to those who do not see any such identity between the two and who advocate a divorce between language and reality. Quine, for instance, does not accept the present conclusion, and holds, on the contrary, that truth hinges on reality and that "the truth-predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality it still the whole point."[15] This theory is based on the belief that language is divorced from reality. Quine believes that language is inessential to reality and language-use is meant for 'Semantic ascent' which is a temporary retreat from the world to the language.[16] Truth-predication, according to him, is the process of cancellation of this temporary retreat,[17] and an affirmation of the non-linguistic world. The analysis of truth in Quine hinges on the ill-conceived theory that language is only conditionally related to the world and truth-predication is really a cancellation of this conditional relation. In Wittgenstein's model of analysis, however, the reverse is true as here language is inextricably involved in reality and truth-predication is an affirmation of the logical identity between language and reality. By saying that a statement is true, we do not affirm an extra-linguistic world, but affirm that the world is really a world as constituted in our language sharing identical structure with the latter.

5. Wittgenstein's analysis has so far shown that truth is an essential property of statements because it is guaranteed by the semantical conditions or internal modes of operation of language-games. So the question of truth is an internal question of language to be decided by the availability of the operational modes of the framework of reference. So it cannot be discussed as an external question to language so evidenced in Quine and Austin. We have so far discussed Quine's theory showing that in his approach truth-predicates are only an external device of asserting reality. Austin, however, in a different way comes to a similar conclusion when he says that truth-predication is a conventional method of characterising statements referring to an objective world. Besides, according to him, language is only conventionally related to the world without having any essential relation to it, since any conventional notation may be appointed for a description of a situation.[18] Both Quine and Austin have come to the view that truth-predicates are logically not so important as are the statements themselves which have, again, the limited purpose of pointing to the world. It is the world which determines and also conditions the necessity of statements as well as their truth-predication. If this is so, then is truth-predication ultimately not logically superfluous? Of course, Austin himself does not accept the 'logical superfluity' view of Strawson according to whom truth-predication adds nothing to the statement itself.[19] However, he believes truth-predication is not totally superfluous as it at least grants or confirms the statement. But what does such a confirmation at all achieve? It achieves, as Austin says, the purpose of describing "the rather boring, yet satisfactory relation between words and world"[20] which genuinely occurs. This, however, does not refute our point that ultimately such a description is logically dispensable and so superfluous.

Wittgenstein also comes to the 'logical superfluity' view though in an altogether different way. According to him, truth-predication is logically superfluous not because it is cancellatory or conventional but because truth is one of the essential conditions of a statement being assertable and intelligible in language. So truth is a necessary feature of our statements which we can understand at all. Wittgenstein always held that our intelligible language consists of true statements. In the *Tractatus* he had held that our science and knowledge consist of true propositions.[21] He believed that falsity is an anathema of language, since false statements cancel even the grounds of intelligibility of statements. A false statement is ruled out by our language-games. Wittgenstein, however, equates falsity with negation and so admits of negation or falsity only as a possible mode of cancelling a truth-claim. But negation is not logically fundamental[22] as it can be explained by positive assertions themselves. (Compare the *Tractatus* view that negative facts are explicable by the existing state of affairs.[23]) So negation is not admitted into language-games except as a possible limit of the assertions of the statements.

In view of these observations it can be seen that truth-predication of statements is logically superfluous if truth is internally guaranteed by the language-games. The addition of the predicate "is true" to a statement is redundant and is logically dispensable. Wittgenstein writes,

> Is there a truth here which *I know*? —
>
> I cannot depart from this judgment without toppling all other judgments with it?[24]

That is to say, truth is so fundamental to a statement that we cannot deny it without denying a host of other statements. And if so, where is the warrant for reasserting that the statement is true?

To sum up: Wittgenstein arrives at two major theses in the analysis of truth viz.

(i) He decidedly comes to the conclusion that truth-predication is logically dispensable. (This explains his silence over the problem throughout his writings, and his brisk handling of it in his last writing, namely, *On Certainty*.)

(ii) He shows that we can better understand truth only by investigating the foundations of our language which have to be described and not justified. These non-justifiable foundations of our language lie in the forms of life of man, and they can alone guarantee the truth of the statements, because they provide the necessary conditions for there being true statements in language. It is only in this context that analysis of truth will be relevant and fruitful.

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RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

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Views on suicide have changed through centuries. Most ancient civilizations condemned suicide in general; however at the same time they allowed for certain exceptions in more or less rigorous terms. Somehow, with the advent of Christianity, the act of suicide came to be regarded as a heinous crime or a great sin so much so that a suicide, if he failed in his attempt, was punished by the law, and if he succeeded, his corpse was denied the usual funeral services (Thakur 1963; Choron 1972). Recently, suicide is viewed less as a crime and more as an aberration of mind, or as an act of a psychotic or neurotic patient. In other words, suicides now-a-days are treated as sick or mentally ill rather than as criminals or sinners. This trend in the recent literature on suicide—whether it is produced from a sociological or psychiatric or purely humanitarian point of view — is so predominant that often one comes across several holistic pronouncements on what 'suicide' is. Often one finds an author crystallising his insights into aphorisms of the following form: "Suicide is an action that takes place in sadness and desperation." (Faber 1968: 3). "In its last analysis, every suicide is a problem in mental disease". (Hoffman 1928: 12). "Suicide is the cruelest repentance in deed for a crime committed in thought." (Flescher, 1971: opposite p. 1). "The suicidal gesture is thus a cry not only in distress, not only a cry for help, not only a prayer, but it is a pleading: I want to live; help me find a way to live." (Menninger 1969: 71) "Suicide and neurosis are both childish forms of reaction to a childish overestimation of motives, humiliations and disappointments. And so suicide represents — like neurois and psychosis — an escape by antisocial means from the injustices of life." (Adler, 1967: 121). .

All these and other such 'suicide is' formulae reflect a tendency on the part of the writers to view suicide as a categorical phenomenon with set causes and motives and with a similar outcome. These writers speak of suicide as if they were talking of some concrete substances like, for example, peanuts with fairly regular tangible characteristics. I find it very hard to capture the phenomenon of suicide in a nutshell, let alone condemn or judge 'it' once and for all. To my mind, suicide is a general, very general name given to a family of events alike only in one, perhaps central, aspect such as a person willfully and knowingly putting an end to his life, but events which are otherwise diverse, sometimes enormously wide apart in almost everything else, such as the causes, the motives, the rationale, the state of mind of the prospective suicide, the methods employed and the effect on the survivors.

In the following paper I shall describe a unqiue type of suicide in India and shall discuss its characteristics in the light of the present day theories about what 'suicide' is. I shall try to see to what extent we can apply the criteria and conclusions of today's socio-phychiatric analyses and on what basis we can judge the acts as morally good or bad. In the end, I shall attempt to extend the conclusions drawn from the cases discussed to more familiar cases and pose a question about the general attitude towards suicide and suicide prevention.

The form of suicide that I am going to describe is unique in its motives, its method, and its effects. It was and is practised by great philosophers, saint-poets or Yogis, i.e., persons who have mastered the Yoga which is a science of mental and physical discipline. This form of putting an end to one's worldly existence is called *mahā-samādhi* or simply *samādhi* if the context is clear. Before going further, a brief note on the word *samādhi*. It is a Sanskrit word and is the name of the last of eight stages of self-discipline according to the science of Yoga. It is often translated with the phrase 'the Yogic trance'. It is a stage where a Yogi, by controlling his breath, diminishes his oxygen intake much below that of the normal human requirements and stays in a very calm, serene and supposedly blissful state of mind. This state can last for hours together and can be acquired by anyone with enough practice and observance of a few dietary rules. The

Yogi can attain this state of mind and body at will and also can come back from this state of acute concentration to the normal state of a layman. In the Yoga tradition it is regarded as a blissful state of mind which unites the individual mind with the cosmic reality and so is practised recurrently by the Yogis. This is to say that it does not automatically lead to death. However, since it is mainly a matter of strong will-power and practised breath-control, which help to minimize physical functions, this very method is sometimes used by the Yogis to leave this world, or as the Indians say, to cast off their bodies.

From the above description it should be clear that the method of a Yogic *samādhi* is very different from other familiar methods employed by suicides. The methods we usually hear of are shooting, hanging, drowning, stabbing, jumping off high places, or using gas, poison, drugs, sleeping pills and so forth. All these are, what I shall call for want of a better term, 'external' methods. They all require external objects such as weapons, ropes, poisons, pills etc. or are dependent on external surroundings such as a high mountain, a waterfall, a running train, and so forth. The Yogi's method requires no such external aids or objects. It is essentially an internal process, a matter of strong will and supreme breath-control.

For the above reason, this method is very much outside the reach of suicide prevention centres. If a man wants to shoot himself and you are convinced that he is out of his mind, you can try to talk him out of it and when he finally gives away his pistol, half your battle is won. If a man wants to jump off a cliff and kill himself, you can try to somehow take him to a less dangerous place and your chances of saving his life are better. But if a man does not depend on any of such external or violent measures, and simply controlling his breath breathes his last, there is not much you can do. This method is not like a hunger-strike or fasting till death comes, for you can forcibly make a hunger-striker eat food and make him live. However, intake of food is no impediment to the procedure of the final *samādhi.*

There are records of people who have taken the final *samādhi* that note that they do not abstain from the normal intake of food on the day when they start their last exercise. (Rolland 1965, 168-9). This method is not like a hunger-strike also in that it does not emaciate the body gradually until it falls off. It is much quicker than that, mostly a matter of hours.

Perhaps one can think of more drastic methods of suicide prevention such as not allowing the Yogi to concentrate enough or to force an oxygen mask on his nose. I am not certain that these methods of preventing this form of suicide can work; but the main question is, is anyone entitled to prevent one who wants to leave this world and leave it so peacefully?

The question of suicide prevention is a complex one, and it is generally centered around rationales concerned with the prospective suicide's loss of reasoning powers, his loss of moral sense or responsibility for his actions, and so on. There is also a direct line of reasoning that judges the act of suicide itself as 'bad' or morally wrong or harmful either to the agent or to others. I am not at present concerned with either defending or refuting these usual rationales behind the existence of suicide prevention centres. I would rather like to suggest that the above-mentioned rationales are essentially dependent on the agent's or the critic's interpretations of the concept of death itself. Since these latter, as I shall show below, fall into a wide range of different and sometimes extremely opposite characterizations of death, the final judgment about the worth of the suicidal act, about the degree of rationality or responsibility involved is bound to be at best very tentative.

When one talks about suicide in general and suicide prevention in particular, one is often launched into a discussion of the causes or motives behind this group of actions and one finds it very hard to pass a judgment on 'suicide' as a *kind* when the analysis of the varied causes and manifold motives is not yet quite satisfactory. However, very often in discussions of sociology, psychology or even philosophy one finds only certain motives of suicide brought into focus, and an analysis of only a few motives leads people to characterize suicide as a *category* of behaviour falling under general headings such as 'cowardice' (Aristotle), 'escape from responsibility' (Socrates), 'self-punishment' (Flescher), or 'escape from an intended murder of others' (Stekel), or even 'a cry for help' (Shneidman and Farberow). Again I would like to point out that such characterizations tend to overlook the possibility that there might be cases or forms of suicide that do not spring from motives suitable for the above descriptions, and therefore, may not necessarily be judged as wrong, or bad, or harmful.

The apparent causes of day-to-day suicides are generally given as follows: ill-health and pain, unhappy love affairs, loneliness, marital strife, financial calamity, humiliation, remorse and so forth. The analysis of these causes leads to a search for the individual's ultimate motives. For these 'causes' by themselves are not sufficient factors that necessarily turn a person into a suicide. Many more people overcome the above-mentioned circumstances or simply learn to live with them. There are very few who actually put an end to their lives in these circumstances. The motives are supplied by the writers as explanations of why certain people kill themselves under certain circumstances. The postulated motives range from Freud's all-encompassing 'death-drive' to Menninger's trio of a wish to kill, a wish to be killed, and a wish to die. (Menninger 1938) Freud's notion of a 'death-drive' has very little explanatory value since he asserts that every man possesses it. For then the question of why only some men commit suicide under certain circumstances is simply raised one step further, and we ask instead why it is that only in some persons this death-drive is triggered under certain circumstances. I shall not discuss this notion any further. Menninger's analysis is more perceptive, because ample evidence is found from the suicidal notes and the verbal testimonies of the people who have committed or failed in suicide respectively (Shneidman and Farberow 1957) — evidence that corroborates the view that in many cases people wish to kill someone else and, when they are unable to do so, they kill themselves as a revenge on the other person; or that they misidentify their own unwanted nature as 'the bad guy' and in a schizophrenic fit, kill themselves in killing the unwanted part of their personality. This speaks for the first two motives of Menninger's trio. As for the third element in his exposition more analysis is needed. A wish to die *per se* means as little to a layman as Freud's death-drive. Since our common belief is that our life is the dearest thing to us, one fails to understand why someone would wish to die. Besides, the meaning of death is not identical to all people. People have different conceptions of what death is going to be like. To take two extreme cases, some believe in the immortality of the soul and in life in some conscious form even after death, whereas others believe in total annihilation after death. It is not clear whether a wish to die in prospective suicides means a wish to go from this birth into a further birth or a wish to end the existence altogether. What is perhaps more important is that one cannot say for sure that either one of the above conceptions of death *necessarily* prompts or precludes a wish to die. There are instances of believers of immortality either defending or denouncing suicide. The belief in an afterlife can help to reduce the fear of death by likening it to a sleep and thus promote a wish to die under certain trying circumstances; but at the same time, belief in an afterlife coupled with a belief in the Day of the Judgment may induce fear of the future punishment for one's sins and work against a wish to die. The same is true of the belief in annihilation after death. Some scholars trace the suicides committed by Buddhist monks in Vietnam to their belief in the total annihilation as an ultimate state. But this belief in itself is no guarantee of a decisive wish to die. Hume believed in no afterlife, and furthermore, he defended suicide on other rational grounds (Hume 1965), but his belief did not promote in him a suicidal wish to die. It might seem that an overwhelming realisation of life's worthlessness or meaninglessness gives rise to a wish to die. This might be so in some cases, for often when we realize the futility of some activities, we try to put an end to them. But even this realisation need not *necessarily* lead to a wish to die. For a brilliant argument leading from the absurdity of life to the decision to live, one has only to read Camus' *The Myth of Sisyphus.*

One last point about the wish to die. That a suicide had a wish to die is almost always established in a retro-active analysis of his performance. However, as I said before, a wish to die *per se* does not appear to be either a necessary or a sufficient factor in order for someone to commit suicide. A potential suicide may only be motivated by a wish to kill plus a mistaken notion of identity and may not really wish to die. On the other hand a person in acute suffering may wish to die and yet not commit suicide. This being the case, one wonders whether the wish to die is not simply a misnomer for a fact that a person has committed suicide.

In short, although Menninger's threefold analysis has more explanatory power than a mere postulation of a death-drive, it still leaves many suicidal cases unexplained, or, what is the same thing, lists them under the mysterious wish-to-die category. The wish to die *per se* is mysterious becaue it is on par with the death-drive. To postulate a wish to die is not enough to explain the final motive behind a case of suicide; it is rather like admitting one's incapability to analyze further. However, even if the wish to die is interpreted as a means rather than the end, i.e., even if the suicidal act is analyzed with reference to a wish to die *in order to* achieve a further end (e.g. avoid misery or shame, to save one's country, to satisfy honour or to hasten the joys of the next life etc.), this category becomes such a mixed bag that again a 'wish to die' loses any real *explanatory* power in the analysis of the suicidal act. Unlike a-wish-to-kill and a-wish-to-be-killed the third wish simply encompasses whatever remains unaccounted for without an insight into the suicide's state of mind at the last moment. This can be seen from a further discussion of the case of the *mahā-samādhi* of a Yogi. The first two motives, i.e., a wish to kill or a wish to be killed are, as I shall show below, inapplicable in the case of a Yogi; so by elimination his case would fall under the wish-to-die category. However, as we shall see, the details of this kind of suicide present a picture so utterly different from the usual cases in Menninger's third category that the wish-to-die is of little help by way of explanation of the Yogi's final motives.

As I said before, a Yogi does not wish to kill anyone nor does he wish to be killed in the ultimate sense. For he believes in the following characteristics of the Self or the Soul which is the life-principle in every living being: "The one who thinks that the Self is the killer or the one who thinks that the Self is killed, they both do not undersand. The Self does not kill, nor is he ever killed." (The *Bhagvad-Gītā* 2.19) "O Arjuna, how can the man kill anyone or have anyone killed when he knows that the Self is indestructible, everlasting, unborn, and immutable?" (Ibid. 2.21). In other words, the Yogi believes that Death does not mean destruction of the Self nor does suicide mean one's act of destroying one's Self. Death for the Yogi is simply a recurrent point in the indefinite journey of the individual Self through various births towards the ultimate Self-realization which is the same as becoming one with the cosmic reality or the *Brahman*. A practical consequence of these beliefs about the nature of Self and Death is that a Yogi, by definition must have his passions mastered before he can rightfully be called a Yogi. He must not be motivated to do anything because of anger, fear, hatred and the like. The Yogi tries at and attains the equanimity of mind (comparable to a Stoic's ideal) in states of pleasure and pain. Normal passions leave him unperturbed. He has no ill-will for others or for himself. Therefore, when a Yogi enters into a last *samādhi*, his act cannot be said to spring from either a wish to kill (hatred) or a wish to be killed (guilt/shame/remorse). The presence of either one of these wishes is flagrantly contradictory to the character of a Yogi by definition, and therefore we can safely exclude all cases of suicide prompted by either one of these wishes as outside of our present discussion.

What then is the motive of a Yogi in entering into the last *samādhi?* In answer to this question I shall draw my evidence from various records of the lives of men who have adopted this method of leaving the world. Mostly the records state that 'the fulfilment of life's mission' was the decisive reason in cases of this type. The Yogi does not have to be of a particular age in order to decide in favour of a final *samādhi.* Many decide at a ripe age, over seventy or so, but some others who have performed remarkable works during a very short time have decided to end their life at a very early age. To give two well-known examples of the latter type, Swāmī Vivekānanda ended his life on July 4th, 1902, at the age of thirty-nine years. In this short span he had produced voluminous contributions to philosophy in eight volumes of about 530 pages each. In 1893 he attended the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago where he was acclaimed as the most inspiring speaker on the philosophy of Vedānta and Hinduism and was the only one to receive a spontaneous standing ovation from the audience (Rolland 1965, 33). In 1897 he founded a religious Order called the Ramakrishna Mission in the form of monasteries which has now branches all over the world including Europe and North America. One can find little reason to dispute his contention that his life's mission was fulfilled at the age of 39. Similarly, Jñānadeva, a saint-poet and philosopher of the 13th century, lived only for twenty-two years and wrote two remarkable works on the philosophy of Vedānta. Both these works are in verse, and are considered to be unparalleled in their explanatory worth and originality of thought. Jñānadeva was the founder of the Bhakti movement in the province of Mahārāṣṭra — the movement that preaches salvation to anyone regardless of his caste, to anyone who simply learns to worship God in any form at all. He considered "his life's mission fulfilled" (Dandekar 1969: 9) and therefore put an end to his life by entering into the state of *samādhi* in the year 1297 A.D.

These and other instances recorded elsewhere attest to the conclusion that when a Yogi decides to enter into the last *samādhi*, he does so only with a 'full' life and pacified mind.

It is a decision taken when he is of sound mind; he cannot otherwise achieve the requisite concentration of mind to exercise the supreme control over his breathing. The decision is not carried out in secrecy, for there is no stigma attached to this type of self-chosen death. It is essential to note here that this type of self-chosen death is one of the forms of suicide that are allowed only as exceptions even in the Indian tradition and that both the present-day law of India and the ancient and medieval law-writers denounce other forms of suicide in strong words. Both the authorities denounce death chosen to avoid responsibility, or chosen out of revenge, anger, extreme pride, affliction or fear (Thakur 1963, Chapter III).

It should also be noted that this form of ending one's own life in *samādhi* is different not only from the common and more familiar forms of suicide, i.e. out of pain, grief or fear etc., but also from other institutionalized forms of suicide like *Satī* (sometimes spelt as *Suttee*) practised in India before the eighteenth century or Hara-kiri practised in Japan. The Yogi's final *samādhi* is extremely non-violent as compared to the widow-burning in *Satī*, and the belly-cutting in Hara-kiri. Unlike in Hara-kiri, the Yogi does not end his life *in order to* achieve revenge, or to prove his innocence of an alleged crime, or to demoralise an opponent. The Yogi's *samādhi* is essentially an *individual* act, not directed towards or against anybody or any institution. Unlike the widow in Satī, the Yogi does not believe that he will gain any additional merit by ending his life in this manner, nor does he believe that there is any demerit in dying a natural death. He believes in the law of Karma, therefore believes in a fixed amount of action that he must fulfil in accordance with his life's duties, and, sometimes when the duties get fulfilled ahead of time as it were, he chooses to end the present form of existence. The duties may also be fulfilled until death comes naturally, as in the case of some Yogis, and they do not enter *samādhi* to end their life if they believe that their work is yet to be done. Unlike *Satī*, the Yogi's *samādhi* is not a form of suicide forced upon him by the society in any sense, and hence no Yogi is either obliged to enter a final *samādhi* or to abtsain from entering it. There is no special valour associated with this end nor is there any stigma attached to it. However, once the Yogi decides to choose this death, people would not try to obstruct him physically. There are records (Dhere, Sood, Ramana Souvenir etc.) that people who have grown fond of the Yogi's bodily existence and are attached to his person try to express their sorrow, argue with him about the necessity of his decision and even beg him to extend his life, but the records invariably talk of the Yogi's instructing people in the immortality of the soul and preparing their minds for the inevitable.

The performance of a *maha-samādhi* is generally not a secret or concealed one; but it is not a spectacular or dramatic deed either, and so it is not given commercial publicity. Usually the disciples, the attendants or the neighbours are present. The Yogi performs his normal duties of the day, gives his last advice to the pupils, bids them farewell, then sits on the ground in the cross-legged position or lies down, and closing his eyes, enters into the state of *samādhi* as described before. His breathing goes slower and slower until he breathes his last.

Since the Yogic *samādhi* has no strings attached to it of any good or bad passions, it cannot be described as 'cowardice', or 'sublimation of guilt', or 'a cry for help'. As for the question of its moral quality or harmfulness to the society or the individual: the Yogi is considered to be beyond the moral 'good' or 'bad' by the Indian tradition. This is so because, by definition, he has attained that state of mind where normal pleasure or pain leaves him undisturbed. He is also not bound by any duties towards any family, because by tradition, when he attains this state of mind, he has no longer one family as his own; he considers the whole of humanity as his family. Hence whatever contributions he makes to the society are considered to be not his duties which the society has a right to claim, but rather as his gifts to the society for which the society can only be grateful. Due to these considerations the Indian tradition does not consider the Yogi's *mahā-samādhi* 'harmful' to the society. It cannot be considered to be even indirectly harmful to the society in the manner of the Roman philosophers who committed violent suicides, provoked an irresistible fascination for like suicides among their followers, and were indirectly responsible for the mass suicides that followed their suicide. There are no instances of mass suicides following a *samādhi* of a Yogi. This is again for the apparent reasons: the Yogi's belief in the accomplishment of his *own* duties in accordance with the law of Karma and his preaching others to be thoughtful and to carry on their appointed tasks in due manner. Since the Yogi's *samādhi* is not a 'public' act (like a soldier's sacrifice in a battle or a monk's burning himself in protest of war), it has no violent effects of arousing similar emotions in the survivors. Those who have witnessed the acts of *samādhi* have written about their feeling of deep sorrow at the loss of a great mind. But at the same time they speak of it as a beautiful, serene and inspiring experience which teaches them a lot about death, deliberation and the Divine.

This should also clarify why I call this a unique form of suicide as regards the effect on the survivors. Normally we think of the suicide of someone as a traumatic experience for his survivors. "Suicide is an action that takes place in sadness and desperation. It inflicts grief and remorse upon survivors." (Farber 1968, 3) In fact Shneidman notes this as one of his reasons to justify suicide prevention. "A third reason has to do with the dyadic nature — the interpersonal and social nature of the suicidal act. . . . The point I am making is that the suicidal act is not an act of one individual. A person has a right to kill himself; but his potential survivors have their rights too, specifically they have a right to lead lives unstigmatized by the suicidal death of that person. When someone talks about his right to kill himself, it is possible to speak also about the rights of the potential widow and children." (Shneidman 1969: 23-4) This point does not arise in the case of a Yogi, because as I said, he has no immediate family, therefore no social responsibilities to be fulfilled except for his self-appointed tasks for which society can only be grateful. His survivors do not feel ashamed or self-critical in any sense ('what did I do wrong?'), because the Yogi's decision is no secret, it is taken by himself, individually, and is not influenced by any factors other than his conception of his life's mission and its accomplishment.

At this point one can possibly raise the question of justifying the Yogi's decision to end his life, especially if he is young and talented. "A further argument is that many people have gifts and talents that can benefit society." (Choron 1972; 61). This is an interesting point, because it bears upon the rights and duties of an individual. First, I shall explain the notions of rights and duties as they are conceived in the Indian tradition and then come back to their general discussion. The Indian tradition prescribes four stages of life which roughly correspond to the student-stage, the householder-stage, the forest-dwellers stage and the ascetic's or the *Saṁnyāsin*'s stage. A person has certain rights and duties in the first three stages of life and is expected to fulfil them. In the last stage of life, when he gets initiated into the life-style of an ascetic, he is no longer bound by the layman's rights and duties. He then renounces all his worldly acquisitions, even his relationship with his family, and spends his time mostly in metaphysical discussions, meditation, and spiritual instruction. Therefore when such a person chooses the Yogic *samādhi* as his end, it is clear that the society has no right to expect more from him, nor is he avoiding any responsibilities. On the whole, these four life-stages are prescribed for every person in the same temporal order. However, sometimes persons of exceptional abilities are allowed to enter the fourth stage at any age. Such was the case of young *Saṁnyāsins* such as Vivekānanda. Once they are initiated in the *Saṁnyāsa* and have proven their worth as Yogis, they are also exempted from the rights and duties of a layman. Hence their decision is not considered to be an evasion of responsibility.

Generally, the life-style of a Yogi can be compared to the life-styles of great humanitarians like Albert Schweitzer who, although they are not obliged by any duty, consider it as one of their 'ultra-obligations' (a term I borrow from Russell Grice, 1967) to serve humanity and accomplish their self-assumed task with just as much devotion and conviction as one would have in doing his duty. The Yogi, when he works for the people, does so, not because he is asked to, but because he feels that he has to. And similarly for his decision to leave this world.

So far I have described the unique phenomenon of a Yogi's final *samādhi*, and I hope my discussion brings out its special features as regards the motives, method, the state of mind corresponding to it, and its effect on the survivors. In considering the moral worth of the act, I have also pointed out why the Indian Tradition regards this as an acceptable form of ending one's worldly existence, and why it does not consider the Yogi either as a criminal or a mental patient. It simply respects the Yogi's decision on the strength of his character and his contributions to the society and allows him to pass away peacefully.

The instance of a Yogi's *samādhi* may seem too remote to bear any relevance to the question of the moral attitude towards suicide. But in fact, it is not so remote. As I said before, Yoga is no mystery, and we already witness more and more people in several parts of the world effectively learning and practising this science of self-discipline. The method of ending one's life by choosing to hold one's breath, although not frequently employed, seems to have been known from quite ancient times, not only to the Indians but to others as well. Diogenes Laertius in his work on the *Lifes of Eminent Philosophers* (Tr. Hicks 1958) records that at least two Greek philosophers, namely, Diogenes, the Cynic, (*Ibid.*, VI, 76-77) and Zeno, the Stoic, (*Ibid.*, VII, 28-30) died of their own accord by holding their breath. Even in modern times, there seems to be no adequate reason to doubt that will-power can control one's bodily functions to a great extent. So we can see how the issue of a Yogi's *samādhi* can be generalized, so as to include any strong-willed person who intentionally puts an end to his life.

It may appear that the doctrine of rebirth or of Karma plays an important part in the Yogi's decision to depart by entering the *mahā-samādhi*. This doctrine is no doubt present in the background of the cases I have discussed so far. However, it is not crucial to my generalized argument. Because, as I have already pointed out, not all those who believe in Karma or rebirth choose to enter *samādhi*, nor again, all who die intentionally by holding their breath need to believe either in Karma or in rebirth. The most important factors seem to be the concept of a self-assumed mission and the conviction of having fulfilled that mission. Granting that both these are highly subjective matters, one cannot deny that there are people of worthy talents who are the best judges of their own work. Here again, one's natural reaction would be to say, "Well, if one feels that one has done one's job, then let him sit back and enjoy! Why does he need to end his life?" However, this is a question of personal attitude. I think one can appreciate the feeling that at a certain age in life, a self-appointed and well-executed death might itself appear to be the best form of rest.

Nor does this feeling have to be prompted merely by sorrow, suffering or depravity. People who have enjoyed their life heartily can just as well feel that now is the time to go, peacefully and without fuss. We hear about several Cynics who 'went out with a cosmic laugh'. (*Xenakis* 1973: 9) Demonax, for example, on reaching a hundred said, "Ah, I am too old", then starved himself to death. Similarly in India, King Śūdraka is reported to have enjoyed a life of ten days after he reached a hundred and then he chose to enter fire. "*labdhvā cāyuḥ śatābdaṁ daśadinasahitaṁ śūdrako 'gniṁ praviṣṭaḥ*" (*Mṛcchakaṭika* 1.4). Kālidāsa too, in a laudatory tone depicts the kings of the Raghu clan as leading a full, many-splendoured life which would be self-controlled to the very end. "They studied in their childhood, sought pleasures of the senses in their youth, lived like hermits in their old age, and, in the end, cast their bodies off by means of Yoga." (*Raghu-vaṁśa* 1.8) Similar concepts of a full life and a self-chosen death may be adopted by anyone else with equal conviction and a fully thought out sense of moral responsibility.

In the case of more secular instances, perhaps the question of saving a life that can be useful to the society can be raised once again. However, I doubt how much right society can claim over a person when that person has already contributed to his own satisfaction and feels that his role is well-played. I allow that this kind of fulfilled feeling is comparatively rare, but we cannot deny the possibility or the fact that there are people who feel this way and that even a third person may share their feeling of a good job being well done. Then, provided the person wants to put an end to it all, I wonder how much 'right' we have in claiming his talents for the society. Sure, we will feel sorry that he will leave us, that the society will no longer benefit from his experience, and so on. But these feelings are, in a way, selfish. They do not reflect as much on the prospective suicide's 'moral failure' or anything of the kind. I think that one cannot talk about suicide in general. One can talk better about this or that case of suicide. There are no fixed rules as to how much a person owes to the society before he can take his leave finally. Hence the argument about the loss of the future benefits to society is not a very convincing argument against all types or cases of suicide.

If death is inevitable, then whether it comes now or later, whether one waits till it comes, slowly and perhaps painfully, or whether one facilitates one's own journey towards it by choosing a self-appointed hour, manner and place, why should we judge one as typically better or worse than the other? It seems to me that what we could do for the benefit of those who want to live as well as those who do not is to understand the diverse possibilities of ending one's life by choice and try to lessen the stigma attached to the word 'suicide'. In the enthusiasm to save life in any form at all, let us not forget the possibility that suicide can sometimes serve as a practical and respectable way to end life, and in fact, as in the case of a Yogi, it may even prove to be a truly inspiring event to educate people in the beauty of life and death.

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CORRECTION

In the July 1977 issue of this Quarterly read after the second line in paragraph 2 on page 606 the following:

> **'conditional apology unless one already knows what is..'**

— Editors.

THE ROLE OF THE FILM IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

Invited to contribute an article on the role of film in social progress, I am led to ponder over the connotations of the word "social" in the title. We had a socially conscious cinema of sorts in the early thirties and forties (the early films of Shantaram and those from New Theatres come to mind) but, as I have argued elsewhere, it was an alienated cinema with its roots and its inspiration drawn chiefly from the West. Consequently it had little or no impact and, with the departure of the British from India, just withered up. Its place has been taken by the self-styled art cinema with its burden of social consciousness — a Western inheritance! That its primary duty is to render truth and beauty without sacrificing the one to the other is ofen forgotten by its over-zealous partisans who have, of late, abandoned both truth and beauty and taken to offering facile solutions for deep social problems. More generally speaking art films with their largely neo-realistic format have often offered for their elite consumers an *escape into poverty* just as commercial films have offered an *escape into affluence* for the masses. So basically both are products of the same exploitative system. Neither cinema is capable of changing our perception of social reality. And it is only when our perception of social reality is undistorted by ideology that social change is possible.

Perception of social reality is hindered rather than promoted by pat and simple solutions. The problematic of the film is dissolved by offering fairy-tale and fanciful solutions. I will give three contemporary examples choosing a Malayalam, a Kannada and a Hindi film — all by distinguished film makers and all of which fail for the same reasons. The truth is that the plots of all three films (perhaps not the Kannada film) are solution-engendering because all three have a charismatic central protagonist with whom empathic identification (of the kind which blots out the rest of the social field) is freely encouraged.

The charismatic central protagonist besteads our al too silver screens like a veritable Colossus, although, of late he has assumed, like our traditional Gods, various forms. Mostly he is a sensitive intellectual (Gangacharan in Ray's *Ashani Sanket*, Praneshachar in Pattabhi Rama Reddy's *Saṁskara*, the number is virtually legion) at some remove from the other characters and the action as well, who falls into a dilemma. Sometime the central character is a bare neatly disembodied consciousness (the young protagonist of Girish Karnad's *Kaadu*) or an armchair philosopher who surveys the world around him and feels a Buddha-like melancholy. Such a one is Raghavan Nair in Ramu Kariat's *Nellu* who is stationed for a large part of the movie in front of a table, woodenly writing his diary in a manner that betrays a lack not only of a literary but a histrionic sense as well. I learn that, by the end, he is a changed man in the Vatsala Novel. This would constitute social change in our sense here — an intellectual lives among simple hil people and becomes finally one of them but, in the film, he merely turns into a wordy preacher. Perched on his vacuou middle-class superiority and surveying the landscape, periodically, in blankets of swollen prose, Raghavan Nair of the hollow laugh seems a complete stranger in his own land And, indeed, like some visiting American anthropologist he details his observations of the Adivasis for our benefit (and oh! how banal they are) and serves as a thinly disguise subrogate for the author. His brand of religiosity (althoug a professed atheist he has travelled to Kasi, to Badrinath to Rameswaram!) is just a cover for his spectatorial attitude to life and indeed for most part he is magisterial aloof from everything. Just how much he has learnt from life among the Adivasis we know at the end when he literally foists the Adiyar girl, Mara, on to the wholly unsuspecting Savithri Warariyar. This is known as passing the buck. But the film presents this as a supreme act of goodness and kindness!

I have concentrated on Kariat's *Nellu* to show how potentially great theme gets subverted by the presence of charismatic central character. Raghavan Nair is even give a Shane-like send off from Thirunelli. As he makes his way out of the village, past all those nice green fields, Mara and Savithri Warariyar may look wistfully at the departing figure but we feel more than a little relief. This send-up of middle class mores is more than evident in the five love affairs that fairly litter the film. Enough to make you think, in these permissive days, of Wynad as a vast love-in! There is to start with, the creeping but infructious lust of widow Savithri for narrator Raghavan Nair. This is strictly for those above forty. I have no quarrel on this score (being above forty myself!) ; but why underline it so heavily? Then we have Kurumatti and Mallan. Kanakadurga's *machan* seduction of a half-asleep Mallan must be pure male fantasy. What was she doing with that dragonfly on the morning after? Her subsequent song, when she is on the rampage again, is enough to make you blush to the roots of your pubic hair! And then there is Tappal Nanu and Javini and Mallan and Mara (ah! Henry Miller!) and Safiya and her young man. Does *Nellu*, then, with its middle-class narrator and middle-class preoccupations, promote social progress and present the plight of the Adiyars of Wynad? No, it promotes itself! Kariat's *Nellu* is mostly chaff and gr(o)in.

To take another example, this time a recent film from Karnataka on virtually the same theme: the plight of Untouchables working in the coffee estates near Chikmagalur. The film (based on a 1930's novel by Dr. Shivrama Karanth inspired clearly by the Gandhian idealism of those days) presents the story of the disintegration of an 'Untouchable' family through the eyes of Choma, the central protagonist, who wants a small plot of land to cultivate from the Brahmin Sankappaiah. Despite the patent sincerity of its director, B. V. Karanth, the film essentially fails because it arouses New Left expectation with its land-for-the-tiller theme without being able to live up to them. This is chiefly because of its obsession with religion and a pronounced Brahmin bias both in the novelist (who is also credited with the screenplay) and in the director. And so, the film, in spite of a brilliant performance by the central character (played by Vasudev Rao in a manner which boldly invites comparison with P. J. Anthony's Velichapad in *Nirmālyam*), is pathetic rather than tragic like *Nirmālyam*. This is because the film depicts the plight of one man rather than that of the oppressed Untouchables. And this, in spite of the pseudo-universalisation sought by endowing Choma with a 'dudi' (drum). Choma never becomes his drum, he remains apart from it. And it is the drum, devoid of all human substance, that we are left with at the end of the film. The film presents Choma's tribalism under the same Hindu umbrella as that of the Brahmin landlord, Sankappaih, and only the odium of untouchability is faintly attacked. This should please Jan Sanghites in the audience but what has this to do with class oppression? Christianity, generally, is the whipping boy for Choma's misfortunes and he dies a martyr not of the politically oppressed Harijan community but of sacred Hinduism. Better a dead landless Hindu than a live land-owning Christian seems to be the message of the film. If the film had merely presented the social and political subjection of the Harijans (the film is set in pre-Independent India) without sentimentalising and glamourising the plight of Choma it would have served its purpose better. Once again a charismatic central protagonist is the undoing of the film.

A final example will be a recent Hindi film: Shyam Benegal's much-tooted *Nishānt*. Here, too, we have a charismatic central character, the bespectacled schoolteacher, played by Girish Karnad, who arrives in the film on a tranquil morning heralded by the most melodious background score. Not only is he given every kind of directorial latitude to lodge himself firmly in our souls, he is even permitted to metamorphose, by the end of the film, into a near mythological figure a Rāma to boot! Alongside, Amrish Puri with his *machismo* and hard liquor, is a latter-day Rāvaṇa and the planned invasion of his palatial mansion by the turbulent hordes (led by Rāma-Girish of course) is a veritable replay of the *yuddhakāṇḍa* in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. I know how Shyam Benegal will defend himself but, then, why does he deliberately plant the *Rāmāyaṇa* reference himself in the film? The sentimental song which is preludial to the final (ritual) slaughter of Vishvam and Sushila, the grief-stricken priest sitting disconsolately amidst the bloody carnage at the end and, especially, the blood-stained heroics of Karnad running to rescue his wife (worthy of a Manoj Kumar surely!) — all these take one's mind away from the central issues of the film. They sentimentalise the conflict between feudal landlordism and the landless peasantry (the film devotes precisely one small scene to this issue) by glamourising and upstaging the plight of the petty bourgeois schoolteacher. Just look at Karnad's house: the frilled pillow-covers, the excellent counterpane on the bed and the sexual tease between man and wife no doubt specially for the benefit of jaded urban appetites (the virile Amrish Puri for the women and the svelte Shabana for the men). So bourgeois is the film that Shabana is made to yield to her adulterous lover only when he comes in with a whip. Shyam Benegal's decadence has to drag in Nietzsche as well!

Nishānt fails essentially because a charismatic character (dumb teacher turning firebrand) is the social placebo turning social praxis into empty ritual. The myth of the all-powerful individual, who has Gods behind him, has taken the place of cool, detached social analysis.

I said at the beginning of this essay that the inclusion of a charismatic central protagonist is solution-engendering. Let me now add that film, if it is to be an instrument of social progress or change, must not offer gift-wrapped solutions for social problems. Thus Mara in *Nellu* being adopted by Savithri is no solution to the plight of the Adiyars of Wynad. Nor is Salim Mirza's joining the student demonstrators in *Garm Havā* a solution to the problems of Muslims living in post-Independence India. The only role the film-maker can play in using film as a vehicle of social progress is by highlighting certain social problems (the odium of Untouchability or the plight of Adivasis or the dilemma of Muslims in India) without necessarily offering apsule, instant vitamin-enriched solutions to these vexing problems. In saying this I draw strength from a famous letter of Engels to Minna Kautsky in November 1885: "I am by no means an opponent of tendentious programmatic poetry (Tendenzpoesie) as such. The father of tragedy, Aeschylus, and the father of comedy, Aristophanes, were both strong *Tendenzpoeten* no less than Dante and Covvantes; and it is the finest element in Schiller's *Kable und Liebe* that it is the first German political *Tendenzdrama.* The modern Russians and Norwegians, who produce excellent novels are all Tendenzdichter. *But I believe that they must spring forth form this.*"

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LET LAW AND MORALS BE AS FRIENDS[1]

Very often when the claim is advanced that law and morality are members of the same family, if not even aspects of the same concept as two chairs might be examples of a platonic exemplar of 'chairness', it is the better part of wisdom to nod, and then continue on with something else; or, if taken by the claim, to begin to ask a fundamental question: What does the speaker mean by the word 'law', and what does he mean by the word 'morality'? Are the two words synonyms for a third concept? Or is each word one which designates a specific concept, neither of which concept is interchangeable, as the "bark" of a dog is not to be confused with the "bark" of a tree?

One may call this kind of endeavour "fashionable"; but in addition it may be an attempt to make clear to oneself some limits, if there be any, of the range and scope of a question which has been with us for a long time, and seems destined to be with us an even longer time, given the present nature of man. Were we omniscient we might not need to ask such a question, nor make such divisions of it; but we are not omniscient, and the divisions of the question which our language permits and encourages helps and hinders us. The sentence which was to end all sentences often lets a part of itself drape outside of the suitcase, forcing us to open up again all of our careful packing. We seem to be better at setting out for destinations than at reaching them.

When we investigate the claim that, in some way or other, the sphere of the moral governs the sphere of the legal what confronts us is one problem of how is it that we distinguish the one from the other? How does a set of moral propositions differ from a set of legal propositions? If both were the same, then *legal* and *moral* would be interchangeable concepts, and could be used as if they were synonyms. But experience shows us that legal and moral systems are hardly synonymous if only for the obvious fact that the aims of one system have, at times, been at odds with the aims of the other systems(s).

The natural lawyer might assert that 'law' is a subs of 'moral'. If he is a theist he might complete his chai argument by claiming that both concepts, 'law' and 'morals derive, in *some* fashion, from the identity of God Himsel It is a bold claim; yet it is a claim which has few adherents This is not to state that such an argument is illogical o fanciful; it is, on the contrary, a most persuasive argumen because it lends consistency and unity to the multiplicit of experience. St. Thomas Aquinas, when discussing natura law in the Summa Theologiae (question 94 of la2ae), fel that it would be the same law for all men but yet realise that material and intellectual conditions of mankind rendered it possible that not all would arrive at the same conclusions about the nature of law. General principles should b the same for all; but specific systems would differ. He coul write this position off by claiming that some were hard o heart, or stupid, or infidels; at least the law *should* be th same for all!

To descend from the logic of deity to the logic by whic the world should run may be an easy move for a theist o a certain type. If he admits that the world is an expressio of the goodness of God and of the self-consistency of God then it is a short step to take to suggest that the world, an all of its creatures, should mirror the divine consistency i every way according to their own abilities and capacitie We may look at the laws of the early Commonwealth o Massachusetts, for example, to see that the civil order an religious order were nearly one and the same. To be a member of that early settlement meant that the civil and mora realms met in the life of the colonist in much the same wa that it is put forth that reason and flesh meet in man.

But is this example one which exhausts future possib legal and moral worlds? Does the argument come to a swif end when one cites an historical example? It might, if w still lived in a world of concepts which made the claim tha examples, by themselves, exhausted concepts, just as som of the early thinkers thought that numbers had to be assigned to a finite group of objects.

It is because we are able to construct systems of law which differ from moral systems that we are able to distinguish the one from the other; and it is because we can see that a moral system, by itself, does not necessarily imply or yield a legal system that some of us try to preserve a distinction between the two realms of thought. It is a truism to assert that both systems are, somehow, concerned with man. Are the demands of each the same upon us? Are the ends of each the same for us? If they are, then they are one and the same.

For the modern thinker the bother comes when he realises that one may construct various legal systems. He can appeal to experience, pointing to the various legal systems of various countries; or he can make an appeal to theory. What would be the best legal system to enact? or, What would be a better Constitution for the United States of America? What has such reasoning in common? In any case, be it historical or theoretic one will set forth a series of propositions which detail the legal system. One does not set forth deductions or decisions which may be reached within any of the systems; that is to present another problem in itself (will decisions be simple, clear, mechanical, penumbral, or impossible?). One makes the claim that any legal system is codifiable, whether it is in fact or not. One can do the same for a moral system, in theory at least. With modern computers it should be an easy task to codify all the moral systems in simple imperative or indicative form, reading out very much like a long form of the Decalogue.

Here begins an interesting experiment which, with the aid of computer technology, could be completed, I believe, in a short while. One would construct his computer to show two bands, or channels, on one screen. One part of the screen would show legal systems; while the other part of the screen would show moral systems. In a rather plain way one would be comparing system against system, in much the same way that one would match up colours in a paint shop, or fix parts of photographs in an Identikit for identifying a police suspect. One would be solving for common, overlapping features. Does a feature from the legal system match up on the screen with a feature from the moral system? If so, then both are the same. If not, then each is different.

The problem begins to become more complicated when we introduce not only *a* moral system, but feed into our computer *all* possible moral systems. One might ask: Can we develop all possible moral systems? If we could, then it implies that moral systems are finite and closed; they can be listed, and then examined, and, in this way, are different from number systems, which do not seem to be finite, but appear only to be bound by rules of self-consistency. What we strive to do, in any case, is to make our claims public. If there is a legal system, then let it be written down; and the same for a moral system.

The legalist who identifies law and morals will look on his screen to see where the two systems, as codified, match up one with the other. One part of the screen might read, "This is *x*" and match up with another part of the screen which would state the same sentence. It would be curious, if I may remark in passing, that moral sentences would be cast in the same sentential form as legal sentences, but it could be possible, as in a Republic composed of religious believers. When we had matched up the two strings of sentences which made up our moral and legal codes, we could coalesce our readings and instruct the computer to give a print-out of one set of sentences only. Just as one might not gain any advantage by possessing two exact telephone directories for the same city, so one would not require two identical print-outs from the computer, one marked *moral*, the other *legal*, if each were identical to the other.

My example might be called the law-moral theory in its simplest and clearest form. Like the right hand and the left hand, each is a member of the same body. There may be little differences. Moral sentences may be written in a slightly simpler or compressed form, or vice versa, from legal sentences. In any case the test would be the same. To moral sentences one would assign a moral predicate, or use a moral adjective to describe the force of the sentences. For legal sentences a moral predicate or moral adjective could be discovered to be the guiding intention for the law. Not only would one have an example of 'a law', but one would have an example of a law 'for a moral purpose'. Like a D.N.A. chain, one strand could not be separated from the other strand without, at the same time, undoing and destroying the complex itself. A legal sentence would always have to contain a moral predicate; if it did not, it could not then be described as a legal sentence.[2] One could make a concession, if he wished to be a soft-hearted law and morals man, that not every moral sentence necessarily had to be, at one and the same time, a legal sentence. Moral sentences (or concepts) would function much like bank accounts to assure the worth of any possible legal sentence which might come into existence. At no time would one fear that he had issued a legal sentence without a requisite deposit of moral sentences in the bank. No overdraft would go morally unsecured.

I admit that this is a very simplistic picture of moral and legal systems. In their simplest form there would exist a one-to-one comparison: there would be one moral system only, and against it would be compared one legal system only. Ideally, there would occur a fusion of the two; or, if not a fusion which was absolute, certainty an embracement so secure that the legal package would be wrapped totally with the moral wrapping paper, with moral paper left over to spare.

But where in the world has such a fusion ever happened? One might reply, in the early Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example. Does that answer the issue? It seems to tell us that a possible case of heaven on earth existed; but it has not answered the problem I have posed. It merely cites an instance where religious and moral beliefs may have been the force of the public order. Our computer experiment would not disallow that possible state-of-affairs; it would only show us that this state-of-affairs was not the final state-of-affairs.

What is the reason for such a claim? I suggest that i rests in the nature of the differences between a moral proposition and a legal proposition. It is quite possible that one proposition may overlap with the other; but that the propositions overlap is not to prove that the propositions, themselves, are the same in every way. Moral propositions spring from beliefs, while legal propositions differ in that their public force is contained in the statement of the propostion itself. I do not believe in legal propositions; I am bound by them, while moral propositions must first have my belief before they can command or compel me.

We pose for ourselves an almost impossible task if we ask, of every piece of statutory legislation, what was its intention? The intention of the statute, or piece of law should be clear to us on its face. For example, if one takes a written instrument, such as the Constitution of the United States of America, one may read the instrument on its face value, and attempt to make decisions on the scope of the instrument over problems which fall under it by appeal to the language of the instrument itself. In this way one claims that the intention of the law rests in the language of the law itself as expressed, sentence by sentence, in that instrument.

On the other hand if we ask what was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, seeking the "real" intention behind the public utterances as codified, we bend ourselves upon a course without end. Should we read all of the correspondence which led up to the drafting, and final adoption, taking every letter every single framer might have written in which reference was made to the debate, and thence the ratification of the Constitution? Which documents will have greater importance than other documents; or will all documents be treated with equal weight? Will we take into accordance possible changes of mind of a framer, even if the change of mind seems to act against his own best interest, or which he later repudiated, even though the Constitution had been adopted? But why should we stop here? Why should we not ask this question of every piece of

Parliamentary legislation, in order to determine the *real* intent of a piece of legislation?

Moral reasoning proceeds from a different set of assumptions than does legal reasoning. One may make a strong claim or a weak claim with regard to moral reasoning. If one makes a strong claim he says something to the effect: I believe that so and so is the case, and what I believe is true. In a sense this is a self-justifying belief, and much religious reasoning depends upon that form of argument. An example of this sort of reasoning, or justification, is that which claims that God revealed himself to man, and that the proof of His revelation is to be found in various biblical stories, themselves dependent upon Him revealing Himself to mankind. Even the strongest theist stops at this point because he wants to preserve a distinction between claims of faith (or of belief) and claims of reason. If one argues that faith, and its propositions, are like sets of mathematical propositions, then one is in danger, as a theist, of reducing faith to reason, and that theists are wont not to perform.

The weak form of moral belief (and I use the word 'weak' as I would of a weak cup of tea) admits that its fundamental propositions, from which other moral deductions derive, are propositions taken on faith, and can be cast in the form of, "I believe that *p* (what '*p*' might be, or indicate) is the case." If the other party does not believe that *p* is the case, it is wrong (even within the language of the believer's moral system itself) to hold the third party bound by the alien set of beliefs. The third party may respect the beliefs of the other, but this is an example of tolerance or civility on the part of one to the other. The strong claim, as during various religious inquisitions, would claim that the disbeliever is, whether he knows it or not, guilty of an offense, and would punish him for not believing. Law has its parallel here in various strict liability statutes, as when one adulterates milk and, as a result, is punished by fine for having sold such adulterated milk even though one was not responsible for the adulteration.[2] Forms of employers' liability, in various master-servant relationships, take the form of penalty by means of strict liability through penalisin the employer (the master) for acts of his employee (th servant). It may be the case that a legal fiction is herewit employed: the law treats the master as if he were liable fo the actions of the servant because the master gains from th employment of the servant, he should, likewise, suffer fault of the servant, reasoning that greater care could have bee taken to retain a servant who would be without fault. But i the case of strict legal liability, whether or not one believe in its worth, one is yet bound by the law which acts in tha fashion. Strict legal liability does not include in its justification that one share in its grounds of belief. It should be recalled that the claim of the strong moral reasoner is tha he holds, as part of his belief, that the other should believe but for some reason does not. In any case he feels that hi moral belief is self-justifying, the self-justification is par of the belief itself. Legal strict liability involves no questio of belief; it is the simple fiat of a constructed legal system.

I had asked at the beginning of this paper, how was on to distinguish a legal proposition from a moral proposition Moral propositions are such that they restrict which actio can be done or foreborne from within a range of actions They restrict by proposing what should or ought to be done but 'should' or 'ought' carry along with their ordinar meaning an added force: there is an imperative force tha such must or must not be done. Just how a moral proposition restricts or guides is itself open to much debate. Som would hold that the very self-consistency of the propositio is a justification of what one may or may not do. If one understands the moral proposition itself, then one know what act he can or cannot do. The rational consistency o moral propositions, it is argued, guarantees the rationa consistency of human actions to which the predicat 'moral' is attached or attributed. Others may argue tha the self-consistency of a proposition about what actions ma be omitted or committed is no more a guarantee of mora truth than the self-consistency of any axiomatised system is the guarantee of the desirability or worth of the system.

One may argue that it is not what the proposition asserts which should be our guide, but what effects or consequences follow from the enactment of the proposition. There is no neat concensus on what constitutes the justification of a moral premise. One may argue, in a final form, that a claim of rationality for moral propositions is a claim not possible to prove, let alone to justify.

If a moral proposition causes us initial difficulties as to assign it to some class, a legal proposition can be just as harrowing. One may hold that a legal proposition is that sentence which compels or directs in some fashion, and has the force of government behind it. Another may assert that a legal proposition compels our belief and adherence because it possesses, as a proposition, a rational consistency to which our minds naturally turn, adapted as the eye is to colour. Blackstone or Burlamaqui, both 18th Century legal theorists, would accept a view which derived law from sets of rational propositions, themselves rationally justified.

Much is made of a democratic society which is not a theocracy, yet which is a polity with binding laws. How can the laws be binding, it may be asked, if, at the same time, the laws are not moral? The question could be turned about and framed in this way: From a plurality of divergent moral systems, how can any one system of civil and criminal law arise?

It is to the latter question which modern legal theorists turn their minds. If a legal system must also be a moral system, then it is a system which is intolerant of beliefs. If a legal system can be subscribed to only because it reinforces one's private moral beliefs, then there is serious doubt if a legal system, as such, could ever arise. The demands of democratic pluralism have forced us to think out and to refine many of our commonsense notions about the scope and claims of legal and moral systems upon each other, as well as upon members of a society. Let me cite two examples. In his Rosenthal Lectures for 1960 Lord Radcliffe tells us that Lord Mansfield was of so fixed a mind that he believed "...that the existence of a moral duty was sufficient groud, without other consideration, for giving lega effect to an actual promise to perform it." Citing *Hawke v. Saunders*, 1 Cowp. 289, 290 (1775), these words of Lor Mansfield appear: "Where a man is under a moral obligation which no court of law or equity can enforce, and promises, the honesty and rectitude of the thing is a consideration."[4] The case was duly answered as to its moral sentiment but mistake at law when the House of Lords, in 1778, in *Rann v. Hughes*, 4 Brown P. C., delivered its judgement in these words: "It is undoubtedly true that every man is by the law of nature bound to fulfil his engagements. It is equally true that the law of this country supplies no means nor affords any remedy, to compel the performance of an agreement made without sufficient consideration."[5]

In some moral system of beliefs it may well be the case that Lord Mansfield's belief worked; or, whether it worked or not, he himself would voluntarily be bound by the force of his moral belief. But it was not the law, and it is not the law; yet we do have a law of contracts. Because a promise given without sufficient consideration is not enforceable at English law does it then follow, if we disagree morally with what is accepted at common law, we are thereby discharged from contractual obligations by force of our moral beliefs? If we returned to our computer screen this would be an instance where the moral and legal systems did not match up; nevertheless, we do have a moral system, and we do have a legal system. Is one less in force because of the variance of the other?

This first example is a mild case. We can still act as practical men and admit that a promise which is not supported by a valid form of consideration is not a contract which is binding at common law. We may hold that a bare promise to act can be admitted to be a valid moral candidate in some moral system, but equally understand that it will not receive social protection by a government. If one breaks his promise, then his own conscience will have to administer punishment, or exact guilt; the state will not. There exists a binding system of contract law independent of one's private moral beliefs. A legal system which has a developed form of contract law and precedents is its own arbiter of what constitutes formal contractual validity. Morally one may abhor the doctrine of *caveat emptor* while legally it is a bona fide part of commercial law. There could as easily exist some other legal system, such as Roman law, which would not follow the "buyer beware" principle, and would also be in accord with some moral system which would eschew our common law practice; nevertheless, the morality of my act does not necessarily entail a subsequent legality. "*A*" may follow upon "*B*"; it need not of necessity.

Although legal fictions were condemned, for the most part, by Bentham, and give moralists migraines, the law functions with the use of legal fictions. Where law and morals have, in the past, conjoined, the law, true to its own identity, has been shown to develop its own methods independent of its moral assumptions. Legal systems to which we accord validity and authority and legitimacy provide us with interesting examples of how independent a legal principle can be from a moral one. For my second example let us turn to Seventeenth Century America.

The Acts of Assembly which were passed in the Colony of Virginia from the year 1662 provide a curious example of how a legal and moral system enmeshed, but how the legal aspect of the fusion developed in its own peculiar fashion. It had been part of the common law requirement for homicide that one had to form a proper intent to commit the crime, 'proper' in this instance meaning necessary element for the commission of an act. We can read in Sir Edward Coke's *Reports* (part 12, [1656]) how a simple, but important, distinction is made between murder and manslaughter:

> "Divers men playing at Bowls at great Marlow in the county of Kent, two of them fell out, and quarrelled the one with the other, and a third man who had not any quarrel, in revenge of his friend, struck the other with a Bowl, of which blow he died. This was held Manslaughter, for this, that it hapned upon a suddain

> motion in revenge of his friend." (Trin 9 Jac. Regi page 87)

The reasoning here is clearly that a sudden, unpremeditat (given proof to, perhaps, by the suddenness of the actio act should not be deemed to constitute the felony of murde Although this is early reasoning about the nature of inte tion, or *mens rea*, the bent is that natural consequences not necessarily merit one description only even though ser ous consequences flow from a rash act. Centuries later, f example, the House of Lords might divide itself on t merit of such a proposition, as it did in the recent murd case *Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions* (1974) 2 A ER 41, holding that certain unintended consequences prove that a murderous intent was present, whether or n an accused admits this, even if not in his own mind.

In 1668 a grand assembly convened by prerogation a James City, in a Virginia colony, during the 21st year o the reign of Charles II. One of the first acts passed was th following, "*An Act about the casual killing of Slaves.*"

> "Whereas the only Law in Force for Punishment o refractory Servants resisting their Masters, Mistresse or Overseer, cannot be inflicted on Negroes, nor th Obstinancy of many of them, by other than violen means suppressed: Be it Enacted and Declared by thi Grand Assembly, and the Authority thereof, that if an Slave resist his Master, or others by his Master's Orde correcting him, and by the Extremity of the Correctio should chance to die, such Death shall not be accounte Felony, but the Master, or that other Person by hi Master appointed to punish him, be acquit from Mole tation, since it cannot be presumed, that prepense Malice which alone makes Murder Felony, should in duce any Man to destroy his own Estate."*

One would hardly say that in 1668 a valid legal system w not in force. It possessed the elements of a legal system the laws were public, promulgated, and enforced. Further more, the laws did not present any outrageous affront t the greater part of the subjects in the community. The act is consistent in its use of a legal fiction: one was not to be assumed to destroy his own property if he disciplined it vigorously. Not much imagination is needed to visualise what horrid abuses could flow from such a piece of legislation; but does the horridness of the legislation make it any less a piece of law?

Those who wish to conjoin law and morals by use of the argument that no legal system can exist unless it also embodies moral premises appear to advance more than they mean with less than they should. It is never clear whether they mean that each and every legal proposition must, at the same time, be a moral proposition, or whether they mean that a legal system (all of its imperative sentences, its statutes, its decisions, its deductions, and such paraphernalia) must, in the broad sense, embody certain broad moral sentiments, such as to do good and avoid evil, and the like. The first premise commits us to an impossible task, while the second commits us to fuziness and a certain type of "good-willism". Neither position, to my mind, satisfactorily resolves the problem(s) in the law and morality debate.

Law, in the wide sense, is concerned with the welfare and order of some society or other. Even Satan, with his legions in Hell, seems to have some kind of law: a possessory claim upon men through their acts and actions, with certain rights and obligations which God must honour. I use the theological case because it seems to be an imaginative model which answers successfully that force of argument which claims that a legal system *necessarily* must embody moral elements. Patently a legal system need not embody any moral system. One can easily construct a legal system which, under Hohfeldian analysis (which would reduce *any* legal system to certain fundamental elements), would not yield a moral predicate or moral element. One need not pursue theological arcanum to state that Satan, as the figure for primordial evilness, is not supposed to have a single redeeming feature in his character: yet he can be thought of as that to whom legal predicates apply.

The goodness or badness of a legal system may b judged in terms of its legal efficiency or inefficiency, i workability, and its purpose. When we introduce a mora criterion we do so at great risk. Which moral criterion sha we employ? Shall we paint the canvas in broad, undefine strokes; or will we be pointillists, examining every part the legal system in an attempt to pass moral judgment upo each part? How will we resolve moral differences betwee differing points of view? Would there be an additiona "moral court" created which, though itself not part of th moral courtroom, would adjudicate between moral suits Would we then have an appeal procedure for the aggrieve parties whereby a final appeal, or an appellate appeal, woul lie to a meta-moral-legal court, itself deemed to exist as neutral party to any controversy? But what of the moralis who would not agree to this procedure? What would we d with the party who faced this final supreme court and said much as John Ehrlichman said to Judge Gesell of the Unite States District Court, Washington, D.C. in the Summer o 1974: "I believe I am the only one who really knows whethe I am guilty and, your Honour, I am innocent of each an every charge."? Judge Gesell had just sentenced Mr. Ehr lichman to a five year term in prison.[7] Would the emotivis or the rationalist, or the natural lawyer, or the utilitarian or the determinist, or the existentialist, or whom would pre vail in winning *the* moral approval which a legal system must have for the approval of a moralist?

What one ought to fear is the prospect of a legal system functioning as if it were also a moral system. One may b the Keeper of the King's Conscience as Lord Chancellor but it is folly for a legal system, as it was with St. Thoma a Becket, to make the Keeper Archbishop of Canterbury. I may salve one's soul; but it destroys freedom of conscienc and liberty of the person. One may judge if the other ha obeyed the law. But how is one to judge — to reach a fina determination correct in its description of the interior mora state of another — that some other person has been mora or not? History is replete with the carnage and victimizatio from legal-moral systems. When a legal system is also the moral system why should there be tolerance? The moral system rests upon private belief, but it can move on like a battering ram mounted on the legal chassis of the state to effect its moral aims. The Jew, the unbeliever, the Catholic or the Protestant, the espouser of an unpopular cause, the member of a minority, the scientist, have at many times through history been victims because their beliefs, or their status, were in opposition to the established moral beliefs in the legal system of the period. If the moral can work through the legal, why should not the legal move just as fiercely to excommunicate or execrate or destroy that person who by force of his own belief stands outside of the moral system which the law promotes? Why should one tolerate the "law-breaker"? Conscience should be the aim of the state, not the aims of the private citizen, if law and morality are one.

But they ought not to be. They should exist as friends, tolerant of differences, but joined by love. This is the case for which I argue.

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NOTES

1. "If citizens be friends, they have no need of justice; but though they be just, they need friendship." Book viii, *Nicomachean Ethics.*
2. This position has been coherently argued in, *English Hamlyn Lectures*, (page 51), Stevens and Son Ltd., 1953.

In the conclusion of his lecture he wrote, "The conclusion which I have therefore reached is that the strength of English Law, from the basic rules of the Constitution to a minor regulation issued by a local authority, depends in large part on the fact that the people of this country recognise that they are under an obligation to obey the law, and that this sense of obligation is based not on force or fear, but o reason, morality, religion, and the inherited tradition of the nation".* I feel that Goodhart is partly righ and party wrong, and I hope to deal with his position i a later paper, for it is a position which, in part, I favour He seemed to be unaware of the difference between legal proposition and a moral proposition, as I hav stated in this paper.

3. A recent example of strict liability is the followin case, now on appeal to the House of Lords: *Tesco Store Ltd. v. Roberts*, (1974), 3 All ER 74, held that the defendants (Tesco) had contravened S 2(1) a of the Foo and Drugs Act 1955 by selling a package of frozen live which, when thawed, proved to be spoiled; but suc spoilage could not have been known to the defendant at the time of sale; furthermore, they claim that the simply sold meat which they had bought from a wholesaler who had frozen the liver in the first phase.
4. Lord Radcliffe, *The Law and its Compass*, (Faber & Faber, 1961), pp. 29-30.
5. A promise on a promise is sufficient consideration as when I promise to pay for which the other promises to sell; or *A* sells me the shoes on my promise to pa for them at a later date.
6. *Acts of Assembly*, London, 1728, printed by John Baskett, copy in the Library of the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn.
7. *International Herald Tribune*, Paris edition, Agust 1st 1974, page one, story by Robert Siner.

THE CONCEPT OF ADHYĀSA AND THE VEDĀNTA OF ŚAṄKARA

I

In the preface to his commentary on the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara brings in the concept of *adhyāsa* as furnishing the clue to an understanding of the philosophy of the upanishads, embodied in what he calls, 'the *Vedānta Vākyas*'.[1] He does not lay any claim to discovery of a 'new' truth, nor does he claim to have expounded a philosophy of his own independent of, and unrelated to, what tradition has regarded as the 'revealed truth' of the scriptures.[2] His greatness consists in presenting the vedāntic truth as absolute non-dualism (*advaita*) against other possible versions of it by means of a masterly interpretation of the texts which is compelling in its logical force. But the fact remains that unlike most philosophies, Śaṅkara does not start with 'first principles', of his own reflective thought, and, thereafter, attempt a logical deduction. It is the method of free and unbridled reflective thinking (and not free imagination)[3] with no anchorage in the intuitions or revelations embodied in the vedānta texts[4] that both Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara, acting upon certain express statements of the upaniṣads themselves unambiguously repudiate.[5] The Śāṅkhya philosophy which Śaṅkara himself regards as a superb rationalistic system and as the strongest rival in the philosophic encounter[6] can by no stretch of imagination be characterised as a system of purely fanciful speculation and on that ground meriting Śaṅkara's condemnation in that context. Now the bare suggestion of Śaṅkara's affiliation to the vedāntic tradition of the upaniṣads as also of his espousal of the revealed authority of the scriptures as an independent and extraordinary source of knowledge (*alaukika pramāṇa*) is treated by some with utmost contempt and is looked upon as inconsistent with Śaṅkara's status as a great philosopher.[7] The argument of these modern exponents of Śaṅkara's philosophy has taken the following direction. Since

Śaṅkara has to be regarded as a great philosopher, he must be understood to be a free and independent thinker unfettered by any tradition.[8] He cannot have accepted, therefore, the scriptural authority as a *pramāṇa*, that is, as an instrument of valid knowledge,[9] not to speak of, as an extraordinary or *alaukika pramāṇa*, impervious and self-dependent, which no conventional *laukika pramāṇa* can either assail or contradict. The bogey of the socalled *śāstrapramāṇa* has to be treated as an illicit and unwarranted imposition, worked upon the purely logical, non-factual and linguistic analysis of Śaṅkara by unenlightened tradition. Or since the expressions, *śāstrapramāṇa*, *āgama*, and *śabda* are found to have been used interchangeably, what Śaṅkara speaks of as an organ of supreme enlightenment and consequently, as a means of liberation, must be *śābdapramāṇa* in the sense of a 'critique of language'[10] currently known in western philosophy as linguistic analysis. Moreover, as Śaṅkara is after all a philosopher, and no philosopher worth the name can take any interest in any 'factual' question regarding the nature of existence and the world of facts which undeniably form the special subject-matter of science, therefore, it follows logically that Śaṅkara could not have evinced any interest in any factual question and an understanding of Śaṅkara in any other light must be sheer misunderstanding.[11] Against such fundamental misrepresentation of Śaṅkara vedānta by tradition and the traditionalists this group of Indian writers have not only voiced their emphatic denunciation but they have also attempted a revision and 're-appraisal' of Śaṅkara's philosophy in their newly discovered light.[12] Since this clamour for re-interpretation of the philosophy of Śaṅkara has acquired some momentum it may not be out of place to give a dispassionate consideration to the above thesis vis-a-vis the traditional interpretation of Śaṅkara and his philosophy.

There is no absolutely settled and, therefore, one single tradition in philosophy. Nor is it philosophically sound to judge merit of a philosopher by reason of his supposed adherence to one particular tradition in philosophy. What philosophy is, or is to be, is an open question. That metaphysical philosophy is nonsense, or that philosophical problems all arise from misuse of language, is only one specific view on the subject. There may be, and have been, other views on the matter. To understand a philosophy and to judge its merit or demerit it is necessary to read it in its own peculiar context and to hold it in the light of the tradition, the point of view, to which it belongs. No praise or blame proceeding from faulty supposition can throw any light upon a philosophical system or its proper appraisal.[13] Śaṅkara is an *Indian* philosopher. In the Indian tradition, philosophy is essentially a view of life and philosophic wisdom consists, not in knowing the world of 'neutral' facts, — its nature as also its laws, but in understanding life as it is given, and in examining the possibility of remoulding and reforming it in the light of what is ascertained as the *truth* about all existence. In this, precisely, lies its specific direction, its orientation towards what is conceived as a supreme end or goal — *parama puruṣārtha*. This is a general characteristic of all systems of Indian philosophy, and the *advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara is the most striking example, and *not* a remarkable *exception*.[14] There is no place for purely theoretic interest in Indian philosophy. The '*atha*' (thereafter) and '*ataḥ*' (for this purpose) are inalienable features of philosophic enquiry in India. Indian philosophy did not aim at mere informative knowledge. It aspired to become *transformative* wisdom. Not that it is non-informative, disinterested or indifferent to the question as to *what is there*. It looks for information in order to *utilise* that knowledge for the purpose of transformation of the person from within with a view to effecting an ideal adjustment to the truth of the situation. This may be looked down upon as a vain-glorious fanciful programme, and wisdom which the word 'philosophy' literally signifies may be interpreted to stand for a critical understanding of some sort, devoid of any ostensible practical aim. But the fact remains that Indian philosophy is *not* a philosophy in that sense. That philosophy has no genuine problems to solve, that all its accredited problems are pseudo-problems—

arising from linguistic confusion, and that the proper fu tion of philosophy consists not in *solving* but only in *resol* *ing* such problems,— 'in showing the fly the way out of t fly-bottle', cannot be meaningfully uttered in the context Indian philosophy. Wittgensteinian wisdom is out of i depth here. In the Indian context, philosophical proble relate to the problems of life, the problems that beset huma existence. Does life have any problem? or can the Wittge steinian magic make them evaporate?

The life we live, looks like an arena of test and tri Man is at war not only with his surroundings, but also wi himself. He is constantly thrown off his balance. This is ev For healthy living, regaining the balance, is indispensab This gives peace. In peace, the person is quite at ease wi and within himself. Man needs peace and rest most of a This, then, can be called the supreme object of his desir his supreme end — *parama puruṣārhta.*[15] Indian philosop in its various schools, and in course of its various theori provides *alternative* planning for realisation of this suprem end. This is its primary objective; all other enquiries a ancillary and are, therefore, of secondary importance. Wi dom consists not in knowing simply, but in knowing how live an ideal life. While reflecting on life, Indian philosop reflects on the varied experiences which life unfolds. analyses these experiences, and in course of such analys also reflects *on*, or postulates *about*, what may be their o jective determinants, on concomitant manifesations. Lo and psychology, epistemology and metaphysics, ethics a religion, even logical grammar and linguistic anaylsis, a commissioned to play their appropriate roles as integr parts of the total enquiry. But none is allowed to outstr its legitimate limit. In its critical reflection on life, in analysis and evaluation of the varied experiences which embodies, in the rational ascertainment of the truth of ex tence which can fulfil its practical demand, Indian phi sophy like other brands of philosophy pursuing their spec programmes, has employed a wide variety of methods. The are Indian systems which accept guidance of extreme pos vistic logic which insists on direct verifiability in term of the person's own immediate perceptual experience as the test of truth. There are, again, systems which follow the logic of inferential reasoning and some that follow postulational logic[16] of primary concepts and first principles, and admit indirect verifiability, not necessarily in term of direct experience, but in term of fruitful deductions, predictability, and even logical conceivability as a method of proof. There are, again, some sysetms which follow a logic which accepts guidance of extraordinary 'impersonal' experiences and intuitions (*āgamānusāri tarka*)[17] *in addition to*, and not in illegitimate and wholesale suppersession of, the testimony of ordinary experience — some sort of a synthetic logic of adjutsment and reconciliation. This is not a logic of exclusion, not a logic which accords recognition to only one type of facts, only one kind of experiences. It accords to each type a place within its legitimate sphere and shows how opposition and even contradiction in or among them may disappear once we take a total view of things. This spirit of accommodation, recognition of the presence of opposites in a total view is reflected in these well-known lines of the upaniṣads: 'where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another, there one smells another, there one hears another. . .where, verily, everything has become just one self, then whereby and whom would one smell. . . .then whereby and whom would one understand. . .Lo, whereby would one understand the understander?'[18]

Logic *is not*, and cannot function in any clime, as an organ of knowledge, as a pramāṇa. It is only a method of proof or disproof. In this function it has unconditionally to fall back upon 'given' knowledge of some kind since it has its roots deeply laid in that ground. Logic originates from experience, and can work *logically* only under the guidance of 'given' knowledge or experience. It does not drop from the clouds, nor can it exercise itself in vacuum. This simple truth, unfortunately, is very often lost sight of. Indian philosophy does not commit this mistake. In the distinction drawn between *jñāna* and *jñapti*,[19] it keeps in clear prominence this distinction between a pramāṇa (an organ of knowledge) and *prāmāṇya parīkṣā* (process of proof). It is also to be clearly noted that Indian logic does not admit sanctity of purely formal inference. The *vyāpti* which roughly corresponds to the major premise of western syllogism is a factual premise, supported by an illustration from the world of facts and experience which is admitted and accepted by the proponent and the opponent alike. In the face of this, it is idle to talk about an Indian philosopher's raising, or indulging in, a purely formal, and in that sense, a purely logical question as distinguished from a factual question.[20]

Generally speaking, western philosophy accords no recognition to pramāṇas other than perception and inference. The same is not true of quite a large number of Indian systems. Some of them, besides admitting other pramāṇas accord a place of honour to testimony or authority. This has laid them open to the charge of dogmatism from many quarters. Something must, therefore, be said in defence of this Indian standpoint. No man is born of himself, nor is he born in an uninhabited globe. Man is born as a social animal and three-parts of all he knows come from social contact and, therefore, from authority. It is true that much of that which we receive from that source is subject to correction by the knowledge we acquire from personal experience as also by inference. But the same can also be said about such individual experience and what is inferred on that foundation. Human knowledge is an organic whole in which the parts modify and correct each other in order to present a coherent system. As contradiction forces correction and reformation of the system, so also non-contradiction or absence of any *actual* clash and conflict gives to it an apparent imperviousness and stability. Bare possibility of contradiction in future does not stand in the way of our acceptance of it as knowledge and truth any more than the bare possibility of indigestion leads us to abstention from all food and nutrition. Corrigibility is not, therefore, any special disadvantage of that kind of knowledge which we derive from others. All the same, the source of this kind of indirect knowledge must be authentic and reliable. This led the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas to define *śabda* or authoritative utterance as *āpta vākya*,[21] that is, sentence originating from a person of unimpeachable veracity (*yathārtha vaktā*). This authority is, again, distinguished by the schools into ordinary or human (*laukika*) and *vaidika* or scriptural. None of the two forms is regarded self-evident (*svataḥ pramāṇa*) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as they do not accept self-validity of any form of knowledge whatsoever. But when we come to the orthodox systems like the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta the case becomes different. These two schools regard all knowledge as self-valid, in the sense that the conditions determining the origin of knowledge determine its validity or truth also, and that a knowledge does not require to be validated or confirmed by some other knowledge or by extraneous reference in order to be accepted as a true knowledge. That knowledge once accepted as true may be subsequently falsified is admitted by them. But this relates, they argue, to the process of invalidation or falsification of one knowledge by another and so extraneous reference (*parataḥ*), and not to validation. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntists commonly make, however, a *special case* for the *revealed* scriptural authority. This is absolutely infallible. The vedic statements are not liable for correction either in themselves, or by anything that our usual *pramāṇas*, the *laukika pramāṇas*, such as, perception, inference, etc., can deliver/or testify. The ground of this special treatment shown to the vedic and upaniṣadic statements is not, however, temperamental or psychological. It is logical. These statements are to be treated as infallible since they are reveal and being so, are impersonal[22] (*apauruṣeya*). They do not have any authorship, human or divine. Although the truths which they embody get expression, or manifest themselves, in personal consciousness, they are as themselve, transpersonal, and are not subject to any personal, subjective and psychological factors of the mind in which they are revealed. They are not revealed in the sesse of being communicated by any superior authority. No god and no enlightened liberated soul is their origin. They do not have any origin. These truths are eternal (*nitya*). These are truth-experiences which are not subject to the limitation of space, time and causality. They are universal and always. They are not like Plato's universals the 'stuff' of the intelligible world and the 'forms' of the sensible. They are not objectivities. Nor are they subjective experiences. They are trans-subjective and trans-objective. Although they are revealed in human consciousness, in the intuitions of sages and seers, they are *self-revealed*. Personal consciousnesses 'have' them when they open up to them, but do not create or manufacture them. They are truths, spiritual and extraordinary, and therefore, the statements or verbal forms in which they are expressed constitute an *alaulika* or extraordinary pramāṇa. Unfolding transcendental truths as they do, they do not state anything which belongs to the order of things known through the laulika or ordinary pramāṇas. Therefore, the very possibility of their coming into conflict with the *laukika pramāṇas* is completely ruled out.[23].

That which is *impersonal* cannot be the conventional cannot be supposed to have any human origin. On the same ground, it cannot also be regarded as *traditional*. That the good and the pleasant cannot be identical, that ignorance and knowledge belong to opposite poles, that duties, if attended to in a detached way, cannot give rise to any infatuation, are truths limited not to any particular tradition. These are neither old nor new; these are truths for all ages. Illustrations may be multiplied limitlessly. Nor can these be regarded as sectarian dogmas. By holding on to them we pass beyond ourselves, beyond our normal limitations defined by personal prejudices, and sectarian beliefs. These impose no limitations; they remove all limitations. The fear voiced by some loudly, and entertained by some others among our westernised contemporaries in somewhat docile and apologetic fashion, that any emphasis on Śaṅkara's affiliation to the upaniṣadic trend is likely to act as a censure and to prove him to be a dogmatist, a traditionailst and as sectarian seems to be groundless.[24]

The simple admission of testimony or authority as one of the *pramāṇas* cannot render a philosophy open to the charge of traditionalism or dogmatism. That charge can be sustained only if the system admitting testimony as a *pramāṇa* admits also its personal origin and, at the same time, regards it as absolutely infallible and sacrosanct. Such a loop-hole is not present in any of the classical systems of Indian philosophy. Systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya, while regarding testimony in either of its two forms — *laukika* and *vaidika* as *āpta-vākya*, make its acceptance conditional upon its being amenable to reason or logical understanding.[25] The Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā, although subscribing to the view of self-validity of all forms of knowledge at the origin, do not regard testimony or authority of *every* form as absolutely infallible. That claim of absolute incorrigibility and, therefore, of absolute infallibility is defended in respect of the *revealed* testimony of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads only, on the ground of their being *apauruṣeya* (impersonal) and *nitya* (eternal). Even, this sanctity does not attach to their verbal forms precisely, since as verbal statements they are subject to the rules of cogent interpretation, such as, *upakrama*, *upasaṁhāra*, *abhyāsa*, *apūrvatā*, *phala*, *arthavāda* and *upapatti*,[26] but to the themes, to the *truths* they convey. Discrepancy or conflict in the instruction if any, will have to be taken, not as discrepancy or conflict among the truth-experiences they embody, but in their verbal forms only, and this is to be remedied by internal reference only, by the law of inner harmony (*samanvaya*), and not by any external test, such as, reference to any of the laukika *pramāṇas*.

The reason is that the *śruti* texts constitute an *alaukika pramāṇa* in so far as they deal with a subject-matter *not* accessible to any ordinary means of knowledge.[27] The extraordinary *pramāṇa* and the ordinary *pramāṇas* do not have any common subject-matter or concurrent jurisdiction.[28] That being so, in any disputation regarding transcendental matters, no *laukika pramāṇa*, can function as a referee. As there can be no interference on the part of a laukika pramāṇa in transcendental matters, so also in phenomena matters, within the legitimate jurisdiction of the laukik pramāṇas, the śrutis cannot exercise any prerogati powers. This is brought out clearly in the view defended b both the Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā that Śrutis cannot b *anuvādaka* of what is accessible to any ordinary means o knowledge, since that would render them redundant and useless (*anarthaka*). It is in this context that the observation such as, even one thousand scriptures cannot render a earthen pot into a piece of cloth — a statement placed b Vācaspati in the mouth of the pūrvapakṣa (opponent) o Śaṅkara in the introductory remarks of his glossary o Śaṅkara's *adhyāsa bhāṣya* becomes significant.[29] Śaṅkara' own comment in the Gīta bhāṣya that even hundreds o śrutis declaring fire to be cold or dark (aprakāśa) canno constitute a legitimate source of valid knowledge[30] will hav to be read in a similar context. In this, Śaṅkara, temperamentally non-coercive as he is in his approach, makes certain concessions to pūrvapakṣa in order to delineate th special province in which *śrutipramāṇa* or *śāstrapramāṇ* enjoys absolute unchallengeability. This and similar observations made by Śaṅkara and his classical commentators ar *not* Śaṅkara's concluding remarks in this connection are recorded in the third paragraph of his commentary on B.S 2.1.6, where Śaṅkara says "āgamamātrasamadhigamya eva tu ayaṁ artho, dharmavat", that is, oneness of reality being a transcendental theme, has to be grasped in the light o the śruti, the extraordinary pramāṇa, although it is a existential content (*pariniṣṭhita*) and not like dharma a content that is yet to be (*bhavya*). The *laukika pramāṇas* i such context can only have supporting role, but no role i opposition.[34] Missing his mark and direction in the maze o Śaṅkara's argument, another scholar characterises Śaṅkara's attitudes in this connection as ambivalent, and comes out with the shocking discovery that in the event of a clash with other means of valid knowledge, śruti has (necessarily) to be taken in a secondary sense, and that śruti, according to Śaṅkara, 'in the sense of authority, is merely subordinate to other means of valid knowledge'.[35] Poor Śaṅkara is not allowed to speak for himself!

Both the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta regard the śrutis as *apauruṣeya* (without a personal origin) and in that sense, *revealed*. Unlike *āptavākya* which is testimony originating from some reliable person and which for that reason forms part of *laukika pramāṇas*, the revealed authority of the śrutis constitutes an extraordinary (*alaukika*) *pramāṇa*. The śrutis relate to transcendental matters which are not accessible to any ordinary *pramāṇa*. Negatively speaking, they do not inform or enjoin in matters decidable by the ordinary *pramāṇas*. Had not this been the case, had they imparted any knowledge or instruction which is also available through our conventional *laukika pramāṇas*, they would simply become repetitional (*anuvādaka*) and for that reason, useless and redundant (*anarthaka*). Taking his cue from this classical distinction, a modern scholar brought up in the tradition of contemporary analytic philosophy, may argue that since the laukika *pramāṇas* deal with all the 'facts' or 'states of affair' that can be there, so the *śāstra pramāṇa*, the other name of which is *śabdapramāṇa*, must be dealing with formal linguistic questions or logical questions as distinguished from factual questions. Under the spell of an alien tradition, he may overlook what the relevant texts actually mean or signify; he may even venture to read his own thoughts into the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta and come out with the declaration that the *śabdapramāṇa* of these systems is nothing but a critique of language and that tradition has committed a glaring and unpardonable mistake by taking it in esoteric and quixotic sense.[36] The Mīmāṁsā, the most conservative and extremist among the vedic systems, for example, although it leaves the realm of the *actual*, of existential things (*bhūtavastu*) and accomplished facts (*pariniṣpanna viṣaya*) to be treated and decided by the *laukika pramāṇas*, harnesses the extraordinary *śāstrapramāṇa* and *śāstravākyas* to the nonsensuous world of *dharma* (merits or spiritual excellences) which is yet to emerge as a consequence of performances of enjoined actions (*Karma*) and abstention from prohibited actions. Taking the reveale testimony of the *śrutis* in this sense, the Mīmāṁsā regard all vedic statements principally as injunctive (*codanā*) i their import and advises that those which are not apparently so, will have to be taken as ancillary to the main tren in some way or other.[37] The Vedānta, on the other hand makes a distinction between the earlier part of the śruti called the Karmakāṇḍa and the later part which is calle the jñānakāṇḍa. The upaniṣads, principally, constitute thi latter part, the subject-matter of which is Brahman, th Absolute Reality — which though existential, self-complet and unnegatable, is not for that reason, accessible to an ordinary means of knowledge. Not being an extremist, th Vedānta school, however, concedes the Mīmāṁsā contention in part — that the earlier part of the Vedas is ritualistic, and that *dharma* is their object-matter. But th Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, in all their schools, commonl admit the absolute infallibility and, therefore, incorrigibility of the revealed authority of śrutis in their special jurisdictions.

But the Mīmāṁsā has one advantage which th Vedānta, in any of its various schools, does not share. Th sphere of non-sensuous *dharma* and *adharma* being characteristically different from the world of sensuous facts an objects, the 'ought-to-be' or 'yet-to-be' (bhavya) bein radically different from that *which is* or *exists* (*bhūta* amity between the *laukika* and the *alaukika pramāṇas* ca be preserved on the principle of non-interference. This not so easy of accomplishment as far as the Vedānta is concerned. Even inside the province of the transcendental non-sensuous, the Vedānta, besides admitting the *bhavya* of th Mīmāṁsā in the ritualistic part of the Vedas, installs a existential reality, such as, Brahman, as the *viṣaya* (subject matter) of the jñānakāṇḍa of the Vedas, called the upaniṣads. So, there are *two* kinds of existential reality, th sensuous and the non-sensuous, and so, the question arises how to provide an amicable settlement between them. Moreover, and this is more fundamental, the Vedānta, not only means the end-part of the Vedas but also the culmination and *consummation* of all knowledge — the *final* and *absolute* knowledge. Such being the case, the Vedānta has not only to reconcile all forms of knowledge, including the knowledge of *dharma*,[38] and provide a rational basis of their explanation, but has also to meet and satisfy the rival claims of the two forms of existential reality — the *given* sensuous and the 'discoverable' but transcendental non-sensuous. Moreover, the Vedānta, as the supreme and the final wisdom about all existence, is not to be *one* philosophy among a host of infinite other forms, but it has to justify its claim and title to absolute knowledge, to be *the* philosophy paramount. *It is to achieve this singular purpose, it should be clearly noted, that the Vedānta refuses to be guided by the free logic of conceptual speculation* adopted by the other schools, *and opts for the guidance of revealed truths, of non-sensuous intuitions (cf. Kant), and the logic which is inherent in them.* Only by this means, the non-finality, the undecidedness (*apratiṣṭhitatva*) and the consequent insatiety (*avimokṣa*) of the logic of speculative reason can be escaped.[39] The revealed truths which are not 'ideas of reason',[40] not also the elements of any conceptual frame-work[41] manipulated by speculative reason, are expected to provide that stable basis which an absolutistic philosophy badly needs.[42] As impersonal intuitions, that is, as deliveries of an 'impersonal' and extraordinary pramāṇa, these have claim to absolute incorrigibility, limited as they are not in space and time, affected as they are not by psychological conditions and personal factors of the mind in which they are revealed. With us initially, they are no doubt, the intelligibles of faith but they are also capable of being interpreted, elaborated and defended by thought,[43] and it is this kind of thought or thinking which can be called '*āgamānusāri tarka*'.[44] The śrutis themselves call this reflective and analytical logical process 'manana' and Śaṅkara has given it the name '*Vākyārthavicāraṇā*'.[45] This 'manana' or 'vākyārthavicāraṇā' constitutes the middle and the intermediate stage of the whole philosophical process which is to render the 'indirect contents' of śravaṇa into 'direct contents' of '*anu-*

bhava, avagati, or of what vācaspati calls '*tattvasākṣātkār* through 'nididhyāsana' (meditation), culminating in wha Śaṅkara names as *adhyavasāna*[16] (elimination of ignorance). This logical interpretation of the vedānta vākya (vedānta vākyārthavicāraṇā) is not itself any knowledge. I is interpretation of the '*sense*' or *meaning* of the vedānt *vākyas cogently* and *harmoniously* as a means to the indire knowledge of what is meant by them. Once the sense i *understood*, the *vākyas* become the pramāṇa, i.e., means o knowledge of the meant.

Cuttack (Orissa) S. K. Chattopadhya

NOTES

1. The purpose of the vedāntasūtras, says Śaṅkara, is t knit together the various vedānta vākyas in the forn of a garland — 'vedāntavākya-kusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṇāṁ. He expounds his vedānta philosophy b quoting and explaining relevant vedānta, vākyas a illustrations in connection with his interpretation of th sūtras — 'vedānta vākyāni hi sūtrairudāhṛtya vicār yanté. B.S.B., 1.1.2. This disproves the contention o Dr. G. Misra that Śaṅkar had nothing to do with th śruti texts as revealed authority, that his śabdapramāṇa does not mean śrutipramāṇa, as misunderstood by one and all before him, but that śabdapramāṇ means a critique of the structure and function of language in the way Russell and Wittgenstein have done See his Analytical studies in Indian Philosophica Problems, pp. 1-14, also G. Nayak — A reappraisal of the Vedānta of Śaṅkarācārya, Ind. Phil. Quarterly New Series Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65-66.
2. Messrs Misra and Nayak trace his greatness to his complete independence of the tradition of the śrutipramāṇa, to his unorthodoxy that dismisses such traditional fads as 'revealed truth', 'intuition', 'mysticism and practical fulfilment such as liberation in 'spiritua

realisation'. Liberation that Śaṅkara speaks of is emancipation from faulty linguistic habits and enjoying intellectual delight in the knowledge of the logic of language. *Ibid.*, Misra, pp. 1-14, Nayak, pp. 58, 60-61.

3. G. Nayak, *Ibid.*, p. 64 — Utprekṣā and śuṣkatarka condemned by Śaṅkara is 'imagination' according to Nayak.
4. B.S. 2.1.11 and S.B. 2.1.6.
5. See Śaṅkara's quotations of śruti texts condemning logic unsupported by śrutis as means of supreme knowledge. B.S.B. II. 1, sutras 1-6 and 11.
6. B.S.B. 2.1.12, also 2.1.3.
7. Messrs Misra and Nayak. Analytical Studies — Logical Foundation of Śaṅkar Vedānta also Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 65-67.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. G. Misra — Analytical Studies, p. 9. Here, he raises a funny point. He asks how could tradition in Indian philosophy regard śabda as having anything to do with authority or scripture as a source of valid knowledge when in a text like the Vedānta Paribhāṣā all that one can find in the Chapter on Śabdapramāṇa is discussion on rules of syntax? Evidently, he does not see the difference between the problem of *meaning* of sentences and that of *knowledge*, that is, what significant sentences seek to *inform* or communicate. This, indeed, is missing the wood in the trees. Does perception as a pramāṇa stand for analysis of perception?
11. G. Misra — 'Śaṅkara's doctrine of adhyāsa. Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3, 1975, p. 229 — See also Nayak's paper referred to already.
12. Dr. Misra advocates revision, Dr. Nayak — reappraisal.
13. This has been shown to be the case with both Dr. Misra and Dr. Nayak towards the end of this paper.
14. See Nayak's paper, pp. 56-61.
15. This is the general characetristic of 'mokṣa' as understood by the systems. Quotations are too numerous to be reproduced.

16. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya are examples on th point.
17. The Mīmāṃsā and particularly the vedānta are i stances on the point.
18. Br. Āraṇyak. 2.4.14.
19. See D. M. Datta — Six ways of knowing, p. 329.
20. See the Criticisms of Drs. Misra and Nayak that trad tion has done the greatest disservice by showing Śa kara as dealing with factual questions which are n philosophic questions at all as per contemporary tren of western philosophy. They have undertaken to sa vage Indian philosophers out of such pitfalls as sel appointed guardians.
21. Tarkasaṁgraha, Ch. IV, 'āptavākyaḥ śabdaḥ, āptas Yathārthavaktā..
22. According to the Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā no impe fection or blemishes can vitiate the 'impersonal', ind pendent as it is of a person's disposition, training a cultural affiliation.
23. Elaborately treated in Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta liter ture. See subsequent explanation attempted in th essay.
24. See Misra and Nayak — Ibid. (writings already r ferred).
25. The Nyāya and the Sāṅkhya follow this attitude. (Nyāya theory of prāmāṇya. The Sāṅkhya insists ('yuktimatvacanaṁ' Cf. Aniruddhavṛtti, i. 26.
26. See vivaraṇaprameya saṁgraha (Bengail Ed.) M. M. P. N. Tarkabhuṣaṇa, pp. 9-13.
27. B.S.B. 2.1.1. 'na ca atīndriyānarthan śrutimantare kascidupalabhata iti śakyam śambhāvayituṁ, nimit bhāvāt.'
28. Otherwise, there would be charges of 'ānarthakya and 'anuvādakatvāṁ'.
29. Vācaspati — Tīkaprarambha. 'nahyāgamāḥ sahas mapi Ghatam patayītumiśate'.
30. Gītābhāṣya, Ch. 18, Śloka 66.
31. G. C. Nayak evidently misreads the situation when his paper he comments that 'wherever śruti comes

clash with other means of valid knowledge Śaṅkara suggests that it be taken in a secondary sense', that śruti in the sense of authority, is merely subordinate to other means of valid knowledge, Ibid., p. 66. Where clear-cut distinction of spheres has been made, it is idle or playful to talk about a *virodha.*

32. Prof. W. S. Barlingay seems not to go through all the connected sentences in his quotation of the passage from Śaṅkara's bhāṣya on śloka 66, ch. 18 of the Gītā. See his paper on Śaṅkara in Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3, p. 275. Dr. Nayak exhibits the very same impatience when in his caricature of his professor he suggests that in the passage quoted by him from B.S.B. 1.1.1. either his professor or Śaṅkara himself rested on an argument proving self-evident character of the self. This is misreading the situation. The point at issue was whether Ātman was *prasiddha* or *aprasiddha* since in either case there was no necessity of Brahmajijñāsā. The argument quoted by Dr. Nayak represennts the popular view-point. Śaṅkara's own view in the context is that although known *superficially* (as that argument shows) it is not known in its true essence—*tad viśeṣam prati vipratipatteḥ.* So a close enquiry is needed to ascertain its true nature. In the passage cited by him from B.S.B. 1.1.4 he leaves out that part specially on which poor A. C. Mukherjee wanted to show him the force of Śaṅkara's argument — 'tatsākṣitvena pratyuktatvāt'. And in respect of this part Ayer's argument or Nayak's own against Descartes' 'cogito' would be spurious and irrelevant. See Nayak's paper pp. 54-55.

33. B.S.B. 2.1.4. The offender here is Prof. W. S. Barlingay, Ibid., p. 275, 288, note no. 8. But it may be added in fairness to him that his argument has not so materially affecetd Śaṅkara's view as Nayak's has done.

34. Cf. 'Tadarthagrahaṇadārdhyāya Vedāntavākyāvirodhi anumānamapi pramāṇam bhavati na nivāryate; śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyābhyupetatvāt. S.B. 1.1.2, also 'Virodhe tu anapekṣam syāt asati hyamumanāni' quoted by Śaṅkara from pramāṇalakṣana in S.B. 2.1.1.

35. Cf. The above note 34 with Nayak's discovery, Ibi p. 66.
36. G. Misra — Analytical studies etc. pp. 1-14; G. Nayak 'Śaṅkara has been misunderstood by one and all in far as they have taken him to have discovered so new fact, albeit of a different kind. His was not a fa tual discovery...', Ibid., p. 54, pp. 66-68.
37. 'Āmanāyasya Kriyarthatvāt ānarthakyamatadarthā aṁ', M.S. 1.2.1 and 'vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutya thena vidhināṁ syuḥ' M.S. 12.7.
38. From the opposition emphasized by Śaṅkara betwe 'bhavya dharma' and 'bhūta-vastutā' of Brahma (B.S. 1.1.1, 1.1.2) as also between jñāna and karma in B.S. 1.1.4, a confusion has arisen in many quarters that, a cording to Śaṅkara, dharma is no object of knowled This is a palpable mistake. Vastutantratā of jñāna is n equivalent to bhūtavastuviṣayatā. Nor is it correct interpret Śaṅkara's 'pramāṇam tu yathā — bhūtavast viṣayaṁ' (B.S.B. 1.1.4) as meaning 'prmāṇam tu bhūt vastu-viṣayaṁ'. See my paper 'vastutantra, codan tantra and Puruṣavyāpārtantra'. Śaṅkara does not de prāmāṇya of vedic statements in the Karmakāṇḍ There the object of knowledge is an 'ought' — in jñān kāṇḍa it is an eternally accomplished fact. Śaṅka himself says "Bhavyaśca dharmó *jijñāsyo* na jñānakā asti puruṣavyāpāratantravāt'. Ya hi codanā dharmas lakṣanaṁ sa svaviṣaye nijuñjānaiva puruṣam *avavodh yati*, brahmacodanā tu puruṣam avavodhayati eva kev lam'. S.B. 1.1.1. This shows dharma also as an object knowledge although here the object is not an accom plished fact, but a value or merit yet to be acquired.
39. B.S. 2.1.11. 'Tarkāpratisthānadapyanyathānumeyami cet' evamapyavimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ.
40. Cf. Kant — Transendental Dialectic.
41. G. Misra — His paper in Ind. Phil. Quarterly, Vol. I No. 3, p. 229.
42. It is to provide that absolute basis for knowledge of reality not accessible to ordinary pramāṇa that instea of depending on reasoning, Śaṅkara brings in the testi

mony of the 'revealed truths' of the śrutis. 'Ekarūpeṇa hyavasthito yo'rthaḥ loke tadviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ samyak jñānamityucyaté, yatharagniruṣṇa iti. Tatraivaṁ sati samyagjñāne puruṣāṇām vipratipattiranupapannā, Tarkajñānāntu anyonyavirodhāt prasiddha vipratipattiḥ, S.B. 2.1.11. It is really unfortunate that this remarkable passage supporting revealed truths of śrutis as furnishing absolute basis for transcendental knowledge is misread and misniterpreted to support the claim of sensuous perception alone as providing basis for vastutantra jñāna.

43. Cf. K. C. Bhattacharyya — Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 65.
44. B.S.B. 2.1.11 last sentence, also 2.1.6 'śrutyanugrhita eva hyatra tarkonubhavāngatvenāśriyate'.
45. B.S.B. 1.1.2.
46. B.S.B. 1.1.2. 'Adhyavasāna' may mean either ascerment (niścayajñāna) or elimination of the hindrance of ignorance. The second meaning is more appropriate and is adopted by vācaspati.

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CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT : SOME CONSIDERATION

I. Introduction

For this paper, I am going to assume that history is not merely a chronicle of events (and it is doubtful if even a chronicle of events can be merely a chronicle of events), and that it involves an understanding of what has happened. Any such understanding of events presupposes an understanding of the nature of man and society—either implicitly or explicitly. Differences in the understanding of the nature of man and society produce different accounts of the events of the same time and place. (I am not referring to the differences in personal background and temperament which might produce such differences given the same understanding of the nature of man and society; nor am I concerned with the fact that the differences in background and temperament affect the choice of a particular understanding of the nature of man and society.) I want to concern myself with a particular kind of difference in two understanding of history. In the light of this, I consider the role of consensus and conflict in a society.

This could have been done by undertaking a detailed examination of a case which illustrates the kind of difference in understanding that I am going to consider. For various reasons, I have not been able to do this. I have tried to overcome this shortcoming by beginning with a reference to a case-study which might clarify some of the points I make in the paper in an abstract manner. The case-study considers the differences in understanding and reactions of Gandhiji and Ambedkar to the problem of untouchability. Some of the main points are presented in the next section.

After this I briefly present two models of man and society and their bearing on our understanding of history. One model views man and society in terms of the mutual interaction and determination of several factors—the dominance of any factor is not a matter of principle, but only a temporary empirical phenomenon. The other model views man and society in terms of the dominance of one factor or another which mainly determines other factors and makes man and society what they are. In the next section I consider some problems of the use of these models. On the basis of these considerations, I suggest that the more fundamental conflict is between the comprehensive and partial models rather than between consensus and conflict as methods of dealing with problems and point out the relation of the two models to the theme of consensus and conflict.

II

The case-study : Untouchability and the different presuppositions of Gandhi and Ambedkar.

In a paper I wrote some time ago (Dissent, protest and Reform : Some conceptual considerations—in Dissent, Protest and Reform in Indian Civilization, 1977, Indian Institute of Advanced study, Simla) I have studied the presuppositions of Gandhi and Ambedkar in their understanding and tackling of the problem of untouchability. I have argued there that Gandhiji was not concerned with only the economic, political and social position of the untouchables; he was also concerned with their moral and spiritual life. Further, Gandhi was not concerned only with all the aspects of the life of the Harijans, he was also concerned with all the aspects of life of the Caste Hindus and the non-Hindus. As against this Ambedkar was concerned with the economic, political and social life of the Harijans and not with the moral and religious aspects of their lives; and he was concenred with the life of the Harijans and not with that of the Caste Hindus. In the reactions, Ambedkar was vehement, but Gandhi was firm; so far as fight is concerned Gandhi was also ready to fight. However, Ambedkar was impatient to see the lot of the Harijan improved, whereas Gandhi was keen on dealing with problems such that further problems, equally or more difficult, were not created.

It would be worthwhile to go into the details of how this affected their understanding, the consequences of their actions and their vision of the future.

III

Two Models of Understanding of Man and Society :

In this section I briefly sketch two models of understanding of Man and Society. They are importantly different but related. I present these models in the framework of *puruṣārthas*—the goals of man : *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mōkṣa*. I do this for many reasons. Among them are : this understanding of man represents the traditional understanding of man which is not absent from our present-day life. However, what is more important, it is a comprehensive understanding of man capable of systematic use in the understanding of man and society.

The understanding of man in terms of *puruṣārthas* raises many questions such as : What is the nature of these goals? Are these the only possible goals ? etc. However, for our purposes it is not necessary to go into these questions. But we must note a few points :

(*a*) The *puruṣārthas* are a group of interacting factors in a matrix; and the goal is to attain not only *mokṣa* but all the goals together in an integrated manner.

(*b*) It is important to note some relationships between the attainment of different goals. For this purpose, let us order the goals in an increasing order of importance—*artha*, *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*. It is possible, though not necessary, that an individual may pursue any goal of lesser importance—say *artha* and neglect a goal of higher importance. But a person who pursues a goal of higher importance, say *mokṣa*, must include the attainment of all the other lower goals—say *artha*, *kāma* and *dharma*. The pattern of integration of the goals varies from person to person combining the goals in many ways.

(*c*) Given these goals of the individual, we can consider the goals of the society. (This is an unsatisfactory way of putting things, because the goals of the individual presuppose the goals of the society and vice-versa.) A broad description of the goals of the society would be that it seeks to facilitate the realisation of the individual's goals. It need not be emphasised that facilitation does not mean attainment of the goals.

(*d*) The facilitation of the attainment of the goals does not mean the same thing in respect of the different goals. In respect of *artha*, *kāma* and *dharma* (in the attainment of *artha* and *kāma* and one aspect of *dharma*) the role of the society is direct; that is, the role of the society is direct in the integration of the pursuit of these goals by the members of the community. In respect of *dharma*

> (in so far as it is related to the attainment of *mokṣa*) and *mokṣa*, the role of the society is indirect, i.e. the role of the society is indirect in the integration of the pursuit of the goals in the individual himself. However, it is necessary that the society should so organise itself that the pursuit of a goal—say, *artha*—does not by its manner or by its hardships or its ease make it too difficult to attain the moral or the religious goal. Equally, of course, the pursuit of the moral or regligious life should not make the attainment of the material goals of the community too difficult.

However, it is a point of considerable importance that this facilitation can be made not for the individuals as such—their differences are too many and too detailed—but for individuals as members of groups. Here too, society does not consider all possible groups and their claims—for example, until very recently, the homosexuals were not recognized as a group. However, the recognised groups would cover all the individuals, though not perhaps in all their aspects. In this framework, the individual was supposed to take care of his own problems. (Incidentally, this has a bearing on the understanding of *sarvodaya*. If it is understood as well-being of all the groups rather than that of all the individuals, it gives a different orientation to questions of social policy.)

The Second Model : As we had said earlier, the second model also uses the framewrok of *puruṣārthas*. It also accepts that there is interrelationship between these goals. However, it gives a predominant role to a particular factor so that it largely, if not wholly, determines the pursuit of the various goals by the members of the community.

This basic importance given to a particular factor must be distinguished from the importance given to a particular factor for different reasons. For example, at a particular time, in particular circumstances, a particular factor—economic, technological—may be very important on account of significant changes. In these circumstances, to give special attention to a particular factor will not be incompatible with the first model, or again, a historian may be interested in a particular aspect of the life of the community.

This also will not be incompatible with the acceptance of the first model. What is incompatible with the first model is the determining role assigned to one factor generally and universally.

Given this kind of understanding of man and society, our view of the history of the society would be different from the one given to us by the first model. It will direct the attention of the individual or the society or both to the attainment of a particular goal. If the importance is given to the moral or religious goal, the facilitating role of the institutions will be forgotten; and if the importance is given to the material goals, the institutions will be given a determining role rather than a facilitating role; and the role of the individual will be forgotten.

IV

The Two Models and their Application :

In this section, I consider some problems in the use of these models and some tentative applications of the models.

1. In the account of the models, there is as important confusion which needs to be cleared up. It is not at all clear whether the goals or the predominance of a particular goal represents a particular situation or it represents an ideal. What do the models say—that such and such is the state of affairs or that such and such ought to be the state of affairs?

The manner of putting the question suggests that the account has to be understood as one or the other. However, I think that this is to misunderstand the nature of the models. Each model claim is to represent man and society as they are—in a state of health. If they are not in a state of health, then they are sick—in a state of aberration; and they ought to be restored to health. In this context, it is wrong to make a sharp contrast between "is" and "ought".

2. But now the question will be : who decides what is health? Who decides which of the two models represents health? Is this a matter of personal choice ? Or are there criteria by means of which we could decide in favour of one or the other ?

One of the criteria suggested might be that the true account of health may be distinguished from the false account by considering which of the two leads us to understand and deal with the situations. However, such an answer reveals only a further question—what is it to deal with a situation ? In a certain sense of the term, both the models will enable one to deal with the situation. (Let us remember that both Gandhi and Ambedkar dealt with the situation.) And both the ways may have their limitations and their merits.

The disadvantage of the comprehensive model is that it makes action difficult; but it has the advantage of being thorough. The advantage of the partial model is that action is easier, however it is not thorough. It deals with only a particular aspect of the problem and therefore it is likely that further problems might arise. It seems therefore that what is good in theory is not so good in practice, or what is good in practice is not so good in theory. But this only means that we must be wrong in our view either of what is good theory or of what is good practice. I am going to assume that the comprehensive model gives us both good theory and good practice. The limitations of practice are only temporary. The partial model is bad both in theory and practice. The advantages of practice are only apparent and temporary. (Though I have said that I am assuming this, the considerations in the next section will show that considerations can be advanced in favour of this assumption.)

V

The Two Models and Consensus and Conflict :

How are these two models of the understanding of society related to the theme of consensus and conflict ? In order to answer this question, I should like to distinguish between two ways in which the concepts of consensus and conflict may be understood. In one of the ways, they refer to the mode of settling a conflict. In consensus, an agreement is arrived at though the nature of the agreement could vary greatly. In conflict, a solution to a dispute is sought by fighting it out—legally, in parliament etc. But consensus and conflict represent two different modes of understanding society. In consensus mode of understanding, a dispute or a problem is understood in terms of all the interests and of all the groups. In conflict mode of understanding, a dispute or a problem is understood in terms of a particular interest and of a particular group. The former mode emphasises co-operation, the latter mode conflict.

One might say that the consensus mode of understanding may lead to consensus method, and the conflict mode of understanding to conflict method; but there is no necessary relationship between the modes of understanding and the methods bearing the corresponding names. The method of settling a problem will depend on the tradition and circumstances of the society, whatever the mode of the understanding of the problem.

If I am right, our emphasis should not be so much on the method, but on the mode of understanding. We must go in for consensus as a mode of understanding rather than conflict. We must prefer consensus rather than conflict also as a method. But if necessary, conflict in the service of consensus understanding, is to be preferred to consensus in favour of the conflict mode of understanding.

VI

Some Concluding Remarks :

1. If the distinction between the two models in terms of health and disease is accepted, the criteria in terms of which we judge of the progress of a society will be altered. We would not judge of the progress of a society in terms only of a particular aspect of life.

2. In the light of the considerations presented here, I believe it is plausible to suggest that a particular misunderstanding was an important factor in the decline of the Hindus : the misunderstanding being that if an individual can be indifferent to *artha* and *kāma* in the pursuit of *mokṣa*, a society also can be.

3. It will also alter the understanding of our present problems and their solutions.*

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NOTES

* I am greatful to Dr. D.K. Raghavendra Rao for his comments and suggestions which have helped me in reducing the unclarities and mistakes of commission and omission in the paper.

ON RUSSELL'S INTERPRETATION OF CAUSAL THEORY

Russell seeks to establish the causal theory of perception in his two books : 1. *Problems of Philosophy*[1] and 2. *The analysis of Matter*.[2] The causal theory states that our knowledge of an external object is indirect to the extent that it is based on the percepts produced by the object in our mind in the form of sense-data, which are immediately apprehended by acquaintance. Russell says that "the real table if there is one, is not immediately known".[3] What we know immediately are the sense-data, from which we infer the existence of the table. To him, sense-data are "the things that are immediately known in sensation : such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, roughness and so on."[4] He gives the name 'sensation' to such experience which has immediate awareness of the things (like colours, shapes etc.). So, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour. But, the colour itself is not a sensation; it is only a sense-datum.

If we want to know anything about the table, we can know it only by means of the sense-data like brown colour, oblong shape etc. We are not sure that the table is sense-data or that the sense-data are the properties of the table. Thus, though the sense-data themselves do not constitute the object, they are indespensable factors for the perception of an object.

While we are perceiving the table, we are not doubting the colour or shape of the table but only about the object; whether there is such an object called table. What the senses immediately tell us is not the truth about the object but the truth about the sense-data. According to Russell, the sense-data themselves are neither true nor false. But they lead us to have two kinds of self-evident truths of perception and in the ultimate analysis, these two would become one. The first truth asserts the existence of sense-datum. When we see a patch of red we say that 'there is such-and-such a patch of red'. We are assuming the existence of red colour, 'there is that'. The second truth includes an analysis. When we see a round patch of red we judge that 'the patch of red is round'. This judgement analyses the datum into colour and shape and recombines them as 'the red colour is round in shape'.

The knowledge of the table as a physical object is known through the acquaintance with the sense-data, so it is called by Russell as 'knowledge by description'.[5] By descritption he means that the table is the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data.[6]

It appears that Russell's position with regard to the knowledge of the object is paradoxical. When we say that the object is not known directly but sense-data are apprehended directly, we are involved in difficulties. We are certain about the existence of sense-data and not about the physical object which is not immediately known. It is difficult to say whether the table has any brown colour or not, since we know only the appearance of the table. We cannot say whether any colour or shape belongs to the table, since Russell himself says that "a colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls on the table". If it is so, then the question arises whether the real object is ever known. To this, Russell's answer would be that we know the real object by description. For example, the table is the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data. The existence of real table is inferred from the existence of sense-data with which we are acquainted directly and the table is the cause of this acquaintance.

In the 'Analysis of Matter' Russell states that the causal theory of perception is pre-supposed by science. The process which is involved in perceiving the table is: the process which is started from the table "traversing the space between the table and the eye, changing its character when it reaches the eye, changing its character again in the optic nerve and the brain, and finally producing the event"[8] which we call 'seeing the table'. Thus, the perception of an object depends upon the external causes, without which we cannot infer the existence of an object.

Russell accepts the belief in simple causal laws and in the existence of external objects. This belief makes us to infer the unperceived percepts and the percepts of the other men. In cases like where others do practically the same thing as we are doing, for example, applaud when the curtain goes down, Russell says, "....we have a sharp stimulus, followed by a very definite act, and our perception of our own act is closely similar to a number of other perceptions which we have at the same time".[9] We infer that all the other people have had perceptions which are similar to our own.

We see others acting as we should act in response to a certain kind of stimulus which however we are not experiencing at the moment. For this Russell gives the following example.[10] Suppose you are a short person in a crowd and are trying to see something which is being exhibited on a screen. You hear a burst of cheering but you cannot see anything. If you manage to perceive the exhibition even a few moments later, it is natural for you to think that the others cheered because they saw the same exhibition. Their perception is not identical with yours because it occurred earlier. Hence, it can be said that if the stimulus to their cheering was a perception analogous to your subsequent perception, then they had perception which you could not perceive. This experience leads us to conclude that "the percepts you call other people are associated with, percepts which you do not have, but which are like those you would have if you were in thier place."[11] Though we do not see our face, our head and our back, yet we experience these by our tactual sensation and we imagine what a movement of an invisible part of our body ought to look like. This is a process of becoming acquainted with groups of visual sensations which correspond to similar tactual sensations. The causal theory of perception involves two types of inference. Firstly, from our perceived percepts we infer the unperceived percepts of other people. Secondly, we construct the physical object from both perceived and unperceived percepts. The causal theory does not claim certainty. It is regarded as a good inductive inference, since we are knowing the objects by accepting the other man's percepts and the similarity of that to our own percepts.

In the 'Problems of Philosophy' the pre-reflective belief in the existence of external objects is simple and direct. According to Russell "this belief is ready in ourselves as soon as we begin to reflect....and is called an instinctive belief.. ..".[12]. In 'The Analysis of Matter' Russell justifies this belief by basing it on the scientific method. The relation between the sense-data and the object is not a direct and simple relation. It is a complex one, since it includes two processes. Firstly, from the perceived percepts we infer the unexperienced percepts and secondly, these percepts lead us to assume a belief in the existence of the external world.

In the '*Problems of Philosophy*' Russell seeks to develop a philosophical analysis of the nature of our belief in the existence of independent physical objects. The adequacy of this philosophical analysis can be questioned. This would lead us to a discussion of the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description and the associated theory of descriptions. In '*The Analysis of Matter*' on the other hand, where the causal theory is sought to be justified as a legitimate hypothesis, the questions would be different : 1. Is there not a circularity involved in basing a theory of perception on scientific methods when science itself seems to pre-suppose the common sense view? 2. Would the causal theory explain adequately our knowledge of independent physical objects ? 3. In what sense is it legitimate to call our belief in the existence of independent object, an inference ?

But with this difference, we find that, in both sources the theory of knowledge is explained as structural. We know only the structure of the object but not the object as it is.

Though the causal theory enjoys the support of science, it seems to have its own defects. It is a self-refuting theory, since it accepts the facts on which it is based, are unknowable. When we perceive only the percepts and not the physical objects, then we cannot have the knowledge of the various causal processes to which the argument refers. The causal theory ends in a circular argument when we say that this theory is based on scientific facts; the percepts are known through scientific facts and these scientific facts are in turn based on percepts. The causal theory establishes the existence of physical objects while pre-supposing precisely their existence in its account of the origin of percepts in us. When we say that perception involves causal process we are not saying that what is perceived is causally dependent upon the external object. If we say so, then we are confusing the perception with what is perceived. Therefore, the causes of our perception are the objects which are having the ontological status since they are things-in-themeselves. So, we know only an 'appearance' of an object.

According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is a direct cognitive relation where we are directly aware of the object itself without any intermediary process of inference or any knowledge of truths. The cognitive relation is not meant to be that sort of relation which constitutes judgement but it is that sort of relation which constitutes presentation. Knowledge by description refers to an object by means of the characteristics which that object possesses 'the-so-and-so'. Any description known to be truly applicable to a particular must "involve some reference to a particular with which we are acquainted".[13] Here is one way in which Russell's statements can be interpreted : "all our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon acquaintance as its foundation, and, that....knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance."[14] Therefore, all knowledge should be reduced to knowledge by acquaintance.

Thus, the theory of knowledge by description is fundamentally based on the theory of knowledge by acquaintance without which we cannot know the percepts. The theory of perception can be explained properly when we have direct acquaintance with the percepts and the dierect relation between the knower and the known. When we have these two, then it is possible to know the object by description.

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NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, 'Problems of Philosophy', Oxford University Press, London, 1962.
2. Bertrand Russell, 'The Analysis of Matter', George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959.
3. Bertrand Russell, 'Problems of Philosophy', Oxford University Press, London, 1962, p. 11.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
8. Bertrand Russell, 'The Analysis of Matter', George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, p. 197.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
12. Bertrand Russell, 'Problems of Philosophy', Oxford University Press, London, 1962, p. 24.
13. Enger R. E. and Denonn, L.E., 'The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell', Simon and Schuster, N.Y. 1961, Part V, p. 26.
14. *Ibid.*, Part V, pp. 218, 223.

MERLEAU-PONTY ON LANGUAGE AND MEANING

I

In his *Phenomenology of Perception* Maurice Merleau-Ponty outlined a theory of language and meaning which goes diametrically against the commonly accepted view in this respect. We generally think that our language expresses a thought which already exists in our mind before it is so expressed. We thus make a distinction between language and its meaning, sign and its significance. But Merleau-Ponty, in keeping with his theory of *conscience incarnée*, has emphasised the bodily character of thought and held accordingly that it cannot exist independently of language* or some such sign in which it is expressed. To him, thought means thought embodied in an expression, whether it is articulated or not. And it is to this view on the part of Merleau-Ponty that the title of the present paper refers.

II

Merleau-Ponty begins his discussion on language with an attack upon the two positions taken up respectively by 'empiricism' and 'intellectualism' in this regard. Neither of these two positions, he claimed, has been able to give a satisfactory explanation of language and meaning. The empiricists, emphasising as they do the physiological substructures of linguistic expression, identify language with verbal images. But then the case of a 'speaking subject'[1] would remain inexplicable, for this view denies that speech is an action which manifests the internal possibilities of a subject. The subject will then speak the way the lamp becomes incandescent; because, in speaking, he will be undergoing a flux of words set in motion by certain innervations without any intention on his part to speak. And this apart, the verbal image theory is flatly contradicted by a very common psychological phenomenon, namely, that of aphasia. In such a case as this what is lacking on the part of the patient is not a certain stock of verbal images but a way of using them. For, the aphasic patient cannot speak gratuitously although he can when demanded by a concrete situation. Behind every word, then, there is discernible an attitude or a function of speech that conditions it. The empirical theory thus breaks down on the difference between the word as an instrument and the word as disinterested denomination. Intellectualists, on the other hand, regard language as an empty envelope or a mere external clothing of some internal thought. "The word", as Merleau-Ponty said, "is only the external sign of internal recognition which could take placewithout it and to which it makes no contribution."[2] But here again, as in the case of empiricists, there is no "speaking subject", but only a thinking one. Both the views, though apparently different, are however one in holding that the word *has* no significance,[3] for in both the cases the word becomes something distinct from its meaning. In one case the word, as a verbal image, is merely a psychic or physiological phenomenon roused by some stimuli or states of mind according to the laws of neurology or that of association; in another it is an external adventitious sign of a thought which is distinct from it. Hence, "the conception of verbal behaviour, as a use of acquisition of either 'image', or 'thought' type overlooks the fact that there is a concerte subject speaking, that expression is essentially an activity and that, most of all, the *word* itself has *meaning*".[4]

III

Against this contention that the word has no significance, Merleau-Ponty places his own theory of language and meaning by adding a very cryptic counterclaim, namely, that *the word has a meaning*[5]. What this means is that while the empiricist and the intellectualist alike make a distinction between the physical word (*lemot*) and its meaning, Merleau-Ponty wants to abolish this distinction. Our language, according to him, does not express a thought already possessed; rather, thought is inextricably bound up with language such that there will be no thought or no meaning whatsoever if there is no language or speech or some such device used in speech. He, however, admits that at first sight the opposite view seems to be true because thought has a universal and external value whereas language is only historical and changing in character. But he suggests that if we look deep into the matter the so-called universality and eternality of thought would disappear. Merleau-Ponty has offered several arguments to substantiate his position. If our speech translates a readymade thought or a thought which is internally complete, why, he asks, thought tends towards expression as to its own completion. A thought is not complete until it is expressed. Why, again, does the most familiar thing appear indeterminate so long as we cannot remember its name ? This is simply due, says Merleau-Ponty, to the fact that thought does not and cannot exist apart from linguistic or any such symbols. Then again, our thought is found to remain vague and shadowy so long as the verbal expression of it remains vague and imperfect. Anyone who cannot formulate his thought very clearly is supposed to be lacking in a perfect understanding of the problem concerned. Further, to know something is to be able to express it in words. A person cannot, in fact, be said to know something if he is unable to express it verbally. Merleau-Ponty turns also to the pre-scientific thinking to show that the word is not an empty container of an already accomplished thought but is itself a power that puts the matter expressed into existence. This primitive consciousness remains so much forceful in certain cases that the mere mention of word seems to bring about the thing spoken of. Thus the cab drivers dislike to hear their passengers mention punctured tubes as if the very term would give rise to the puncture itself.[6]

Lastly, it is only by means of language that we can assimilate a thought which was first unknown to us. If thought were not present in the words themselves we could not appropriate to ourselves the thought of an author through a study of his works. It is also an accepted fact that the listener receives thought from speech itself. So, Merleau-Ponty concludes, "a thought limited to existing for itself, independently of the constraints of speech and communication, would no sooner appear than it would sink into the unconscious, which means that it would not exist even for itself."[7] Thought and language, the sense and the word, are inseparable, both "are intervolved, the sense being held within the word, and word being the external existence of the sense."[8]

But does it not seem somewhat surprising to suppose that the meaning of a language remains contained within the language itself such that it cannot even have any independence over the language in which it is couched ? Do we not express the same meaning in different languages ? The unusual character of his position, Merleau-Ponty tells us, would no longer remain if we consider what happens in other forms of expression used by the body.

Merleau-Ponty here observes that linguistic expression is on the same level as the musical or the aesthetic expressions. The meaning of a music cannot be separated from the sounds of which it is composed; nor can the meaning of a painting be divorced from the canvas and colours.[9] Now if, in these cases, the meaning of an expression cannot exist apart from the materials themselves of expression, why should, he asks, the case be different in respect of linguistic expression ? In fact, "it is no different, despite what may appear to be the case, with expression of thoughts in speech."[10]

Word is both the presence of thought in the phenomenal world and its body, Merleau-Ponty has at this point compared our speech to gesture and its meaning to the structure of the world outlined by it. "The spoken word", he says "is a genuine gesture and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its".[11]

In other words, Merleau-Ponty is in favour of a *gestural* theory of expression. In the gesture he sees a paradigm of what a *sign* is. The meaning expressed in and by a gesture is strictly inseparable from it because the gesture is the body of this meaning.

Here, however, one thing need be noted. We generally think that the same meaning or the same state of mind, anger, for example, can be expressed by different gestures and so the relation between a gesture and its meaning is not one of inseparability but one which is purely arbitrary. The indissoluble unity between a gesture and its meaning seems to be unfounded. Merleau-Ponty, however is not ready to accept this view regarding the relation between a gesture and its meaning. According to him, difference in the gesture institutes a parallel difference in the meaning expressed therein. "The difference", as he puts it, "of behaviour corresponds to a difference in the emotions themselves".[12] Different gestures can never, according to him, express the absolutely same meaning; the same gesture cannot express different meanings on different occasions either. Similar, Merleau-Ponty thinks, is the case with thought and the language in which it is expressed. One and the same thought cannot be expressed in different ways or in different languages. Neither can the same language or speech express different thoughts in different contexts. Hence the question of the translation of same thought or same meaning in different languages becomes indeed a problem. And Merleau-Ponty is led, by the nature of his analysis, to hold that "the full meaning of a language is never translatable into another."[13]

The eternal and universal character of thought, its independence over language or speech, Merleau-Ponty categorically points out, stems from our failure to distinguish between the two primary dimensions of speech or language. These two dimensions of speech are what he calls *parole parlante* and *parole parlée*, the '*speaking word*' and the '*spoken word*' respectively. The spoken word or the second order expression is one which, after coming into existence, becomes the general possession of linguistic community.

In this sense word or speech is an institution which has been established through repeated use by the different members of linguistic group. This secondary expression which is used generation after generation by different individuals must, however, have some origin. The 'spoken word', before being a common possession, must have been spoken for the first time. Thus the secondary expression or the '*spoken word*' refers back to the '*speaking word*' or the authentic speech which formulates somethings for the first time. This 'speaking word' is the original speech which brings meaning into existence[14] and makes the word say what has not been said before. As an example of this originating speech, Merleau-Ponty cites the case of the child uttering its first word, of the lover revealing his first feelings, of the 'first man who spoke' or of the writer and philosopher who reawaken primordial experience anterior to all traditions".[15] It is in this level of original speech where man superimposes on the given world the world according to man, that the true character of speech and language is revealed. Language once constituted sheds its obscurity gradually through social communication and thus becomes quite obvious to us. The meaning of this constituted expression can be endlessly reiterated and that too, by any one of a linguistic community. In this way there arises in us the impression that the expressed meaning has an eternal character, which, however, will appear as a contingent fact if we look back to its origin. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "it loses sight of itself as a contingent fact and takes to resting upon itself; this is what provides us with the ideal of thought without words; whereas the idea of music without sounds is ridiculous."[16] Thus it is obvious that' speaking word' or 'the authentic speech' is the place where meaning comes into existence through speech such that meaning cannot be divorced from speech nor can speech from meaning. Speech at this level is not an expression of meaning already accomplished, because it is the source of that meaning; it is because of constituted speech, which we silently recall to ourselves that we believe in a thought which exists for itself and prior to expression. But "this supposed silence is alive with words, this inner life is an inner language."[17]

IV

We are now, I think, in a position to consider whether Merleau-Ponty's view on language is at all justifiable. His exposition is not very clear and he shifts his position freely from *lesmots* to *les paroles* without caring much for his reader. But here I shall touch only upon the principal aspects of his theory without going into these intricate details.

We have seen from our discussion above that Merleau-Ponty regards speech as a gesture and ultimately bases his theory upon the character of speech as a *parole parlante*. The question before us is whether speech has all the characteristics of gestures. It is indeed true that the meaning of gesture which is nothing other than the world outlined by it, cannot be divorced from the gesture itself and if language or speech be a gesture, its meaning cannot likewise be separated from it. But, one can legitimately ask, is speech really a gesture ? It seems at first sight, however, that speech and gesture have very different characters. Thus an emotion e.g. anger, is conspicusous in the gesture itself but the meaning of language is not so directly manifest in the language. As a matter of fact, communications through gestures are much easier than those through language. This is because gestures are natural signs, and language is a conventional and arbitrary sign of thought. The existence of a number of languages lends plausibility to this view.

Merleau-Ponty here invokes the genetic perspective of language to show that language is equally natural. He holds that all conventions are later developments which presuppose an original system of expression. Thus if we look at the "first attempts at language in the emotional gesticulation" of man, we shall leave behind us all conventions, viz. the phonological laws, the rules of syntax and the like, and arrive at an original system of expression where language does not seem arbitrary. In this realm of original speech it would not appear entirely arbitrary to call night by the word 'nuit' if we use *lumiére* for light. Merleau-Ponty, however, admits, that if we consider the second-order expression and not the authentic or original speech, the verbal form does appear arbitrary. But here too the form in question would not look arbitrary if the emotional aspect of any language, or what he calls its '*gestural sense*', be taken into consideration. From this standpoint, he said, different languages are but different ways of singing the world.

Again, the supposed natural character of gesture is not natural either. Thus the Japanese, for example, smiles in anger. Hence "it is no more natural and no less conventional, to shout in anger or to kiss in love than to call table a table".[18]

But still the case does not stand because there is at least one more obvious difference between speech and gesture that defies solution. And Merleau-Ponty is constrained to admit this, namely, that whereas we can speak about speeches, there is no gesture about gestures or painting about painting. As he puts it, " the fact remains that the expressive process in the case of speech can be indefinitely reiterated, that it is possible to speak about speeches whereas it is impossible to paint about painting,.... "[19]

This means that language can be used to mean its referents as also to speak of itself, but gesture or painting can refer only to the world it delineates but never to itself. In other words, the celebrated use-mention distinction is applicable only to language or speech but not to gesture. But then can we identify language with gesture ? And we have already seen that, according to Merleau-Ponty, same language cannot be used to express different thoughts. If this is right, then Merleau-Ponty cannot consistently maintain that speech can be taken to refer to itself and also to indicate the world meant by it. The use-mention distinction cannot thus be accommodated within the framework of his theory of language.

Here Merleau-Ponty again turns to the distinction between original speech and second-order expression just to restrict the scope of his assertion that language is a gesture. According to him, the use-mention distinction, though applicable to second-order speech, does not hold good in the case of original or authentic speech. Thus, according to him, only original speech is a gesture. To show that original speech is a genuine gesture, that like gesture, the use-mention distinction does not apply to it, Merleau-Ponty marshals all the support he can in his favour by comparing original speech to such artistic expression as music, painting and the like. Painting refers to what has been painted and not to itself. Similarly, he thinks, originating speech which for the first time brings a thought into existence, means the world indicated by it, but it can never be taken to mean itself.

In the constituted speech, then, a clear distinction can be drawn between a talk about languages and a talk about their referents, but no such distinction is possible as regards original speech. The statements about languages and the statements about their referents are two very different classes of statements so far as the constituted speech is concerned. But in original speech they do not form distinct classes. Here statements about language and their rules, are not clearly distinguishable from the statements about their truths. Hence questions of truth, reference, consistency and all these will have meaning in original speech very different from that in constituted speech.[20]

But then, can we describe the realm of original speech by means of constituted or secondary speech which has a language pattern very different from that of original speech ? A very pertinent question indeed. To describe the realm of original speech in terms of secondary speech seems indefensible and, indeed, a self-defeating enterprise because truth, meaning, validity etc. spoken of by secondary speech as pertaining to originating speech would not be what they actually are in the latter. The originating speech would then run the risk of being given a distorted look. Messrs Michael Kulman and Charles Taylor thus question Merleau-Ponty's ability to describe the realm of original speech in pre-objective language.[21] That Merleau-Ponty has attached great importance to this level is amply clear. He said, "our view of man will remain superficial so long as we fail to go back to that origin, so long as we fail to find, beneath the chatter of words, the primordial silence, and as long as we do not describe the action which breaks this silence".[22] But how can this silence be described linguistically ? If a proper description of this realm is to be given at all, it must be in terms of originary language but this, on Merleau-

Ponty's own admission, is not possible. There can be no originary speech about originary speech, it being a genuine gesture. Thus the task suggested by Merleau-Ponty in respect of language seems to be bogged down in an imbroglio.

Merleau-Ponty's theory, as we have already seen, is founded upon an inseparable unity of thought and word, meaning and the sign-vehicle, which has, however, been advocated also by Saussure. The theory takes its cue from Merleau-Ponty's distinction between original speech and secondary speech.

Beneath the level of secondary speech which renders a thought already acquired and is translatable, there remains a primitive level of meaning incarnated in the phonemic patterns, primordial melody and intonation destinctive of each language. To Merleau-Ponty this level of meaning is existentially prior to, and more fundamental than, the translatable conceptual thought. Merleau-Ponty's primary concern, in the field of language, is with this level of meaning to which, perhaps, no philosopher has paid any attention. The clearness of language stands out from this dark soil and it is here that the meaning and language are inseparable. Despite the difficulties noted above, it is true that language analysis would remain incomplete unless this primitive level of meaning, where the "use of our bodies and their natural powers of vocal gesticulation for purposes that transcend them, namely, to mean, express, and understand the world as humanly comprehensible", is investigated. "Merleau-Ponty's attitude toward language is quite idiosyncratic for a philosopher " no doubt, but, as James M. Edie admits, "in this, he is extremely original."[23]

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NOTES

*The term 'language' is used here in a most comprehensive sense to include words, speeches, written languages and all linguistic symbols.

1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Trans. Colin Smith, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962 p. 174 (Hereafter quoted as *PhP*)
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 176–77.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
4. John F. Bannan, *The Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Harcourt Brace and World Inc. 1967, p. 81.
5. *PhP*, p. 177.
6. R. C. Kwant, *The Penomenological Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty*, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburg, 1963, pp. 51–52.
7. *PhP*, p. 177.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 389, pp. 182–83.
10. *Ibid.*, p.183.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 178, n, 389.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 179, n.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
20. R. Schmitt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. *XIX*, March 1966, pp. 514–15.
21. Michael Kulman and Charles Taylor, The Pre-Objective World, *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. *XII*, Sept. 1958, pp. 108–32.
22. *PhP*, p. 184.
23. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language* Trans. H. J. Silverman, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1973, p. *XVII*.

UNIVERSALITY OF METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

1. It is generally argued that since all philosophical traditions in the world grapple with the same fundamental problems of, for instance, reality, knowledge, existence etc., one cannot and should not attempt at a cultural compartmentalisation of philosophy into Indian or Western or Chinese etc. It is thus said that philosophy is universalistic, i.e., beyond the influence of cultural boundaries. It is further held by some thinkers that philosophy is universal in the same sense in which science is universal,—after all, there cannot be Indian or European or Chinese science. We will investigate the following issues here : Can philosophy be universalistic ? Can it be universalistic in the same sense in which, say, natural science is universalistic ? Can there be different methodologies of philosophical observation ?

In what follows, we argue that philosophy is not and cannot be universal in the same sense in which science is universal. We further argue that Western philosophy is a distinct example of individualistic philosophy—where what matters more is the manner in which an individual philosopher 'obeserves' his experience—and with its present methodologies of observation it can never become universalistic. However, Indian philosophy, contrarily, is an example of a universalistic philosophy but universalistic in quite a different, and, rather, *novel* sense.

2. What are the criteria of universality ?

Well, firstly, there should be a universal *object of inquiry*. That is an object which is not characterised by social, cultural, or geographical boundaries. By object I mean that which can be *named*. It could be the name of a *class*. It may turn out to be an illusion, a mere spuriousness, but it could '*turn out*' only after the inquiry is complete and then only can we deny its being an object. Science *is that* which has a universal object of inquiry. In natural science the object of inquiry is Nature or Matter. Social and life science inquire about social and animate objects respectively. Philosophy also has an object of inquiry, or, rather, *objects* of inquiry. These could be said to be Reality, Nature, Matter, Knowledge, Truth etc. There is a distinction between the methods which science and philosophy employ for their inquiry about the objects. Firstly, science accepts the principle of necessity of some assumptions at some stage but philosophy tends not to assume anything. For instance, science would assume the ontology of the object of inquiry or it would assume a definite duality between the object of inquiry and the inquirer. However, philosophy would, and must, question *all* assumptions. Secondly, science has a definite, strict method of observation. In science, the objects can be experimented upon although they may not necessarily be confinable to laboratory conditions (e.g. astronomical objects). However, in philosophy there is no rigid criterion of observation. One could 'observe' one's own experiences; one could experiment upon one's own experiences. One could observe natural phenomena as one *likes* to observe them, or, rather, as one's perception permits him to do and arrive at *one's own* conclusions. Thus, another general criterion of universality is that there must be a universal methodology of inquiry such as in science. This universal methodology could, however, be possible only when the object is transcultural. Methodology, generally speaking, can have two aspects : methodology of logicising (or theorising) and methodology of observation. By methodology of logicising we mean that in saying what one wants to say certain logical rules must be followed and *all* logical fallacies must be avoided. In logicising, one *hypothesises* about the nature of object or any of its phenomena. This hypothesising does involve *intuition* and *speculation* but these work only in so far as one is searching for a *novelty* in arranging the facts, in patterning them—, in "seeing" facts in a novel way. Logicisation involves deducing implications from a given set of facts—given perhaps by experimentation—and a given set of *relations* between these facts—the laws. This is dependent on experience and/or on *given level* of logicisation. This can be called the "principle of logical consistency". There is the "principle of intersubjective interpretation" which relates to experimentation in science. By experimentation we mean that the implications of the hypothesis are carefully and *systematically* experienced. *Precise* experience with the help of instruments is called experimentation. Generally, there is a limit to which precision can be achieved with the help of instruments and thus *precision* is carefully defined in science. Experimentation is nothing but more refined experience of novel facts which have been deduced by the hypothesis from facts already given by *earlier* experience.

Therefore this aspect of methodology must necessarily remain tied down to experience and what was hypothesised must be "confirmed" by *new* experience. Further, this experience is generally treated as *reliable* or *valid* only when it is *repetition invariant* and *subject invariant*. That is, whatever number of times a particular experience is repeated—with the help of instruments, laboratory conditions etc., it must give *almost* the same data; and whoever does it, it must remain invariant. I say *almost the same* because all minor fluctuations and variations are ignored and this aspect is very important.

3. How do life science and social science try to meet these general criteria of universality ? We will not go into a detailed discussion of this issue here since it may take us beyond our main concern. However, a brief discussion will not be out of place. In life science, the object of inquiry is animate object, i.e., the object possessing *life* which is characterised by reproduction, adaptation etc. A tree, for example, is not a natural object—in any case, not in the sense in which, say, a stone is. Trees possess life since they grow, become old, suffer from diseases, die. reproduce etc. All the aspects of animate objects which concern life science are universalistic, free from cultural specificities.

In social science, the object of inquiry is the social object and its central charateristics perhaps are possession of *voluntary action* and *living in groups*. *Active man in society* is a social object. There can be a sociology of animals, birds, bees and ants from this standpoint. I am sure development of such a sociology can benefit us human beings a great deal. Social science concerns itself with *value-possessing* social object since the voluntary action of this social object already presupposes the possession of a *value*. Voluntary action is *guided* by values that the social object seeks. But values are generally considered to be *cultural*. Does it mean, then, that social science is not universalistic ? Or, that there can be universal values which guide the action of social object ? From this standpoint, a truly universal social science would be only that which inquires about *action-possessing* social objects *all* of which are guided by the *same* universal values. In such a social science further details of the process of seeking of these values by individuals as well as variations around these universal values would be merely corollaries. This issue, however, still remains unresolved and in fact it is a paradox which is central to modern social science.

4. Can philosophy be universalistic in the same sense in which science is universalistic ? Take western philosophy as a case for consideration. It has universal objects of inquiry. In its methodology of logicising it strictly adheres to the Principle of Logical Consistency. But, obviously, it completely violates the principle of intersubjective interpretation. And, amazingly, this violation of a single principle seems to turn it into an individualistic philosophy. Let us see how. The *universal* objects of western philosophical inquiry are not within the ambit of reliable experience, i.e., they are neither repitition invariant nor subject invariant. In western philosophy each philosopher has *his own unique* experience to tell about the objects of inquiry. In fact, we should put forward a much stronger thesis : that this experience *must necessarily be unique*, the one with a stamp of individuality which is not merely a novel rearrangement of facts as in science. Western philosophical logicisation does not conform to any invariant experience. Every philopsopher must have his own story to tell *about* the objects of inquiry. Experience is purely at an intimately private level and facts are arranged purely according to the individual likings and tastes, if not whims, and these need not conform to any universal experiential test so long as they satisfy the principle of logical consistency. Everybody "sees" the object in his own way. It all depends on how an individual philosopher experiences the object of inquiry and how he likes to arrange the facts. In fact, this seems to me to be the central feature of western philosophy and it can be called the 'doctrine of unique experience'.

It can be said : all experiences, in the last analysis, are individual experiences, whether in science or in philosophy. Experiences are essentially private and whether they tally with those of others is purely hypothetical. One can agree with the universality of object of inquiry but this does not necessitate the acceptance of universality of experience. This argument would, however, emphasise the individuality of experience which could only be a position taken by some representative of western philosophy—thus, it would restrengthen the individualistic character of western philosophy. We should avoid the issue of whether experience could be universalistic or it must necessarily be individualistic because this is not central to our main theme.

On the other hand, it could be said that the criterion of universality of object itself is purely a *nominal* criterion since we cannot presumably ascribe any ontological status to any such object. Thus, Reality, Truth etc. are only *names* that are universal and one cannot say whether any such concrete object of experience exists. But we hold that even these names, when uttered and their meanings understood, should generate *similar*, or, to some degree *same*, experiences (just as in sciences) if the criterion of universality is to be satisfied. If it be said that they cannot, then, again, individualistic feature would be reinforced. One could put forward even a third argument, which ultimately seems to lead to scepticism. That all experiments in science after all derive their validity from *agreement* between various experiencers. If some experiencers *decide* to *disagree* about some *observed data*, then they could do so and thus, again, the reliability of experiment would depend on individuals that decide to or decide not to agree. This issue seems very profound in science and brings in *ethical* and *moral* problems—problems of *intellectual honesty*. This, again, seems to reinforce a kind of individualistic feature—but this time not only in philosophy but also in science. It seems to me that neither western philosophy nor western science as it is, can overcome this problem—this has to be accepted as a basic assumption. But we will doscover, in the following section, how this problem is tackled —and very ingeniously—in Indian philosophy.

5. Does Indian philosophy meet the criteria of universality of science ? What is its methodology ?

Just as *matter* is the universal object of inquiry of science, *brahman*, or *ātman*, or *puruṣa*, or *citi*, is the universal object of inquiry in Indian philosophy. Unlike science, Indian philosophy does not begin with any ontological commitment. But this object of inquiry has to be "seen" (*darśana*) by the "seer" (*darśanika*), i.e., whether it really is ? How can this object be "seen" or "experienced" ? What *methods* should be adopted ? In their attempts to answer these questions, Indian philosophers seem to have devised many methods of "experiencing" the object of inquiry. One of them is Sāṁkhya-Yoga method and I shall try to delineate it here. Before that it should be noted that almost all these known methods of "experiencing" agree with the principle of logical consistency and their method of logicisation is generally the same as that of western philosophy. The main difference lies in this "method of experimentation" or in having systematic experience of the possible object of inquiry, which seems to make this philosophy not only universalistic in its own way but also the one which overcomes the limitations of present day western science.

In this method one begins at the level of experience. It is essentially *an* experience confined to the individual experiencer when he adopts a definite posture (*āsana*) and observes (*dhyāna*). The multiple experiences at different levels, that the individual experiencer has, can be recorded independently as *data*. Now, these data are said to be subject invariant. That is, if another individual adopts roughly the same posture and observes in roughly the same manner, he would obtain roughly the same data. Again, these data are also repetition invariant, i.e., the *same* individual may again and again obtain them. In other words, data repeat themselves in individual experiences and their turning out to be the same in all independently taken records, confirms that implications hypothesised are *valid*. Thus, the principle of intersubjective interpretation is satisfied although in a different way. This difference arises because the object of inquiry is not situated "outside" the experiencer but it is *the same object inside each observer*. Then and only then could it be subject invariant and repetition invariant. We can depict this situation as follows (Fig. 1 & 2).

We can describe this situation by stating that in scinece the object of inquiry lies outside the boundary line of the universe of observation whereas in Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy the object of inquiry lies inside this boundary line. In science, not only the object but also the instrument and the data lie outside this boundary line whereas in Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy only data do so. This situation can, again, be depicted as follows (Fig. 3).

boundary line of the universe of observation
universe
object of inquiry in S–Y philosophy
object of inquiry in science

This method of Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy gives us a new concept of science and the one that employs such a method of observation we shall henceforth call *new science.* The central feature of the method in this new science is that all the observers independently "observe" the object of inquiry and compare the data so obtained. Thus, universal experiential knowledge of the individual experimenter is to be called new science. This new science assures that there sould be no two views as to the nature of the object. Almost all philosophical methods of India arrive at more or less the same result. And inspite of deep roots of science in western philosophy, the western philosophers have always felt puzzled at this similarity of results obtained by Indian philosophers !

There is another aspect of Indian philosophy which reinforces its universalistic feature by going beyond experience. Indian philosophical observation begins with experience of the individual but gradually *eliminates this experience.* Thus, it is said that one must advance from *vṛttiviśleṣaṇa* to *vṛttinirodha*; from *vijñāna* to *jñāna.* It is held that experience becomes possible due to the existence of this boundary line of the universe of observation. However, continued observation of the object of inquiry, more precise and persistent observation, leads to the *breaking* of this boundary. This is the essence of *transcendence.* This transcendence makes data futile which are only of the level of experience. This transcendence constitutes the mystical aspect of Indian philosophy. It is held that reality (*puruṣa* or *citi*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and truth (*satya*) become one here. They are found to be the same ontologically. This, incidentally, delineates the difference between *jñāna* and *vijñāna*, the former being ontologically *the same* as the object of inquiry whereas in the latter the boundary-line separates the object and the experience.

6. We have argued above that Sāṁkhya-Yoga in particular and Indian philosophy in general *is* universalistic but not in the same sense and way in which present day science is generally held to be universalistic. This universalistic feature of Indian philosophy seems to be the one that overcomes the problem of intellectual honesty in present day science by the transition from *vijñāna* to *jñāna* when the observer (or seer) finds the universal objects of inquiry—such as consciousness, knowledge, truth—

as one and the same. At this stage he reaches a point where category of disagreement and agreement does not seem to apply: in other words, he seems to have no *choice*,—whether he should agree or not. In a sense the boundary line that separates one observer from another seems to break down and *all observers* seem to know *what the other is observing*.

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Jaipur.

—**Virendra Shekhawat**

Figures 1, 2 and 3 on the following pages.


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Fig.1. Observation in physics


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Fig.2. Observation in Samkhya
Yoga philosophy

Fig. 9


boundary line of the universe of observation
universe
object of inquiry in S-Y philosophy
object of inquiry in science

ARE SAṂNYĀSA AND TYĀGA SYNONYMS IN THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ ?

I

The Bhagavadgītā uses the words Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga along with their grammatical variations frequently.[1] A survey of these various uses in the Gītā[2] raises the question whether these words are being used to mean the same thing or to mean different things. Indeed this question is raised within the Gītā itself when Arjuna asks Kṛṣṇa for a clarification of the distinction between the two.[3]

This paper is only concerned with the question of the identity or otherwise of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga and not with other issues the verse might raise. That this issue is indeed raised by the verse seems to be beyond reasonable question. It is clearly covered by interpretations (4) and (3). The second interpretation is difficult to sustain and as for the first, a discussion of the true nature of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga must involve at least marginally if not centrally a consideration of the distinction, if any, between the two.

II

An attempt to answer Arjuna's question could be made at two levels : (1) at the level of the verbal meaning of these words and (or) (2) at the level of the essential implication of these words. Though it would probably be unwise to draw too sharp a distinction between the two levels it may be pointed out that Arjuna asks for an answer at the second level—at the level of essential implication.[4] He wants to know the *tattvam*,[5] the truth or essence of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga as *pṛthak*,[6] as distinguished.

This paper is an attempt to answer Arjuna's question at both the levels.[7]

It is worth noting that nowhere in the Gītā does Kṛṣṇa directly answer Arjuna's question by stating categorically whether Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga are same or different. This is not entirely surprising for even elsewhere sometimes Kṛṣṇa does not give direct answers to Arjuna's questions. Arjuna even complains about this.[8] This paper, however, is not an attempt to answer Arjuna's question on Kṛṣṇa's behalf; rather it is an attempt to answer

Arjuna's question in the light of the remarks made by Kṛṣṇa in the Gītā on the subject of Tyāga and Saṃnyāsa. Thus Arjuna asks whether Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga are different and Kṛṣṇa never says they are the same : in this paper this open-endedness is explored.

III

In order to answer the question posed by Arjuna it is helpful to identify first the central context in which these words and their underlying concepts appear in the Gītā.

It is a tale which has been told many a time. On the eve of the great battle Arjuna is overcome with emotion at the prospect of having to kill his own kinsmen,[9] throws down his arms[10] and refuses to fight[11]—although he is a warrior. Why ?

Arjuna argues that by killing his kinsmen he will incur sin,[12] indeed, he will incur a great sin.[13]

When Arjuna's emotion-charged arguments are filtered through the sieve of Hindu philosophy, his position can be refined into the statement that the *act* of *killing* will produce the *fruit* of *sin*. Thus if now Arjuna's position is further typologized and generalised it means that an action (killing) will produce a fruit of action (a bad one in this case, a rotten apple, sin)—which he does not like.

Kṛṣṇa then tries to meet Arjuna's objections by pointing out that there are ways in which the sinful conseuquce he so dreads could be avoided. The Gītā, from one point of view, is a compendium of the various possible ways in which this could be done.

From the point of view of this paper it is helpful to classify these various options under two major headings : namely, those options which relate to the realm of action (*Karma*) and those which relate to the realm of fruit of action (*Karmaphala*). That is to say, the Gītā suggests certain attitudes which could be adopted towards *karma* and certain attitudes which could be adopted towards *karmaphala* and that these attitudes have the effect of averting the sinful consequences of the course of action Arjuna is reluctant to embark upon.

Now some of these various attitudes which the Gītā recommends are brought in relation to the concepts of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga in the Gītā,[14] and this paper must now turn towards an examination of this relationship.

IV

It seems best to begin such an examination by pointing out not what the Gītā recommends but what it does not recommend. It does not recommend Arjuna's way of avoiding sin which is not to fight.[15] Arjuna seems to closely if naively argue that to get rid of sin which is the consequence of action one might give up the action itself. It is not so simple, Kṛṣṇa seems to say. Kṛṣṇa accepts the general Hindu pre-supposition that Karma binds but the way out of the bind is not to refrain from acting because act man must[16] or Arjuna must[17] but to cut the bond of Karma in other ways. This bond of Karma (*karmabandha*)[18] could be cut at two points—at the point of its origin, Karma itself, or at the point of its fruition or Karmaphala. It cannot, however, be cut by refusing to act. What other options are then available ?

Let us first discuss the options available in the realm of Karma. The general point seems to be that there are various ways of acting in which action so performed is not *karma* in the sense that it does not generate *karmaphala* even though outwardly it might appear that a person has acted. What are these situations in which action is no-action in the karmic sense ? Some of these situations visualized in the Gītā are presented below.

(1) When one acts only to fulfil one's prescribed duties (*niyata*)[19] and not desire-motivated ones (*kāmya*).

(2) When one acts but with the realisation that it is not "he"[20] but the body which is acting[21] or the *guṇas* are at work.

(3) When one acts but casts off one's actions on God or Brahman, i.e., the actions are deposited with God or transferred to God.[22]

(4) When one acts without attachment to the action performed.[23]

(5) When one acts but without being motivated by the fruit of action[24] or when one's action does not depend on the fruit of action[25] or is performed out of a sense of duty.[26]

(6) When action is performed in consonance with Yoga.[27]

Next, some of the options available in the realm of Karmaphala may be discussed. The main thrust here seems to be that if what one has to avoid is sin and if the *act* of killing results in the *fruit* of sin and if this link could be severed—then even if one acted there would be no sin for the act may be there but the attitude towards its fruit would be such that its fruit will not accrue. From this point of view some of the available options in the realm of Karmaphala are :

(7) One may act but give up the *desire* or resolve for the fruit of action—then the fruit of action does not accrue.[28]

(8) One may act but give up *attachment* to the fruit of action—then the fruit of action does not accrue.[29]

(9) One may act but give up the fruit of action itself.[30]

To sum up : there are myriad ways of acting which really are not acting in the sense that they do not subject one to Karmic bondage. Acting in those ways means giving up action in the sense that it is no longer Karmically consequential, as when one gives up attachment to action; gives up attachment to the fruit of action; gives up attachment *and* the fruit of action etc.

Thus Arjuna begins by wanting to give up fighting but Kṛṣṇa points out that what he must give up is not the physical act of fighting but mental engagement and one has a pleroma of statements on Kṛṣṇa's version of 'giving up' as against Arjuna's. Now the two words Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga both have the general meaning of giving up.[31] Out of the pleroma of Kṛṣṇa's statements on 'giving up' is it possible to identify some senses which belong uniquely to either Saṃnyāsa or Tyāga ? The task is formidable but we should not give up !

V

If the various usages of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga are now analysed in the context of the *realm of karma* and the *realm of karmaphala* an interesting conclusion emerges. Over most of the two realms the uses of the two words overlap. There are, however, three notable exceptions :

(1) the word Tyāga is not used in the sense of casting actions on something else such as God,[32]

(2) the word Saṃnyāsa is not used in the sense of giving up the fruit of action.[33]

(3) the word Saṃnyāsa is not used in the sense of giving up attachment to action.

An example will probably help clarify the implications of this conclusion. It is hoped that the example will make the problem posed in the Gītā appear less formidable and will not have the effect of trivialising it.

Let us suppose that a young American, caught up in the current fad for things Eastern, becomes exposed to Hindu philosophy and jumps to the conclusion that all action binds. Then when asked by his mother to do the dishes and in spite of the fact that the mother tries to make the undertaking attractive by offering two dollars the young lad refuses to do the dishes on the grand philosophical argument that 'action binds' !

Should now his mother be well-versed in the subtleties of the Gitā (which is unlikely) how could she, Kṛṣṇa-like, respond to the situation ? The mother could point out that according to the Hindu scripture known as the Bhagavadgītā the action of dish-washing may not bind if

(1) he regards dish-washing as his prescribed duty and so performs it;

(2) if he realises *he* is not washing the dishes, the dishes are being washed;

(3) if he mentally casts off the action of dish-washing on her;

(4) if he washes dishes without any attachment (on revulsion) to dish-washing;

(5) if he washes dishes without making his dish-washing depend on whether he gets the two dollars or not;

(6) if he washes dishes single-mindedly;

(7) if he gave up *desire* for the two dollars he will get from washing dishes (which does not mean that he may not have them);

(8) if he gave up this *attachment* to the two dollars;

(9) if he just gave up the two dollars !

If now thus edified the young lad should choose to proceed with dish-washing along any of the options except options number (3), (4) and (9), the spiritually precocious youngster could be called either a Saṃnyāsi or Tyāgi in the diction of the Gītā. If, however, he chose option number (3) he could only be said to be performing Saṃnyāsa and not Tyāga and if he chose options number (4) or (9) he could be called a Tyāgin but not a Saṃnyāsin.

It would appear, therefore, on the basis of the above analysis that though there is a tremendous area of semantic overlap between the two words Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga in the Bhagavadgītā they do not appear to be totally synonymous.[34]

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NOTES

1. See G. A. Jacob, *A Concordance of the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita*, Bombay : Government Central Book Depot, 1891, pp. 410–11, 968; Prahlad C. Divanji, *Critical Word-Index of the Bhagavadgita*, Bombay : New Book Co., 1946, passim etc.

2. To avoid cumbersomeness the Bhagavadgītā may be occasionally referred to as the Gītā in this paper.

3. XVIII. 1. Although this verse has been translated in at least four ways it is difficult to avoid the implication that the point at issue is the distinction between Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga. This becomes clear when the four ways in which the verse has been translated are examined closely. These are (1) that Arjuna wishes to know only the true nature of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga severally, that is, of Saṃnyāsa on the one hand and of Tyāga on the other. The question of the distinction recedes in the background. This is how it seems to have been taken by Franklin Edgerton, *The Bhagavadgītā* Part I, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1944, p. 163; Arthur W. Ryder. *The Bhagvad-Gītā*. University of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 125; Swami Swarupananda. *Shrimad-Bhagavad-Gītā*, Calcutta : Advaita Ashram, 1967, p. 365; D. S. Sarma, *Lectures on the Bhagavad Gita*, Rajamundry : N. Subba Rau Pantulu, 1937, p. 200; J. Cockburn Thomson, *The Bhagavad-Gita*, Hartford : Stephen Austin, 1925 (?), p. 116; A. C. Bhaktivedānta Swami, *The Bhagavad Gita As It Is*, New York : Macmillan Co., 1968, p. 299; S. Radhakṛishnan, *The Bhagavad-gitā*, London : George Allen and Unwin, 1948, p. 351; etc.; (2) that Arjuna wishes only to know the true nature of both together. This is how John Davies, *The Bhagavad Gitā*, London : Trübner and Co., 1882, p. 168, seems to take it. This rendering is hard to uphold—the expression *Pṛthak* hasn't been taken into account at all; (3) that Arjuna wishes to know both (*a*) the true

nature of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga, and (*b*) the distinction between the two. It seems to have been thus taken by Srimat Yatindra Ramanujacharya, *Srimat Bhagavat Gitā* (in English translation), West Bengal : Sree Balaram Dharmasopan, 1968, p. 408; Ernest Wood, *The Bhagavad Gita Explained*, Los Angeles : New Century Foundation Press, 1954, p. 221; Charles Johnston, *Bhagavad Gita*, New York : Flushing, 1908, p. 56; Edwin Arnold, *The Song Celestial*, Boston : Roberts Brothers, 1888, p. 168; Ann Stanford, *The Bhagavad Gitā*, New York : Herder and Herder, 1970, p. 120; Eliot Deutsch, *The Bhagavad Gita*, New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 130; etc. : (4) that Arjuna wishes to know the distinction between Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga above anything else. The verse is read thus by Śaṅkara (see A. Mahadeva Sastri, *The Bhagavadgita, With the Commentary of Sankaracharya*, Madras : Ramaswamy Sastrulu, 1961, p. 441) and Rāmānuja (infra) and by Jnānesvara [see H. M. Lambert, ed., *Jnāneshvari* (translated by V. G. Pradhan), London : George Allen and Unwin, 1969, p. 235–236]. It has been construed similarly by Swami Nikhilananda, *The Bhagavad Gita*, New York : Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1944, p. 345; Swami Sivananda, *Srimad Bhagavad Gita*, Rishikesh : Yoga-Vedanta Forest University, 1949, p. 767; Nataraj Guru, *The Bhagavad Gitā*, Madras : Asia Publishing House, 1961, pp. 657–8 and Shri Purohit Swami, *The Geeta*, London : Faber and Faber, 1935, p. 88, etc.

4. This is clear from the verse notwithstanding the fact that the preceding verses of the previous chapter on the word *sat* almost sound like a lexicographical entry (see XVII–26, 27).

5. This word is usually translated as "truth", e.g. by R. C. Zaehner, *The Bhagavadgītā*, London : Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 385, so also by Franklin Edgerton, *op. cit.*, p. 163; Edwin Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 83; Swami Swarupananda, *op. cit.*, p. 364; W. D. P. Hill, *The Bhagavadgita*, Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 256, etc. It has also been rendered as " true essence " (Eliot Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 130); as " true nature " (Swmai Nikhilananda, *op. cit.*, p. 344; S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 351); and as " essence or truth " (Swami Sivananda, *op. cit.*, p. 767). A. C. Bhaktivedanta Swami renders it as " purpose " (*op. cit.*, p. 299).

6. The word *pṛthak* is most often translated as "severally", e.g. by W. D. P. Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 256; Franklin Edgerton, *op. cit.*,

p. 163; S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 351, etc. It has also been rendered as " distinction " (Eliot Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 130).

7. In their glosses on XVIII.1 both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja move on both the levels. They often talk of *artha* or meaning of the words as they discuss the *tattva* or essence. In other words they are functioning on both the levels—they are seeking to expound *tattvārtha*—the essential meaning.

8. III.2.

9. I.28.

10. I.47.

11. II.9.

12. I.36.

13. I.45.

14. An alternative modus operandi could involve seeking a connection between Saṃnyāsa and Bhaktiyoga and Tyāga and Karmayoga. This approach gains some credibility through verses such as III.30 which involve a transference of Karma on God and through verses such as XVIII.11 which link up tyāga with the giving up of the fruit of action, the hallmark of Karmayogin as a karmayogi cannot obviously abandon manifest action. But this approach can take one only so far—and not further. There are verses which use the word Saṃnyāsa in the sense of mere abandonment rather than deposit (e.g. XVIII.7) and the word Tyāga with its variants covers a very wide semantic spectrum in which giving up the fruits of action is only one element (see G. A. Jacob, *op. cit.*, passim). The watershed between Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga therefore must be explored for in a different location.

15. II.47; XI.33; etc.

16. III.5; XVIII.11.

17. XVIII.59.

18. II.39.

19. III.8; XVIII.7; etc.

20. V.8.9.10; V.13.

21. IV.21.

22. XII.6; XVIII.57.

23. II.48; V.10.11; XVIII.6–9.

24. II. 47.

25. VI. 1.

26. XVIII. 5.

27. IV. 41; V. 11; IX. 28.

28. VI. 2.4; VI. 24.

29. VI. 2; IV. 20.

30. XVIII. 9–12. The references on which this enumeration is based are scattered all over the Gītā—sometimes in the same verse the realms of *karma* and *karmaphala* blend (e.g. XVIII.9) and sometimes procedures at both the levels—of *karma* and *karmaphala*—are recommended in a single verse (e.g. XVIII, 6).

31. See Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 456, 1148.

32. The word Tyāga is used in the Gītā in connection with giving up *karma* (XVIII. 3), *dharma* (XVIII. 66), *saṃkalpa* (VI. 24), attachment (V. 12), etc. It is used for casting off say life, for someone (I. 9) but is not used for casting off *actions* on someone.

33. The word Saṃnyāsa is used in the Gītā for giving up the *desire* for the fruit of action or *attachment* to the fruit of action (VI. 2, 4) or *dependence* on the fruit of action (VI. 1) but not for giving up the fruit of action itself.

34. Some more general considerations seem to undergird this conclusion :

(1) The expression Tyāgaphalam (VXIII. 8) occurs in the Gītā but not the expression Saṃnyāsaphalam; indeed in only one verse do the words *karmaphalam* and saṃnyāsa seem to appear together (VI. 1). This seems to suggest a general trend in the Gītā to associate Saṃnyāsa with the realm of action and Tyāga with the realm of fruit of action when the two are distinguished outside the area of semantic overlap. (2) The usage of Saṃnyāsa to cover some senses in the realm of the *fruit of action* becomes possible when (i) the word Saṃnyāsa is used along with the word Yoga and not by itself and (ii) when the most inclusive interpretation to the word *Saṃkalpa* (VI. 2, 4) is given and the word is taken to include the desire for the fruit of action. (3) The Gītā tends, it seems, to equate concepts whenever possible or desirable. For instance, it identifies Sāṃkhya and Yoga (V. 5) and Saṃnyāsa and Yoga (VI. 1). This has not been done in the case of Saṃnyāsa and Tyāga even though Kṛṣṇa is explicitly questioned about it (XVIII. 1).

It is possible to argue, nevertheless, that in the Gītā the word Saṃnyāsa is undergoing a metamorphosis and that VI. 1–4 represents one phase in that process and IV. 20 provides the rationale for that process, wherein it is said that if one does not cling to the fruit of action no action is really performed. A similar move could be seen in a possible linkage of the two concepts through Yoga (read V.12 with XVIII. 11 and VI.2). From this it is but a step to claiming that Tyāga and Saṃnyāsa are the same. Yet the Gītā never quite seems to take this step. Indeed, when the opportunity arises in Chapter XVIII it is not utilised. Thus while it could be claimed that the word Saṃnyāsa is undergoing a transformation in the Gītā towards an equation with Tyāga or vice-versa it should be borne in mind at the same time that this transformation does not seem to have reached the point of identification between the two in the Gītā.

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AN OBITUARY

The Indian Philosophical Quarterly records with profound sorrow the demise of Professor Jadunath Sinha.

Professor Sinha has made notable contributions to the study of Indian Philosophy and Psychology and in these fields he has a number of important books to his credit, among them being three volumes on *History of Indian Philosophy, Indian Psychology,* Indian *Realism* and *Problem of Post Śaṅkara Advaita Vedanta.* These books and a host of valuable articles have shaped the thinking and understanding of generations of students and scholars and have earned for Professor Sinha, the esteem, respect and reverance of students of Indian thought. In his academic career and in his writings, Professor Sinha has greatly contributed to scholarship in Indian Philosophy. His passing away, therefore is a great loss. We pay our deep homage to the memory of a noble scholar and philosopher.

Statement about ownership and other particulars abo
newspaper "The Indian Philosophical Quarterly".

FORM IV

1. Place of Publication : Department of Philosophy,
University of Poona
Pune 411 007.

2. Periodicity of its Publication : Quarterly

3. Printer's Name : Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay
Head of the Department of Philosop
University of Poona
Pune 411 007.

Whether Citizen of India : Yes

4. Publisher's Name : Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay
Head of the Department of Philosop
University of Poona
Pune 411 007.

Whether Citizen of India : Yes

5. Editor's Name : Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay

Whether Citizen of India : Yes

Address : (i) Dr. Surendra Sheodas Barlingay
Head of the Department of Philosop
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ON SIDGWICK'S RECONCILIATION OF ETHICAL THEORIES

The burden of the present paper is to examine Sidgwick's attempt to reconcile the differences between ethical intuitionism and hedonism on the one hand and egoism and utilitarianism on the other. Sidgwick reduces all ethical theories to three, namely ethical intuitionism, ethical egoism and utilitarianism. The present paper deliberately avoides the discussion concerning how he reduces all ethical theories to three, because this will form the basis of my different papers.

On the question as to whether the rightness or wrongness of a conduct is ascertained on the basis of the goodness or badness of the consequences of a conduct, there are two answers. According to one answer, the rightness or wrongness of a conduct is ascertained on the basis of the fact as to whether or not it conforms to certain unconditionally binding rules.[1] It strictly avoids the suggestion that the rightness or wrongness of a conduct is ascertained on the goodness or badness of its consequences. This means that the goodness or badness of the consequences of a conduct does not form the part of the definition of its rightness or wrongness. For instance, a man who speaks the lie intends to produce false belief in the listener. But it is held that the characteristic of falsity in lying is only taken into consideration to decide the rightness or wrongness of this act. Besides this, there are other characteristics also, e.g., undesirableness of the consequences. But the latter does not form any part of the definition of lying. This theory is known as deontology; Sidgwick sometimes calls such theory also intuitionism.

According to the second answer, the rightness or wrongness of a conduct is ascertained on the basis of the goodness or badness of its consequences. It strictly avoids the suggestion that the rightness or wrongness of a conduct is ascertained on the basis of the fact as to whether or not it conforms to certain unconditionally binding rules. This means that the goodness or badness of the consequences of a conduct forms part of the definition of its rightness or wrongness. For instance, when a man speaks the lie, he intends to produce false belief in the listener. But it is not the case that the characteristic of falsity in lying is taken into consideration to ascertain its rightness or wrongness. On the contrary, the undesirableness of its consequences forms part of the definition of its rightness or wrongness. This theory is known as teleology; and hedonism is a form of it. Hedonism maintains that the pleasantness of the consequences of a conduct determines its rightness and painfulness its wrongness.

Again, on the question as to whether the greatest pleasure or happiness of the doer determines the rightness or wrongness of his conduct, there are two answers. According to one school, a conduct will be right if it produces the greatest pleasure in the doer and wrong if it does not. We may define it negatively and say that even for the slightest increase in the happiness of the agent, the maximum happiness of others can be sacrificed. This theory is known as egoistic hedonism.

The other school maintains that the maximum amount of happiness for the maximum number of people determines the rightness of a conduct. This theory lays much stress upon the fact that the total results must be the greatest amount of happiness. Sidgwick points out that the net balance of pleasure over pain is to be sought; for him it is immaterial whether it is obtained from the increase of the happiness of the agent or from the increase of happiness in others. This theory may justify the fact that if an increase of pleasure in a peasant gives rise to the increase of pleasure in the balance and such an increase in a king does not do that, then the farmer is to be preferred to the latter. This theory is known as utilitarianism.

Sidgwick makes an attempt to reconcile the rival claims between intuitionism and hedonism, and also between egoism and utilitarianism. In what follows, I shall present in short his arguments and then go on to examine them.

He takes up the case of ethical intuitionism and hedonism and suggests that duties and virtues which the former claims to be self-evident are not so. They, on the contrary, are derived from certain ultimate and absolute ethical principles, and those principles, according to Sidgwick, are self-evident. These are principles of prudence, benevolence and justice. The principle of prudence states that it is the duty of a man to obtain one's greatest good rather than to obtain his lesser good. The principle of benevolence states that each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him. The principle of justice states that 'Do to others as you would have them do to you.' He again explains the principle of justice as follows : First, 'It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment.' Second, 'We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference in their duties.'

Sidgwick maintains that ethical principles mentioned above form the rational basis of hedonism. The principle of prudence forms the rational basis of ethical egoism and the principle of benevolence and justice form the rational basis of utilitarianism. With these presumptions Sidgwick claims to reconcile between ethical intuitionsim and hedonism. Sidgwick writes :

"We have found that the common antithesis between intuitionism and utilitarianism must be entirely discarded : Since such abstract moral principles as we can admit to be really self-evident are not only not incompatible with a utilitarian system, but even seem required to furnish a rational basis for such a system."[3]

Sidgwick gives another argument to corroborate his claim of reconciliation. He argues that when a person finds himself in a fix in deciding which of the different courses of action is his duty, he does not consult the conflicting theories of duty for deciding his action, but his course of action is decided by referring to the utilities which are expected of each of the courses of action in question. He takes the case of truth speaking as an instance to illustrate this point. Usually it is accepted that it is a duty of everyone to speak the truth. But when a situation comes in which speaking of truth seems to produce a bad result then one decides his duty not by referring to the rules which prescribe duties, but by referring to the utility which the course of action in question is expected to produce. If giving an information to an ailing man is expected to give him a shock which he may not be able to tolerate, it is always thought better to give him a false report when he askes about it.

As far as egoism and utilitarianism are concerned, we have seen that the principles of these theories seem to Sidgwick to be equally self-evident. But he finds them to be mutually inconsistent. The principle of egoism says that the highest end of human life is the maximum happiness of the agent. The principle of utilitarianism, on the other hand maintains that the end of human life is the net balance of pleasure over pain whether it is attained by increasing pleasure in the agent or in others. But these two principles seem to be mutually inconsistent. In order to save his view of absolutism, which states that if two principles conflict, either one of them is to be rejected or modified in such a way that the conflict is resolved, he has to take recourse to either of these alternatives. But as both the principles are self-evident. he does not seem inclined to reject any one of them.

Hence, he examines a brand of utilitarianism which maintains that the utilitarian code is the command of God which enjoins upon men to promote general happiness. Those who obey his commands are rewarded and those who violate them are punished. Sidgwick points out that if one is convinced that there is an omnipotent Being who commands men and intends to furnish and reward them, then he does not feel the need of further inducement to plan his life on the utilitarian principle. But an enquiry into the necessity of such postulate in matter is very important, because 'by the result of such an examination will be determined as we now see, the very important question whether ethical science can be constructed on an independent basis; or whether it is forced to borrow a fundamnetal and indispensable premiss from Theology or some similar source.'[4] He compares this postlulate with some clear and certain moral intuitions and comes to the point that the postulate of such a Being is not as clear and certain as genuine moral intuitions. But he says :

> Those who hold that the edifice of physical Science is really constructed of conclusions logically inferred from self-evident premises may reasonably demand that any practical judgements claiming philosophic certainty should be based on are equally firm foundation. If, on the other hand, we find that in our supposed knowledge of the world of nature propositions are commonly taken to be universally true, which yet seem to rest on no other grounds than that we have a strong

disposition to accept them, and that they are indispensable to the systematic coherence of our beliefs,—it will be more difficult to reject a similarly supposed assumption in ethics, without opening the door of universal scepticism.[5]

This seems to suggest that if natural sciences accept certain postulates which command universal acceptance although they are based on a strong disposition to accept them, there will be no mistake in accepting certain postulates in ethics even if they are not self-evident but are based on such dispositions.

To sum up, Sidgwick seems to suggest three arguments in settling the controversy in question. (*a*) Prudence, benevolence and justice which are self evident ethical principles from the linking point between ethical intuitionsim and hedonism. (*b*) Since utility is the deciding factor of conflicts raised with regard to any duty or virtue ethical intuitionism instead of being opposed to hedonism gets support from the latter. (*c*) The postulate of an omnipotent Being resolves the opposition between ethical egoism and utilitarianism.

We propose to examine these arguments in the following pages.

Are prudence, benevolence and justice really self-evident ? Here we are reminded of the two models of the criterion of self-evidence which Sidgwick seems to apply throughout in the *Methods*. We will begin with the model of criterion which states four conditions the fulfilment of which alone makes a proposition self-evident. They are : one, terms of the propositions must be clear and precise. Two, the proposition must be distinct. Three, the proposition must be mutually consistent with other self-evident propositions. Four, the proposition must command 'universal' or 'general consent'. Let us see whether the principle of benevolence propounded by Sidgwick fulfils these conditions. For discussion's sake let us put this principle again in its form. '....each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him.'[6]

The term in which it is stated cannot be said to be clear and precise. We may ask : who is that other individual whose good we are morally bound to regard as much as our own ? It may b presumed that by this Sidgwick means every human individua whether he be a friend or an enemy, a compatriot or a foreigne a civilised man or a savage. He points out that it may fairly b urged that practically each man ought chiefly to concern himse with promoting the good of a limited number of human being and that generally in proportion to the closeness of his connectio with him, but he urges that this may be done 'even with a vie to universal good.' But the question is : what about animals While examining utilitarianism, Sidgwick considers who th "all" are whose happiness is to be taken into account. He seem to give a definite statement maintaining that "all" does not exclu pleasure of any sentient being. Still, instead of this definite stat ment, we cannot conceive that Sidgwick would have regarded it a a self-evident proposition that we ought not to prefer our ow lesser good to the greater good of a beast or bird or fish or insec however unreasonable it might be to exclude them from the pri ciple of benevolence. We venture to say that when he formulat this principle he does not bestow on the question of animal happ ness that 'careful-reflection' which is the second condition states of a self-evident proposition. Further, this principle do not fulfil even the third condition mentioned above. In this conn tion, we have to consider the relations between the principle benevolence and the two other principles of prudence and justi which he regards to be self-evident. He formulates the princip of prudence as 'one ought to aim at one's own good'. It obvious that this principle is not consistent with that of benev ence without an important qualification, namely, that one ought aim at one's own good on the whole only when it does not confli with the greater good of someone else.

The principle of justice is stated in the form that '... it cann be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wro for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two differe individuals, and without there being any difference between th natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reaso able ground for difference of treatment. This proposition is tr but that is so because it is tautological and the truth expressed it applies not only to rightness of acts but to all other ethi concepts. This principle is not inconsistent with the principle benevolence, but the latter however derives no support from it. According to the former principle, it may very well be right for each person to prefer his own lesser good to the greater good of another, although it could not be right for one and wrong for another similar person in similar circumstances to do so. Further, the principle of benevolence does not seem to command universal or general consent. Those who believe in egoistic hedonism will, at least, not give their consent to this principle of hedonism, because they think that the rightness of a conduct is decided by the maximum happiness of the agent himself. Again, those who believe in perfectionism, that is to say, those who maintain the end of life to be the perfection of the self will also not give their consent to this principle. The above analysis of different self-evident intuitions makes it abundantly clear that they do not fulfil the conditions which Sidgwick himself has put forward for a self-evident proposition.

When we judge his self-evident ethical principles on the second model of the criterion for self-eviedence, i.e., unprovability, we see that in this sense such intuitions may be self-evident but in that case they may become mere dogmatic assumptions. Now, the claim of reconciliation based on such ethical principles cannot escape the charge of being dogmatic. Thus, the argument based on the self-evidence principles which work as intermediary between common sense (ethical intuitionsim, ethical principles and hedonism) is not tenable. Our analysis has made it clear that these principles are mere dogmatic assumptions which, instead of helping the reconciliation, make even hedonism dogmatic.

(*b*) Sidgwick's argument, that utilitarianism resolves the conflict which occurs with regard to duties and virtues and so this thing instead of being opposed to ethical intuitionism gives support to it, also does not seem to be tenable. He has used the term 'utilitarianism' for a theory of universalistic hedonism. But in his analysis of the morality of common sense what he seems to prove is mere utility. Whenever common moral opinions conflict, we resolve them by referring to their utility. But just by showing that ultimately, in ethical intuitionism, appeal is made to utility, he does not establish the point that utilitarianism gives support to ethical intuitionism and thereby concerned, instead of being universal happiness, may be social well being.

(*c*) As far as the reconciliation between egoism and utilitarianism is concerned, first, we would like to make it clear that the direct opposition of egoism is not with utilitarianism as Sidgwick thinks of, but with ultruism. In order to make it clear, we may put the principles of these theories in the following form. Egoism says that the end of human life is the maximum pleasure of the agent. Even for the slightest increase of happiness of the agent, the maximum happiness of others can be ignored. Altruism holds that the end of human life is the maximum happiness for maximum number of people. Even for the slightest increase of happiness of others, the maximum happiness of the agent can be ignored. Utilitarianism, unlike these two, maintains that the end of human life is the increase of net balance of pleasure over pain. This theory is indifferent to the fact as to whether this net balance of pleasure is increased by an increase of happiness of others. Thus, an egoist holds that it is his duty to ignore the happiness of others, provided it does not affect his own.. An altruist holds that it is his duty to ignore his own happiness, provided it does not affect the happiness of others. Utilitarian holds that it is his duty to consider the net amount of happiness and can ignore his own happiness or the happiness of others as the case may be. This analysis of egoism, altruism and utilitarianism shows that the direct opposition of egoism is with altruism and not with utilitarianism. Still the opposition between egoism and utilitarianism can never be denied. The conflict occurs when an egoist sticks to do something which does not tend to increase the net amount of pleasure. Hence, the problem of reconciliation between egoism and utilitarianism, although mitigated, yet exists. We have seen while discussing Sidgwick's view on the issue that he shows an inclination to accept a postulate from theology in order to surmount this difficulty. The reasoning which he gives to justify this postulate is that in natural sciences also we make certain postulates on similar grounds. Let us compare Sidgwick's postulate of a benevolent and powerful being who so commands that we are led to act benevolently, with a postulate of science, such as, 'if two apparantly similar things we have differently in apparently similar situations, there must be some difference in the things or the situations which will bring the difference in behaviour under a general law'. It is clear that if we act on such a postulate, we will look for such a difference, whereas if we act as if the postulate is false, then we shall very soon give up looking for it. Now, if we look for it, we may increase our knowledge. Thus, the justification for making postulates in science is clear. As far as Sidgwick's postulate is concerned, this cannot be justified as a means of increasing our knowledge or making our beliefs mere coherent. Instead of making our beliefs coherent, it leaves the two self-evident intuitions of prudence and benevolence as mutually inconsistent. Nevertheless, it adds to our difficulty when such a benevolent and powerful God allows such mutually inconsistent principles to be there. Hence, Sidgwick's postulate cannot be justified on the basis of increasing knowledge and theoretical coherence. If it can be justified, it can be justified only as a practical postulate. But, since in science we do not make practical postulates, the analogy of science which Sidgwick has used here does not seem to be relevant.

Thus, we may safely conclude that the transference of the idea of a scientific postulate to the postulate of ethics is not tenable.

Another point which adds to our difficulty and which is not less important than the above is the admission of a theological postulate in ethics. Here we will like to refer to Sidgwick's aims and ambitions to restore the autonomy of ethics. He starts with an ambition to safeguard this autonomy and in order to fulfil their ambition, he deliberately avoides any discussion of psychology and theology and of any other discipline. When we accept a postulate of theology and apply it to solve a knotty problem of the antithesis between egoism and utilitarianism, it is surprising how Sidgwick could then safeguard the autonomy of ethics. Ethics being an autonomous study and an independent science, as he wants to make it, becomes dependent on theology. It is just astonishing that a thinker of the stature of Sidgwick has missed this point, and if he does this deliberately, then he must be taken to be a failure at least in this matter.

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NOTES

1. Sidgwick Henry : *The Methods of Ethics;* 7th editio London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1963. p. 96.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 496.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 507.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 509.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 414.

THE ROLE OF REASON AND EXPERIENCE IN THE CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

General Remarks :

There have been generally two different attitudes in philosophy with regard to our knowledge of the external world viz. rationālism and empiricism. Rationalism traces the source of all our knowledge in reason and empiricism in experience. Sometimes, the two attitudes are regarded as completely opposed to each other, each regarding the other as a recalcitrant element hindering our perception of Reality and the growth of knowledge, as is done by the Intellectualists on the one hand and the Phenomenologists and the Existentialists on the other; sometimes the two are regarded as not opposed but complementary elements, each having its legitimate place in the organisation of our knowledge, neither one being reducible to the other, reason being the regulative principle and experience, the constitutive principle of our knowledge, as is done by Kant, Russell and the Logical Positivists. Although, philosophers and common people use both the methods, yet the problem arises as to which one is more fundamental than the other. For the rationalists, reason is more fundamental than experience in as much as the very experience is not possible without a rational element into it. For them, knowledge consists in universal essences which are categories of thought and can never be derived from experience, i.e., Reason is both the constitutive and the regulative factors in knowledge. As against this, empiricists maintain that true knowledge consists in elementary statements which contain no universal element in them. If a statement does contain a universal element, it is a generalisation from experience and is completely reducible to it. For them, experience is a constitutive and reason a regulative factor in knowledge. For pure rationalism, both matter and form are provided by Reason; for pure empiricism, they are all derived from experience. Pure rationalism believes in innate ideas which are applicable to the world; pure empiricism is absolutely opposed to the doctrine of "innate ideas". For empiricism, any idea, if it is to be applicable to the world, must be derived from sense-experience, or they would only be figments of imagination. For it, there are no logical presuppositions of knowledge : all principles of the mind are a-postiriori and have to be empirically derived. Rationalists' and Empiricists' though differ with respect to the derivation of the Form and the Matter of knowledge; they quite agree at least in one thing that without Reason, a mental faculty, no knowledge can be had. Rationalism applies the word Reason both for Rational Intuition and for Reasoning; empiricism applies the word Reason only for Reasoning from elementary statements to general propositions and then from general propositions back to elementary statements.

With these preliminary remarks, let us now examine the respective roles played by Reason and Experience in the constitution of human knowledge.

Historical and Eternal Statements :

Prof. George Boas has distinguished between two kinds of sentences : the historical and the eternal. A historical statement is one which is true only of a dated and localised event.[1] For instance, any statement of fact like, "It is raining" or, "The snow-drops are in bloom", or, "I cannot find my rubbers", may be taken as examples of a historical statement. In the instances given above, the date is the "present" and the place the "here". But the date and the place need not be confined to only the "present" and the "here", it may refer to any date and place. Thus, the tense and locality are indifferent to the nature of the sentence. As against these historical sentences, there are some which are true or may be true irrespective of date and place. Universal laws, general propositions and mathematical formulae come under this category and are called "eternal sentences." " Rain falls on the just and unjust alike", "Snow-drops are the first flowers to blosom in the spring", "Men who are absorbed in philosophical writing misplace their personal possessions".— are examples of eternal statements, even though they may not be true. The only thing is that the people who make these statements take them to be true always and everywhere. "They are eternal in the sense of being timeless, not in the sense of being immortal or everlasting".[2]

Observation is a Violation of Some Eternal Statement :

We are surrounded by a number of things about us, as for instance, the books on the table, a radio-set nereby, the plants growing in the garden, the chirping of the birds just over our head and a lot of other things in the environment. These are the things about which we hardly make any comments and sometimes they do not catch our attention at all. But suppose that I am writing something on my table, and suddenly it begins to rain. This will immediately catch my attention as I did not expect it to rain since when I came to my study table, it was all a sunny day and the weather was quite fair. Had it been a cloudy weather and it were raining when I entered the room, I would not have made the comment that I do now that "it is raining". We do not make any comment about the "obvious" which are expressed in eternal sentences or scientific laws. We do not observe or care to observe things which usually happen in nature. Our mind is completely at rest about usual and regular happenings in nature. If we are convinced that it would rain every morning from 10 O'clock until noon, there would be little ground for saying at 10 A.M. that "It is raining". But suppose that one day, at 10 O'clock in the morning, I look up into the sky and find that it is not raining then certainly it would be a matter of observation and inquiry for me and I would ask, "Why, the sun is shining". Behind this questioning attitude of the mind lies the philosophical assumption that "the natural order ought not to change but should exhibit a constant and predictable pattern".[3] Consequently, whenever we make a descriptive assertion of fact, it can be interpreted as emerging out of the observation that some eternal law or statement has been violated. This philosophical assumption of the regularity of nature or of the possibility of always discovering some unity beneath or behind or above the apparent diversity is the source of all science. "The unity is what we are looking for; the diversity is what we encounter"[4]. It is the diversity that we meet within experience and the unity that we have to establish by reason. "In short, experience is the origin of science and philosophy only in the sense that it gives rise to our questions. It becomes the terminus of knowledge when it answers them".[5]

What we encounter in experience, to begin with, is no knowledge; it is simply a suggestion, prompting or provocations. The suggestions, promptings or provocations are expressed in historical statements. They are transformed into knowledge proper when the subjects indicated by them "have been elevated to the realm of eternity or they have ceased to be things and have been purified into concepts".[6] This hammering of the content out of the historical statments and turning them into eternal statements is done by the scientist's power of abstraction. Let us take a simple instance : Whem Galileo formulated the Laws of Falling Bodies, he had in mind not this or that falling body made of wood, stone or patter, falling in air or through water. He must have known that bodies like bits of paper or big dry leaves do not obey the Law of Falling Bodies at all, for they certainly fall more slowly through the air than stones do. But his genius enabled him to conceive a situation in which an eternal statement could be framed eliminating all the variations in fall, that is, the material out of which the bodies were made and the medium through which they fell. He had no prior information to the effect that the medium or the nature of the body would make any difference to the Law; he concerned himself simply with a conceptual situation in which an eternal statement could be made independent of all the variations in fall. And we all know that he was successful in framing a law governing all falling bodies irrespective of their materials and their media. It provides us with a rule by which we can determine whether things are as they ought to be. The law defines the diversity of events as deviations from the norm, but only apparently and not really. For example, when we find feathers fluttering down through the air and not falling like stones, we may observe it to be a deviation from the law of falling bodies. But this observation would not constitute knowledge; it will be elvated to the rank of knowledge when it is incorporated into an eternal statement or a set of eternal statements. Knowledge arises when a general idea has been precipitated out of experience and then it can be extended well beyond experience as well. Thus Kant's famous statement that "There can be no doubt that all knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises out of experience"[7] stands fully justified here.

The Nature of A-Priori Propositions :

We can make a fresh bid to contrast rationalism and empiricism with regard to the nature of apriori propositions. There are two alternative modes of formulation of this contrast, one with regard to the problem of content and the other with regard to the problem of analyticity. According to the first mode, namely the problem of content, empiricism is defined as the view that apriori propositions tell us nothing about reality, possibly, they are about ideas or language. According to the second mode viz. the problem of analyticity, empiricism is defined as the belief that an apriori proposition is analytic in the sense that it does not express a synthetic connection between two distinct things or notions but is only an analysis into its components of the entity or notion expressed by its subject. Rationalism, correspondingly, is often construed as the denial of one or both of these assertions.

Let us consider, first, the second of the two above definitions about the empiricist-rationalist issue.

Empiricist's rejection of the synthetic character of apriori propositions rests directly on his atomism. To empiricism, it is inconceivable that two events which are independent of the mind can be both two and yet necessarily connected. So, if there were any synthetic apriori propositions, they would be about necessary connections of different events in an independent world. Accordingly, empiricists reject the theory of the synthetic apriori, for them all apriori propositions are analytic in character.

As regards the above view of the empiricists, we can point out that what are necessarily connected into an apriori propositiont are not events or facts but concepts. Hence it does not go agains, atomism. Again, if apriori propositions are about concepts it does not mean that they are not synthetic. They are synthetic inasmuch as they are prompted or suggested by experience.

According to the first definition rationalism is distinguished from empiricism in that for it, there is an apriori knowledge of independent reality to which empiricism does not subscribe. The empiricist believes that apriori propositions are not about any reality either internal or external but are only about our own concepts or language. As to the reasons why apriori propositions cannot be about any independent reality, the empiricist could give the following :—[8]

A. The only reason for our belief in any proposition should be that it must be evidenced by directly inspectable data. But there are only two sorts of data that can be directly inspected, sense-data known in sensation which account for our belief in aposteriori judgements; concept-data known to us in reflection or introspection which account for our belief in apriori judgements.

Now as to independent realities, it is generally assumed that only sense-data form part of independent realities, concept-data being only derivatives from sense-data. Hence, it is only the sense-data which warrant our belief in aposteriori judgement, that can be actually inspected; concept-data cannot be inspected at all on this assumption and consequently, no apriori judgement can be warranted by inspection.[9]

B. If *apriori* propositions cannot be evidenced by inspection of *realities*, they cannot be about such realities. Nor can they be evidenced by some other thing, for a proposition can be about one thing and evidenced by another thing only if there be some knowable connection between the two things. In our present case, our concepts or meanings could be taken as evidence for a truth about an independent reality only if there were some knowable connection between the ideas or the meanings on the one hand and independent reality on the other. Moreover, the connection would have to be necessary and known *apriori*. But we have seen by the argument A that independent reality cannot be directly inspected. Hence one end of the supposed concept-reality connection cannot be inspected. Therefore, the connection cannot be established by inspection, i.e., it cannot be known apriori.[10]

The above refutation of rationalism at the empiricist's hand is based on a curious view of the empiricist's conception of what rationalism it. According to him, rationalism is a doctrine that truth about independent reality can be known by reasoning or a juggling of concepts. The empiricists are quite right when they say that mere juggling of concepts could give us no certain knowledge of any independent reality. But this view of rationalism may be true of some forms of rationalism, yet is certainly not true of all forms of rationalism.

A typical doctrine of rationalism does not hold the view that *apriori* knowledge consists in *judgement* about something un-inspectable. *Apriori* knowledge, however, is not supposed by rationalism to be prior to all inspection whatever, but only to sensuous inspection. Reason for a rationalist, is not essentially reasoning but rational seeing, intuition. *The essence of rationalism is its belief that other modes of consciousness besides sensation and introspection are forms of acquaintance or there is such a thing as non-sensuous inspection or seeing.* Empiricism, on the other hand, limits acquaintance to sense-experience and thus remains committed to the sensationalism of Hume in that only sensation and reflection are admitted as original sources of knowledge. All other modes of consciousness being but "ideas" derived by processes of compounding, abstracting etc. from these original data

To sum up : As far as our practical knowledge about the world is concerned, there is no doubt that it is prompted by experience, but it will be called "knowledge" only when it is purified into concepts. Knowledge consisting in concepts, does not mean that it is not about reality. It is about reality, since it is suggested by experience. Therefore the empiricists are wrong when they say that *apriori* propositions are only analytic and not synthetic. Again, empiricism is also wrong in thinking that rationalism essentially means reasonsing.

The true meaning of rationalism is rational seeing or intuition or a direct preception of Reality.

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NOTES

1. Boas, G., The Limits of Reason, p. 17.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
7. Kant, E., Introduction to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.
8. Moore, A., Rationalism, Empiricism and the Apriori, in *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 36, July 1959.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

THE CONCEPT OF 'ALIENATION' IN RECENT AMERICAN THOUGHT

As all important philosophical terms, 'alienation' has no single meaning. If it has, then like the terms 'good', 'justice', and 'freedom', it probably would be neither so important nor the source of so much difficulty. What is obvious and simple is seldom the cause of controversy. Where men disagree and sometimes resort to violence to enforce their will on others, philosophers must assume that some concept is at issue which admits of no easy or final solution. What is complex is the source of disagreement just because in itself it allows men to define it in various ways. Each person can insist his is the only 'correct' definition, although some will propose methods which they claim can permanently solve our disagreements over important terms. Yet our continued verbal strife, and refusal to unite on any single methodological proposal, should tell us not so much that human nature is perverse as that the metaphysical core of the created order is complex at its base.

Although we cannot call 'alienation' a new term, it has come into prominence recently and has come to characterise much that is said about American life and culture. Hegel and Marx, of course, make extensive use of the concept, but what is of interest to us is its recent rise to prominence on the American scene. In the turbulent 60's, of course, Herbert Marcuse was widely read on college campuses. His stress on alientation seemed to strike a note of response in the youth of that time. Basically, 'alientation' means being estranged from something, or somebody, usually either from society or from oneself. Yet it is not a term always used with a negative connotation. For instance, if one wants to understand any person or phenomenon, we must first gain distance from our object. In other words, we must go through a period of estrangement in order to gain the perspective leading to comprehension.

To live through 'alienation' may never feel good, but it may be an experience we must go through if we are to understand what is near at hand and has become too familiar. For a student in the educational process, then, alienation or estrangement from amily, state, inherited beliefs or former teachers is necessary for maturity. What may make this change seem unnatural is merely that the experience is abrupt or forced on us from outside. This happened in the United States during the Viet Nam war, when a whole generation found itself involved in a conflict neither to its liking nor of its own choosing. Even without this, the young would still have experienced alienation from culture, except perhaps more quietly, less publicly, and without such violent outbursts. Anyone who criticises his social structure, his inherited values, or himself experiences estrangement from that which formerly was close to him.

Marx, we know, traces the source of alienation to the worker's lack of control over his material product. Hegel locates its source in a lack of spiritual development, and thus it is a necessary phase to all progress. Existentialism tends to see estrangement as arising from a lack of self-acceptance of the failure to develop an independent self. Freedom almost necessitates alienation, because one who is free does not have to be any one thing. Thus, one is alienated from himself because the requisite decisions to crystallise the self have not yet been made. If freedom remains, it follows that alienation will be a constant human experience as long as choice lasts. Thus, we find that sources of alienation are many. Only if we accepted one as definitive could there be any hope for overcoming alienation permanently. Furthermore, alienation is a by-product of an increasing sense of freedom, and may have to be tolerated if the uncertainties of freedom are valued.

As long as multiple accounts of the source and nature of alienation are given, it cannot be finally overcome. Thus the basis of alienation lies in the existence of a plurality of philosophies which never allow man to view himself under one pattern only. Of course, Marx thinks his proposed revolution in the control of the material sources of power can eliminate alienation. However, that can only come about if all men ultimately accept not only Marx but also one authoritative interpretation of his teaching. As long as intellectual freedom remains, this is not likely to happen; so alienation and the philosopher's feeling of estrangement will persist. Socrates distanced himself from his society and refused dogmatic solutions to philosophical problems, so we see that to remain in this state is not all bad. In fact, one could argue that it is alienation that forms the basic philosophical attitude of questioning.

Kierkegaard finds in 'the pathos of distance' the source of the poetic spirit that produces verbal creation. Of course, he is the one in the modern age who has stressed the essential 'aloneness' of men in all crucial and decisive phases of choice. To be alienated may be to be creative, although most existentialists are disillusioned romantics. They recognise that such total aloneness and freedom is hard to bear and is also the source of self-destruction, as often as it leads to creative effort. Those who simply accept prevailing values and themselves as they are do not experience alienation, but neither do they learn the origin of philosophic attitude of criticism. In experiencing alienation on a mass scale, America may have taken a step toward creating a generation of philosophers and artists, if they survive the threat of destruction.

Hegel thought philosophy could itself provide a feeling of triumph over alienation. Kierkegaard essentially denies this by reversing the role of the philosopher. The philosopher is one who by nature must be immersed in the ordinary world with its inevitable alienations. Hegel could escape by idealised thought; Kierkegaard could not. If all of us as souls are divided, we all experience alienation to the extent that we do not discover a final unity. If as selves the world around stays alien to us in the sense of being 'other', to live in the world among men is never to escape a feeling of alienations. Estrangement from one's fellowmen and from society often coincides with a period of great productivity. To think that man's experience could be other is to yearn to achieve heaven on earth. It is, as Sartre says, to face becoming God as one's project, to want to have one's essence and existence become identical. But as long as time lasts, man remains free, and contingency is real, this cannot happen.

'Alienation' means to be out of touch with one's time and in that sense inaccessible. This may explain why the generation of the sixties in America experienced alienation so intently that they sopke as if they were the first generation ever to discover it. The age preceding theirs had an unusual sense of identification and 'at-oneness' with their time and society. Individually the youth of the 50's undoubtedly experienced self-alienation as all men and women do, but the outward harmony made it seem minor or less evident. The sense of alienation increased too for those who have high ideals; for them, the disparities between real and ideal are seemingly magnified when the goal is higher. A lethargic satisfied generation disguises its estrangement with contentm The sixties in America were dominated by an intense ideali Thus, estrangement from the social values of the day seemed m intense and less a matter of the normal break-away of matur youth.

"We shall overcome, some day", the lyrics of the '60's c rights theme song runs. "We shall overcome" a sense of ali ation in ourselves and in society. But this Negro spiritual wh the activists of the '60's borrowed for their theme origin referred to the second coming of Jesus, God's judgment, and t total reconstruction of the world at that time. The polit activists changed it to mean "right now", and then they experien a greater sense of alienation between their ideal world and t actual society around them. This is not to say that one sho give up his ideal strivings, but it does mean that those who m for brave new worlds, inevitably experience a greáter sense alienation from their present society. The non-conformist, by action, alienates himself from society and should not expect experience to be any different. Marx thought the modern wo dehumanised man, and Marcuse extended this idea. But worlds dehumanise one who holds ideals and goals that are supported in the society around him.

Marx thought all forms of alienation stemmed from one sour as did Hegel. In the first place, they differ as to this source, wh should make us suspicious of ever gaining complete agreement eradicate alienation. Secondly, we might suspect that the sour of alienation and estrangement are many. In this case, to sta out one source is not to eliminate all. This is essentially disheartening discovery of the American activist youth of the '6 Essentially they won the Viet Nam war protest and even most their civil rights demands. The war stopped and civil rights l were passed, but all alienation did not disappear. Like the par in the New Testament, we may sweep our house clean only find it occupied by more devils by the next morning. We m push the rock up the hill only to see it roll back down again.

Martin Luther King had a dream and so did Marx. Ki wanted to see the promise of freedom for all realised. Ma wanted to build a Utopian society where all divisions betw classes were permanently dissolved. Ideally, there is nothing wrong with either dream; progress can be made. The difficulty comes if we expect all sources of alienation to be removed, never to return again. The affluent American achieved financial wealth, only to find other barriers still preventing his total self-enjoyment. Thus, at the same time they both felt estranged from the values of their society. Those who embodied these values in the 'establishment' found themselves strangely unsatisfied, even though their material ambitions had been achieved. From both sides Americans experienced painful estrangement, but from different sources and for different reasons.

If the sources of alienation are multiple, the sense of personal estrangement is not peculiar to capitalist countries but common to all men. Certainly the prominence of Russian dissidents today gives evidence that not everyone is happy with the fate of society under communism. Party leaders in Moscow surely must be wondering now if alienation is not a necessary part of the life of all intellectuals and thus remains a possible experience under communism also. Alienation is increased by education, an experience common to both Berkeley and Moscow. As the educational level rises, so does the level of social and individual criticism and the sense of alienation. Of course, it may lie dormant for a time, until it burst forth when events reveal its presence and make it impossible to ignore.

Some religions by their nature call on us to alienate ourselves from society and its ways. In fact, all must do this to some extent or they cannot be religious. Christianity wants its followers to be "in the world but not of it", which certainly means a sense of outward estrangement. The observant Jew does not live like other men, nor does the strict Hindu. It is just that, even in religious life, we experience times of harmony and identity man to man, society to man, and man to his religion. But eventually the time will go "out of joint". Now the alienation experienced for a time comes back with double impact. Those religions which exhort man to a higher, purer life are alienation-inducing; Marx did not see religions performing this function in his day, but then it is a commonplace of religion that all fall degenerate and need to be reformed back to a condition of purity from time to time.

One interesting feature of our situation in America has been that those who write about alienation have not been primarily philosophers but psychologists and social critics. This may tell us that philosophers have fallen on comfortable and decadent days. Thus, they fail to experience alienation in pursuing their craft as they should. However, alienation is often first experienced in religion as estrangement from God, and the lack of religious interest in recent philosophers may have deprived them of this primal experience. Spiritual death is alienation from God, as both St. Paul and Kierkegaard agree. But if God and the spiritual life are both neglected, alienation can appear to be overcome, until some rupture in events uncovers it again. Perhaps true unity exists if the self is overcome and individuality is transcended. But if this ceases to be a human goal, a resurgence of alienation is inevitable.

Intellect and feeling must be harmonised if self-estrangement is to be overcome. But have philosophers of late taken this as their task, or simply the refinement of intellect ? If the harmony of intellect and feeling is neglected, a disproportion in the human soul is bound to appear. However, we need to ask whether philosophy itself can achieve this reconciliation, or whether it must come simultaneously in religion, in art, or in a life of action. We should not assume the removal of alienation by following any one means until we have experienced such final harmony. Even then, we can never be sure that our way is the way for all men. Of course, in recent American life the prominence of alienation has been attributed to a rising consciousness among black and other minorities. *The Invisible Man* portrays a sense of the alienation experienced by the black man in a white society. The writings of James Baldwin and others outline the feeling of poetic distance from society that is the black experience. We came to experience greater alienation in America just because we finally came to expect that it should be overcome.

Yet, just as this sense of alienation rose to a crescendo, so did black creative effort in literature, dance, theology, and art. One does not justify black suffering by pointing this out, but it does highlight the relationship between alienation and creativity. Alienation occurs when a person's self-conception changes. He is no longer what he was, and his sense of estrangement from his past is painful. Thus, no new awareness can come without its price in personal pain. Any other worldly consciousness is by nature alienated, as is any reformer or revolutionary. Momentous events outside the person seem to result from his internal condition of disproportion. Internal alienation becomes manifest in outward disruption if not even chaos. If Hegel is correct in contending that alienation can only be overcome by achieving universality, then to the extent that we remain individual as Kierkegaard wanted us, we cannot overcome alienation and we will continue to experience it. Hegel and Marx differ only about the type of universalisation desirable and the means to achieve it. Neither considers individuality as prize as Kierkegaard does. Recent American experience has been to reject uniformity, to stress individuality, but this proportionately increases the sense of alienation. Only the romantic considers individually an exhilerating experience. The disillusioned romantic knows that individuality means to live alone and that means pain, no matter how productive the experience may be otherwise. Unity with society can be achieved only by surrendering the particular self, and this is precisely what American youth of 60's found they did not want to do.

Marx wanted to release private property from its alienation, but the important question being asked with increasing frequency, is, "What price will man pay to achieve a state of contentment ?" Communism overcomes human self-alienation by universalisation, Marx contends, and so it provides a definitive resolution to the antagonisms between man and man. But, we must ask, is Marx's tracing of the source of alienation to a single root correct, and is the loss of individuality a price man is willing to pay for a sense of oneness ? To answer "no" to either count puts us back where Greek tragedy began and denies that Hegel's age, or Marx's, is superior to any other. The issue is whether definite solutions not available before have been revealed in a new theory, or whether new solutions can always be proposed but each will remain as one among many in an eduring human situation.

Erich Fromm had a great deal to do with popularising the term 'alienation' in America. In general, he simply meant by it that something is not as it should be. Sometimes he uses it to mean simply loneliness, and at other times, 'alienation' is a sense of powerlessness in the face of vast social structures. Americans, then, discovered in the '60's in a painful way the disparity betw the way something is and the way it ought to be. They expe enced alienation, the loss of a sense of progress, and the convict that the modern world had in its hand the tools needed to put m on a different plane from where he had traditionally been. Thi went well in the '50's, and the discrepancies in ourselves and society were hidden. It seemed as if the millennium was at ha But as disturbing factions and disillusions crept in, aberration w experienced again, and all the more intently then because w thought it could be banished by the achievements of the mode scientific world.

Disunity is always involved where alienation is felt, so th Americans did experience disunity of purpose and a separati from their general goals and ways of life. If unity is achiev again, the American sense of alienation is overcome, but the ca is that we now believe such unity to be momentary if desirab and not a permanent achievement. Church and state in Ameri seemed to have a unity of purpose and an agreed way of life for time. When these came into conflict and alienation was expe enced, our notions of religion had become so happy and accepti that the reappearance of alienation in the '60's led us to think re gion had failed. All that really happened is that Americans ha again experienced the primal religious situation of standing alo before God as sinners.

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AN ADVAITIC EMENDATION OF KANT : A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE METAPHYSICS[1]

We shall attempt to explain and clarify the central problems involved in the philosophical investigations of Kant and Saṁkara. During Kant's time the claims of both science and morality were at stake. Encouraged by the success of mathematics the rationalist philosophers tried to apprehend even the noumenal reality through the categories of the understanding. Philosophy, as a matter of fact, sought the assistance of mathematics because of the clearness and certainty which distinguish the conclusions of the latter and which she wished to obtain for her own. In excess of her zeal she was not content with striving after this ideal of indefectible certitude but forgetting the real diversity of the two fields, strove to imitate other qualities which are not transferable. Instead of learing from mathematics philosophy became subservient to it. Not only this, what is worse is the application of the categories of the natural sciences which are valid only in the realm of sense-experience, to the transcendent reality which is never given in sensibility. This unauthorised and unwarranted extension of the categories of the understanding could produce nothing but 'transcendental illusion'.[2] It blurred the distinction between the principles valid within the realm of moral and religious consciousness. On the other hand, the empiricist philosophers challenged the efficacy of scientific reasoning by denying the necessity and universality of its governing principles. No doubt they accepted the validity of mathematical judgments but they maintained that the judgments of mathematics have nothing to do with the matters of fact. No *apriori* judgment can be made about the nature of reality. Experience is the only and exclusive source of the knowledge of reality but experience can give only what is contingent and probable. Universal certainty and apodictic validity is something for which experience cannot manage to account. As Hume pointed out, whatever appears to be necessary in experience can be accounted for by the laws of association based on customs, habits etc.[3] Experience gives only what is psychologically necessary. In this way, the sceptics robbed physical sciences of their secure ground. It is in this predicament that Kant's contribution to philosophy is to be evaluated.

Kant's aim was to safeguard the claims of both science and morality. He did it by studying critically the origin, validity and the limits of the concepts of the understanding. Thus his problem is of twofold nature : to determine both validity and limit of the universal principles of knowledge. The first is necessarily related with the second. That is to say, the validity of the principles of understanding is confined to the reality given in sensibility. The purpose of the transcendental deduction of the categories is to establish this point clearly. He also proves negatively that when these principles of understanding are applied to anything which is super-sensible or transcendent, they cease to be valid and we get only 'transcendetal illusion'. Thus Kant succeeds in defending the claims of science and morality against the attacks of dogmatists and sceptics by creating a dichotomy between knowledge and faith and consequently between the known and the unknown or phenomenon and the noumenon. In this way, he constructs successfully the metaphysics of experience but is unable to discover the nature of higher reality positively. He postulates it only as an ideal which can be believed but never known either objectively or subjectively.[4]

It is on this point where an Advaitic emendation of Kantian philosophy can be suggested. Kant left philosophy in an impasse. It was for his successors to find the way out. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, made important contributions towards this end. But the efforts of the post-Kantian German idealists are not absolutely flawless. All these systems failed to realise the importance of self-awareness. They failed to realize the importance of immediate experience which alone can solve these tedious problems. Bradley made some improvement in this respect. But his doctrine of self which is almost a relapse into empiricism makes him unable to solve this problem. Though Bradley was one of the greatest advocates among the exponents of immediacy in western philosophy, he could not realize that only genuine immediacy is that of self.[5] Śaṁkara's philosophy must be viewed as an important and valuable rejoinder to all those systems which either make the really real unknown or make it known through the principle of mediacy or divorce self from genuine immediacy. In the opinion of Śaṁkara self is the highest reality which is capable of being realised in immediate experience or Ātmānubhūti.[6] Here Śaṁkara's views appear to be quite in consonance with those of Kant in so far as he maintains that discursive intelligence cannot apprehend the self.[7] But like him he does not take help of faith. He solves this problem with the help of reason itself as for him self-knowledge is the highest mode of knowing.

Both Kant and Śaṁkara have the same epistemological problem before them, i.e. the problem of the knowledge of the unconditioned. Kant had solved the problem of the limit of the theoretical activity of reason in knowledge. He, as a matter of fact, defined the scope of agreed knowledge in philosophy and consequently put philosophy on the sure path of science. Kant admitted the philosophical knowledge, the knowledge of the unconditioned, as merely an ideal. He laid much emphasis upon the *aprioriness* of knowledge characterized by necessity and universality but he paid almost no attention to the realization of self as the sole and only reality in the intuitive awareness or any other form of higher experience. To say that noumenal entities are postulates of ethics and morality realizable in practical reason, is simply the denial of their theoretic awareness. Kant believed in a metaphysical reality but he denied knowledge of it. It was a challenge to reason. The half-hearted solution which Kant found in Practical Reason was actually no solution. A theoretical problem requires a theoretical solution. But Kant could not meet this demand due to his restricted assumptions and limited metaphysical outlook. But Śaṁkara does not have recourse to practical reason to safeguard the freedom of the self. He relies upon the more natural and common experience and explores the implications of the various phases of experience, waking, dreaming, sleeping etc. Kant missed this mainly because it is not the vogue in the West to explain these phases of life.[8]

Kant could not possibly solve the problem of the knowledge of the unconditioned due to his forced distinction between the intellect of man and that of God. In his opinion man's intellect is discursive while the divine intellect is supposed to be intuitive. This distinction between the human and the divine intelligence made it difficult for Kant to account successfully for the ultimate issues of epistemology. What he failed to realize is the essential identity of the human and the divine intelligence. Śaṁkara could solve these problems successfully, because he realized the essentia oneness of man and God.[9] According to Kant man and God belong to two absolutely different and disparate realms and what is the privilege for the God is the privation for the man. Due to this predilection Kant maintained the view that God knows the thing-in-itself through an intellectual intuition[10] and man can manage to have an access to it only through faith. But this dichotomy of intellectual intuition and faith is almost foreign to the advaitism of Śaṁkara. According to Śaṁkara there is only one way of knowing the unconditioned which is the same as the ultimate reality. It is the direct experience of it—the Anubhava or Ātma-pratyaya.[11] Kant invents faith for this purpose. Thus he failed to resist the temptation to apprehend the ultimate reality. It is only his narrow conception of knowledge which led him to forget that faith is only another name for the higher knowledge. And because he could not realise it, he failed to give the correct account of this mode of knowing. Ultimately intellectual intuition and faith are simply different expressions for one and the same thing, if the same ultimate reality is known to God through intellectual intuition and revealed to man through faith. Samyagjñāna is vastutantram. It is of one and the same form (Ekarūpam) and Anubhava is the means to it.[12] The self for Śaṁkara is not a subject in the sense in which it means an agent as distinguished from knowing and the object of knowledge. It is knowledge or consciousness as such.

So far as the knowledge of the unconditioned in the objective attitude is concerned, Śaṁkara would like to agree with Kant. The unconditioned cannot be known as an object of knowledge. When such an attempt is made, it results into a sort of philosophical smuggling amounting to 'transcendental illusion' in Kant and Adhyāsa[13] in Śaṁkara. Both of them realized correctly that self is the presupposition of whatever is known objectively and consequently cannot be dragged to the realm of that which depends on it. It is at the back of all psychic activity and therefore psychically unknowable. But while Kant makes self unknowable and unspeakable, Śaṁkara would like to make the case for both these possibilities. Though the unconditioned or self is objectively unknown, it can be subjectively realized and though it is literally unspeakble it is expressible symbolically. Śaṁkara makes it possible to know and speak about self within theoretic consciousness. When we speak about the self or the unconditioned, it should not be understood literally but analogically or symbolically. It is dogmatism to maintain that the sole function of language is either to describe the facts of natural sciences or to express our emotional ejaculations. In speculative metaphysics language is used for neither of these purposes. It is used there symbolically. The metaphysical reality is expressible in language though it is not meant. It is only suggested symbolically. By investing language with a symbolic dimension, the Advaitin lifts linguistic expressivity to a higher altitude, from where it could negotiate to express the unthinkable. The Mahāvākyas like Tattvamasi do express a non-discursive situation —one purely metaphysical in essence. As a matter of fact, we start speculative thinking with spiritual experience of Brahman or self. And whatever is said about Brahman and his power may be regarded as the conceptual formulation of this experience. But this conceptual formulation is to be interpreted only symbolically. The intelligible contents of pure consciousness as expressed in the Ātmanic metaphysics of Śaṁkara are to be understood only symbolically.[14]

We have maintained that there are two dimensions of knowability, one Kantian, limiting knowledge to objects given in experience, and the other, Advaitic, extending the sphere of knowability beyond objects of sense-experience. The Advaita criticism of Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā philosophies indicates beyond all doubts, that Advaitism is much aware of the unknowability of the unconditioned as an object as is Kant, but Kant stops short of this and his dialectic is used simply to demonstrate the unknowable nature of the unconditioned. But the dialectic in Advaita is double-edged. It points to the limitation of thought but vindicates the scope of reason (Pure Reason) by showing that it is also knowledge, knowledge-in-itself, i.e. knowledge which neither contemplates an object, nor does lose its intelligibility. Those who deny outright the possibility of such intuitive knowledge (Anubhava) in the name of reason are actually dogmatists in disguise. The account of experience as we find in Śaṅkara is essentially an attempt to get beyond the dogmatism of the type of Kant and analyse experience in a wider and more comprehensive sense and consequently to bring out the full significance of the higher and the more subtle forms of perception of reality already present in it. What Kant actually gives is not a theory of knowledge as such or of true knowledge, a knowledge of reality-in-itself, but essentially a theory of scientific knowledge which can at the most ward off the attacks of scepticism against it. This is the minimum which a rationalist can legitimately do and Kant attempted to accomplish that end.

We maintain that agnosticism is not the legitimate culmination of philosophical enquiry. And to justify and vindicate metaphysics in an irrational key is also the defeat of philosophy. The unknowability of the unconditioned is a necessary corollary of the objective attitude. \To think that all that is known and is knowable, is an object to a subject, is to insist on the phenomenalisation of the noumenal. To maintain that the unconditioned is realisable through moral effort, amounts to a phenomenalisation of an 'idea of reason', if not in cognitive consciousness, in volitional consciousness at least. So philosophical thinking in Kant has got an indissoluble tendency towards objectifying what is not at all objectifiable.[15] But Śaṁkara, while denying the knowledge of the ultimate reality as an object, very clearly admits the possibility of its knowledge as the ultimate knower. In every act of knowledge, in every event of cognition, we are conscious of its existence but not as an object but as a subject. Here we have clearly discerned an Advaitic emendation of Kantian epistemology. Ward's pure ego, Alexander's enjoyment and Śaṁkara's Aparokṣānubhūti,[16] are all knowledge par excellence and yet not the knowledge of an object. Kant no doubt claims to have effected a Copernican Revolution in philosophy by shifting the centre of gravity of knowledge from the object to the subject, but his revolution remained incomplete, in so far as Kant lapsed into the objective attitude, and forgot that the subject is essentially free and even when it is unobjectifiable it is knowable par excellence. In case Kant would have managed to realise the essential knowability of the self, as freedom from objectivity, he would have given to the unconditioned a better status in knowledge-situation than he has, and would not have connected it with a moral volition that negates the cognitive mode of consciousness. If the Kantian approach to the epistemology smacks of a failure, the blame consists in the very motive for philosophising in the Kantian strain.

But such an awareness on our part with a reference to the limitation of Kantian approach is no condemnation of Kant. It is simply an attempt to vindicate metaphysics by showing the way in which a metaphysical statement symbolises a theoretic function. Philosophy from the standpoint of Advaita Vedānta of Śaṁkara has its beginning and end in revelation. It begins with Śruti and ends in Anubhūti thereby making the spitirual heritage of mankind a personal possession.

Kant realised in the Dialectic of his Critique of Pure Reason that the human reason in the true sense was wider than understanding. It never remained satisfied with the conditioned. It always craved for the unconditioned—the limitless. But the prejudices for the conclusions reached in the Analytic compelled Kant to restrict knowledge only to what is given in sensibility. He had, therefore, no alternative except to maintain that reason in the wider sense can give only ideas of reason, which function only as 'heuristic maxims', and remain only problematic concepts. These ideas of reason remained only ideals of knowledge just to guide our understanding. They were only regulative principles. As man was devoid of intellectual intuition, there was no possibility for him to realise their nature in the theoretic mode. Kant, no doubt, pleaded for the possibility of their realisation in the Practical Reason and the other ethical works,[17] through faith. But faith was either identical with higher reason or not. If latter, it was only a poor subterfuge. Had Kant understood his conclusions clearly, he would have realised that higher reason has an access to the highest mode of being. Śaṁkara did realize and hence he maintained that discursive knowledge is incapable of revealing the ultimate reality but the ultimate reality is not beyond the Ātmānubhūti. We cannot agree with Professor A. C. Mukerji on any other point more than when he says that Śaṁkara's epistemology is to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the rationalism of Leibnitz and Hegel and from the agnosticism of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, on the other. It is rational intuitionism as distinct from antirational mysticism.[18] Thus thought in his schemes of things far from being a useless superfluity represents an unavoidable stage of discipline leading to the highest form of experience in which the ultimate reality becomes self-luminous and self-revealed. This higher experience, in the Advaitism of Śaṁkara, although differing from logical ratiocination or discursive knowledge, is yet to be regarded as the inspiration, the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge.

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NOTES

1. By an Advaitic emendation of Kant I simply mean a correction of Kantian epistemology in the light of the Advaitism of Śaṁkara. A comparative study which consists in mutual supplementation of arguments and consequent clarification of issues alone can point out the new constructions in epistemology and thus help the growth of the philosophical heritage.

2. See N. K. Smith's translation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, MacMillan and Company, London, 1964, pp. 299-300 for Kant's views on Transcendental Illusion.

3. See Hume, Enquiry, Section IV, Part II.

4. See Prof. G. R. Malkani's article published in '*The Philosophical Quarterly*', Amalner, India, Volume XVIII, No. 1, April, 1942, pp. 1–8.

5. Bradley's doctrine of Immediate experience has been criticised even by James Ward in one of his articles to *Mind*, New series, Volume 34, 1925, entitled 'Bradley's doctrine of Experience' pp. 13–38.

6. See *Śaṁkara Bhāṣya*, on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2.

7. Śaṁkara's view about the limitations of reasoning in apprehending the self or the highest reality can be gathered freely from his comments on the sūtra 'Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' in his commentary on Brahmasūtra.

8. See, Prof. T. R. V. Murti's article 'The Rational Basis of Advaitism', published in '*The Philosophical Quarterly*', Volume VI, No. 1, April, 1930, p. 70, Amalner, India.

9. Jīvo Brahmaiva Nāparaḥ.

10. For Kant's view on Intellectual Intuition, see, N. K. Smith's *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, MacMillan and Company, 1918, p. 160.

11. See Śāṁkara Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra 1.4.7.

12. Samyagjñānamekarūpam Vastutantratvāt —Śāṁkara Bhāṣya, on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.2. See also Śāṁkara Bhāṣya on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* 4.5.15.

13. See for a detailed account of Śaṁkara's theory of Adhyāsa, the introduction to *Śāṁkara Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra.*

14. See K. C. Bhattacharya's *Studies in Philosophy*, Volume 1, p. 95.

15. See Professor S. S. Roy's *The Heritage of Śaṁkara*, Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1965, p. 170.

16. See Prof. N. K. Devaraja's *An Introduction to Śaṁkara's Theory of Knowledge*, Motilal Banarsi Dass, pp. 184-185 for the nature of Knower as ' Aparokṣa '.

17. Cf. *Ground Work of the Metaphysics of Morals.*

18. *The Nature of Self*—Second Edition, The Indian Press, Allahabad, 1943, p. 367.

PROF. AYER'S CONCEPTION OF SENSE-DATA

Prof. Ayer is more definite and certain in his pronouncements and professions of his theories regarding the nature of sense-data and their relation to physical objects than Prof. Moore. Whereas Prof. Moore oscillates between two extreme positions whether sense-data do or do not form part of physical objects; or whether they can or cannot exist without their being perceived by a mind, Prof. Ayer is quite definite and emphatic in that physical objects *can* be completely reduced to sense-data and that sense-data *cannot* exist without their being perceived by a perceipient mind. We can well gather Moore's oscillating mind from the remarks that he made in his contribution to The Philosophy of G. E. Moore in reply to his critics : "Although I am still inclined to think that no after-image (and therefore, also no sense-datum) can possibly exist except while it is being directly apprehended—and, more than this, none that I directly apprehend can possibly exist except while I am directly apprehending it, I cannot see why there should be a contradiction in supposing the opposite. I cannot see where the contradiction lies"[1].

Prof. Ayer takes up the thread here and takes upon himself the task of solving the problem posed by Moore. Whereas Moore does not see the contradiction where it lies, Ayer locates it.

The most characteristic difference between Moore and Ayer is that whereas for Moore the problems enumerated above are matters of fact, for Ayer they are matters of convenient linguistic terminology. The reason why these problems are not matters of fact is that they cannot be put to an empirical test. To say that we directly perceive our physical hand or a part of it, or that a particular sense-datum can continue to exist even if we cease to perceive it are claims which can neither be substantiated nor confuted by resort to experience. Similarly, the problem whether sense-data can appear to have qualities that they do not really have, can also not be solved by any device or empirical verification. These propositions, if they are at all true, are true only analytically, i.e. their truth depends on the meanings that are given to 'being part of the physical object', 'being directly seen' etc. How Ayer solves these problems will be taken one by one.

Whether we perceive Physical Objects or sense-data :

We have "somewhat" discussed this problem in our treatment of "Is there a problem about Sense-data" and made references to the view of Ayer in this connection. There, we noted that he recommended the use of the term "sense-datum" instead of physical objects as a matter of linguistic convention and not because of its stronger claims to facts of experience. Experience is not going to decide the issue either in favour of the one or the other. Nor it is going to be decided by the actual usage of the various expressions involved. Once[2] Ayer held the view that such problems can be solved by reflecting on the standard usages of the different expressions but now[3] he holds the view that it cannot be so solved because of there being no established usages of such terms as 'physical objects' and 'sense-data'. How is the problem to be solved then ? Ayer's view is that the problem cannot be solved so long as it is assumed that the truth or falsehood of the proposition is already there to be discovered. The problem is "not as that of assessing the validity of a proposition on the evidence already available but rather as that of 'manufacturing' the evidence".[4] Alternatively, in order to remove such doubts from our minds whether we perceive physical objects or sense-data, what we must think about is 'not the actual truth or falsehood of the propositions in question (for this is not determinable) but the advisability of making them true or false'.[5] Thus, when Moore holds that some visual sense-data, are identical with parts of the surfaces of physical objects while others are not, he is not making two incompatible assertions either logically or empirically, but rather 'hesitating over the choice of alternative conventions'.[6] There being no fixed usages of words with regard to sense-data, their usage will have to be prescribed and determined by us.

Prof. Moore has a different opinion about the meaning of sense-data. According to him, though the meaning of a sense-datum cannot be settled by the method of empirical verification, it can be settled by the analysis of standard usage. He says that 'such a question whether the surfaces of physical objects are directly seen can be reformulated in a way which does not bring in any of the technical expressions as 'sense-datum', 'directly see' or 'directly apprehend' but does bring those expressions which do have a standard usage in oridinary life. The expressions I mean are those which consist in saying such words as "This is a penny" or "That is a penny", *together with* some standard gesture which seems to explain what object we are referring to by the words "this" and "that"; and if we could only discover the right analysis of what is meant by such expressions, my question would be answered [7]. Moore justifies this analysis on the basis of Russell's Theory of Descriptions as he says that when expressions like 'this is a penny' are used in this way, there is one and only one object to which the demonstrative refers, 'an object which it is tempting to suppose to be identical with *the* part, which (the percipient) is seeing of the physical object's surface but with regard to which on the other hand, there are strong reasons for supposing that it cannot be identical with *the* part which he is seeing, of the physical object's surface.[8] It is in this way that Moore says that the meaning of a sense-datum can be understood by providing explicit definition of it together with a demonstrative gesture.

Ayer's objection to the above analysis given by Moore is that in his analysis of the meaning of a sense-datum as 'this is a penny' together with a gesture, the demonstrative '*this*' *does not refer to any object as Moore describes.* In a case where I am looking at a penny, and say with an appropriate gesture, "this is a penny", the word "this", does not stand for a sense-datum which can be identified with *the* part of the panny's surface, rather it stands for the object "penny" itself. The word "this" would have stood for the sense-datum if I would have said ' this is the surface of the penny' or 'this is part of the surface of a penny' and not 'this is a penny'. But here Prof. Ayer is mistaken in saying that for Prof. Moore, the word 'this' in 'this is a penny' stands for a sense-datum as we have made clear in giving his analysis of sense-datum. Even for him, the word 'this' stands for an object[9]; it is short for a description of the type "the object of which *this* is part". It stands for a sense-datum when the word 'this' is no longer short for a description but only serves the purpose of demonstration.

Elucidating further his point, Prof. Ayer says that even in cases where I mistake some other object for a penny and say 'this is a penny' the word 'this' does not refer to a sense-datum but denotes whatever *object* it is that I am mistaking for a penny. And in extreme cases where I undergo a complete hallucination and say 'this is a penny', the demonstrative 'this' does not stand for any object at all. The upshot of all this is that a sense-datum cannot be explained in terms of its explicit definitions together with a demonstrative gesture for it may contain expressions or words which do not stand for anything at all. Ayer's point is that 'it is a mistake to identify the meaning even of a demonstrative with its denotation'. There may be demonstratives which do not denote anything at all. Moore's conception of sense-data is the result of his faulty logic, i.e. that of identifying the meaning of a demonstrative with its denotation. The full meaning of a sense-datum cannot be understood in this way; it can be understood only in the way we decide to use it.

In our day-to-day talks, we do not use the word 'see' in one invariable way. Sometimes, the word 'see', is used in a way where what is 'seen' does actually exist and at other times we use the word 'see' where what is 'seen' does not in fact exist but is only imagined to exist. Let us take the case of Macbeth's perception of the dagger. The situation can be described either by saying that Macbeth *saw* a dagger which did not exist or by saying that he imagined he saw a dagger, but did not really see it. If we say that he saw the dagger, then we are using the word 'see' in a way that from 'X is seen', it does not follow that 'X exists'. If on the other hand, we use the word 'see' in a way that 'X is seen' does entail 'X exists', we must not say that Macbeth saw the dagger, but that he only imagined that he saw it. Both the uses are legitimate from the common sense point of view. But the question is which of the two we are to adopt in direct apprehension. The point is : if we can be said to directly apprehend X, does it or does it not entail the proposition 'X exists' ?

Prof. Moore does not explicitly state his intention of the use of the word 'direct apprehension'. But one thing is clear that he thinks it logically inappropriate to say that a thing is being directly apprehended but that it does not exist. Thus, in the case of Macbeth's perception of the dagger, Prof. Moore would say that there existed a sense-datum which Macbeth was directly apprehending, though his sense-datum was not identical with part of the surface of a real physical dagger. In this sense, it is only a sense-datum and not a physical object, that can be directly apprehended. For, with regard to a physical object, it can always be maintained logically that it is seen or otherwise perceived in a sense of the word 'see', from which it does not follow that it exists. We may be undergoing an illusion or hallucination. Thus, a physical object and not a sense-datum, cannot be directly apprehended. From which it follows that no sense-datum can possibly be identical with any physical entity.

If it is so, all attempts to treat physical entities as sense-datum as Prof. Moore has done, are bound to be a failure. This failure can be seen on three different fronts. Firstly, if one takes any physical entity as a sense-datum, one will have to use the words which stand for the various modes of direct apprehension in a way that to say that something is being directly apprehended, does not entail saying either that it has whatever characteristics it appears to have or that it exists. But, this does not meet the purpose which the philosophers who have used the term sense-datum, have commonly intended it to fulfil. For, one of the motives that led philosophers to use the terminology of sense-data, was their desire to be able to say, in such cases as that of Macbeth's imaginary dagger, that something, which existed was being seen even though it was not a real physical dagger. One of the advantages of this procedure was that it serves to clarify the meaning of statements about physical objects in terms of statements about sense-data which are of a different logical form. But this desire on the part of these philosophers cannot be said to be satisfied if the sense-data themselves are taken to be parts of physical objects which allows the apprehension of sense-data to be mistaken both qualitatively and existentially.

If we define direct apprehension in a way other than the one described above, it will have the effect of separating sense-data from physical entities. One such way to define direct apprehension is that to say of something that it is directly apprehended, will entail saying that it exists but does not have the characteristics that it appears to have. But this way of defining 'direct apprehension' would have the serious objection that it deals with qualitative illusions on a footing different from existential illusions. If a sense-datum which the observer is directly apprehending, does really exist even though the physical object, which we may imgaine he is perceiving, does not exist, there is no reason why a qualitative illusion may not be dealt with in a similar way. We have as good a reason for saying that something i.e. a sense-datum which one is directly apprehending is really yellow, even though the object which has it is white, as we have for saying, in the case of Macbeth's hallucinatory perception of the dagger, that something i.e. a sense-datum, which he was directly apprehending, did really exist even though the object to which it belonged, did not exist.

Thus, the only course open to us if we are serious about our use of the terminology of sense-data and if it is to serve some useful purpose—is to exclude the possibility of their being either qualitatively or existentially delusive. That is to say that 'X is directly apprehended' would entail—'X exists, and X has whatever characteristics it appears to have'. This will have the effect of completely separating the sense-data from physical objects. Again, in order to minimise the danger of confusing sense-data with physical entities, the converse of it should also be taken to be true. That is, 'X exists' would entail 'X is directly apprehended'. In other words, the existence of X a sense-datum is made as logically dependent upon its being directly apprehended and the converse of it is also true. So that when Berkeley said *esse est percipi*, it is a proposition not to be proved on the basis of empirical facts, but to be accepted on a well-established convention of our use of the word 'sense-datum'. It is simply a matter of deciding that the expression 'X exists' where X is a sense-datum, is to be understood both to be entailed by and to entail 'X is directly apprehended'.

Can Sense-Data have Characteristics that they do not appear to have ?

In the previous section we have seen that we have so used the word 'sense-datum', that it cannot *appear* to have characteristics that it does not really have. Let us see if the converse of it is also true, that is, a sense-datum cannot *have* characteristics that it does not appear to have. The very fact that we have resolved to interpret 'X exists' where X is a sense-datum, to mean 'X is directly apprehended', excludes the possibility for a sense-field to have constituents which are not apprehended at all. As against this view, there are philosophers who maintain that sense-data may be much more differentiated than we think them to be[10] or that "two sense-data may be really different when we connot perceive any difference between them"[11] or that 'sense-field may really contain a definite number of constituents of a certain kind without their being apprehended otherwise than as merely numerous'. Let us see what meaning can be attached to these statements.

Let us take the first statement i.e. 'that sense-data may be much more differentiated than we think them to be'. Ayer maintained in one of his previous works^{12} that such a statement to be meaningful would involve the use of a physiological criterion to determine the real characteristics of sense-data. But if sense-data themselves are to be defined in physical or physiological terms, this will have the effect of nullifying the utility of the sense-datum terminology as a tool for the analysis of propositions about physical objects. That is why, he maintained there that in the domain of sense-data, whatever appeared and also only what appeared, should be taken as real. Thus, if the use of a microscope reveals details in an object that were not to be seen previously, it would not mean that some sense-data were more differentiated than others, but that one set of sense-data was being replaced by another and this would perfectly be a legitimate and adequate description of the empirical facts. Similarly, to say that two sense-data might be really different, when we cannot perceive any difference between them, is based on the assumption that the relation of exact resemblance was transitive in its application to sense-data, as well as in its application to physical objects and this assumption can easily be contradicted. Again, to say that a sense-field may contain a definite number of constituents although it is apprehended as merely numerous, is obviously false. In a case of a person's seeing stars, there is no doubt that a number of sense-data are apprehended without being apprehended as a definite number, the same thing cannot be said of physical objects like actual stars. While, it would be self-contradictory for physical objects to be numerous without consisting of any definite number, the same cannot be true about sense-data. The upshot of the whole thing is that a sense-datum cannot have characteristics that it does not appear to have.

Prof. Price^{13} and Mr. Chisholm^{14} have raised objections against the last point on the ground that it commits us to saying that 'a sense-datum can have a determinable characteristic, without having *any* of the determinate characteristics which fall under that determinable' which is like saying that an event will occur in a given year but not in any of the particular months of which the year is composed. The objection would have been perfectly legitimate, had the epithet 'numerous' been applied to physical objects than to sense-data, but it loses much of its force when it is remembered that the epithet 'numerous' refers to sense-data. To take Price's own example of a striped tiger, it would be self-contradictory to say that the tiger has a number of 'physically dark stripes on the left-hand side of its body' without having some definite number, but it is not self-contradictory to say of the visual sense-field, corresponding to the physical-expanse of the tiger, that it contains a number of stripes without containing any definite number. The reason is that the characteristics which are to be ascribed to this sense-field are not necessarily those that the tiger really has, but only those that it appears to have, so that when stars are apprehended as numerous without being apprehended as a definite number, the reference was not to the physical characteristic of *being* numerous but to the physical characteristic of *looking* numerous. Prof. Price himself admits this when he says that the stripes on the tiger look numerous, does not entail saying that they look to be a definite number. What is really meant by saying that a sense-field contains a number of stripes, is simply that it has the Gestalt quality of being striated and the presence of this quality, though quite compatible with there being a definite number, does not entail it. In the same vein, Price remarks, that a sense-datum, say, of a flower, 'might be blue without having any definite shade of blue' or it 'might have a roundish shape, but not any definite sort of roundish shape'. If it is insisted that the very meaning of the word 'determinable' is such that it precludes the possibility for anything, whether physical objects or sense-datum, to have a determinable characteristic without having some determinate chatracteristic which falls under the determinable, Prof. Ayer answers that, in that case, "words like 'blue' and 'roundish' are not in this usage names of determinable characteristics, but of qualities which are simple in the sense of not being analysable into a disjunction of others just as a word like 'striated' when applied to a sense-field, may be used as the name of a Gestalt quality, which is not analysable in terms of a numerical disjunction of stripes".[15]

Prof. Ayer's Comments :

There are philosophers who maintain that sense-data are a nuisance and their introduction does not serve any useful purpose. They go even to the length of saying that their use in interpreting perceptual phenomena is quite illegitimate. Thus, Prof. Ryle remarks in his Concept of Mind that "this whole theory (of sense-data) rests upon a logical howler, the howler, namely, of assimilating the concept of sensation to the concept of observation".[16] The ground for taking this a howler is that if observing something implies having a sensation then having a sensation cannot itself be a form of observation. Otherwise, it would in its turn involve having a further sensation thus leading to an indefinite regress. His point is : what can be said about observation or perception, cannot significantly be said about sensation. 'When a person has been watching a horse-race, it is proper to ask whether he had a good or bad view of it, whether he watched it carefully or carelessly and whether he tried to see as much of it as he could.' But it is quite foolish to ask such questions about sensations any more than any one asks how the first letter in "London" is spelled.[17] Sensations are 'not objects of observation' and 'having a sensation cannot itself be a species of perceiving, finding or espying'.[18]

Prof. Ayer, in reply to the above objection, will say that Prof. Ryle is using a physiological criterion[19] to determine the characteristics of sense-data which cannot be admitted as it begs the question at issue. Moreover, the objection is based on the assumption that it is impossible to perceive anything without having the appropriate sensation. But Ryle himself subsequently does not accept the above assumption as he says that 'the primary concept of sensation is not a component of the generic concept of perception, since it is just a species of that genus.[20] There is no doubt that some of our perceptions are accompanied by sansations, such as a strain in the eyes or a tingling in the ears, these sensations do not represent the objects that are seen or heard. They are not visual or auditory impressions or sense-data of which philosophers, of late, have been talking. They do not even exist. "Impressions are ghostly impulses, postulated for the ends of a para-mechanical theory".[21]

Prof. Ayer, as against the above view, maintains that firstly, the advocates of sense-data do not treat sensation as a form of observation; rather they do not believe in the existence of sensations at all. Secondly, even if they treat sensation as a form of observation, Observation is not here something which itself entails sensation. Thus they are not committed to indefinite regress. We have seen that the sense-datum philosophers have a special reason for analysing the perception of physical objects into the sensing of seeming objects, but these reasons do not apply to the sensing of seeming objects themselves. Thus, there is no question of adopting the general view that we cannot approach an object except through an intermediary. Prof. Ryle seems to have adopted this general view. When it is accepted that we *can* be aware of a sense-datum without there being a sensation, it "in effect explains the having of sensations as the *not* having any sensations."[22] Here Prof. Ryle understands by "sensations" as "being sensitively affected". But what is this "being sensitively affcted" ? Is it not explaining experiences in physico-physiological terms ? If it is so, how are we going to explain these physico-physiological affects ? If we explain experiences in physico-physiological terms and physico-physiological affects in empirical terms, will it not involve the fallacy of circular reasoning? In order to avoid these difficulties, Prof. Ayer suggests that one of the two should be taken as primary and the other as simply derived. Obviously nothing can be more primary than our experiences, for after all, all our knowledge ultimately depends upon them. Thus on Prof. Ayer's view to talk of some-one's sensing a sense-datum is just another way of saying that he is sensitively affected. There is no use to introduce anything over and above sense-data at all in the form of sensations.

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NOTES

1. The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, p. 660.
2. Language, Truth and Logic, p. 57
3. Philosophical Essays, pp. 76–80.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Reply to critics in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore, 2nd Ed. p. 680.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 679.

9. Moore, G. E., Visual Sense-Data in British Philosophy in the Mid.-Century, p–206.

10. Broad, C. D., Scientific Thought, p. 244.

11. Russell, B., Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 141.

12. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 116–135.

13. Review of ' The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge ', Mind, N. S. 50, pp. 280–293.

14. ' The Problem of the Speckled Hen ', Mind, N. S. 51, pp. 368–373.

15. Ayer, A. J., Philosophical Essays, p. 94.
16. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, p. 213.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
19. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 116–135.
20. The Concept of Mind, p. 242.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
22. *Ibid.*

A JURISPRUDENTIAL PANORAMA OF DEONTIC LOGIC

In this article I shall present an outline of a new area of logic which has greatly engaged the attention of legal theorists and which has supplied tools of thought much needed also by legal practitioners. The following exposition contains some net results of my work in this area.

Deontic logic (DL) is logic in its application to the field of normative relevancy. It is related to, but not identical with, the logic of norms and logic of the Ought. The scope of the latter is narrower than that of the former, for not all norms are ought-sayings; there are also may-norms as well as can-norms. The scope of the logic of norms is again narrower than that of DL, because this relates also to absence of norms.

The basic concepts of DL are *deontic functors* (e. g. "obligatory", "prohibitory", "permissory") and *deontic fungenda* (e. g. "action", "omission", "conduct"). These fungenda are appropriate to all norms of *conduct*. For norms of attitude, as for all norms, "incidence" can be employed as a general fungendum. Often, "deontic operator" is used instead of "deontic functor" and "deontic argument" instead of "deontic fungendum". These terms are, however, objectionable, since the deontic functors effect no logical *operations* and since "argument" (meaning also a line of logical reasoning) is ambiguous in the field of logic, especially in that of legal logic (whose essential task is to deal with arguments in this sense). The combination of deontic functors and deontic fungenda produce *deontic functions* (e. g. "obligatory action", "prohibitory omission", "permissory conduct").

The main task of DL is the determination of logical relations between deontic functions. In this, it is presumed that in any context of logical formulae or operations any symbol standing for an action, omission, conduct, or incidence refers to something constant. There is an isomorphy of logical relations between deontic functions with those between ontic functions (such as "necessary event" and "possible event") and with those between alethic functions (such as "necessary truth" and "contingent truth"). Thus DL can be regarded as a kind of modal logic. Another important task of DL is the determination of logical relations between deontic fungenda.

If "conduct" is symbolized by "u", "action" by "a" and omission by "o", the logical relations between deontic fungenda can be expressed as $u \leftrightarrow (a \vee o)$. On some occasions, also $a \leftrightarrow \sim o$ or $o \leftrightarrow \sim a$ are appropriate, but this relation does not represent a general law of DL. In general, only $a \vee o$ can be regarded as equivalent to u.

Deontic systems can be either normatively closed or normatively open. The closure principle underlying the closed systems is often expressed by the following sentence: Whatever is not prohibited is permitted. There are normative systems conceivable to which the closure principle does not apply. The contemporary international legal order appears to be actually a normatively open system. Thus the closure principle is a contingent material principle and not a universal logical principle, if "permitted" in its formulation relates to a *normative* state of affairs.

In the logical construction of the normatively closed system, the following are necessary: either (1) one deontic functor (e. g. "obligatory") and two deontic fungenda ("action" and "omission") or (2) two deontic functors (e. g. "obligatory" and "prohibitory") and one deontic fungendum (either "conduct" or "incidence"). In the second case, an abbreviated notation can be employed in which the ever-occurring expression "u" (or "i" for "incidence") is simply omitted. Because of the advantage of formulae thus simplified, this method will be employed here.

Using "o" for "obligatory" and "I" for "prohibitory", the fundamental deontic relationships in the normatively closed system are as follows: (1) $O \rightarrow \sim I$; (2) $I \rightarrow \sim O$; (3) $\sim O \wedge \sim I$; (4) $\sim O \vee \sim I$. $\sim I$ can be expressed by the term "permissory" ("P") and $\sim O$ by the term "dispensory" ("D"). Thus it can be said that obligatory conduct implies permissory conduct (Formula (1)) and that prohibitory conduct implies dispensory conduct (Formula (1)). Formula (3) constitutes the concept "licensory couduct" ("L"). Formula (4) expresses that the adjunction of permissory conduct and dispensory conduct embraces the whole deontic universe.

The normatively closed system can be constructed as an axiomatic system with one axiom and one defintion (introducing "L") as follows : CSAx. : $\sim O \vee \sim I$; CSDf. : $L =^{\text{df}} \sim O \wedge \sim I$. If the use of "$P$" and "$D$" is desired, their definitions are: $P =^{\text{df}} \sim I$ and $D =$ df $\sim O$.

In the logical construction of the normatively open system, the additional concept "neutral conduct" ("N") is necessary. This system can be constructed as an axiomatic system with three axioms and one definition (introducing "N") as follows : OSAx. 1 : $\sim O \vee \sim I$; OSAx. 2 : $\sim O \vee \sim L$; OSAx. 3 : $\sim I \vee \sim L$; OSDf. : $N =^{\text{df}} (\sim O \wedge \sim I) \vee \sim L$. If the use of "$P$" and "$D$" is desired in the open system, their definitions are : $P =^{\text{df}} \sim N \wedge \sim I$ and $\sim N \wedge \sim O$.

The deontic functions can be employed in order to formalise norms in all areas of regulation. They are particularly important in the field of law, where the distinction between normatively closed and normatively open legal orders plays a fundamental role. There are the following kinds of legal norms : (1) "Y is an obligatory conduct for X" (or "X ought to ... Y"), (2) "Y is a prohibitory conduct for X" (or "X ought-not to ... Y"), (3) "Y is a licensory conduct for X" (or "X may ... Y"), (4) "Y is a permissory conduct for X" (or "X can ... Y"). What is permissory includes not only what is licensory but also what is obligatory; in other words, what one "may" or "ought to" that one also "can" (in the sense of permissibility and not, of course, in the sense of physical or mental capability). Note that the sentence "Y is a neutral conduct for X", which is meaningful in relation to a normatively open system, does not express a norm but only a normatively relevant state of affairs. The sentences (1) to (4), too, express normatively relevant states of affairs, but beyond that they also express norms.

DL has produced various paradoxes, whose solution (or resolution) has been one of the main preoccupations of deontic logicians. As examples, the following two may be mentioned : (1) The paradox of Normative Adjunction : From "It is obligatory for X to mail this letter" it follows "It it obligatory for X to mail this letter or it is obligatory for X to burn this letter." ($Ou_1 / \therefore Ou_1 \vee Ou_2$). The impression of a paradox arises in this case due to the difference of the meanings between "or" in ordinary language and in the language of logic. The conclusion does not import the claim that its second adjunct holds, but that at least one of its adjuncts (possibly both) holds. Only when one adjunct is excluded does the other follow. This exclusion, however, is not expressed by the premiss of the inference. (2) The Paradox of Derived Obligation : From "The compliance with law is obligatory for X" it follows "The compliance with law or shooting the policemen is obligatory for X" ($Ou_1 / \therefore O(u_1 \vee u_2)$). A source of this paradox is that the deontic functor in the conclusion relates here to the deontic fungenda constructed as deontic adjuncts. Such application of deontic functors is not warranted by general logic. It is admissible only on the basis of special deontic principles which establish a connection between internal and external operations with deontic functions. They can be postulated only if they are required, or at least tolerated in a special area of normativity. The Paradox of Derived Obligation indicates, above all in the light of legal experience, that the postulation of these principles overtasks DL.

In the above construction of DL, the deontic fungenda were conceived as referring to a conduct (or an incidence). They can also be conceived as referring to sentences (e. g. "It is obligatory that X behaves in the manner M"). Through this construction nothing of importance is achieved; on the contrary, it produces clumsy expressions. Seemingly, the advantage of such a construction is that it enables internal operations in deontic functions to be performed by means of propositional operators. Insofar as these operations are required at all, they can also be carried out by means of the logic of concepts. In this treatment, the operators receive their fundamental meaning from a basic ("protological") calculus; their specific meanings are determined by the requirements of the semantic field to which they belong. The iteration of deontic functors is possible in both above mentioned constructions. Thus "obligatory obligatory conduct" is not less meaningful than "It is obligatory that it is obligatory that X behaves in the manner M".

The truth-values ("true" and "false") can find application in the construction of DL here preferred only to normatively relevant sentences (such as "Y is an obligatory conduct for X"), provided that these sentences are understood as normative meta-sentences. However, if these sentences mean norms, truth-values are not appropriate to them; the corresponding values could then be "valid" and "not valid". In the normatively open system, where both norms and their absence are contained, "tenable" and "not tenable" are appropriate. The problem of logical values in DL can be side-stepped by the application of the axiomatic method or the method of natural deduction. Where the application of tabular methods is required, the protological values "plus" and "minus" yield the same results as the truth-values. Because it is possible to deal with DL without being tied to the latter, it is not necessary to resort to artificial constructions by which reduction of DL to alethic logic is attempted.

The analyses and operations enabled by DL are useful wherever self-consistent thought is a desideratum in the normative area. They have a particular significance in the field of law, where the contemporary development of DL has made important contributions in order to identify, avoid, and remove antinomies and gaps in law. On the other hand, work on specific legal problems has promoted the development of DL, notably elaboration of the systems accommodating the phenomenon of normative openness in a logical construction. Efforts to solve actual legal problems have also drawn attention to the fact that some systems of DL contain theses which cannot claim universality. This has had a beneficial effect on the tracing of sources of paradoxes of DL by showing that postulation of certain deontic principles means smuggling into legal theory natural-law assumptions which are inconsistent with the ways in which law actually works today.

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COMPARATIVE ONTOLOGY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF 'KARMA'*

I

PREFACE

This paper begins with a preliminary exposition of the "doctrine" of *karma,* on the more or less standard interpretation. The intelligibility of this doctrine is then called into question; the standard interpretation is found problematic in terms of our natural everyday understanding. It is then suggested that the proper method of interpretation of *karma* requires the excavation of the categorial structure or ontological paradigm which renders *karma* intelligible. The intelligibility of a concept or doctrine is relative to a given ontological paradigm or world view which must be taken as a whole. So, a preliminary sketch is given of the *generic karma* categorial structure and the formal features of this ontological paradigm are explicated. It is shown that *karma* is, indeed, intelligible when interpreted or translated in terms of its indigenous world view. This leads to considerations of the formation of world views or ontological paradigms. The concept of formal ontology is presented and factors which contribute to the differentiation of world views are made explicit. This opens the way for a new understanding of the nature of philosophical interpretation or radical translation between different worlds. The notion of ontological hermeneutics is developed and it is shown that radical translation between different ontologies is really an intra-linguistic enterprise. Any given natural language, through its formal ontological structure, has access to any possible ontology or world view. Radical translation becomes the project of re-creating or reconstructing the original ontological paradigm which shapes a given world and defines its intelligibility. The implication is that no culture or tradition has privileged access to its ontology or scheme for interpreting experience. The paper concludes with further interpretation and elaboration of the *karma* paradigm. The inner logic and coherence of the *karma* ontology in disclosed, and certain features of *karma* which before appeared opaque, incoherent, arbitrary and unintelligible, become transparent, intelligible and necessitated by the structure of the *karma* paradigm. Thus, the paper has a two-fold aim. One is to give a philosophical interpretation and translation of *karma*. The other is to make explicit the logic of interpretation and translation which determines the method of ontological analysis being used. And this involves the development of ontological hermeneutics and formal or comparative ontology.

[INTRODUCTION]*

"Karma" is often taken to indicate a "law of action" or a "principle of causality" with special reference to moral action. Sometimes it is loosely designated as a "doctrine". Whatever its status and however it may be appropriately referred to, it is clear that this term is as problematic as it is characteristic of Indian thought in general. But it is one thing to raise questions about the truth and verifiability of *karma*, another to inquire into its intelligibility or sense. Indeed, investigation of the *meaning* of a term is logically prior to consideration of its *truth*, of evidence for its validity, or of the legitimacy of belief in it. For if it is unintelligible then questions of its truth are not appropriately raised. So I shall begin this investigation of *karma* by raising some questions about its meaning and intelligibility while bracketing questions about its truth, verification and grounds for belief. If it is found to be intelligible then to this extent at least it is a *possible* object of belief and a *candidate* for truth. Perhaps it may even be found worthy of belief.

[The "doctrine" of *karma*: preliminary exposition]*

The Sanskrit term "karma" is derived from the root *kṛ* which means "to do". An exemplary summary statement of the doctrine of *karma* is given by Eliot Deutsch in his introduction to *The Bhagavad Gītā* :

> "The term *karma* means 'deed', 'work', 'action' and is used in the Hindu tradition to mean both any action which produces tendencies or impressions (*sanskāras*) in the actor,

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(* Main topics are indicated in brackets—"[..]", and sub-topics are in parentheses, "(...)",) which then function as determinants to his future action, and specific ritual actions which are performed in the context of Vedic ceremonial religion. Further, according to most of the Indian philosophical systems, *karma* suggests a 'law' of moral nature which holds that actions necessarily produce effects and that this is enacted over a period of innumerable births, deaths aud rebirths. Every action must produce its results—if not immdiately, then at some future time—and every disposition to act is the result of one's past action. One is completely responsible for oneself. A man's present condition is a result of his past action over many lives, and his future condition will result from his past and present action".[1]

(The Conceptual Connection Between *karma, saṁsāra* and transmigration)

First of all, then, "karma", according to this interpretation, means human action which causally produces results of consequences. But the distinctive feature of *karma* seems to be that the *identity* of the agent or actor extends over innumerable lifetimes, and that the effects of actions are played out over many lives of the same agent. So the *identities* of agent; actions and causes and effects extend in time through innumerable births and deaths. It appears that *karma* is essensially tied to a certain conception of existence-in-time, a world view in which existence is without beginning and withont end in time (*anādi*). This conception of existence is called "saṁsāra", which means that which is incessantly in motion or flux, the world of phenomena. This conception of perpetual existence as applied to the cosmic history of a particular human agent leads to the notion of *transmigration*. This is the specific aspect of *saṁsāra* in which the identity of the phenomenal self (*jīva*) persists through different lifetimes so that at death the existence of the *jīva* is not terminated but is transformed and continues to exist and is "reborn" (re-incarnation, trans-incarnation). This menas that birth is not the beginning of the existential identity of the particular *jīva*, and death is not the cessation of its existential status. Thus, the notions of *karma, saṁsāra* and *transmigration* are essentially connected conceptually. This is made explicit by M. Hiriyanna :

> "Since, however, those causes cannot all be found within the narrow limits of a single life, it postulates the theory of *saṁsāra* or the continued existence of the self (*jīva*) in a succession of lives. Thus the theory of transmigration is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of *karma*".[2]

This conceptual connection is also explicitly acknowledged by Deutsch in his book *Advaita Vedānta* :

> "From now on when the term 'karma' is used, it refers to the joint doctrine of the 'law' of *karma*—the principle of causality which holds that all moral actions produce moral effects—and of *saṁsāra*—the principle that there is a transmigration of the self (the *sūkṣma-śarīra* or 'subtle body') in a series of births, deaths and rebirths".[3]

(*Karma* as a 'moral law' : *jīva, avidyā, bandha*)

The second distinctive feature of *karma* is that it is taken to be a *moral law* which means that it applies primarily to human agents and conduct and not to all existent entities in general. Thus Hiriyanna says,

> "In the first place, the doctrine [of *karma*] extends the principles of causation to the sphere of human conduct and teaches that, as every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is preordained".[4]

This passage leaves us suspended as to whether *karma* is a *universal* principle of causality which applies to all existent entities or whether it is restricted to the realm of human conduct in a specifically moral context. In any case *karma* is often taken to be restricted to moral conduct and is a "causal" law in some special sense. The moral context is special in that it applies to the phenomenal self (the *jīva*) which is in bondage (*bandha*) to existence-in-time (*saṁsāra*) and which is thus alienated from true Being. It is this alienation and bondage of the phenomenal self which gives rise to the moral dimension of *karma*. For *saṁsāra* is born from primal ignorance or *avidyā* and the moral end of persons is to overcome this *avidyā* and transcend the bondage and inherent suffering of phenomenal existence.

> "The other important point of agreement among the various schools is the recognition of liberation or release (*mokṣa*) from the cycle of rebirths as the highest of human ends or values ... and *mokṣa* has come to be acknowledged as the highest of human values by all the doctrines, so that all of them are now doctrines of salvation."[5]

So, moral value and conduct is possible and required because of the alienation of existence-in-time from Being. The true Self does not exist in time, does not act, is not born and does not die. The *existent* self (*jīva*), as part of the phenomenal world, always has some particular moral value and is part of a hierarchy of values. That is, to exist is to have some *value status* in a hierarchically ordered phenomenal world. It is in this context that the possibility of moral value arises. *Karma* may be good or bad, and good conduct is that which tends to overcome the need for conduct, to overcome the bondage of *saṁsāra* and bring release from phenomenal existence.

> "According as one acts, according as one conducts himself so does he become. The doer of good becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad action".[6]

It appears, then, that the *jīva* always has some intrinsic value status which is determined by its constituent qualities, and the actions of such a value-qualified *jīva* inevitably reflect its value-status. *To exist is to be qualified in moral value.* One is what one does and one does what one is. And *karma* indicates a causal moral law which specifies a relation between the actions of the *jīva* and its existential value-status :

> "According to the doctrine of *karma* everyone—as a *jīva* in bondage to the world—is conditioned and determined by his conduct, as this is enacted over a period of innumerable births, deaths, and rebirths. Every deed that one performs has its effect in the world and forms within the doer a *saṁskāra* or *vāsanā* (tendency) that becomes the basis of his future deeds. *Karma* is thus a 'law' that sets forth the relation between one's action as a *jīva* and one's state of being".[7]

Finally, we may end this preliminary exposition by acknowledging that the different schools of thought in India have each developed the doctrine of *karma* in distinct ways, each gives *specific* connotations to the concept. Nevertheless there is a *generic* level of analysis, a general sense of "karma", which applies to the different traditions. Again, Deutsch makes this explicit :

> "Whether *karma* has its roots in the *Ṛg Veda*, or was borrowed from non-Aryan sources, or whether again it is but a natural extension of beliefs present in early Vedic times, is of historical importance. All the later systems of Indian thought agree, though, that *karma* is operative in life; they disagree only about *what* it is that transmigrates and about *how* it takes place; *that* it takes place is accepted, and this alone is of philosophical importance." [8]

[*Preliminary Questions about Karma*]

Does *karma* make sense? Is it rationally intelligible? We have seen in the above sketch that *karma* is essentially tied in sense with *saṁsāra* and transmigration. It is this connection which gives *karma* its distinctive features. But precisely what makes it distinctive also renders it questionable and problematic in intelligibility. For we are familiar enough with the concept of an agent performing actions which have consequences and which produce tendencies or habits. Our ordinary intuitions about *agents*, *actions* and *causes* appear to be straightforward and intelligible. But when it is added that the *identity* of the agent (*jīva*) extends cosmically through time and spans innumerable lifetimes, and that the causes and consequences of actions are played out in a cosmic context through many lifetimes, our ordinary understanding is jolted and strained. What can it possibly mean to speak of a person or actor whose identity and existence extends through a beginningless series of births and deaths? Our common sense notion of a person takes its existence and identity to be delimited between birth and death. The existence of a person begins with birth (or conception) and ends (in any identifiable form) with death. What strange conception is this that takes the person to have pre-existed in innumerable lives (and presumably retaining its existential identity through diverse forms) and to post-exist in ongoing lives and forms? The very *meanings* of "birth" and "death" are altered. *Time* itself seems to bend and move in a circle. And the concept of a *person* or *agent* becomes dislodged from its familiar and natural contexts. For when the *principle of identity* of a thing is changed the very sense of its concept is altered. It seems, then, that the karmic context which is committed to *saṁsāra* (perpetual temporalized phenomenal existence) and to transmigration (the perpetual identity of the *jīva* through a series of lives) bends and stretches and perhaps snaps our common conceptions of *time*, *existence*, *person*, *cause*, *action*, *birth* and *death*.

Even worse, we are expected to make sense of the possibility that the form of existence of a given *jīva* may change from life to life; that a *jīva* may be in the form of a human being in one life and return in the next life as an insect, plant or "lower" animal. Our common notions of persons is that they are different in *type* from other forms of life, that persons are special in the realm of existence and radically different in identity and characteristics from other creatures. What can it possibly mean to say that a person may be reborn as an insect? This again strains our imagination, our conceptual powers. Not only are we required to make sense of the *identity* of a person extending through cyclical time in innumerable life-times, but also of the *type* of being evolving and changing through different existential forms and species, in effect, *changing identity* and "essential" characteristics. We lose our bearing here with the notions of *personl identity* and *existence*.

And the same holds for our notions of *action* and *cause*. Given our commonly accepted commitment that existence and identity are delimited within *one* given lifetime (what is to count as *one* lifetime?), proscribed between birth and death, we naturally *identify* actions and causes (and their effects) within the temporal span of one lifetime. The *karma* doctrine requires us to conceive that certain unknown (and unknowable?) occurrences in previous lifetimes are the causal conditions of actions now being performed, and that the actions now being performed will have their full effects and consequences, if not in this lifetime then in subsequent ones. Of course this demands much more than a mere elasticizing of our ordinary concepts of *action* and *cause*. By no stretch of the imagination can we break through the *conceptual* barrier of common understanding in which the existential scope of a person is delimited within the poles of birth and death in one conventional lifetime. The very *sense* of *action* and *cause* is being tampered with, the *principle of use* of these terms is critically changed, the principle of identity of these concepts is radically altered.

The radical changes in the conceptual function and use of "person", "action" and "cause" required by the *karma* doctrine seems to make a mockery of these concepts in their natural use. For when the antecedent causal conditions of my present actions extend through alleged previous lifetimes of which I am not aware, how can I possibly be said to act intelligently, deliberately, rationally and responsibly? We *assume* in everyday life that we have access to the relevant antecedent causal conditions which take effect in *rational* action. And if deliberation and choice are to have meaning it is reasonable to expect that we can specify the ends of our actions and anticipate the full fruition of the consequences and effects of these actions within a reasonable length of time. But if my actions and their effects are played out past my death and through innumerable presumed future lives, again of which I have no direct awareness, the very *rationality* of human action is seriously challenged. For rational, deliberate and voluntary action takes for granted access to and influence over the antecedent causal conditions as well as the effects and consequences. We can *identify* a given action which occurs at some time. But what becomes of the concept of *action* when a given act is extended cosmically through time and a series of lives? How long does *one* act take? What is to count as *one* act and what are the criteria of identity of a given act? What becomes of deliberate action then?

The *intelligibility* of karma is even more problematic than it already appears. For we have seen that *karma* is taken to be a "moral" law of conduct. But if the form of existence of the agent (*jīva*) in previous and subsequent lives may be non-human (insect, plant, fish, etc.) then what are our moral responsibilities to these non-human species? Presumably any of these species may be inhabited by a *jīva* in its ongoing cosmic journey. What is the scope of the moral community? Are we to assume that the *activities* of insects, for example, are really actions with moral worth? If transmigration makes sense then it is possible for a human being to be reborn in the form of some other creature. If so, wherein consists the *identity* of that person in the new form? Are we to assume that the external form of this newly born creature is somehow accidental to the inner identity or essence of the original person? We seem forced *either* to hold that only persons (human beings in the conventional sense) perform moral actions which are of a different type from mere activities of other species, *or else* to hold that *actions are activities* and all creatures are capable of moral action and are part of a cosmic moral order. Either way there appears to be incoherence in terms of our everyday notions of human action and the activities of other creatures. In this light the question hinted at earlier take force : Does *karma* indicate a universal cosmic causal law which applies to all existent entities or is it restricted in sense to the sphere of human moral action? If all activities *are* actions and all creatures are part of one cosmic moral order then *karma* becomes a universal causal moral law.[9]

These are just samples of the sorts of questions which naturally arise in trying to make sense of the *karma* doctrine. These questions concern the intelligibility of *karma*; questions of truth, evidence and belief have not yet been addressed. The question, then, is : Can we make sense of *karma*?

[*Making Sense of Karma*: *Preliminary Sketch of Karma Ontology*]

I wish to show in this paper that the "*karma* doctrine" does indeed make sense. But the intelligibility of *karma* is determined by an integral world-view or ontology taken as a whole. In general, the sense of a term or concept in natural language is relative to a particular categorial scheme or ontology, and apart from this its sense remains indeterminate, variable and ambiguous. Making sense of *karma* requires the explication of the ontological structure or paradigm in which it originates and in which alone it gets its meaning. An ontology (world-view, categorial scheme for interpreting experience) is a *system* of intelligibility and what makes sense in one world need not (and often does not and cannot) make sense in another. "Common" expressions in ordinary language are inherently equivocal (systematically ambiguous) in sense between ontologies. The task of philosophical interpretation or translation is to excavate and specify the ontological paradigm or categorial structure which renders a given term or doctrine intelligible. Thus, *karma* is not so much a law or principle, or even a "doctrine" as it is an ontological paradigm or integral system for interpreting experience as a whole. The *karma* paradigm is a unified structure with its own inner cohernece and logie. In this respect interpretation of *karma* must be systematic and not fragmentary and partial. *Karma* can only make sense when we enter the unique conceptual space of *karma-ontology*. And interpretation of *karma* in the context of its indigenous *categorial* structure de-mystifies it and reveals its inner coherence and rationality.

This is why the challenge to the intelligibility of *karma* given above has force. We cannot make sense of *karma* in terms of the ontological paradigm(s) which happens to inform our ordinary conventional language at this time. *Karma* cannot make sense when interpreted through an alien world-view with a different categorial structure. It is bound to appear incoherent and unintelligible when so interpreted or translated. Our task is to explicate the original general ontological paradigm which generates the *karma* "doctrine".

We saw above that *karma* is essentially tied to *saṁsāra* and transmigration. The latter are primary structural features of the *karma* paradigm. It is only when the full structural meaning of *saṁsāra* is appreciated that the *karma* doctrine emerges with intelligibility. In carrying out this sketchy preview of the *karma* paradigm we shell attempt to recreate the inner logic of its ontology.

(The Principle of Conservation and Continuity of Existential Status)

First of all, *saṁsāra* is an ontological commitment which formally determines the nature and status of existence, and thereby shapes a unique world. This existential commitment is twofold. On the one hand, it is a commitment to the view that existence is co-extensive with time which is cyclical in the sense of being without beginning or end. Existential *status* is *perpetual* and *continuous* in a cosmic way. This means that *any* and *every* existent entity has an ongoing cosmic history, an indefinitely long past and future. On the other hand, *saṁsāra* is a commitment to the *phenomenal* status of existence, that is, that existential status arises through primal ignorance or *avidyā*. So existential status holds only on the phenomenal level of appearance and is alienated from true Being, which is beyond time, change, existence.

This *saṁsāric* feature of *karma* ontology is the key to uncovering the intelligibility of the karma doctrine. For this world shaping (and sense-determining) commitment formally defines the nature of existence and existent things. To exist is to be qualified (constituted by *guṇas*), to have name and form (*nāma-rūpa*). And to be qualified is to be delimited and limited in space and time, to be particularized, and hence to suffer privations and incompleteness. And since existential stutus is perpetual and cosmically continuous, an existent entity will always be in bondage to qualification and finite delimitation. Alienation and bondage (in this formal sense) are *intrinsic* to existential status. It must be stressed that this is true of *all* existent things, not only for human beings.

In the case of human beings, for example, the structural meaning of *saṁsāra*, which involves perpetual existence, is manifested in suffering and bondage which *does not begin* with birth and *does not end* with death. Birth and death are mere *stages* and *events* in the ongoing continuous history of a given person (*jīva*) The existential status (qualified nature) of a *jīva* extends through time and innumerable births and deaths. It is important to notice that this *transmigratory* feature of human existence is *not* an *added* thesis about the human condition, but is a *structural requirement* of the *saṁsāra* commitment. The *saṁsāra* ontology *requires* that all existent entities (as existent) be perpetually existent. In the special case of humans this principle of continuity of existence generates the notion of transmigration. All existents transmigrate in the generic and formal sense that they persevere in their existential status in time through all changes. Thus *saṁsāra* entails the principle of conservation of existential status.

(Causality as an Internal Principle of Continuity/Inheritance of Existential Status)

The principle of conservation and preservation of existential status means that an existent thing is always qualified and retains its particular identity through all its transformations in its cosmic history. It is this principle which formally shapes the meaning of *causality* in *karma* ontology. The notion of cause and effect here is unique in sense. It does not have the epistemological and psychological connotations of causality in Hume's thought, for example. Rather, it is an *ontological relation* of continuous qualified identity through time in the history of a given entity. The qualities which constitute the existence and identity of a thing at a given moment in time are passed on (transferred, inherited) through causal change at a later moment. Causality in *karma* ontology is not an external principle of association of distinct events but rather an *internal* principle of qualitative inheritance and continued existential identity of a given thing through time and change. It is a formal feature of the *saṁsāra* ontology. The latter *requires* causality to be an inner connecting principle in the fabric of perpetual existence. It is this requirement that makes causality cosmic, that explains, for example, why the causes of human actions have antecedents in previous lives, and why present actions take full effect in subsequent lives. There is no mystery about causal relations holding through a series of lifetimes in the samsaric existence of a given *jiva*.

In the light of saṁsāric existential status it becomes clear that whether or not I have experience or awareness of previous or subsequent lives is irrelevant to the question of intelligibility of *karma*. That I am not able to verify transmigration through direct experience does not challenge the legitimacy of the formal principle of conservation of existential status. Indeed, this saṁsāric principle, like the principle of coservation of energy (which is an ontological commitment of modern science) appears more intelligible and likely than the suggestion that existential *status* begins with birth and ends with death, in the conventional sense. Of course eventful qualitative changes occur at birth (conception?) and death, but precisely because they *are* eventful they are signals of continued qualified existential status.

(Identity and Individuation : Existents as Quality-values)

As we now recall that saṁsāric existence is at the level of phenomenal appearance, arises in primal ignorance and is alienated from true Being, the question of the principle of identity and individuation of an existent emerges. We saw that *to exist is to be qualified.* This saṁsāric principle has formal significance. Any existent entity is at once particularized with its identity and discriminated from others. But individuals in this ontology are *not* substantial in an Aristotelian sense, for example. Individuals, being existent and phenomenal, are not ultimately real in the saṁsāric world. Rather, they are *constituted by qualities.* "Substance" at the existential level becomes a principle of *qualitative identity.* True substance, if it obtains at all, does so on the level of Being, not existence. This is a critical feature of *karma* ontology. It is a mistake to import alien *substance*-models of identity and individuation into the karmic world. If, for example, I think of existent entities as if they were Aristotelian substances, the notion of *karma* would be opaque.

The *qualitative* model of identity and individuation of existents is a distinctive feature of *karma* ontology. Existence is constituted by certain primitive quality-features or categories which are at once descriptive and evaluative (quality-values). The *guṇas* or strands which constitute existence in the Sāṅkhya school is an example of this. The three guṇas which make up all existence combine descriptive qualities and values.[10] And the identity of a given existent is determined by the particular combination of quality-features which constitute it. Thus, in this qualificational (in contrast to substantial) model of identity, individuation and existential status of any given entity is determined by its constituent quality make-up. And since the elemental qualitiies are at the same time values, every entity has unique *existential status and value.* Thus, to exist is to have determinate identity —to be qualified and to have existential status-value.

The identity of individuals in the saṁsāric world is determined by their quality-value make-up. And since individuals are not substances *with* qualities, but *constituted by* qualities, the very concept of an individual is radically different from other substance-ontologies. An existent changes in time and yet retains its identity and individuation. It is not necessary to appeal to *substance* to explain this, as we have seen in the case of Hume's thought. But the implication of this is that *the boundaries of* *individuals are fluid* in change through time. There is no underlying permanent substance wherein the identity of an individual consists. As the qualities change the existential make-up and value of the entity alters. Nevertheless, the entity retains its identity through change and, to this extent, is the "same" entity. It becomes clear in a *qualificational* ontology that the concepts of "identity" and "sameness" have a different meaning from their counterparts in a substance ontology. An existent changes radically in the course of its history and retains its cosmic identity (is the *same* entity) precisely because it need not conform to the alien essentialistic criteria of identity found in substance/essence ontologies.

The qualitative make-up of an entity can affect another and be affected by others. It is possible to have qualitative (existential) exchange and interchange between entities.[11] This ontological possibility is enhanced by the fact that *all existents in the saṁsāric world are of the same kind*, as we shall see in a moment. There are no antecedent constraints on the possibility of qualitative exchange and transformation between different entities. In this world entities *can* transact at the level of existential identity. It is this ontological feature which explains the origin of caste structure and fears of existential contamination, for example. For one's existential value *is* one's qualitative make-up and qualitative identity may be transacted among existents, each of which has a particular existential value. In this world it is true to say that *one is what one does and one does what one is.* One's identity is reflected in and reflects one's activity, for existential identity is constituted by qualities, states and activities.

This fluidity of existential identity in the saṁsāric world does not deny the real distinctions and differences between existent entities. This becomes obvious once we recognize that the terms "same", "different", "identity", "distinction" and "entity" are systematically ambiguous between qualificational ontology and substance ontology. What counts as a *real* distinction in the substance model does not apply to the saṁsāric paradigm. In the latter the criterion of identity (and differentiation) is determined by the particular *combinations* (mixtures) of constituent qualities or *guṇas*. The particular quality/value configurations which constitute an individual determines its distinctness and unique identity. But these real distinctions in the saṁsāric world do not entail that entities are of different *types*, as in the case in certain substance models.

(The Feature of Qualificational Monism)

Since the primary quality-features which constitute *all* existents (human beings and other creatures) are *universal*, a *qualitative monism* is entailed. This means that all existents, despite the real differences between them, are of *the same ontological type* This is another critical feature of *karma* ontology. In our commonly shared categorial scheme we take human beings to be of a different order of being from other creatures, to be different in *type*. Such type difference means that the categories which give unique character to a given type of entity *cannot* apply (without a category mistake) to other types of entities. An ontology which is committed to type differences is thereby committed to formal constraints on possible intelligible transformations; we cannot conceive of a transformation from a human being into an insect, for example. It would be a category mistake, and not merely a false statement, to say that this insect was (or is) a person. The categorial structure to which we are committed in our ordinary language, and which shapes and determines what makes sense and what does not, *rules out formally* the possibility of a transformation from human-kind to alien sorts of creatures, like insects. However, in *karma* ontology, which involves a radically different categorial structure, new conceptual possibilities emerge. For since all existents are constituted by a common resource of primary quality-values (*guṇas*) an ontological monism is entailed. The primary quality-categories apply to all possible entities, and all existents are, despite the real differences between them, of the same ontological type *formally*. This is a *structural requirement of karma* ontology, of qualificational monism.

A consequence of this is that there are *no formal antecedent constraints* on possible qualitative transformations, on interchange and exchange of existential identity. Since a given existent is identical with its constituent *guṇas*, and since its identity is as rigid or fluid as its possible qualitative transformation, it may intelligibly *become anything* whatever in the saṁsāric world. This is the ontological ground of transmigration. The possibility that a particular *jīva* was an insect in a previous life and is in the human form (or qualitative configuration) in this life, and may be either liberated from the saṁsāric world altogether or reincarnate as a dog, for example, in the next life, is perfectly intelligible in qualitative monism. Thus, three main features of *karma* ontology : the principle of conservation of existential status through time and change, the principle that the identity of an existent is constituted by its quality-values, and the principle of qualitative monism—together render the concept of *transmigration* or trans-incarnation perfectly intelligible. When transmigration is interpreted in an alien ontology, however, an ontology which is committed to a substance model of identity and individuation which assumes that substances are of different types, it appears to be unintelligible, incoherent or mystical.

(Action as Qualities and States of Things)

The ontological features of the *karma* paradigm give the concept of action unique meaning. Since an existent entity is identical with its constituent quality-values, with its qualifications and modification, its identity is manifested in its states and activities. Any entity in the saṁsāric world is always in some unique determinate existential state, and this, of course, includes its activities. The activities of an entity are not external to it, not mere products which are separable from its identity, but rather constituent of the thing itself. This is why in the sphere of *human activity* the ontological principle of action — "One is what one does and one does what one is" — makes sense. The actions and activities of a *jīva* are as perpetual and inevitable as its existential status. To exist is to be in some form of activity, whether deliberate or not.

> "No one can remain, even for a moment, without performing some action. Everyone is made to act helplessly by the *guṇas* born of *prakṛti*".[12]

This feature of *karma* ontology *requires* human action to be on the same level conceptually as all other forms of activity. The activities of insects, for example, have the same existential origin as the activities of humans. This is another implication of *saṁsāric monism*. The fact that human actions are activities in the *karma* ontology formally necessitates *either* that all existents be considered as part of a cosmic moral order *or* that *karma* is not specifically moral at all. It would be incoherent and forced in saṁsāric monism to draw a sharp categorial boundary among existents such that moral action applies to humans only and not to the activities of other entities. Now it begins to be clear why the concept of action, like the concept of cause, is cosmic in extent and why *one* act can spread through a series of lifetimes. The concept of *action* in *karma* ontology is radically different in sense from the concept of action that we find in Aristotle or Kant, for example. Karmic actions are activities, and *all* existents are in some form of activity. For activities constitute the existential identity of existents, their quality-values and states. This conception of action reinforces the intelligibility of transmigration with its implication that a *jīva* may trans-incarnate as an insect or plant, for example. The activities of insects or plants are on a par with the activities of humans. There can be only differences in *degree* here, not of kind. A *jīva* which takes the form of a plant does not cease to be active. *Karma*, then, potentially applies to all existents. The ontological alternatives begin to emerge. If *karma* is conceptually tied to *saṁsāric* monism, then it applies to all existent entities. But if *karma* applies only to human beings, and human conduct is taken to be different in *kind* from the activities of other creatures, then saṁsāric monism must be rejected.

(The Concept of *Moral* Action)

Of course this view of human action, transaction and interaction requires a radically different concept of moral action than we find, for example, in Aristotle or Kant. We saw earlier that *karma* involved a *moral* dimension. It should now be clear that the concept of moral action here is *unique in sense*. It was pointed out earlier that to exist is to have some *value-status* in the saṁsāric order of things. This was because the primary qualities (*guṇas*) were *also* moral values. One of the three *guṇas* in Sāṅkhya philosophy, *sattva*, is descriptively "dynamic equilibrium" and also connotes the values of intelligence and goodness. Value is woven into the fabric of things; there is no room in this ontology for a categorial difference between fact and value, for to have descriptive or qualitative content is precisely to have moral value-status.

But good *and* bad *karma* (and in general, all activity) remain within the saṁsāric realm of existence-in-time. Any action, good or bad, exemplifies the principle of conservation of existential status and therefore leads to *further* altered qualifications or modifications. This is the principle behind the remark that "all actions produce results". No human action *in* time, good or bad, can itself alter the saṁsāric existential status. Once qualified always qualified; actions only deepen our involvement in saṁsāric qualifications. Conventional *morality* is concerned with the distinction between good and bad actions, but this applies only to the *jīva*, the moral agent which is to be identified with its activities.

By contrast, the *ethical* concern with liberation (*moska*) applies to the Self and involves the ideal of non-action or detached action. The detachment in action (whether good or bad) is a radical *transcategorial* detachment, the non-action which comes with the realisation that the *jīva* with its saṁsāric existence is born of ignorance and is not to be identified with the true Self which is not saṁsāric, not in time, not an agent and not karmic. This detachment is a radical transcendence of saṁsāric existence as a whole which comes when the *avidyā* from which existence arises is dispelled. No action in time, then, can bring about this radical transformation beyond existential status. Only the discriminating wisdom which recognizes that the true Self is not the *jīva* can effect the release which is salvation from the bondage of *saṁsāra*. This radical transformation is a non-action which goes *beyond good and evil*. Thus, a distinction must be made between *moral action* which is bound within saṁsāric existence, and *ethical non-action* (detachment in action) which brings *mokṣa*.

(Summary Review and Transition)

In this preliminary sketch of the *karma* ontology I have stressed that there is an integral ontological paradigm in terms of which the doctrine of *karma* is to be interpreted. This doctrine can and does make sense when interpreted in the context of its indigenous categorial structure. This ontology has its own *inner* logic and coherence which is a *system* of intelligibility, a scheme for interpreting experinece as a whole.

Before we proceed with further development and elaboration of the *karma* ontology it is necessary to address directly the issues of the logic of translatability and interpretation, of the nature of ontological paradigm formation, and of the method of comparative ontology, which are raised in the preceding mode of analysis.

The challenge for philosophical interpretation or translation is to explicate the ontological paradigm or categorial structure which renders a particular concept or doctrine intelligible. This method of *ontological hermeneutics* must now be reviewed and examined before we proceed with the interpretation of *karma.* The following questions naturally arise. What is an ontology? How are different ontological paradigms shaped? What considerations distinguish different ontologies? How is an ontology related to a natural language? Is there an ontology in ordinary conventional language? In what way is an ontology a system of interpretation of experience as a whole? How does it determine the sense (intelligibility) of a language? Can two different ontologies share common terms with common meanings? Or must it be the case that all terms are systematically ambiguous between different ontologies? And if each ontology internally defines its own form of intelligibility how is translation or interpretation between different worlds possible?

[*COMPARATIVE ONTOLOGY AND THE LOGIC OF INTERPRETATION*]

(The Concept and Method of Formal Ontology)

In a previously published paper, "Formal Ontology and Movement Between Worlds"[13] (hereafter abbreviated *MBW*) I presented the concept and method of formal ontology in the context of the methodology of comparative thought. It is now necessary to review some of the main themes of comparative ontology and develop them further here with specific reference to the logic of interpretation.

(Ontology as the Investigation of Categories and Kinds)

First of all I attempted to show that the *sense* of a term in natural language is relative to an ontology or world view. The "same" term in ordinary language will have different senses in different ontologies. The term "ontology" (the science of being) is used in the classical sense to indicate the formal science of the *kinds* of things there are, in contrast to the predominant contemporary use of the term in the analytical tradition where it has come to mean the investigation of *what there is*. The question of *what there is* is essentially tied to the concept of *truth*, whereas the consideration of the *kinds of things there are* concerns the nature of *sense*. The science of the kinds of things there are involves an investigation of the nature and formation of the *categories* which constitute the world and inform experience. Meaning or sense, as manifested in a language, is determined by the particular categorial structure or world view which informs the language. Thus, the category structure of a language is the origin of sense and determines what possibilities are intelligible. For example, a given category configuration would determine whether two particular terms in a language may be joined significantly to form a thought and specify some possible state of affairs. If the two terms in question may not be so joined, then their union results in a category mistake and fails to depict a real possibility. In this respect *sense is prior to truth*; sense determines what *may be* the case (possibility) while truth is a matter of what *is* the case (actuality). A categorial structure, therefore, at once defines the sense of a language and determines the nature of its world and the structure of experience that is possible in and through it. What makes sense is intrinsic to a world view or category structure, and different world views have different sense structures. What makes sense in one world fails to make sense (is unintelligible or a category mistake) in another. Considerations of sense-formation must be addressed before issues of of truth are appropriately raised.

(Ontology as the Investigation of the Origin of Sense)

So *ontology* is at once the investigation of sense and of the nature of being or the world. The assumption here is that what makes sense, what is intelligible or conceivable or possible reflects the *form* of a world. And the form of a world is constituted by a particular categorial structure. Categories such as, substance, individual, entity, attribute, quality, space, time, cause and so on, configure in different ways to structure a world and thought. The different possible configurations of categories shape different worlds. Language, thought, world and experience mutually reflect one another through a categorial structure. There is no thought or experience apart from some particular categorial configuration. In this respect an ontology as a category structure is a scheme or paradigm for the interpretation of experience and world. *To experience the world is to interpret it thraugh an ontological paradigm.*

The meaning of thought as reflected through language is always relative to an ontology. It was shown in the *MBW* paper that ontological structures are formed through the logical or predicative form of thought. Logic investigates the *form* of thought and reveals thought to have a predicative structure. Thought consists of the joining of subject and predicate terms. The form of predication is the structural origin of categorial configurations.[14] Thus, we move in a circle in which the logical form of thought is reflected in language and manifested in the world. A world is constituted by a categorial configuration which is structured by logical form and experience is an interpretation of the world in virtue of its categorial structure or ontological paradigm as this is apprehended through language. But an interpretation is a systematic mode of *making sense* of things, of determining what is intelligible or meaningful. Whether we begin with thought language, world or experience we find that a categorial structure or ontological paradigm is presupposed and manifested. The common consideration here is sense or meaning. It is in this, context that the term "ontology" is used. *Ontology* is the investigation of the origin of sense or meaning as it emerges through categorial structures which equally inform thought, language, world and experience.

(What is Formal Ontology?)

I have spoken of categorial *structures* (plural) and this implies that there are different schemes or paradigms for interpreting, experiencing or making sense of the world. This point needs to be explored and clarified.

Natural consciousness and language, while always being in some determinate form with respect to sense and the world, has the inherent openness, power and potentiality to reconstitute or reform itself. The particular world view or category structure, the particular system for interpreting and making sense of the world, which a natural language happens to be committed to at a given time in its ongoing evolution is always subject to revision and revolutionary change. The sense structure of a language must not be thought of as being rigid and fixed once and for all. On the contrary, as determinate as its sense may be at a particular time, it may be reconstituted and reformed. A natural language must not be identified with its form of sense at any given time. For what makes sense in a language is determined by the ontological paradigm or categorial configuration to which it happens to be committed, and this may, and often does, change. An essential feature of natural language is its power to revise and reinterpret the world it reflects, the potentiality to radically change its sense. Thus, a natural language is recursively and reflexively open to reinterpretation.

So, different ontologies are possible within the same natural language. Alternative world views may be expressed through the same language, and this means that language, in itself, is *indeterminate in sense* apart from reference to a specific ontological paradigm. This raises a number of questions. How many different paradigms or categorial sense structures are possible within a language? How are paradigms distinguished? What considerations shape a given paradigm uniquely? Precisely how does a given paradigm determine the sense of a language? What is the logic of transformations between different paradigms? Is there a logic to radical revision of sense structure in a language?

The conception and method of formal ontology is developed to answer these and similar questions. Different *particular* ontologies share common features or principles. *Formal* ontology, in contrast to *particular* or *material* ontologies, investigates the *form* of any ontology. Although different ontologies are worlds apart they nevertheless share common structural or formal principles. These formal principles define in general terms what it means to be a world, to be an entity of *any* type in that world, to be of the same or different type, etc. They are the formal conditions which determine whether a world is a possible or coherent world.

It was shown in the *MBW* paper that these formal principles were the logical conditions of the possibility of "movement" of any kind (e. g., translation, interpretation, revolutionary transformations, etc.) between different worlds. And we shall see in this paper that they are necessary conditions in the logic of interpretation.

(Ontological Paradigms or Categorial Structures)

We may best appreciate what "formal ontology" means and how formal ontological principles are conditions for any ontology by *applying* this method of analysis to different *examples* of ontological paradigms. So let us now examine in greater detail what an ontological paradigm is and how different paradigms are formed.

It was stated earlier that an ontological paradigm was a particular categorial configuration which defined a world view and constituted a scheme for interpreting or making sense of the world. But what is a category? And how do categories configure to shape sense in a particular language, and to determine what is and is not possible within a particular world?

(Categories as the logical form of concepts)

An ontology, as a particular categorial configuration, determines the *kinds* of things there are in the world it defines and constitutes, and thereby determines what does and does not make sense in the linguistic or conceptual depiction of this world. The notion of "kind", which is so fundamental to ontology, may be formally defined in terms of *category. A category is the logical form of any given concept*. Thus, in ordinary language a particular concept term such as "red" specifies a particular determinate color. But in terms of its logical form "red" (like every term in the language) has its logical opposite or *contrary*, which may be indicated by "un-red". This logical contrary specifies every other color than red, including the privation of color, namely, that which *lacks* color and is "colorless". Together, the contraries "red" and "un-red" exhaust the range of "what is colored". The latter is the *category* of color. While "red" and "un-red" are property-words, the logical union of the contraries, indicated by the absolute term/red/(which signifies "that which is either-red-or-un-red") is a *category*-word and may be said to specify a *feature* (rather than a mere property). Any concept in its logical absolute form is a *category* which specifies a *feature* of the world. Ontology is primarily concerned with the *features* of the world, and only secondarily, if at all, with properties.

(Types of Kinds or Entities and Predicative Form)

This special notion of a category is the key to defining the *kinds* or *types* of things there are in any given world. The *form* of any ontology is the logical structure of thought. In classical Aristotelian logic, for example, the logical form of thought is *predicative* : every thought consists of a logical predicate being positively or negatively joined to a logical subject. But not all terms in the language may significantly configure; logical laws determine which terms are mutually predicable. This is a *formal* feature of sense formation in natural language—language discriminates between sense and non-sense. The laws of predication formally determine which terms in the language may be intelligibly joined in thought.[15] And when all of the categories of a language are mutually deployed according to these laws they form a predicative structure which shows which terms may be significantly joined in predication. When terms that are not formally predicable are joined in a sentence non-sense results, a category-mistake committed. Category-mistakes are sentences which fail to specify a thought, are unintelligible, and neither true nor false. A thought which is category-correct makes sense and is thus either-true-or-false. To make sense is to have *truth-status*, to be/true/, rather than to have determinate truth-value. This is another way to express the earlier point that *sense is prior to truth*. Whether a thought is true or false is subsequent to and dependent upon whether it makes sense.

Predicative form and the laws of predicability, then, are the formal origin of categorial structure and hence of sense formation in natural language. An ontological paradigm is a particular categorial structure. We may now observe how categorial relations define the ontological *types* of things there are in a given world. Since a categorial structure is a network of predicative relations it is not surprising to find the *formal principle of types* in the form of a predicative law :

(*Formal Principle of Types*)

> "Within a given world, two entities *a* and *b* are of different ontological type if and only if a category term of feature *P* applies to *a* but not to *b*, and a category term applies to *b* but not to *a*".

For example, in ordinary English we find that stones are /colored/, but numbers are not, and numbers are /even/, but not/colored/. It would be a category mistake to join numbers and colors predicatively. "Seven is blue", for example, is a category mistake. Thus, by the above formal criterion of type difference, stones and numbers are of different types. This example shows that type differences with respect to a given world are determined by the particular category structure or ontology and are immediately tied to the sense formation of the language in question.

(Illustrations of Different Ontological Paradigms)

A *category*, we have seen, is the logical form of a *concept*, and a *type* is the ontological form of an *entity*. Together, the categories and types which are discriminated in a particular language are mutually related by predicative laws and thus fall into a predicative configuration. A given entity is of a particular type depending on the categories which apply to it ("apply" here means "predicable of"). The type of an entity is ontologically revealing since it obviously indicates the *nature* or *essence* of the thing. The categories or features of a thing specify its nature. Thus to know that a particular entity is /colored/ reveals that it is /extended /or in space and located. Numbers, which are not in space, are obviously of a very different nature.

We are now in a position to illustrate how different categorial structures shape different ontological paradigms and determine different forms of sense or meaning. An ontology is a world view, and in this sense it is clear that the dualism of Descartes, the idealism of Berkeley or Hume, the materialism of Hobbes or Democritus, and the monism of Spinoza are different world views. Each recommends a restructuring of the categorial configuration, each argues for a new model or paradigm for making sense of the world and experience, each wishes to revise the sense of conventional language.

Descartes uncovers a *dualistic* paradigm in his *Meditations*. He presents a categorial structure which reconstructs and redefines the configuration of *categories* and *types* in ordinary experience. He argues that the category of /thought/ (the feature of thinking and being in some mode of consciousness) and the category of /extension/ (the feature of occupying space and having dimension), are mutually exclusive and distinct. This means that they *cannot* apply to (be predicable of) the same entity. The implication of this radical category distinction is that *mind* (the type of thing that is /thinking/) and body (the type of thing that is /extended/) are of different ontological types. This radical dualism of mind and body necessitates a distinctive feature of Descartes' ontology, namely, that *persons* are dual in nature, are composite and not primitive individuals. The ontological paradigm which Descartes is recommending is represented in the following diagram :

Figure 1

(Dualistic Paradigm)



Here we find that the ego is a purely thinking thing and is of a different type from stones, which are extended in space. (This is an instance of the law of type difference). It would be a category mistake in this paradigm to predicate "thought" of stones or "spacial location" of egos. This is how a category configuration determines what makes sense and what does not with respect to a given paradigm. The situation with *person* in figure 1 is problematic because both categories apply to persons and yet the figure shows that the two categories are mutually exclusive and unrelated. The only way formally to resolve this predicament, assuming, of course, that the two category terms are univocal, is to *require* that *persons* are composite and dual, rather than primitive individuals. So, the category of /thinking/ applies to person *qua* mind, and the category of extension applies *qua* body, and the person is a dual entity of *mind-and-body*.

It must be stressed that this is a *formal requirement* of the paradigm. Incoherence would result if persons were taken to be individuals in this ontological paradigm. A formal ontological law is in effect here :

(*Formal Law of Individuals and Ambiguity*)

> "If *a*, *b* and *c* are any three entities in *any* world and *P* and *Q* are categories such that *P* is predicable of *a* and *b* but not *c*, and *Q* is predicable of *b* and *c* but not *a*, then either *P* must be equivocal over *a* and *b* or else *Q* must be equivocal over *b* and *c*. Conversely, if *P* and *Q* are univocal terms, then the middle term, entity *b*, *must be* equivocal or composite,"

(Illustration)

Figure 2



This formal ontological law is a necessary condition of coherence for any possible world. If it is violated an incoherent ontology results, which, of course, means a breakdown in the sense structure of the language in question.[16]

When the Cartesian dualistic paradigm is contrasted with other ontological paradigms we begin to see more clearly *both* how radically different in sense structure different worlds are *and* how the formal ontological principles are common to different worlds and determine their inner logic and coherence. Let us consider simultaneously the ontological paradigms of an *idealist* and a *materialist* categorial structure. In Berkeley's ontology, for example, we find a very different categorial configuration from the Cartesian one. Berkeley, as an idealist, argues that the unifying category of all experience is /thinking/, which here indicates spirit or consciousness and what is presented to and dependent upon consciousness or mind. Accordingly, the category of /matter/, or /extension/, as the primary feature of space, is *derivative* from the category of /thinking/ or /mind/ and logically depends upon it for its sense. It other words, the category of

/matter/ is included within the category of /mind/. This is precisely what Descartes rejects. Berkeley's paradigm entails a different sense structure for langnage from Descartes'. It may be depicted as in the following figure :

Figure 3



Idealist Paradigm

Figure 4



Materialist Paradigm

In Berkeley's categorial structure, figure 3, the predicative possibilities allow for a spirit which is purely /thinking/, without body, as in the case of Descartes' pure ego, but here we find that a person is of the same type as a stone—both sharing the same features of being a body with thought. Of course this is radically different from the Cartesian world in which stones and persons are of different types, for persons are in the category of /thought/ while stones are not. In the world of the idealist all things necessarily fall within the category /thought/, and his world is thoroughly spiritual. Thus, Berkeley's paradigm *necessitates* that persons and stones are of the same type and have the same predicative possibilities. It makes sense to say of a stone that it depends upon /thinking/ and is of the nature of /thought/. But this would be a category mistake in the Cartesian world in which the categories of /thought/ and /extension/ are radically distinct. Again, in Berkeley's paradigm we find that the concept of a person is a primitive individual and not composite. This, too, is entailed by the paradigm. In this respect the Idealist paradigm avoids the mind-body dualism of the Cartesian ontology. The point to be stressed is that what makes sense in Berkeley's world does not make sense in the Cartesian world, and *vice versa.* And we begin to see more clearly how different ontological paradigms reshape the sense of terms. For example, the term "person" has different senses in the two paradigms, it is *systematically* ambiguous. Here it is natural to wonder whether the word "person" has anything in common between the two paradigms, other than the mere inscription. And, in general, it must not be assumed that the basic categories have univocal sense between different worlds.

As we consider the materialist paradigm in figure 4 we find the contrary position to that of the idealist. The materialist argues that the primary category of language and world is that of /matter/, and that thinking or /mind/ is derivative and logically dependent upon /matter/. In this paradigm we find that a stone is, as in the Cartesian paradigm, purely /extended/ apart from thought and of a different category from persons. However, in this world persons are thinking bodies and this is a different concept of *person* from that found either in the Cartesian or Idealist paradigm. In this materialist world there is no room for a pure spirit apart from matter; it is not possible to conceive of God without body, for example. Again we find that what can be thought or conceived of in the materialist world is different from what makes sense and is possible in the other two paradigms. What can be said significantly, or is category-correct, in one paradigm is a category mistake in another. And even if the same thing is *said*, the same utterances made, in different worlds, the sense would be systematically ambiguous. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the same formal ontological laws hold for any possible paradigm. The formal principle of type difference or of individuation, for example, are conditions for any possible world. The materialist *can* take persons to be individuals since the categories are connected; and the same holds for the idealist. The dualist, however, *cannot* maintain this without violating the principle of individuation.

(Ontological Considerations which Distinguish Paradigms)

What are the ontological considerations which distinguish different paradigms or worlds? In general, any ontological commitment which formally changes the predicative or categorial possibilities is a world-shaping and paradigm-distinguishing desideratum. We have seen in the three illustrations that each paradigm is shaped by different ontological commitments: the Cartesian dualist maintains (assumes ?) that the category of mind is redically distinct from and unrelated to the category of body; the materialist is committed to the thesis that all experience and all features of the world fall under the inclusive category of/matter/; and the idealist maintains the contrary ontological thesis that all experience, all entities and features of the world, are to be explained in terms of the category of /mind/. Needless to say, the terms "/mind/" and "/matter/" are systematically ambiguous between the three paradigms, for formal and structural reasons, since each is bound up in different predicative possibilities.

As we take other examples of ontological paradigms from the history of Western thought we begin to see the variety of ontological commitments which make a world of difference. Take Hume's ontology, for example. Since the primitive elements or individuals which make up experience of the world are the immediate impressions of perception (sense-data), and since these impressions are atomically discrete and momentary, the impressions of sound being of a different type from the impressions of sight, and each lasting only a fleeting moment, we find a paradigm in which there is no substance, in the sense of an underlying continuously existing entity which is the principle of unity and identity. This means that the entities designated by the common nouns of ordinary language are not primitive individuals but are really *clusters* or *bundles* of atomic and momentary impressions. The term "table", for example, indicates in Hume's phenomenalist ontology a congery of ever-changing momentary and discrete impressions. Needless to say the sense of "table" is radically different in Hume's language or paradigm than it is in its ordinary conventional use. The interpretation of 'this term according to Hume's paradigm differs from the conventional interpretation which preanalytically and informally accepts a different paradigm. Notice here, too, that the status of ordinary objects as classes or clusters of individuals (atomic impressions) is *necessitated* by Hume's atomic and phenomenalist paradigm, and *determined* by the formal principle of individuation. Since what I *see* and what I *hear* and what I *smell* are atomically discrete and of different types, these perceptual terms have different senses from the perceptual terms of ordinary language, where it is assumed that what we see, hear and smell are united in the same individual object. Thus, we find in Hume's case, which, by the way, is a development of Berkeley's paradigm, that the *atomism*—the commitment that the primitive individuals of experience and language are discrete and atomic—gives unique shape to his paradigm and is a world-distinguishing consideration

The same is true of Spinoza's monistic paradigm. This ontological paradigm and form of making sense of the world takes the Cartesian commitment that the categories of /thought/ and /extension/ are mutually exclusive and unrelated. In fact, Spinoza goes further to hold that they form two distinct languages. However, he rejects Descartes' commitments to there being finite substances and instead maintains (argues?) that the very meaning of "substance" requires us to conceive of substance as infinite and one and indivisible. This leads to his ontological monism in which reality is One (Substance/Nature/God). This means that conventional discourse must be radically re-interpreted in its meaning since the conventional assumption of discrete and ndividual substances is false and apparent and are *really* only imodes of the one true Infinite Substance. Thus, here again we find a world-shaping and sense-making ontological commitment which redically alters the interpretation and significance of experience or thought.

It should be noticed that neither Hume nor Spinoza is recommending that we change what we *say* in ordinary convenslional discourse. For we continue to say the same things—that there are tables, and that the table is square and brown, etc.—but the meaning of these conventional utterances are radically revised in the light of the recommended ontological paradigm. These utterances about tables, for example, would have very different interpretations in the paradigms of Hume and Spinoza.

(Formal Factors which Alter Predicative Possibilities)

From the comparison of these different ontological paradigmwe may discern general patterns of the ontological considerastions which distinguish different paradigms. One factor which distinguishes paradigms is a structural change in the *categorial configuration*, the sort of change we found in the move from the idealist to the materialist paradigm. Another sort of consideration is a formal change in the *principle of identity and individuation*, the type of transformation found in the paradigm of Hume or Spinoza. Hume's paradigm was different because of his commitment to phenomenal *atomism*, while Spinoza's was unique because of his commitment to monism. In each case the *material* criterion of what is to count as an individual, as one entity, is transformed; the *formal* principle of individuation which holds for any possible world remains the same. For Hume, the individuals of conventional discourse are interpreted to be *really* bundles of momentary atomic impressions. And for Spinoza the individuals of ordinary discourse are taken to be *actually* modes of the one true Substance or Individual which is God or Nature. Thus, there are different structural ways to reform sense, to alter the predicative possibilities, and to differentiate ontological paradigms of interpretation. The differences between atomism and monism, between materialism and idealism, between dualism and pluralism, and between substantialism and asubstantialism (qualificationalism), and so on, are formal ontological commitments which distinguish different world paradigms. Ontological commitments which change the status of existence, taking existent entities to be phenomenal or apparent rather than real, will heve a formal bearing on predicative status and mode of interpretation. Or, making a commitment to the perpetual and continuous status of existence through time, and through an endless series of rebirths, will formally change the principle of identity of existent entities, as is the case in the *karma* paradigm. Whatever the structural transformation which reshapes sense and predicative possibilities the net effect will be either to change the categorial configuration, and thereby alter the very meaning of the categories, or else to change the criteria of identity and individuation of entities which alters the types of things discriminated in a given paradigm. And, of course, change in one affects the status of the other.

(The Integrity, Coherence and Inner Logic of Paradigms)

It must be stressed that each paradigm has its inner integrity and logic. A paradigm is a *complete system* for interpreting experience as a whole. It *defines* what makes sense and what are predicative possibilities. In this way it defines what is conceivable or intelligible and hence, what *may* be the case, what *can* be true or false. We have seen in the examples above that the *form* of a paradigm prescribes and proscribes the internal features of its world and language. We saw, for example, that Descartes' dualistic paradigm necessitated that persons be treated as composite entities. We also saw in the case of Hume's paradigm that conventional objects *must* be treated as clusters of fleeting atomic phenomena. These ontological properties were formally dictated by the categorial structure of the respective paradigms. So an ontological paradigm must be *taken as a whole* and once we enter its inner coherence and logic it leads us and teaches us and constrains us to think in radically new ways. The exploration of a new paradigm leads to startling conceptual discoveries as a strange new world is disclosed.

(Paradigms as Cultural Prototypes)

Furthermore, the pervasiveness and depth of an ontological paradigm may be easily overlooked. To say that a paradigm is a *complete system* for the interpretation of *experience as a whole* means that all levels of experience are shaped by the paradigm in question. In this respect a paradigm or categorial structure, as a world view, is a *cultural prototype* in the sense that it informs everyday experience, moral experience, social and political reality, esthetic expression, and so on. As we enter the Hindu paradigm, for example, at some sufficiently general level, we begin to see how the world view or ontology shapes experience at all levels. It explains why the religious form of life of the Hindus takes the particular form it does; it reveals the inner logic which illumines and inspires its esthetic ideals and practice; it discloses the deeper reasons for the social reality and behaviour being the way it is; it determines why the form of moral experience *must* take the course it has taken; it shapes the deep-seated attitudes of the culture towards knowledge and truth, and makes manifest the research values which determine the acceptable and desirable forms of scientific practice; and to the extent that a culture is consistent and coherent and faithful to its shaping paradigm it uncovers the inner logic which shows the rationality, intelligibility, unity and coherence of all of these forms of cultural experience.

ONTOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE LOGIC OF TRANSLATION

(The Universal Interest in Sense and Interpretation)

A central concern of this paper has been to give an interpretation of *karma* and to present the *general method* of interpretation being used. The translation and interpretation of *karma* is an exploration of its sense, and we have seen that this requires ontological analysis and explication of the *karma* paradigm or catogorial structure in terms of which this "doctrine" may be intelligibly interpreted. Ontological analysis is an investigation of the origins of sense formation which is always relative to a particular paradigm of interpretation. To apprehend meaning is to interpret, and interpretation is possible in terms of an ontological paradigm. In this respect such paradigms are *semantic* schemes of interpretation. Thus, the investigation of sense or meaning and the logic of interpretation and translation are primarily matters of ontological analysis.

Hermeneutics is the science of interpretation, and interpretation pervades all levels of experience. It has become clear that *to experience is to interpret*, for experience of any form is possible only with respect to some categorial structure, can only arise within some ontological paradigm or world view. Whether at the level of mundane daily experience, or the experience of scientific research and theory, whether in our religious or esthetic lives, interpretation is always present; the hermeneutical concern is universal. *Ontological hermeneutics* investigates the origin and formation of sense or meaning and is a method of interpreatation through ontological analysis.

(The Philosophical Problem of Translation)

The philosophical problem of radical translation must be distinguished from issues of linguistic translation. It is one thing to translate between different languages, such as Sanskrit and English, another to "translate" betwen different ontological paradigms. The former is called "lingusitic" translation, the latter "philosophical" or "ontological".

(The Ontological Relativity of Sense)

The possibility of translation between different worlds or ontologies is in question since, as we have seen, sense or meaning is *relative* to a particular ontological paradigm or categorial, structure. A given term in natural language is indeterminate in sense apart from some paradigm. But it has been stressed that sense is *defined* internally by each paradigm. A term has determinate sense only *within* a given paradigm, paradigms being closed systems of interpretation which have their own inner logic and form of coherence. What makes sense in one world fails to make sense in another. This implies that there is radical and *systematic ambiguity* between different ontological paradigms. Different paradigms do not share common meanings of terms. Paradigms are radically incommensurable in terms of internal sense, they are different "language games". And since there are no "neutral" meanings for terms *between* paradigms, it is natural to wonder *whether* translation between different worlds is possible at all.

(Radical Indeterminacy of Sense in Natural Language)

The systematic ambiguity of sense between paradigms is complemented by the radical indeterminacy (variability, relativity) of sense in natural languages. For if the sense of a term is always relative to some *particular* paradigm (the *ontological relativity* of sense), a given term in natural language will obviously be devoid of determinate sense. For this reason it is problematic to speak of the "same" term between different paradigms. *The principle of ambiguity between paradigms* rules out the possibility of terms with ontologically "neutral" or shared sense. It is therefore more accurate to speak of *the same linguistic expression* or inscription (rather than a term or concept) in neutral language shared by different paradigms. *The principle of indeterminacy of sense* applies to expressions or linguistic inscriptions in natural language. For example, the expression "person" in ordinary English is indeterminate in sense apart from some specific categorial structure which provides a context for its sense and interpretation. It was shown in the comparison of different paradigms above that the expression "person" was systematically ambiguous between worlds, it had different senses in each paradigm. This is true of all linguistic expressions; they are all indeterminate in sense apart from an interpretive scheme.

This is not to say that the term "person" has no sense in ordinary English. Of course it does. But this is because ontological paradigms *are* at work shaping sense in ordinary language at any given time in its history and evolution. Conventional discourse has determinate sense only insofar as it makes ontological commitments to certain categorial structures. I speak in the plural here since it is often the case that a variety of paradigms simultaneously shape sense in ordinary language. This is the origin of ambiguity in ordinary language. And it is *this* feature of conventional discourse that is sometimes referred to as its "informal" character. It may be the case, for example, that one ontological paradigm determines our religious commitments and experience, while another shapes our scientific practice and values, and still another our social and political reality. Such multiple commitments to different paradigms simultaneously in conventional or ordinary discourse is at once its virtue and its vice. It is a virtue in as much as it celebrates the inexhaustible power of natural consciousness to entertain different forms of life, or "language games", as Wittgenstein would put it. This anti-reductionist and anti-essentialistic tendency of ordinary language is a sign of its health and vitality. On the other hand, this "informal" feature of natural discourse, as many of the "ideal-language" analytical philosophers have warned, is a source of confusion, ambiguity and incoherence. And we can see why, since any given expression in ordinary language will have different senses when interpreted or used in different ontological contexts. This is confusing only because it is not explicitly recognized that different cotegorial paradigms are influencing the interpretation of the same expression simultaneously. Different "rules of use" or "language games" are being used to interpret the given expression, and here language "goes on a holiday". It is clear that both the formalist and the informalist have their legitimate points.

(Openness of Language to Radical Revision)

It was pointed out earlier that natural consciousness, natural language, must not be identified with the particular paradigms of interpretation to which the linguistic community happens to be committed at any given time. For the distinctive feature of language is its openness to radical revision and revolution in sense structure, its power and potentiality to reconstitute its forms of sense. And this process of revision is constantly at work in the evolutionary history of a language. For example, as scientific discourse evolves and develops its paradigms for interpreting experience a new vocabulary develops and impinges upon the conventional senses of terms in ordinary non-scientific discourse, and gradually new senses or connotations emerge in ordinary speech. Or, the revision may be more profound and dramatic as in a religious or cultural revolution. Such radical transformation in cultural consciousness may be understood as the shifting to new ontological paradigms. More often, however, it is really the deepening of understanding of a world view to which the community is *already* committed. An ontological paradigm, we have seen, has its integrity and inner logic. The full import of a paradigm is often not appreciated by the cultural community which resides in that world. The paradigm is slowly developed and understood, and when it fades a renaissance is called for, and so on.

(Radical Translation as Intra-Linguistic Interpretation)

Given these features of sense in natural language—that sense is relative to a paradigm, that there is radical ambiguity and incommensurability between paradigms, and that sense is variable and indeterminate in natural language—the problem of translation is intensified. Translation between natural languages is the *starting point* of ontological hermeneutics. For example, the *linguistic* hypothesis that "karma" be translated in English as "deeds performed with consequences", leaves radically open to interpretation the relevant sense of "deed", etc. It was shown earlier that "deed" or "action" is systematically ambiguous between the different categorial paradigms which were compared. It is different in sense still within the *karma* paradigm. For this reason successful *linguistic* translation, the appropriate mutual mapping of *expressions* or *inscriptions* between natural languages is the starting point of radical translation or philosophical hermeneutics. The challenge for ontological hermeneutics is to *disambiguate* the expressions in question by interpreting them through appropriate categorial paradigms. The aim of radical translation is to render *determinate* the indeterminate sense of the proposed expression within the *same* natural language. Thus, *philosophical translation is intralinguistic interpretation.* Radical translation is not beetween the expressions of different natural languages, e. g. Sanskrit and English, but the ontological interpretation and disambiguation *within the same language.*

(Radical Translation as Movement Between Worlds)

This suggestion seems ironic, even perverse, in the light of our habit of thinking of translation as an inter-linguistic enterprise. But the question of radical translation concerns the systematic ambiguity of expressions within a given language between different ontological paradigms or categorial schemes of interpretation. And it has become clear that all *possible ontological paradigms are accessible within the same natural language.* Radical translation, then, is interpretation between different worlds or paradigms; it is cross-ontological rather than inter-linguistic. And it is "cross-cultural" only if this designation implies that different cultures reflect different ontological paradigms and are worlds apart.[17]

But translation or interpretation between different worlds is not a matter of synonymy or of the mutual mapping of expressions which have the *same* sense, for this is ruled out by the principle of radical ambiguity between paradigms. There are no synonymous concepts between *different* worlds. Rather, *the ideal of radical trnslation is identity of meaning* which is to be achieved through reconstruction of the original categorial paradigm in question. For example, the ideal in the translation of "karma" is to reconstruct the original *karma* paradigm within English, and in this way to uncover and recover the *identical* system of sense which gives "karma" its intelligibility. There are no ready-made equivalent terms for "karma" in ordinary English. Instead, expressions from ordinary English must be *given* the appropriate significance by interpreting them within the context of the *karma* paradigm. The *system* of sense of the *karmic* categorial structure must be re-created within English. It is in this respect that radical translation is intra-linguistic interpretation.

The implication of this is that there can be no "translation" between *different* ontological paradigms, only the re-creation of identical paradigms. But the more interesting and challenging task of ontological hermeneutics is to discern differences in meaning, systematic ambiguity in sense, between different worlds. The aim of ontological hermeneutics is not to "translate" the categorial structure of Spinoza's monism into the paradigm or language form of Hume, for example, but rather to appreciate the systematic differences in sense between these two worlds. So ontological hermeneutics has the dual aim of either recreating *identical* sense or recognizing systematic *differences* in sense between different paradigms.

(All Ontological Paradigms Accessible Within Natural Language)

The key assumption in this account of radical translation is the openness or accessibility of a natural language to all possible ontological paradigms. Once it is clear that a natural anguage is not to be identified with the particular ontological paradigm(s) which happens to inform it at a given time in its evolution, when it is seen that it is open to ontological evolution, revision, revolution and radical re-interpretation, then its internal accessibility to any possible world is readily acknowledged. This power of natural language to develop or radically reconstitute its sense structure is a manifestation of the *formal* ontological structure which holds for any natural language. The formal features of natural consciousness or language is the source of the openness and transparency of thought, of the recursive potentiality of natural language to re-interpret and re-form its sense.

This open-textured feature of natural language is the key to understanding radical revolutions in sense—relgious reformation or conversion, metaphysical revision, scientific conceptual or theoretical revolutions, cultural renaissance, etc. And here we find two sorts of transformations possible. One sort of transformation is *evolutionary* and *developmental*. That is, a given paradigm, at any given time in the history of a cultural tradition, may undergo *internal* development and growth. This is possible because, as we have seen, any paradigm has its integrity and potentialities which are subject to exploration and discovery. A paradigm is never fully manifest or understood, never completely exhausted or comprehended. The uncharted territory of the inner landscape of an ontology is the frontier which allows for a cultural renaissance, which allows for a breakthrough into a new self-awareness, for a deeper appreciation for the inner meaning of a cultural world.

But the other sort of transformation is, perhaps, the more radical one of *external revolution and revision.* Here the culture, the natural language, undergoes a radical re-formation of its world view or sense structure with the introduction of a new ontological paradigm. Such revision is dramatically seen in the history of revisionary metaphysics in Western thought. For example, Spinoza's thought may be seen as recommending a new ontological paradigm, a new categorial scheme for interpreting experience and revising the religious tradition. The same may be said for Hume's ontological recommendations. Needless to say, the two forms of transformation shade into one another. For example, the cultural/ontological revolution from the Hindu to the Buddhist world may, indeed, be taken as the introduction of a new paradigm, but it may also be taken as a further deepening of the inner meaning of the Hindu world view. And, the religious revolution effected by Jesus may at once be regarded as the recommendation of a new form of life *and* as the deepening of appreciation of the earlier tradition or world view. The fact that there are such evolutions and revolutions within the same natural lauguage in the history of a culture testifies to the openness of natural consciousness to re-interpretation.

(No Culture has Privileged Access to its Paradigm)

The formal accessibility to any possible world within the same natural language has important implications for cross-cultural research and translation. If philosohical translation is the *re-creation* of an "alien" world view within a natural language, then the ontological paradigm in question is just as open to exploration and development in its new linguistic setting as it is in its native cultural milieu. Ironic though it may be, no culture has privileged access to its ontological paradigm; it may equally misunderstand itself, deceive and violate itself, and may be as unfaithful to its ontological commitments, as some "alien" interpreting culture might. Indeed, it may well be that the distance of a foreign perspective, the possibility of objectivity through the fresh look of disinterested eyes, may be an antidote to the myopic subjectivity of native self-interest. And no culture can claim privileged authority over the correct interpretation of its world. It can make no special claims to legitimacy, and has no special rights of ownership of its world view. Thus, for example, it is perfectly possible for an interpreter in a "Western" linguistic setting to attain a deeper grasp of the *karma* paradigm than a given native Hindu might have. It appears that native cultural corrigibility follows from the open textured feature of natural language.

(Exegetical and Creative Interpretation)

It becomes clear that ontological hermeneutics may take two forms. One objective is to explicate the *actual* interpretation or understanding that a given cultural tradition has of its ontological paradigm at a given time. This is *descriptive or exegetical* interpretation. So one task in the interpretation of *karma*, for example, would be to explicate how native Hindus have *in fact* interpreted their world. But precisely because the native interpretation of a paradigm is corrigible and distinguishable from the paradigm itself, there is room for the *development* of interpretation of the paradigm. A second task, therefore, is *creative interpretation* which has licence to explore and discover a paradigm in new ways. It is restricted neither by native or foreign antecedent interpretations. Creative interpretation is at liberty to excavate a paradigm in a new light and develop a new, and hopefully, more faithful and profound interpretation.[18]

(Incoherent Interpretation and Mixed Paradigms)

Of course there are logical constraints on authentic interpretation or translation. Natural language tends to be informal in the sense that it may be simultaneously committed to a *variety* of ontological paradigms. We saw earlier that this is a source of both virtue and vice when it comes to interpretation. *Incoherence* results when an interpretation mixes paradigms. Thus, interpretations of *karma* which assume alien categorial structures or which capture some features of the *karma* paradigm piecemeal are bound to land in incoherence and generate unintelligibility. A special type of global category-mistake results with *paradigm-crossings*. A paradigm crossing confuses systems of meaning, or "language-games". A critical constraint for ontological hermeneutics, then, is to clearly distinguish distinct paradigms and to avoid the incoherence of mixed paradigms.

This leaves open the question of adjudication between different paradigms. It need not be asaumed that a given community or natural language must be committed to only one ontological paradigm at a time. The luxury of the informal attitude welcomes a plurality of world views. A given community mey be committed to a particular world view and still remain open to, tolerate, entertain, and even celebrate a different ontology. This is possible because, as was stressed earlier, there is a difference between sense and truth. To make an ontological commitment to a particular world, to embrace it as true, does not preclude the possibility of entertaining a different world as intelligible, coherent and possible. One may by committed to the truth of his world view and still enter the intelligible structure of an alien world and appreciate it without affirming it. Thus, a Christian, from this point of view, has access to the Hindu world and may appreciate its intelligible powers while neither affirming nor denying it. And the question remains open: how many worlds can one simultaneously inhabit and be committed to? It is not obvious that the answer is: only one at a time!

(Quine's Scepticism about Radical Translation)

It is natural to wonder how the theory of radical translation being proposed here speaks to the well-known sceptical concerns of Quine. Especially since I have used terms such as "indeterminacy of sense", "ontological relativity" and "radical translation". But it should be apparent that Quine's logical framework is radically different from the *categorial* logic which ontological hermeneutics presupposes. Quine's logical language is *extensional* and takes reference and truth as primary. His language takes meaning to be specified by truth-conditions and involves a quantificational world which fails to discriminate between different types of things. As a result there is no nonsense in such a language, every syntactically well-formed sentence being either true or false. By contrast, the categorial logic presented here is an *intensional* lauguage which takes sense as prior to truth and reference. It assumes a category-differentiated world in which entities fall into different types and predicability is governed by formal category structure. There is a world of difference between the two logical languages. Thus, the expressions "indeterminacy of sense", "ontological relativity" and "radical translation", for example, are systematically ambiguous between these two logical frameworks or paradigms. Quine's scepticism concerning radical translation (in *his* sense) is a *result* and *requirement* of his logical language which is committed to indeterminate reference. It does not apply, however, to ontological hermeneutics, and is not required in a categorial logic.

(Formal Conditions of Radical Translation)

We may now review some of the main features of ontological hermeneutics. First, sense in natural language is indeterminate (indeterminacy of sense). The sense of a term is relative to a particular ontological paradigm (ontological relativity), and a term considered apart from a specific paradigm remains variable and open to interpretation (systematic ambiguity). But a natural language cannot be identified with any particular ontological paradigm and is essentially open to systematic re-inters pretation. This power to re-constitute its intelligible form springs from its formal ontological structure (formal ontology). In this respect a natural language has access to any possible categorial structure or world view. It is here that the formal condition of radical translation appears. For radical translation, that is, translation between different worlds, amounts to ontological interpretation within the same language, and is hence intralinguistic. But ontological interpretation *begins* where successful linguistic translation ends. For the linguistic expressions of a language remain indeterminate in sense without ontological interpretation; the same sentence may be given different senses, there being a difference between what is *said* and what is *meant*. In any case, there is systematic ambiguity between different paradigms, which means that there are no common univocal terms between differen worlds. It is now clear that radical translation does not presuppose common meanings between different paradigms. On the contrary, radical ambiguity is precisely what makes such translation possible. For ontological interpretation is the disambiguation of terms in a natural language, the systematic assignment of terms to their respective ontological paradigms. Thus, ironically, radical translation is possible *because* of the systematic ambiguity of terms between paradigms and trades on the radical indeterminacy and variability of sense in natural language.

[FURTHER INTERPREATION AND APPLICATION OF THE *KARMA* PARADIGM]

In the light of the foregoing discussion we may now resume the explication of the *generic karma* paradigm and ontological interpretaion of *karma*. It was shown earlier that the "doctrine" of karma makes sense when interpreted in terms of the *karma* paradigm which involves the features of conservation and preservation of existential status (*saṁsāra*), of a qualitative principle of identity or individuation, and of qualitative monism. These features distinguish the *karma* paradigm as a unique world view. We also saw in a preliminary way how these formal features of the *karma* paradigm rendered intelligible and necessitated certain characteristics of the karmic world view. For example, the notion of transmigration does make sense in a world in which the identity of the individual (*jīva*) is not delimited by conventional birth and death. If the identity of a *jīva* is constituted by its qualities (*guṇas*) and has a cosmic history, without beginning and without end, then the notion of a *jīva* re-incarnating in a subsequent life is intelligible and *required* by the paradigm. Furthermore, it became clear that in *saṁsāric* qualitative monism all existents are homogeneous in type, so qualitative transformations are possible and intelligible between different existential forms. This feature of the *karma* paradigm explains why a *jīva* might take the form of an insect, for example, and so on.

(The Generic Sense of *Karma* and Specific Differences)

We are in a position now to *apply* the generic paradigm to actual issues of interpretation. Thus far in the paper attention has been focused on the *generic karma* paradigm. But it is clear that there are real *specific* differences concerning the interpretation of *karma* among the various schools of Indian thought. The Yoga School develops *karma* in one way, while the Advaita tradition moves in another, and both of these differ significantly from the interpretation of *karma* in the early Buddhist tradition. It is natural to wonder whether the generic paradigm encompasses them all, and whether the differences between the schools do not require the detection of ambiguity in the concept of *karma*. In response to this legitimate concern it should be noted that there are constraints on the sense of *karma*, as there are, of course, on any term in a language. If the term *karma* is taken to be equivocal between the various schools, then this means that different ontological paradigms are involved. That would open the question whether there are any limits to the sense of *karma*. For example, might we then say that *karma* arises in Hume's thought, or is obviously present in Aristotle's ontology? The analytical procedure followed in this paper has been to begin *informally* with what is commonly taken to be the doctrine of *karma* in the most generic sense, and then to formalize it through ontological hermeneutics to get at the generic paradigm. If one wishes to argue that the concept of *karma* in Buddhist thought, for example, is radically different in sense from the Hindu tradition, then the alternative *karma* paradigm would have to be produced.

But the assumption behind the explication of the *generic* paradigm is that there are shared ontological commitments, at a sufficient level of generality, among the different karmic schools. For example, the concept of *karma* will have a place in an ontology that is committed to *saṁsāra*. And, indeed, it is found that the Hindu and Buddhist schools share such an ontological commitment. The point is that the specific differences between the different schools are real, but they are disagreements within a shared commitment to the intelligibility of *saṁsāra* and transmigration. Thus, in a saṁsāric paradigm it is formally required that there be some principle of identity through the transformations of life to death and back to life again, in an ongoing series. But precisely *how* this is effected is open to specific interpretation, and allows room for disagreement. The Abhidharmic School, given its *other* ontological commitments (to dharmas) about the nature of individual entities, is constrained to give one sort of account of the transfer of identity, and the Sāṁkhya School, with its commitments to *guṇas*, is constrained to give a different account. But real differences at this level do not preclude the possibility of shared ontological commitments at a more generic level. It is a common commitment to *saṁsāra* that gives the different schools of Indian thought a distinctively "Indian" character. And it is the conspicuous *absence* of such a commitment among the European schools of thought, for example, which gives force to the general contrast between these two cultural traditions. Thus, Deutsch's remark, which was quoted earlier, may be appropriately recalled here :

> "All the later systems of Indian thought agree, though that *karma* is operative in life; they disagree only about *what* it is that transmigrates and about *how* it takes place; *that* it takes place is accepted, and this alone is of philosophical importance".[19]

Specific disagreements, then, concerning *how* the transference of identity between lives takes place, and *what* the mechanism of transference is, whether it is some "stuff" which transmigrates, for example, may be seen as local disagreements within a shared general sense structure. Real disagreements about *how* transmigration takes place presuppose that transmigration is intelligible. So the presence of *specific* differences implies common *generic* commitments.

(Transference and Non-transference Models of *Karma*)

This way of accounting for specific differences within a shared generic context may be applied to what appears to be a fundamental split in the Indian tradition over the interpretation of *karma*, namely, whether *karma* is transferable or not. Two recent interpreters of *karma* have taken different sides on this issue.

On the one hand, McKim Marriott develops a "transactional" model for Indian thought which seems to imply that *karma* is transferable in some sense. On the other hand Karl Potter disagrees and argues that Marriott's interpretation cannot apply to the *karma* theories expounded in Yoga and Advaita, since these theories do not allow for the transfer of *karma*. How is this issue to be understood? Is there an issue here at all? In what follows I shall apply the generic *karma* paradigm and show that there is room for both interpretations, and that such *specific* disagreements are natural rather than problematic.

Let us begin with a brief sketch of Marriott's interpretation. It was stressed earlier that an ontological paradigm is a *cultural prototype* which shapes all levels of human experience. This aspect is nicely brought out in Marriott's interpretation, for he attempts to apply his model of analysis to all facets of Indian social reality. His interests are anthropological and ontological, but it is clear that his conceptual model is grounded in the ontological karma paradigm. Marriott says,

> "This essay proceeds from the axiom that the prevasive indigenous assumptions of any society, such as Indian notions of the identity of actor and action and of the divisibility of the person, provide bases on which an anthropologist may construct his models of cultural behaviuor in that society. It applies that axiom by constructing a monistic, dividualistic general model of Indian transactions, fitting this model first to the most accessible data, which are on the inter-relations and ranking of castes. It then proceeds to a wider review of the typical transactional tactics and strategies of groups and persons in India's varied moral, instrumental, and affective systems of action."[20]

Although the ontological issues are eclipsed in the discussion, Marriott rightly focuses on the critical issues of the identity of actor and action, of the existential divisibility of the person or agent, of a generic monism, and of the criteria of individuation. These are precisely the *ontological* features which were stressed in the presentation of the generic karma paradigm. The striking parallel continues as Marriott develops his model :

> "Indian thought about transactions differs from much Western sociological and psychological thought in not presuming the separability of actors from actions. By Indian modes of thought, what goes on *between* actors are the same connected processes of mixing and separation that go on *within* actors. Actors' particular natures are thought to be results as well as causes of their particular actions (*karma*). Varied codes of action or codes of conduct (*dharma*) are thought to be naturally embodied in actors and otherwise substantialized in the flow of things that pass among actors. Thus the assumption of the easy, proper separability of action from actor, of code from substance (similar to the assumption of the separability of law from

> nature, norm from behaviour, mind from body, spirit or energy from matter), that pervades both Western philosophy and Western common sense..is generally absent; code and substance (Sanskrit *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, *dharma* and *śarīra*, and so on) cannot have separate existences in this world of constituted things as conceived by most South Asians..Before one begins to think of Hindu transactions, one thus needs firmly to understand that those who transact as well as well as what and how they transact are thought to be inseparably 'code-substance' or 'substance-code'. The latter term will be used in this essay to stand, perforce awkwardly, for belief in the non-duality of all such pairs".[21]

This model agrees with the *karma* paradigm in insisting on the inseparability of actors from actions. The saṁsāric paradigm with its qualificational monism revealed that one's identity is constituted by the qualities, states and actions or activities which applied to it, and this explained why *one is what one does*. And, in general, all dualities which held in a substantial and atomic paradigm melted in qualificational monism. This is precisely what Marriott intends by his term "substance-code". This term may be naturally interpreted as the *quality-values* of the *karma* paradigm, and it is a signal of a correct breakaway from a substance paradigm to a qualificational paradigm. It was pointed out earlier that the existents in a saṁsāric world were not to be taken as discrete substances, but rather as constituted by the universal qualities (*guṇas* or codes) which applied to all existents. If we take "substance-code" in this ontological sense then Marriott's transactional model conforms to the generic *karma* paradigm precisely. Existential transaction is one of the primary features of qualificational monism. So Marriott's model is on firm ontological ground.

Marriott shows in his paper that this transactional model is a powerful explanatory device when applied to social behaviour in India. The caste system, for example, may be seen as a natural outgrowth of a world view in which one's existential identity itself may be transacted, where there are "boundary overflows" between individuals. Some of the main features of Marriott's conceptual model are nicely summed up in Potter's paper :

> "Marriott delineates a number of features of substance-code : it may be relatively gross or subtle, i. e. more or less capable of transformation, such transformations conceived on analogy with the heating or cooking of foodstuffs. It is 'particular, therefore divisible, highly diverse', it 'constantly circulates' and constitutes 'all natural entities', which are inevitably transformed 'by combinations and separations of their substance-codes'. A characteristic and fundamental aspect of Indian life consists in the exchanging of substance-code, and Marriott goes on to provide an interpretation of Indian thinking about caste involving distinguishing castes according to the strategies their members adopt in transacting such stuff...On Marriott's view the Indian conceptual scheme is 'monistic' : there is basically one kind of stuff, called 'substance-code', and Indian thought is not characterized (as ours is) by separations between law and nature, mind and body, spirit and matter, substance and code, etc. The scheme is 'particularistic' : substance-codes are basically particles which are constantly moving from one aggregate (body) to another. These particles of substance-code range in size from gross to exceedingly subtle, and in value from negative (evil) to positive (good or pure). It is noteworthy that not only is what we (Westerners) think of as 'material stuff' so constituted, but likewise 'perceived words, ideas, appearances, and so forth' are also types of substance-code. Persons, in this scheme, are aggregates of particles of substance-code of various kinds, and their nature is constantly changing due to gain and loss of these particles. Persons are thus, in Marriott's terminology, 'dividual' rather than 'individual', and they are constantly exchanging some of themselves with what is in their environment, including other persons". [22]

It should be strikingly clear that Marriott's model squares with the main features of the *karma* paradigm: the 'dividual' notion of persoal identity, the substance-code which are qualitative and evaluative at the same time, the identity of persons with their states and activities, and the qualificational monism which rejects the substance model of individuals and permits and requires the possibility of transformations and transactions at all levels.

While Potter acknowledges that Marriott develops "an analysis superior in explanatory power to previous accounts of caste behavior", he nevertheless maintains that this model of analysis cannot apply to the non-transference model of *karma* in Yoga and Advaita:

> "The fundametal reason why Marriott's interpretation cannot fit the karma theories expounded in Yoga and Advaita is that those theories do not allow for transfer of karma, while the interpretation that one naturally derives from Marriott is that they should. Karmic residues are construed as substance in these theories, and if anything can be said to be 'code' these certainly can. Yet it seems to me we must recognize that in Yoga and Advaita and other philosophical systems karmic residues are not transferable".[23]

Here, then, we find a specific difference in the interpretation of *karma*. Marriott's transactional model seems to entail that *karma* is transferable while Potter's analysis discloses that *karma* is not transferable in Yoga and Advaita.

The issue between Potter and Marriott needs to be clarified. From the point of view of the *generic* karma paradigm, the fact that there are specific differences of interpretation concerning the trnasferability of *karma* is neither surprising nor problematic. There *appears* to be a fundamental disagreement concerning the *sense* of *karma* because Potter and Marriott are speaking on different levels. Marriott is developing a *general* conceptual model which applies to all existent entities in a saṁsāric world. And in this world of qualificational monism, where all existents are "dividual", existential transformations or transactions are *possible* or *conceivable* on all levels. But it is clear that dividual entities retain their identity through such transformations. Which *specific* constituent qualities (substance-codes) of an individual are *in fact* transferred or transacted is open to differing interpretations. It is perfectly plausible for Yoga and Advaita to be ontologically committed to the generic paradigm and nevertheless *deny* that karmic residues are *in fact* transferred between different persons. But this does not mean that qualificational transference (transaction of substance-code) in general must be rejected, much less the rejection of the generic paradigm as a whole. On the contrary, both

Yoga and Advaita are committed to the ontological features of the *karma* paradigm: to saṁsāra, to transmigrtion, and to qualificational monism. Obviously there must at least be "lateral" transaction of karmic residue in the transformation of birth to death to re-birth in the ongoing history of a single *jīva*. But to deny the "vertical" transference of karmic residues *between* different *jīvas* is a point of specific disagreement which is permitted within the generic paradigm.

But Potter seems to treat the issue of the transferability of *karma* in *isolation* from the fundamental ontological issue. The specific question of transference *cannot be separated* from the context of the ontological paradigm taken as a whole. Does Potter wish to deny that the *other* features of the karma paradigm which are evident in Marriott's model are also rejected by Yoga and Advaita? If so, what is the *alternative* ontological paradigm to the transactional one? The alternatives for Potter's line of argument seem to be the following. Either Potter wishes to argue that the *enitre* ontological paradigm implied in Marriott's model fails to apply in Yoga and Advaita, in which case a different ontological paradigm must be produced, and this would mean that the concept of *karma* is systematically ambiguous between the transactional and non-transference paradigms. Or else Yoga and Advaita are indeed committed to the generic karma paradigm with its transactional possibilities, but simply *deny* that *in fact* karmic residues are transferred or transacted between persons. If the latter, then the specific disagreement over the transferability of karma poses no special difficulty. If the former then the task for ontological hermeneutics would be to draw out the systematic ambiguity between the different ontological paradigms, and again there is no special problem. Otherwise it would be incoherent to pick and choose from the karma paradigm rather than taking it as an integral whole. Such fragmentary analysis is bound to fall into the incoherence of mixed paradigms.

Again, if Yoga and Advaita are simply *denying* the specific case of karmic transference between persons, then the disagreement between Potter and Marriott is accommodated, indeed made possible, by the generic paradigm. For this paradigm in principle (and formally) allows for qualitative transference at *all* levels of existence. This makes it possible for a particular theory to *deny* that there is transfer of karma, while another contrary theory *affirms* this. The possibility of both denial and affirmation here, however, presupposes the *intelligibility* of transference. The fact that one affirms what the other denies shows the deeper shared commitment to the significance of transference. Otherwise, does Yoga or Advaita *deny*, in principle, transference and transaction of other qualities or "residues" between persons or other existent entities in the saṁsāric world? If they did, then this would be evidence that a very different ontological paradigm was in effect here. Thus, the two interpretations have much more in common than it first appeared. They share a generic paradigm which invites and even requires specific differences in interpretation. Such diversity at the level of specifics is to be expected and celebrated, rather than found problematic or to be exaplained away.

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NOTES

- Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the following:
  - (i) The Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session on *Karma*, March 30th, 1978, in conjunction with AAS, Chicago.
  - (i) Columbia University : University Seminar on Oriental Thought and Religion, April 7th, 1978
  - (iii) International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, April 15th, 1978, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee in the session on "Ontologies, Epistemologies, and Cross-Cultural Translatability".

1. *The Bhagavad Gītā*, translated with introduction by Eliot Deutsch, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, New York, 1967, pp. 12-13
2. *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, M. Hiriyanna, Allen and Unwin, India, 1973, p. 47
3. *Advaita Vedānta*, Eliot Deutsch, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1973, p. 68

4. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 46
5. *Ibid.*, p. 50
6. Quoted by Eliot Deutsch from *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Up.* (IV, 4 5) in *Advaita Vedānta*, op. cit., p. 67
7. Eliot Deutsch, *Ibid.*, p. 67. It should be noted that "state of being" must here be taken as indicating *existential* status, and cannot refer to the true Self which is beyond states and qualifications.
8. Deutsch, *Ibid.*, p. 68
9. It is clear that the *sense* of "moral" is here in question. It was indicated earlier that *karma* gets its moral dimension from the context of the alienation of *saṁsāric* existence from true Being. This means that the distinction between good and bad conduct is *within* the *saṁsāric* realm, but the aim of moral conduct is to transcend this realm, going beyond good and evil. And now that we entertain the possibility of all existents being part of one cosmic moral order the deep ambiguities in the term "moral" begin to surface.
10. *Guṇas* are the primary features which constitute all existent entities. But these features are *quality-values. Sattva*, for example, has the connotations of "dynamic equilibrium", "potential conciousness", "intelligence", "objectivity" and "goodness".
11. This is the *ontological* background which supports one interpretation of the transactional analysis of McKim Marriott in his paper, "Hindu Transactions : Diversity Without Dualism". This is developed in the last part of this paper.
12. *Bhagavad Gītā*, tr. Deutsch, op. cit., ch. 3/5, p. 48
13. *Philosophy East and West*, 26, no. 2, April 1976. See also "Formal Ontology and the Dialectical Transformation of Consciousness", forthcoming in the same Journal, January, 1979.
14. For details see *MBW*.

15. For detailed development of this point see *MBW*.

16. Of course, this is where ambiguity and metaphoric language are connected. When "category mistakes", from the literal point of view, are nevertheless taken to have significant use it must be in a mataphoric sense.

17. In this context the term "cross-cultural" gets its force by trading on the connotations of "cross-ontological".

18. Thus, a given culture may fail to grasp the full import of a paradigm to which its community is committed. A cultural renaissance, reformation or revolution may result from a new insight into the paradigm. In this respect a paradigm *teaches* and *instructs* as deeper meanings are disclosed. But such creative interpretation is just as possible from "foreign" sources as from native initiative. A cultural renaissance may well be launched from foreign soil.

19. See footnote 8 above.

20. MaKim Marriott, "Hindu Transactions: Diversity without Dualism" in *Transaction and Meaning* ed. Bruce Kapferer, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1976, p. 109

21. *Ibid.*, pp 109-110

22. Karl H. Potter, "The Karma Theory and its Interpretation in Some Indian Philosophical Systems", a paper delivered at Haverford College in the Gest Lecture Series in the Fall, 1977.

A TYPOLOGY OF WHAT THERE IS

INTRODUCTION

1. One way of understanding the world is to establish what it is made of.

2. The establishing of what the world is made of is partly a matter of fact and partly a matter of analysis (or classification, or setting of boundaries, or definition).

3. This paper does not deal substantially with any matter of fact. The main thrust is in the direction of analysis by classification; and it includes an array of definitions of the proposed classes.

4. The matter of fact involved in establishing what the world is made of may be formulated, with regard to any questionable component of the world, thus: Is it in fact a component of the world? For example, if one has defined a hippogriff as a winged horse, the pertinent question of fact would be whether one can find such an animal in the ordinary world of space and time.

5. If, however, instead of defining a *hippogriff* and asking the pertinent question of fact about a hippogriff, one defienes *the hippogriff nature* as the attribute or essence of being a winged horse, one can relevantly either (a) ask, as a question of fact, whether that attribute or essence is exemplified anywhere in the ordinary world of space and time, or (b) realize that, as an attribute or essence, the attribute or essence of being a hippogriff is a component of the class of attributes or essences merely by virtue of being a namable attribute or essence. One can also do both, i.e., in the first place, ask about exemplification and, in the second place, notice or realise that the attribute or essence is by its own character a member of the class of attributes or essences.

6. Thus, I am assuming, or postulating, for the purpose of this paper, that every namable attribute or essence is, merely by virtue of its being specifiable, a component of the class of attributes or essences. This is not to say that every component of

the class of attributes or essences is exemplified in the ordinary world of space and time. Indeed, of all attributes or essences, one can say that some are actually exemplified in the ordinary world of space and time, others have the potentiality of becoming so exemplified, and still others—like the attribute or essence of being a square circle—do not have even the potentiality of becoming so exemplified.

7. At this stage of my project, some philosophical readers may object that my proposed classification is not so innocent of factual presupposition as I have pretended it to be. For, they will argue, I have proposed to include attributes or essences in the list of components of the world, whereas such inclusion is actully a matter of controversy, the nominalists rejecting and the ontological realists accepting such inclusion.

8. My reply to that accusation is: By including attributes or essences in the list of components of the world, I am not asserting what the ontological character is of these attributes or essences. I am not saying that they are "real" in the sense in which nominalists and ontological realists disagree over whether "universals" are real. I am only contending that if we even *talk* about attributes or essences (and say that they are real or that they are unreal), they are *ipso facto* "talked-about entities" for my purposes.

9. What I propose to do, thus, is to exhibit, by proposing classifications, the broadest components of the world (in the most liberal sense of "components") and to show, by the same precedure, how these components are themselves composed of smaller and smaller components, until the individual things, persons, events, attributes, etc., of everyday experience or reflective recognition are identified, and classified.

10. The process of classifying the major and minor components of the world is comparable, as regards the cosmos, to Linnaeus' project, *vis-a-vis* the world of plants. In is also analogous to the mapmaker's art, in that it shows the location and boundaries of things and some of their interrelations.

11. Whereas the test of a statement of fact is its accuracy, and the test of a scientific theory is the simplicity and comprehensiveness with which it describes the states of affairs purportedly

covered by it, the test of a classfication is whether it "carves reality at the joints"—whether each class into which it divides things is a natural and basic, rather than a superficial, grouping. Thus, a classification of Asians into those who live in the Indian subcontinent and surrounding areas, those who live in Siberia, etc., would be better—for the purpose of setting out to understand Asian cultures—than a classification of Asians into those whose family names begin with the letters *A* to *F*, those whose family names begin with *G* to *M*, etc., because the former breakdown comes closer to carving reality at the joints, i. e., each class in the former breakdown is a more natural and basic grouping (for the purpose of undertanding Asian cultures) than is each class in the latter breakdown. (The sense in which the words "natural" and "basic" are used here can be specified.)

12. A given group of components of the world may sometimes be usefully broken down in more than one way. Thus Asians may also—in addition to being classifiable according to the regional breakdown—be usefully classified, for some purposes, into those who are self-employed, those who work for others for pay, and those whose livelihood is derived in some other way; into those who are of voting age and those who are not; into those who live in urban areas and those who live in rural areas; etc. i. e., reality may be carved at the joints in more than one way. (For some purposes, indeed, a classification into those whose family names begin with a letter from *A* to *F*, from *G* to *M*, etc., might be appropriate.)

13. The present paper presents a breakdown of the components of the world into two classes; it also presents a breakdown of each of the two classes into subclasses; and in some cases it presents further breakdowns into sub-subclasses.

14. The most general kinds of things in the world are : entities and attributes.

(This breakdown into entities and attributes is intended as a way of avoiding the disputed issue over whether there are, first, qualityless substances and, secondly, qualities which the qualityless substances "take on," or "assume," or "participate in," i. e., for example, the issue over whether a hard, brown chair consists of a chair-without-hardness-or-brownness-or-other-qualities, with the addition thereto of hardness and brownness. What I here call "entities" are *not* qualityless; an atom, which is an example of an entity, *does* have attributes. My division is a division into first, the entities which there are in the world-entities, that is, which have attributes but are viewed in the perspective of being entities, without emphasis on their attributes—and, secondly, the attributes which are there in the world, whether or not they characterise specific, timebound entities.)

I. ENTITIES

15. Entities are things which are not attributes of other things.

16. Examples of entities are: birds, atoms, sentences, couples, tomorrow, this room, ideals.

17. As suggested in paragraphs 11 and 12, entities may be broken down into kinds, or classes, by various cross-sectionings, just as a circle may be bisected by various diameters.

18. Six cross-sectionings or bisections of the class of entities are to be described below. Only the sixth of these will itself be broken down into subclasses and sub-subclasses. The first five breakdowns—or modes of classifying entities—will merely be touched on, and the further breakdown thereof will be left to the reader's creative imagination.

A. First Breakdown

19. Entities are of two kinds: actual and nonactual.

The Actual

20. An actual entity is one which can be apprehended, at least in theory.

21. Examples of actual entities are: Julius Caesar, as a living being, in 55 B. C.; Julius Caesar, as an historical figure, today; space and time; the Rock of Gibraltar; solutions of certain mathematical problems.

The Nonactual

22. A nonactual entity is one which cannot be apprehended, even in theory.

23. Examples of nonactual entities are: Julius Caesar, as a living being, today; the Trojans with their ongoing civilization, today; tommorrow's breakfast; a breakfast which will never be prepared; a negative mathematical product of positive integers. (This is not to say that "Julius Caesar, as a living being today," as a concept, cannot be apprehended, but only that Julius Caesar, as a living being, today, cannot be seen or heard.)

B. Second Breakdown

24. Entities are of two kinds : absolute and relative.

The Absolute

25. An absolute entity is one whose essence does not involve a counterpart.

26. Examples of absolute entities are : men, stones, atoms.

The relative

27. A relative entity is one whose essence involves a counterpart.

28. Examples of relative entities are : husbands, rivals, remainders, products.

C. Third Breakdown

29. Entities are of two kinds : phenomena and noumena.

Phenomena

30. A phenomenon is an entity which is apprehended primarily by means of the senses.

31. Examples of phenomena are : people; rain, gold.

Noumena

32. A noumenon is an entity which is apprehended primarily by means of the intellect.

33. Examples of noumena are : nations, time, meanings.

D. Fourth Breakdown

34. Entities are of two kinds : numerable and nonnumerable.

The Numerable

35. A numerable entity is one which can meaningfully have a number prefixed to the word designating it, in the singular or the plural.

36. Examples of numerable entities are : stones, men, atoms.

The Nonnumerable

37. A nonnumerable entity is one which cannot meaningfully have a number prefixed to the word designating it, in the singular or the plural.

38. Examples of nonnumerable entities are : stone, water, wood, rain, consiousness. (We do not speak of three waters, although the word "waters" is sometimes used, metaphorically; or of three rains, except in a special sense, namely, in the sense of three temporal actualizations of rain. When we speak of three stones, we are using the plural of "a stone," not the plural of "stone.")

E. Fifth Breakdown

39. Entities are of two kinds : natural and mysterious.

The Natural

40. A natural entity is one whose forms, and laws of behaviour, are discernible through scientific investigations.

41. Examples of natural entities are : men, planets, truths.

The Mysterious

42. A mysterious entity is one whose forms, and laws of behaviour, are beyond the scope of scientific investigation.

43. Examples of mysterious entities are : God, the Logos, Tao. (Here, as in the case of attributes or essences, I am not intending to presuppose—by mentioning God—that God "exists", in the sense in which some say that God exists, and others say that God does not exist. I am only intending to say something about the nature of God, just as I could say that a winged horse is winged, without committing myself to saying that a winged horse is to be found in the ordinary domain of space and time. In other words, in citing God as a certain kind of

entity in *this* breakdown, I am not saying that, in relation to *another* breakdown, God is an actual entity rather than a non-actual entity.)

F. Sixth Breakdown

44. Entities are of two kinds : the changing and the abiding.

Changing Entities

45. A changing entity is one which acquires or loses qualities.

46. Examples of changing entities are : men, trees, wood, planets, atoms.

47. Changing entities are of three kinds : time, physical entities, and vital entities.

48. *Time*—Time, which itself "changes" in the sense that time "elapses", is the medium of change of other entities which change.

49. Of time, there are no "examples" in the usual sense, since time is not a class of things; but parts of time, or periods of time, could be cited as "examples" in a certain sense. Thus, one speaks of "early times", of "different times", of "changing times", etc., as if time were a numerable entity; but it is, basically, nonnumerable.

50. There are no "kinds" of time, in the usual sense, as there are kinds of members of those entities which constitute classes, for time is not a class. In an unusual sense, however, one can speak of such "kinds" of time as : objective time, experienced duration, etc. But these are rather aspects of time than kinds of time.

51. Although, as has been said, there are, strictly speaking, no "examples" of "kinds" of times, there are parts of the totality of time. Such parts may be called "periods."

52. The totality of time may be divided into periods in various ways (i. e., according to various breakdowns). Two of these breakdowns will be mentioned.

53. First Breakdown. Time (i. e., the totality of time) may be divided, from the human standpoint, into the prehistoric period and the historic period.

54. Second Breakdown. Time may be divided, from the standpoint of any "point" in time (a point in time is what is between any given period and the succeeding period), into the past and the future.

55. The past, from the standpoint of any point in time, is what preceded that point.

56. The future, from the standpoint of any point in time, is what is to come after that point.

57. The term "the present" refers to that portion of time which is "covered" by the moving point which divides the past from the future, for a more or less extended period in the life of the person who uses the term "the present."

58. *The Physical* — A physical entity is one the functioning or scope of which can be recorded or measured by a spatial instrument of observation (such as a camera, a Geiger counter, a tape recorder, a pressure gauge, etc.).

59. Examples of physical entities are : space, atoms, mountains, people's bodies.

60. Physical entities are of two kinds : space and matter.

61. Space. Space is the medium of motion.

62. Of space, as of time, there are no "examples" in the usual sense, since space is not a class of things; but parts of space, or locations in space ("places"), could be cited as examples in a certain sense. Moreover, one speaks, for example, of "the wide open spaces", or "the spaces between the lines on this page", as if space were a numerable entity; but it is, basically, nonnumerable. In other words, "space" means the whole of space, or (sometimes) a part of it, rather than a collection of it or a collection of kinds of it.

63. There are no "kinds" of space, in the usual sense, as there are kinds of members of those entities which are classes, for space is not a class. In an unusual sense, however, one can speak of such "kinds" of space as : absolute space, relative space, etc. But these are descriptions of space, from the viewpoint of different theories, rather than kinds of space.

64. As, when speaking of time, one can refer to (a) the present and (b) the past and the future, so when speaking of space, one can refer to (a) here and (b) there.

65. Matter. Matter is what moves.

66. "Matter" is another name for some or all material thing. For purposes of naming examples, the term "material things" is more suitable than "matter".

67. Examples of material things are : (a) atoms, rocks, wood, flesh, rivers, water, air.

68. Material things are of two kinds : (a) those which are "purely material " and (b) those which are the bodies, or living parts of the bodies, of living entities.

69. Examples of purely material things are: atoms, molecules pencils as pencils, pencils as things composed of molecules (or atoms, or subatomic entities), galaxies as galaxies, galaxies as things composed of molecules (or atoms, or subatomic entities).

70. Examples of material things which are the bodies, or living parts of the bodies, of living entities are: my body, your body, my left index finger, the cells that comprise the brain of the President of India, the trunk of a tree, the total material aspec, of a tree.

71. *The Vital.*—A vital entity is the living aspect of a living being.

72. Examples of vital entities are: I (the person to whom such expressions as "my body" and "the pain which I feel in my finger" apply); you (i.e., you "behind the eyes" when I look at you); Jacqueline Onassis, apart from what you see when you look at her; a bee, apart from its material aspect; the living aspect of an amoeba; the living aspect of a tree.

(For vital attributes, such as life, personality, selfhood. intelligence, mind, spirit, and divinity, see *post*, paragraph 100).

Abiding Entities

73. An abiding entity is one which does not acquire or lose qualities.

74. Examples of abiding entities are: the class of numbers which are smaller than 37; any specified class, in so far as the specification of it as a class is not changed; the fact that the American Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776; the nature of the Declaration of Independence.

75. Abiding entities are of three kinds: concepts (as distinguished from conceptions), or "natures"; classes; and propositions.

76. A concept, or a "nature," is an unchanging description.

77. Examples of concepts, or "natures," are: the concept or nature of unity (any unchanging description or definition of unity), the concept or nature of morality (any unchanging description, not of the content of morality, but of the meaning of morality); the concept or nature of wood. It should be noted in this connection (a) that unity and morality are attributes, not entities, but the concepts of unity and morality are entities; and (b) while the concept or nature of wood does not change, our conception of it may change.

78. A class is a group of things (a group of entities or of attributes).

79. Examples of classes are: pairs, trios, null classes, solo classes. It should be noted that the number 3 is an attribute, not an entity (it is an attribute of a trio); but a trio is an entity.

80. A proposition is that which can be expressed by a declarative sentence.

81. Examples of propositions are: It is hot in Bombay today (i.e., the proposition expressed by the sentence "It is hot in Bombay today"); if *A* is larger than *B*, then *B* is smaller then *A*; Julius Caesar was born in 1975; I shall not wholly die.

82. Propositions may be broken down in various ways: into those which are true and those which are false; into fects, which are particular, and truths, which are general; into those which are logical and those which are empirical; etc.

II. ATTRIBUTES

83. An attribute is something that characterises one or more things.

84. Examples of attributes are woodenness, color, the color red, equality, divinity.

85. As is true of entities, attributes also may be broken down into kinds, or classes, in various ways.

A. First Breakdown

86. Attributes are of two kinds: those which are actual and those which are nonactual.

87. Examples of actual attributes are: the attribute of being Julius Caesar, as a living being, in 55 B. C.; the spatiality of space; the hardness of the Rock of Gibraltar.

88. Examples of nonactual attributes are: the attribute of being Julius Caesar, as a living being, today; the attribute of being negative and positive in the same sense at the same time; the spatiality of the nonspatial.

B. Second Breakdown

89. Attrbiutes are of two kinds: phenomenal and noumenal.

90. Examples of phenomenal attributes are: raininess, woodenness, hardness, sameness of length.

91. Examples of noumenal attributes are: temporality, meaning, sovereignty

C. Third Breakdown

92. Attributes are of two kinds: numerable and nonnumerable.

93. Examples of numerable attributes are: colors, sounds, virtues.

94. Examples of nonnumerable attributes are: color, sound, virtue.

D. Fourth Breakdown

95. Attributes are of two kinds: natural and mysterious.

96. Examples of natural attributes are: color, virtue, truth.

97. Examples of mysterious attributes are: divinity, primordiality, infinity.

E. Fifth Breakdown

98. Attributes are of two kinds: temporal and atemporal.

99. Examples of temporal attributes are: permanence, priority, pastness.

100. Examples of atemporal attributes are: materiality color, sound, size, and motion (all of which are physical attributes); experience, mind, intelligence, thinking, the thinking of a particular person, virtue, interest, personality, selfhood, spirit, and divinity (all of which are vital attributes); and mathematical equality, the attribute of being seven in number, implication, and truth (all of which are logical attributes).

F. Sixth Breakdown

101. Attributes are of two kinds: absolute and relative.

102. Examples of absolute attributes (also called "qualities") are: temporality, virtue, color.

103. Examples of relative attributes (also called "relations") are: equality, difference, similarity, identity, causality, priority, superiority.

Qualities

104. Qualities are of two kinds: substantitive and nonsubstantive.

105. *Substantive Qualities*—Examples of substantive qualities are: (a) woodenness, or being made of wood, as in "*X* is wooden" or "*X* is made of wood"; (b) being a body of water, as in "The Ganges River is—or has the attribute of being—a body of water."

106. *Nonsubstantive Qualities*—Examples of nonsubstantive qualities are: being large, or largeness; being good, or goodness; being red, or redness; being seven in number.

107. The most convenient way of classifying nonsubstantive qualities is to divide them (as in paragraph 100) into those

which are physical, those which are vital, and those which are logical.

Relations

108. Relations are of two kinds : relations of similarity and relations of difference.

109. Examples of relations of similarity are : equality, resemblance, identity, reflexivity, symmetry.

110. Examples of relations of difference are : causality, instrumentality (the attribute of being a means to an end), distinction, opposition, divergence, transitivity, being greater than, being later than.

III. EXERCISES

111. It should be possible to locate, in an appropriate genus or species of the above classifications, each of the things of everyday experience and each of the things found or postulated by scientific investigation.

In what class, for example, is music? It is a vital attribute.

In what class is negation? It is a logical attribute.

In what class are mornings? They are parts of time.

What are waves? They are physical attributes.

112. As exercises, you—reader—may wish to locate some or all of the following : poems, extrasensory perception, sex, force, events, meanings, science, law, enzymes, fish, plasma, griffins.

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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY?

Philosophy of history is, notoriously, a vague and many-faceted area of inquiry, and anyone who surveys the existing literature in the area must soon become aware of a certain clumsiness in the widely accepted distinction between 'speculative' and 'critical' philosophy of history.[1] Although limitedly useful, this distinction needs elaboration and refinement, which ought to be linked to ananalysis of distinguishable central meanings within the (itself highly vague and many-faceted) term 'history'. Hence, this paper begins with an attempt to draw the basic distinctions that are necessary for an adequate delineation of the main directions of inquiry that are pursued under the rubric 'philosophy of history', and to ask whether any particular one of those directions could plausibly be seen as the centrally, or properly, characteristic one.

But philosophy of history is also, notoriously, an area of inquiry whose legitimacy is controversial, and the arguments offered for or (more often) against its very possibility are many. While a direct consideration of these arguments lies beyond the purpose of this paper, some account will nevertheless have to be taken of several such arguments whose general drift bears on the question of what philosophy of history is. Hence, the second part of the paper is an attempt to consider the meaning of 'philosophy of history' in the light of the main kinds of argument that are invoked to deny its very legitimacy as an area of philosophical inquiry.

I

First, as it is used within writings on philosophy of history, the term 'history' can mean one or more of four broadly distinguishable things. The most basic meaning is roughly definable as 'the totality of actual past events in the realm of whatever thing the history is the history of'. History in this sense, which may be termed simply 'history', is the concrete, infinitely complex, past reality that is the presupposed object of general historical inquiry, but that can never be grasped in its full, concrete totality by historical knowledge. The *history* of Caesar, then would be the totality of things that actually happened to him, or were done by him, in the course of his life. (Here the problems of just how, in practice, such a history is to be delimited, and whether the notion of history can properly apply to anything whatever, or only to things intimately connected with human existence, may be ignored.)

A second broadly distinguishable meaning of 'history' is 'the totality of existent, supposed knowledge of the history of something'. For all practical purposes, this meaning of 'history' implies recorded (or at least communicated) accounts of the history of something, and can thus be designated with the more precise term 'historiography'. There is, of course, an obvious distinction within historiography between historiographical activity (or science) and historiographical records (or knowledge), but here this distinction can remain collapsed. (It also seems unnecessary to take account here of the distinction between historiography as chronicle and historiography as explanation and interpretation.) History in this sense is a (possibly internally conflicting) knowledge-claim purporting to present and preserve a maximally complete account of the "facts" about the nature of the actual history of something. The *historiography* of Caesar, then, would be the totality of existing records purporting to recount aspects of Caesar's history.

A third meaning of 'history' emerges when the emphasis within historiography shifts from claiming to report the maximally concrete factuality of past reality to claiming to reveal the ultimately significant, or most important, aspects of that concrete factuality. Since what is seen as an event of great significance or importance is commonly spoken of as a really *historical* event, the term 'historicality' can be used to identify this third distinguishable sense of 'history'. History as historicality, then, presupposes history as historiography, but implies a clear emphasis on the distillation of a level of ultimate significance or importance from historiography. The *historicality* of Caesar would accordingly be the most significant, or most important, aspects of his history. (These must, of course, be judged from some perspective, but here it is unnecessary to pursue the problem of whether historicality can ever be 'objectively' grounded in some 'absolute' perspective or not.)

Finally, a fourth broadly distinguishable meaning of 'history' is 'the quality of human existence that inheres in the structure and implications of those aspects of the nature of man and the world that make the phenomenon of history (in the three previously distinguished senses) possible'. This sense of 'history' can be designated by the term 'historicity' (whose use in this way will be familiar to those acquainted with recent 'continental' European philosophy), and it refers to a complex quality resulting from certain aspects of the nature of human existence, e. g., that man exists in space, through time, and as embodied; that man is mortal and has a finitely-perspected consciousness; that man is socially contexted and reproduces himself in successions of individuals; that man is language-using, belief-directed, and value-striving; that memory and imagination enable man to transcend the present in the directions of past and future; and so on. The *historicity* of Caesar, then, would be the quality inherent in those particular aspects of his nature and environment that must be pre-supposed when any being is subject to existence through time in the specifically human way

The four senses of 'history' that have been distinguished here may be summarized in a way that makes clear that they have been listed in order of increasing generality. *History*, as the totality of what actually happened to something in the past, is the concrete, specific substratum that the other three are based on. *Historiography* comes next, as an attempt to record and explain what actually happened in the past. Since historiography can never reflect the past in its concrete totality, but always remains partial and selective, it inevitably represents history at a somewhat general level. *Historicality*, which comes next, implies greatly increased partiality and selectivity, in the direction of judgments about ultimate significance and essential importance, which obviously represent history at a still more general level. Finally, *historicity*, as a quality of the general conditions that make specifically human historical existence possible, can be viewed as the totally general, abstract 'form' of the original substratum of actual, concrete history.

In the light of this analysis of the different general meanings that the term 'history' can have within philosophy of history, the notion of 'philosophy of history' itself may now be more directly examined. Here it seems best to begin with the stock distinction between 'speculative' and 'critical' philosophy of history. This distinction has its basis both in the history of philosophy of history (the 19th-century German tradition is seen as exemplarily speculative; the 20th-century Anglo-Saxon, as exemplarily critical) and in the aims of philosophy of history ('metaphysical' intepretations of the meaning, pattern, or goal of history are seen as reflecting speculative aims; 'epistemological' investigations into the purposes, methods, and limitations of historiographical science are seen as reflecting critical aims).

If this distinction is considered against the background of the four distinguished senses of 'history', there seems to be an obvious link between critical philosophy of history and the notion of *historiography*, and an equally obvious link (at least to those familiar with the writings of thinkers typically classed as 'speculative' philosophers of history) between speculative philosophy of history and the notion of *historicality*. Also, it becomes obvious that the speculative-critical distinction leaves the question of the relation between philosophy of history and the notion of *historicity* largely unanswered. In fact, those who use the speculative-critical distinction tend to give little attention to historicity and its problems, and insofar as they are at all aware of such problems, they tend to see them as lumped together with the problems of historicality, and to consign both kinds of problem to the 'speculative' realm.

In view of this situation, a distinction within the stock notion of speculative philosophy of history seems necessary. Since philosophy of history's concern with historicality implies attempts to give large-scale interpretative accounts of actual past history, whereas its concern with historicity implies attempts to deal with highly general problems of a kind usually termed 'metaphysical', it seems reasonable to label the first kind of concern 'interpretative philosophy of historicality', and the second, 'metaphysical philosophy of historicity'.

Once *metaphysical* philosophy of *historicity* has been separated off from *interpretative* philosophy of *historicality*, and both of these placed alongside *critical* philosophy of *historiography*, a satisfactory indication of the three broadest streams of activity within philosophy of history seems to result.[2] (In practice, of course, these distinctions are far from absolute, but they do seem to reflect centrally important differences in emphasis and intent.) However, anyone familiar with the entire range of activities within philosophy of history will probably still feel uneasy about the category designated 'interpretative philosophy of historicality', and it seems possible to draw some useful sub-distinctions within that category.

Assuming that interpretative philosophy of historicality is basically concerned with revealing the most significant, or most important, aspects of the (historiographically accessible) actual past history of something, and that the 'something' in this case is usually Western history or world history as a whole, three distinguishable kinds of orientation seem discernible wihtin the works of those who undertake this kind of interpretative project.

First, there is the *sociological* orientation, which seeks the key to historicality in certain basic structures of social organization and basic laws of social change that can supposedly be discovered to exist as universal constants below the apparent uniquenesses, irregularities, and diversities that characterize the surface of the historical flux. Second, there is the *culturological* orientation, which seeks the key to historicality in the supposedly unique, unrepeatable nature of the particular world-view and socio-cultural configuration that characterizes each of the major 'cultures' or 'civiliazations' that existed in the past. Finally, there is the *historiological* orientation, which seeks the key to historicality in some unifying strand or pattern of abstract intelligibility that supposedly underlies, and is articulated through, the various particular stages of the concrete, on-going course of historical reality. (Again, these distinctions are far from absolute, and the fact that all three orientations can exist together in one philosophy of history, as they do in Hegel's, does not necessarily render the distinctions invalid or useless.)

In summary, then, it seems possible to outline the main directions of inquiry actually pursued within philosophy of history as follows :

1. Critical philosophy of historiography
2. Interpretative philosophy of historicality
    a. Sociological orientation
    b. Culturological orientation
    c. Historiological orientation
3. Metaphysical philosophy of historicity.

Here, the question inevitably arises of whether all of the outlined directions of inquiry are equally representative of the nature of 'philosophy of history', or whether some particular one of these directions could possibly be regarded as being the proper, or uniquely characteristic, form of philosophy of history.

It seems obvious that critical philosohpy of historiography largely overlaps with the areas of general philosophical inquiry known as epistemology, logic, and scientific methodology, or with what may be called 'philosophy of (social) science'. On the other hand, it seems equally obvious that metaphysical philosophy of historicity largely overlaps with the areas of general philosophical inquiry known as ontology and philosophical anthropology, or with what may be called 'metaphysics'. This would seem to suggest that a proper, or uniquely characteristic, area of inquiry for philosophy of history would have to be sought within *interpretative* philosophy of *historicality*.

However, all three of the sub-streams within that area are pursued professionally by various historians and sociologists, who strongly claim that their particular professional qualifications make them the only ones properly competent to pursue these streams with any success. Philosophers within the Anglo-Saxon tradition have tended to agree with this claim, and to content themselves with viewing philosophy of history as little more than a convenient term for identifying a specific area of focus within philosophy of science. But many philosophers within the 'continental' European tradition have continued to lay claim to the area of interpretative philosophy of historicality, and to argue that *their* particular professional qualifications make *them* the only ones ultimately competent to pursue these streams with any success. (The classic statement of the 'continental' case here is given by Hegel.)[3]

Whether or not the 'continental' tradition is right on this point cannot be decided here, but the foregoing considerations seem to suggest that, if it is *wrong*, philosophy of history is left as a fairly 'hodge-podge' area of inquiry that lacks any clearly definable, uniquely characteristic, philosophical focus. If, on the other hand, the 'continental' tradition is *right*, the foregoing considerations seem to suggest that philosophy of history would have to derive its unique focus from being a kind of fusion, or integration, of the areas distinguished as methaphysical philosophy of historicity (the specifically *philosophical* element) and interpretative philosophy of historicality (the specifically *historical* element). (If this hypothesis seems to slight critical philosophy of historiography, it may be noted that most of the problems dealt with in critical philosophy of historiography are also dealt with in metaphysical philosophy of historicity, although not vice versa.)

II

Assuming, then, that philosophy of history, in its proper, uniquely characteristic philosophical sense, is a fusion of metaphysical philosophy of historicity, or what could be viewed as a *metaphysically sophisticated* approach to interpretative philosophy of historicality, a brief review of the main kinds of objection to the legitimacy of philosophy of history may throw some additional light on the problem of just what philosophy of history is.

Perhaps the most obvious objection that might be raised against the legitimacy of such an undertaking would be that metaphysics itself is an outmoded, nonsensical kind of philosophical inquiry, and thus that supposed metaphysical sophistication could contribute nothing to one's ability to interpret historicality properly. Fortunately, many of those who might have been inclined to raise this objection in earlier years would now admit that metaphysical assumptions are implicit in any attempt to think at all, and that anti-metaphysics is itself a metaphysical position. Hence, in view of the realization that metaphysical assumptions are inescapable, confirmed anti-metaphysicians can do little more than try to dismiss metaphysics by claiming that its assumptions rest ultimately on unprovable, irrational choices. This may be true, or it may not, but as it stands, it is itself metaphysical, and thus can hardly serve as a philosophically effective denial of the relevance or possible usefulness of metaphysical inquiry.

A second kind of objection would be that the very nature of actual, concrete history, and of the historical dimension of human reality, is such as to necessarily foredoom all attempts to give large-scale interpretative accounts of historicality. According to this view, history is the realm of the concrete, the infinitely complex, and the largely unknown, so that all large-scale interpretative attempts must inevitably remain hopelessly abstract, incomplete, and arbitrary. This kind of objection may, or may not, have some force, but if it does, one could ask whether the very same objection would not apply equally to most of what normally qulifies as specifically *historical* writing. Is the 'abstractness gap' between Hegel's or Spengler's interpretations of world-history and the infinitely complex concreteness of world-history really *significantly* more problematic than the 'abstractness gap' between a professional historian's account of anything (e. g., Japanese history, the Russian revolution, or Vico's life) and the infinitely complex concreteness of that thing? And, if it is assumed to be more problematic, does this not rest on prior assumptions about the nature of 'abstractness', 'concreteness', 'reality', and 'knowledge' that can perhaps be refuted within metaphysical philosophy of historicity? Hence, this kind of objection seems to be more an identification of certain problems that any interpretative approach to history must be expected to face rather than a refutation of the possibility of specifically philosophical interpretations of history.

A third kind of objection (the last to be considered here) would be that, even though a fusion of metaphysical philosophy of historicity and interpretative philosophy of historicality seems sound in theory, it could not be successful in practice, since no single person could possibly acquire the requisite degree of detailed competence in both metaphysics and history. This objection is somewhat more persuasive than the other two, since one might well doubt whether anyone setting out to do interpretative philosophy of history could be both a fully competent metaphysician and a fully competent historian. Still, one could suggest that it is much easier for a professional metaphysician to acquire an adequately thorough knowledge of history by assimilating the main relevant writings of historians than it would be for a professional historian to acquire an adequately sophisticated knowledge of metaphysics by trying to assimilate the main writings of metaphysicians. This is because history is written in familiar, everyday language and deals with familiar, everyday kinds of action and event, whereas metaphysics is written in esoteric, highly technical language and deals with areas of reality and experience whose high generality makes them all but unapproachable to common-sense. Hence, the present objection could be met by arguing that philosophy of history presupposes first-hand professional competence in metaphysics only, and that adequate second-hand competence in history can be relatively easily acquired by a metaphysician who is willing to devote sufficient time to appropriating the major relevant writings of professional historians.

All of this will undoubtedly sound naive and condescending to most professional historians, who, although probably willing to admit that they could not easily acquire metaphysieal competence, would tend to deny that they need it anyway, and also to deny that metaphysicians could, as suggested above, easily attain historical competence. Further, professional historians would probably object to the implication that they are little more than the hand-maidens of philosophers, and that their work remains incomplete until philosophers have taken it up and refined it into some scheme of supposedly ultimate significance.

However, the support of professional historians is not indispensable to the possible legitimacy of the aims of interpretative philosophy of historicality, and one of the inescapable implications of the ligitimacy of those aims would seem to be that professional historians are, in a way, the hand-maidens of philosophers. On this view, the function of historians would be primarily one of providing maximally probable and maximally complete reports about the human past, which the philosopher can then survey and interpret against a background of metaphysical sophistication. Historians, of course, would inevitably continue to indulge in a degree of large-scale historical interpretation of their own, but it would tend to be naively based on either the metaphysics of 'common-sense' or the metaphysics of some particular ideology, and in both cases the philosopher would have little trouble recognizing, and discounting, these aspects of historians' writings.

The foregoing considerations pretty well exhaust what can be suggested about the nature of philosophy of history within the scope of this paper. In conclusion, it is perhaps worth noting that philosophy of history, in the assumedly central sense, seems to differ significantly as a 'philosophical' undertaking, from the other 'philosophies-of' such as philosophy of art or philosophy of religion. In doing philosophy of art or philosophy of religion, the philosopher does not thereby necessarily become an artist or a theologian; but in doing philosophy of history, the philosopher does, apparently become a historian. Hence, philosophy of history seems to be 'philosophical' only in that it must be *undertaken* by a philosopher, but what is undertaken is a kind of historiography, or *history*, and not philosophy.

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NOTES

1. See William H. Dray, *Philosophy of History* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1964), Chap. 1, where the distinction is explained and its clumsiness noted.

2. Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, *Das Problem des geistigen Seins* (Berlin : de Gruyter, 1933), pp. 2-3.

3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, Vol. 12 of *Werke* (Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970). Particularly intersting are the distinctions between original, reflective, and philosophical history (pp. 11-29) and the analogy between Kepler and the philosopher of history (pp. 87-88).

A CONCEPTUAL LAYOUT OF GAUḌAPĀDAKĀRIKĀS

I

The text of Gauḍapādakārikās is usually regarded as a commentary on the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad. In a sense this may be so since it helps us understand the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad in a different perspective and more clearly. But Gauḍapāda is not just a commentator since he is presenting his own independent thesis by way of a commentary. As a matter of fact an unbiased study of Gauḍapādakārikās should reveal that Gauḍapāda is in fact posing for the first time in Indian thought, with the exception of the Buddhists, an epistemological problem and is trying to offer a philosophical model connecting the epistemological problem with problems such as causality etc.

Since Gauḍapāda makes use the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad to propound his own philosophical thesis, it would be useful to make a note of the thesis that is propounded in the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad. To use the current idiom, the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad begins its inquiry by making a distinction between the 'knower' and the 'known'. Thus, one would have to think of various situations,—the epistemic situations—in which knowledge becomes operative. Such a distinction between the knower and the known would also indicate the limiting case of the occurrence of knowledge. (The limiting case of the occurrence of knowledge could be defined as that situation where the distinction between the knower and the known is temporarily absent but is later on recalled. In this situation not only the knowledge does not occur, but even the minimum characteristics, i. e., the objects of knowledge and the knower are absent, although temporarily.) These various situations, which are epistemic are described in the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad as Jāgarita, Svapna and Suṣupti. By Turya is meant a situation where the epistemic situation lapses into the ontic. The concept of the knower which is presupposed in all the epistemic situations, however, leads to the problem of the identity or the sameness of that knower. According to the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad these different 'knowers' present in the various epistemic situations are one. This 'one' knower is *Ātman*. The Māṇḍukya

Upaniṣad further says that this *ātman* is Brahman meaning thereby that it is not different from Brahman.

As has been pointed out above, Gauḍapāda makes use of Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad to develop his own philosophical thesis. It would be interesting to work out a conceptual layout of some of the important Gauḍapāda Kārikās. Such an attempt to work out a conceptual layout would be useful in two ways. First, it would help us understand the development of Gauḍapāda's philosophical model and also it would help us understand the thought kernel of his thesis. However, before constructing such a conceptual layout, it must be borne in mind that Gauḍapāda's system, as it is, is not a deductive or fromal system of propositions. So when I attempt to construct a conceptual layout of Gauḍapāda's philosophy, it is not with the intention of converting Gauḍapāda's system into a deductive or formal system.

II

Gauḍapāda, accepting the Upaniṣadic intuition as is expressed in the sentence, "All this (idam sarvam) is aum and this ātman is Brahman" develops his thesis further. The following three propositions seem to have been accepted by Gauḍapāda as basic to his thought. In fact, they could be looked upon as a nucleus around which Gauḍapāda's thought is further developed. These propositions are :

(1) All this is Sat.

(2) It is only the Prāṇa which creates all Bhāvas or Bhedas. (That is, it is the Prāṇa which generates the distinctions of the knower and the known. Sarvam janayati prāṇaḥ cetonsun puruṣaḥ pṛthak.)

(3) Samvṛtatva and Vaitathya are the common characteristics of all Bhāvas or Bhedas.

Around these basic propositions Gauḍapāda's thesis is framed. This thesis can be expressed in the following way :

1.1 All this (idam sarvam) is Sat. The ātman is Brahman; i. e. it is not different from Brahman.

1.2 It is only the Prāṇa which creates different Bhāvas or Bhedas i. e. it is the Prāṇa which generates differen forms of reality such as different knowers and different states of experience.

1.21 That (knower) which is concerned with the 'outside world' is called Viśva. That (knower) which is concerned with the 'inside world' is called Taijasa. That (knower) which is not so concerned is called Prājña.

1.22 The consciousness is continuous and being so, it is one. It is the same consciousness, or it is the same one continuant 'knower' as it were which sometimes acts as Viśva and 'knows' the outside world; sometimes it acts as Taijasa and 'knows' the inside world. It also sometimes acts as Prājña when the 'knower' knows neither the inside nor the outside world. The classification of the same continuant consciousness into Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña as 'different' knowers has only practical significance.

1.23 Jāgṛita and Svapna are epistemic or knowledge situations; because it is in these situations the distinction between the knower and the object of knowledge is presupposed. The knowledge which results in these situations is due to the contact between the knower and the object of knowledge.

1.24 Suṣupti is also an epistemic situation although no 'knowledge' is said to emerge from it for want of the contact between the knower and the object of knowledge. Accepting that the knower, the object of knowledge and their cognitive contact is necessary for any knowledge to emerge, we can still imagine a situation where the knower and the object of knowledge are present, but where there is no contact between them. However, the 'knowerness' of the knower could still persist in such a situation; and to the extent the knower is regarded to be persistent, it could be said to have the capacity of knowing in the dispositional sense of the term. Assuming the knower, the object of knowledge and their contact, we can imagine certain cases such as Jāgṛta and Svapna and claim that 'knowledge' emerges therein. But we could also imagine a situation in which although no knowledge emerges yet, it has a profile of an epistemic situation. Suṣupti indicates this situation.

1.25 Turya refers to the case where the distinction like the knower and the known is absent. Turya strictly speaking points to a case beyond the epistemological situations. It serves as a base for constructing knowledge or epistemic situations.

1.26 Turya is to be distinguished from Suṣupti. In the case of Suṣupti, the 'knowerness' of the knower is still acknowledged. (Gauḍapāda uses the term prājña, the knower in Suṣupti. Prājña, i. e. the ignorant is essentially a notion that presupposes an epistemic situation for its significant use.) It is a case within limits of knowing situation, although it may be a limiting case of knowing situations. Here although no knowledge emerges the background required for the emergence of knowledge is present. In the case of Turya, on the contrary, the very distinction between the knower and the object of knowledge is not thought of. Turya does not exhibit any characteristic symptoms of an epistemic situation, and is therefore a limiting case for the knowledge situation.

1.27 Turya, or a state of affairs which is independent of the epistemic reference, is something which exists in its own right. It is Sat.

1.28 A state of affairs, independent of the distinction between the knower and the objects of knowledge, can be described only in terms of its existence.

2. It is only the Prāṇa (i.e. the knower) which creates all these Bhāvas or Bhedas. These Bhāvas or Bhedas refer to different forms of reality such as different knowers (Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña) and such states as Jāgṛita, Svapna etc. And thus, an epistemic situation is created with a knower and the known.

2.1 The Bhāvas etc. are only epistemic in character. As they are creations of Prāṇa they are bio-centric (anthropo-centric).

2.11 The division of one reality into the knower and the objects of knowledge would not be possible in the absence of Prāṇa or the knower.

2.12 The division of reality into different Bhāvas is only epistemic. If these epistemically different Bhāvas or forms of reality are absent, what remains is the reality qua reality (without any epistemic forms).

2.13 The reality which is all this (idam sarvam) when split up in different forms, appears to be many. One can imagine or construct infinite number of forms of reality or characterize reality in infinite number of ways.

2.14 But such creations or constructions are not real in themselves. Creation of Bhāvas does not mean creation of things existing in their own right. The reality which exists in its own right is one. It is advaya. It is also called Turya.

2.15 The Prāṇa (or jīva) which creates all these Bhāvas, itself is a creation. Prāṇa or Jīva is the primary condition for epistemic creation; but it is not the condition of the 'creation' of reality.

2.16 The conditions for knowing are to be distinguished from the conditions for something being the case.

2.17 In reality, nothing is ever 'born'. (It is always existing.) Reality as it is, is ajāta. That is, no real change takes place in the stuff of the original substance.

2.18 When the whole is divided into different parts, one cannot regard these parts as different from the whole. Similarly, different forms of reality are not different or independent of it. And because reality as reality is always existent, these parts of reality are also existent. In this sense, these different forms of reality are not 'born'.

2.19 So long as we think that the anthropo-centric constructions over the reality are born, we also think of their causes, and start believing in the cause-effect relationship. But when we look upon these forms of reality as something which is not 'born', the cause-effect relationship becomes inoperative.

2.20 Although it is the Prāṇa or jīva which constructs (creates) different forms of reality, it would be incorrect to think that the Prāṇa etc. is the 'cause' of these forms.

2.21 The notion of Asparśayoga points out that from the cosmocentric point of view, the different froms of reality in the anthropo-centric world are not different from reality. In fact, there are nothing like parts of Reality as such. What exists is the reality without any parts or division.

2.22 The mind (citta), the knower (i, e. prāṇa or jīva) the 'manas'—all these lead us to epistemic creations. The notion of Amanībhāva (the manas ceasing to be manas) suggests that if epistemic creations are absent, what remains is the reality which only is.

3. Samvṛtatva and Vaitathya are the common characteristics of different Bhāvas or Bhedas that we perceive both in dreams or in waking experience.

3.1 Samvṛta means that which is limited or that which is covered by space and time.

3.11 Vitathā means that which is other than real. That something is vitathā could also be interpreted in this way saying that the real (tathā) is further characterized or qualified in a particular way. Hence it could mean that the real which is so characterized is something which could be taken as something other than the real.

3.12 In dreams and also in waking, we perceive things in space and time. Things, whatever be their nature, are camouflaged by space and time. And this is the characteristic of things we perceive in dreams or in waking, have in common. This fact is stated by the proposition that Samvṛtatva is common to both.

3.13 Usually we distinguish objects perceived in dreams from the ones which we perceive in waking on the basis of space and time.

3·14 But since that with the help of which we distinguish between dream objects and the objects in waking experience is common to both these States, Samvṛtatva would not provide a criterion which would enable us to draw a logical distinction between the two. (But that does not mean that they are not distinct.)

3.15 In the case of dream objects, we usually determine its 'vaitathya' (unreality) with the help of the principle, "that which does not exist at the earliar and later points of time does not exist in the middle also". This is also applicable and is true in the case of objects in the waking state. Like the dream objects, objects in waking also do not exist at the earliar and the later points of time. In other words, these also have a beginning and an end. To say that something has a beginning and an end is, however, not to suggest that it is the mark of its unreality. To point out that the same feature is common to dream and waking objects is to suggest that the Schema which is presupposed in dream and waking experiences is in fact common to both these experiences.

3.16 Both the objects perceived in dreams and in waking states are presented to us in space and time. What distinguishes these presentations is the difference of the temporal durations and spatial magnitudes that characterize the waking and dream experience. But difference in terms of temporal durations and spatial magnitudes are in themselves not sufficient to draw a logical disitnction between these different presentations.

3·17 That which is Samvṛta is Vitathā. If something is further modified or characterized it acquires different qualities or assumes different forms and these cannot be said to be the real qualities or forms of that thing. In a sense, due to this further modification or characterization the thing (as it is) looks something other than what it is. This becoming of something other than what a thing really is, is described by the term Vitathā. If something is covered or limited or modified by space and time, then it assumes certain qualities and forms and in a sense it becomes something other than what it is. Space and Time are perhaps human creation.

3.18 That which is Samvṛta does not exist in its own right. To imagine that the reality which only is, is restricted or limited by something else is to 'create' a projective system.

3.19 Projective System is to be distinguished from the reality. The reality is one which serves as the ground for its projective system and it is for this reason that the projective system does not become unreal or non-existent. The Vaitathya of a projective system only means that it does not exist in its own right.

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ANTI-CARTESIANISM AND JAMES

In his essay of 1904 ("Does Consciousness Exist?") James protests against the absolute qualitative difference between the mental and the material that has come down traditionally as a metaphysical dualism since the time of Descartes. The dualistic systems in the history of philosophy have dichotomized the world into two water-tight compartments which do not admit of anything in common to bridge the gulf. James effected a simplification, since he dispenses with the postulation of two different kinds of entities and substitutes one neutral stuff, to which he gives the name of pure experience. In James' philosophy the dualism between the knower and the known, subject and object, is replaced by the neutral stuff, and this replacement supposedly enables James to achieve emancipation from the age-old dualism.

James points out that thoughts and things are taken by common sense to be names for two sorts of objects which are opposed to each other. Philosophers have reflected on this opposition and have come up with a number of different explanations. Towards the beginning of modern philosophy the most widely accepted view was to regard them as a pair of equipollent substances both of which are equally real and important and irreducible to each other. James notes that the status of thoughts and things as two equipollent substances underwent a radical change after Kant undermined the soul and replaced it by the transcendental ego. Kant argued that the metaphysical belief in the existence of a soul substance is riddled with irresolvable contradictions. He nevertheless held that it is necessary to postulate a transcendental unity of consciousness to explain the possibility of knowledge without committing himself to its metaphysical status. James points out that since the revolutionary doctrine of Kant, philosophy never returned to the erstwhile bipolarism of thought and thing or soul and body. As he writes :

> At first, 'spirit and matter', 'soul and body', stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance.[1]

James questions the basic premises of the dualistic metaphysics. He does not agree with either of the basic tenets of dualism, viz., (1) that mind and matter are two fundamental *substantive entities*, (2) that mind and matter are *essentially different* from each other. The notion of substance is a fundamental concept in the Cartesian metaphysics. In the Cartesian system, substance is the primary category and the other categories can only exist in a secondary sense as attributes or modifications of substances. Descartes defines substance as follows :

> Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists, anything that we perceive, i. e., any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea is called a *substance*; neither do we have any other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally or eminently. For by means of our natural light we know that a real attribute cannot be an attribute of nothing.[2]

Thus the table is not its shape, plus its hardness and so on. In addition to all the qualities of a thing, Descartes argues that there must be something for them to belong to. Thus substance is that "additional" thing which has all these qualities and in which all these qualities inhere.

With James, there is no notion of a physical substance as "entity" that undergoes changes and holds properties together. James argued that the concept of an unperceivable "something" underlying the attributes is quite dispensable. James rejects the "thingized" (as Spaulding expressed it) concept of substance prevalent in the Cartesian tradition. It follows from the postulate of radical empiricism that evidence for the existence of any entity must ultimately come from experience. James points out that all that we know from experience are particular qualities. A unitary substance over and above the particular qualities is not simply presented by experience. As he writes in his article, "Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered,"

> ...all we know of the chalk is the whiteness, friability, etc., all we know of the wood is the combustibility and

> fibrous structure. A group of attributes is what each substance here is known-as, they form its sole cash-value for our actual experience.[3]

Since the particular qualities are all that we ever come across through experience it would make no difference to our experience if the so-called substantive "entity" did not exist. However, James does agree with the self-existent nature of a substance. As he writes, "If we ask what substance is, the only answer is that it is a *self-existent* being."[4] This admission, however, does not lead him to accept it as some kind of entity or thing behind or beyond experience. "Substances" are the things of ordinary experience.

In "Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered," James supported Berkeley's refutation of matter as substance. He agrees with Berkeley that matter does not mean something over and above the qualities. Thus : "The fact of the bare cohesion itself is all that the notion of substance signifies. Behind this fact is nothing."[5] Again, in his chapter on "The One and the Many," we find James reaffirming his acceptance of the empiricist treatment of the concept of substance.

It may be noted here that this analysis of substance should not be construed to mean that James *identifies* the concept of matter with the phenomenal properties in the flux. According to James, the table is not *exhausted* by the set of qualities. It has some sort of significance beyond the multiplicity of bare data. It is the experienced continuity of things that goes beyond the momentarily experienced groupings of atomistic parts. As early as 1884, in his article on "Against Nihilism" James criticized the positivist's denial of substance and wrote :

> Substance metaphysically considered denotes nothing more than this : "*It is meant,*" *a plus ultra the phenomenon.* What this plus is may be left undecided : it may only be the other phenomena with which the present real one is related, — it may, in a word, denote merely the continuity of the real world. In any case, it is unrecognized by nihilism, which maintains that the instant phenomenon is a separate nature absolutely sufficient to itself....[6]

Next, James went on to argue against the other pole of the Cartesian dualism, viz., the existence of consciousness as a substantive entity. Cartesians have described the mind in terms of the model of "the substance and its state." In this tradition philosophers have believed that in being self-conscious one is aware of a spiritual substance which is housed temporally in the body "like a pilot in a ship". Thus one can legitimately speak of the mind as the entity that experiences, wills and thinks. For James, consciousness regarded as the name of the alleged entity denotes nothing. There is no evidence for the ontological status of mind as an entity. By introspection we have evidence of the occurrence of certain experiences only. James writes :

> Consciousness, as it is ordinarily understood, does not exist, any more than Matter, to which Berkeley delivered the coup de grace.[7]

James notes that the rationalists have inflated Kant's transcendental ego into an all-engulfing Absolute, whereas the empiricists have reduced consciousness to a mere function of knowing which has no substantial status. James points out that the logical outcome of this empiricistic trend of thought is the assertion that there is no such entity as consciousness. There is no original stuff or substance out of which our particular thoughts are made—which stuff or substance has to be contrasted with the stuff or substance out of which the material object is made. If the first principles of Being were to be enumerated, they would not include the name of consciousness as an entity.

James is fully aware of the paradoxical nature of this assertion. Since thoughts undeniably exist it may seem absurd to deny that consciousness exists. And hence James is careful to specify the exact sense in which the denial of consciousness ought to be interpreted. What he denies is that consciousness is a name for an entity. But James is not denying the obvious fact that things become known or get reported. 'Consciousness' stands for a real function, namely the function of knowing. Without consciousness things that exist could not get reported or known. But there is nothing mysterious or puzzling about a thing becoming known. As he writes :

> There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a

function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is *knowing*. 'Consciousness' is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known.[8]

Having rejected the idea of mind and matter as substantive entities, James went on to reject the other basic dualistic premise that *substances differ essentially.* True to his scholastic heritage Descartes traded upon the ancient doctrine that every substance has an essence. In his writings, Descartes used the words essence, nature, principal property, and principal attribute interchangeably. As he writes: "There is always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and on which all others depend."[9] Each substance has one and only one essence, e.g., thought is the essential attribute of mind and extension is the essential attribute of matter. With his famous example of wax, Descartes illustrates that extension is the essential attribute that endures through all changes of matter. All other sensible qualities of wax—its particular color, fragrance, texture, etc., are subject to alteration. Descartes writes that when we have abstracted "from all that does not belong to the wax" nothing remains but "a certain extended thing which is flexible and movable." Thus with Descartes the physical substance is that which is extended, *res extensans*, and the mental substance is that which thinks, *res cogitans*. Solidity and spatiality cannot be reduced to anything mental or mental factors like the emotions, beliefs and desires to anything physical. Hence Descartes claimed that "extension" and "consciousness" are the original and fundamental substances. Everything else must therefore be regarded as a modification of these fundamental qualities. These two prime predicates, according to the dualist, are related disjunctively.

James questioned the basic dichotomy of the Cartesian metaphysics, the tendency to split the entire universe into two substances. James repudiated the old traditional doctrine of essence. He does not believe that mind or matter have an essential core of qualities which makes them what they are and without which they could not be. A traditional metaphysician believing in a doctrine of essence would hold that mind is essentially different from matter—that anything mental possesses an essential nature of its own that can be possessed only by a mental object and by nothing else. The same holds of matter. Anything extended is matter and anything that is matter is extended. James protests against such "a priori determination" of the concept of materiality. He argued that the concept of matter (or mind) cannot be determined on an a priori basis. It must be determined on the basis of experience. Our experience does not support such an absolutistic contention that extension is the essential property of matter. James argued that one could also conceive of a different kind of extension which could very well belong to a mental state.

Let us for example think of a picture hung on the wall. The picture on the wall undoubtedly has extension. James asks why should not extension be attributable to our thought of the picture as well? Of course the extension attributable to our thought of the picture has to be different from the extension belonging to the picture itself. The extension belonging to the thought will be a subjective extension as distinguished from the extension belonging to the picture which is objective. The difference between subjective and objective extension is clear and is one of relation to the context in which the extended object belongs. In the case of subjective extension various "extents" do not maintain any fixed, unalterable order in relation to each other. But in the case of objective extension the order is necessarily fixed. A physical object in outer space (to the left of another object, the latter necessarily to the right of the former, but not vice versa) necessarily excludes another physical object from occupying the same place, and their changing relations follow a fixed order. James therefore admits that subjective extension is very different in nature from objective extension. Nevertheless he fails to see why subjective extension could not be regarded as extension at all and why our mental states could not be characterized by sujective extension.

James' main point is that a philosopher should not face the world with a set of pre-determined notions such as that to be material something must be extended and anything extended is material, and then try to fit the facts into his scheme. To a philosopher approaching the facts with such a presuppositon the essential difference between mind and matter may be enshrined in the very presupposition. But if we rise above such presuppositions and study the facts impartially we find that there is no essential difference between mind and matter.

James avoids the heterogeneity of thoughts and things, for "thought and actuality are made of one and the same stuff, the stuff of experience in general."[10] The percept of a tree and the physical tree are one and the same bit of pure experience, taken twice, one time as belonging to this, then again as belonging to the other group. The supposed heterogeneity of thought and thing is to be explained as an affair of relations. 'Subjectivity' and 'objectivity' refer not to any intrinsic property but are only relational or functional attributes.

Since James holds that both consciousness and matter come from the same source, namely pure experience, one may be misled into thinking that according to him the original "stuff" is a whole containing both consciousness and matter within itself. Consciousness is obtained from such a whole by subtracting it from the other half of the whole, namely matter, and vice versa with regard to matter. Upon such a construction the distinction between matter and consciousness will be the result of abstraction or of separation of one aspect of the whole from the other aspect.

But this kind of metaphysics is very far removed from James' doctrine. According to James, though both consciousness and matter come from the same source neither can be labelled as "conscious" or "material." It cannot be regarded as a whole both containing consciousness and matter within itself. Rather the original stuff is of a much simpler nature that does not as yet permit the distinction between consciousness and matter. However the same experience after entering into one web of relations can be distinguished as conscious or material. When the experiences enter into relations of mutual action and interaction of an ordered and predictable sort, they come to belong to the "physical world." On the other hand, when the same experiences enter into relations of a very different nature, viz., when they are transitory, plastic, and changeable at will, they become a part of the "psychical world." The same original experience thus becomes either a consciousness or a material thing depending on the relational context in which it occurs. Thus the development of the original stuff into something conscious or material is the result of being added to either of the two groups of elements differently related. In itself, experience has no inner duality. Thus the distinction between consciousness and matter is functional and not original. An experience becomes conscious or material depending upon the phenomenal group in which it becomes a vehicle of reciprocal action. Designations like "mental" and "material" do not stand for ontological features of ultimate reality, but are significant of the particular context in which they occur.

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NOTES

1. *The Writings of William James*, ed. J. J. McDermott (New York : Random House, 1969), p. 169.
2. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes.*, ed. E. S. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross (Cambridge : University Press, 1967) II, p. 53.
3. *The Writings of William James*, p. 391.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. Ralph Barton Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James* (2 Vols : Boston : Little, Brown, and Co., 1935), I, p. 527.
7. *Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe*, ed. R. J. Bernstein (New York : Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971), p. 120.
8. *The Writings of William James*, p. 170.
9. From R. M. Eaton, *Descartes*, (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 275.
10. *The Writings of William James*, p. 187.

THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF (EARLY) KARL MARX

In Africa, other developing countries, and even inside developed Europe and America, there exist very distorted ideas about Marx and his teachings. Some reasons for this are not hard to find. The developing nations have been the battle-field of propaganda between the West and the East, betwen the Right and the Left. In their bid to win the emerging nations to their side, the Western colonial powers launched serious propaganda aimed at discouraging the Third World from embracing Communism. It was portrayed as destructive of religion, freedom of speech, private property even to the extent of advocating community of wives and children. People were instructed to keep contact with Marxists very limited and to suspect any humanistic move they made as a device to get into the system of government and of the church in order to overthrow them. Marx was branded as being materialistic. "Marx is supposed to have believed that the paramount psychological motive in man is his wish for monetary gain and comfort and that this striving for maximum profit constitutes the main incentive in his personal life and in the life of the human race...Marx's criticism of religion was held to be identical with the denial of all spiritual values.... that he had neither respect nor understanding for the spiritual needs of man, and that his "ideal" was the well-fed and well-clad but "soulless person."[1]

Perhaps the Western powers in Africa were right in their propaganda against Communism. Perhaps in Russia, freedom of speech was curbed to some extent; that families broke up on account of the State's intervention in determining who did what job to maintain the Communist System; that children belonged first and foremost to the State and secondarily to their parents that the church was persecuted. These were alleged proofs of the demerits of Communism and the inhuman treatment inflicted on the people under communist regime.

Whatever the truth of these statements one point is clear as a result of a reasearch on (early) Marxism – namely, that the man Marx and the Communism he preached were quite different from what they were said to be by the West. Eric Fromm defends Marx: "Suffice it to say at the outset that this popular picture of Marx's Materialism — his anti-spiritual tendency, his wish for uniformity and subordination — is utterly false. Marx's aim was that of a spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of economic determination, of restituting him in his human wholeness, of enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature. Marx's philosophy was, in secular, nontheistic language, a new and radical step forward in the tradition of prophetic Messianism; it was aimed at the full realisation of individualism, the very aim which has guided Western thinking from the Renaissance and the Reformation far into the nineteenth century."[2]

We shall trace the development of early Marx's concept of man from the background of the Hegelian philosophy and show how indeed early Marx concerned himself primarily with the realization of the individual man as a person.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL AND FEUERBACH AS REMOTE INFLUENCES ON MARX

(a) *Influence by Hegel*

The connection that Marx had in his early university training with the Hegelian philosophy, was very decisive in the future of Marx's philosophy of anthropology. Hegel had died in 1831. Marx entered the University of Berlin in 1836 where Hegel had taught till the time of his demise. Most of the Faculty of philosophy had become Hegelian at the time Marx began his philosophical studies. In fact, Gans, a Hegelian disciple had lectured Marx on the Philosophy of Right and Marx was credited to have been "very industrious" in the course. "Gans' interpretation of Hegel's theory of right was to have a profound influence on Marx's early philosophy. It was in his classroom that Marx's attention was first drawn to the revolutionary aspect of the Hegelian dialectic—that no historical state of affairs can ever be considered final. Rather than freezing juridical institutions dialectical philosophy must further their progress by its own dynamic character."[3]

Hegel had dealt with what ought to be the ideal. In the Phenomenology of Mind, he noted a separated identity between ego and nature, "I" and the "other" in all the four levels of perception. His whole philosophical effort was to reconcile the one-sided identity and to show the sameness of ego and nature. "The present standpoint of philosophy is that the idea is known in its necessity, the sides of its direction, nature and spirit, are each of them recognised as representing the totality of the idea—what exists as actual nature is an image of divine reason, the forms of self-conscious reason are also the forms of nature. The ultimate aim or bussiness of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the notion with reality."[4]

Hegel's treatmant of Lordship and Bondage which illustrates the Hegelian notion of human relationship had a far reaching influence on Marx's treatment of the Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat. According to Hegel the level of conscionsness that operates in Lordship and Bondage is that by which one is conscious of oneself as the negation of the other by a process of objectification. The 'other' is regarded as a 'thing' which is useful (or not) according to whether it renders or does not render services. One never reaches the individual character or personality of the other. This gives rise to social and political control, injustices and wars.

The evils of the Master-Slave relationship can be overcome by the ethical disposition of the individuals concerned, namely the knowledge of identity of all their interests with the whole and their mutual knowledge of themselves in this identity. "The ethical substance is thus, in this determination actual concrete substance, Absolute spirit realized in the plurality of distinct consciousness definitely existing .. It is Spirit which is for itself, since it maintains itself by being reflected in the minds of the component individuals".[5]

Whereas in the Lordship-Bondage situation, the "Other" is useful or useless, on the level of ethicality, I find my realisation in the 'other'. I realize that my being is contained in the other. The Master realizes that he is servant within their difference and that he is then a servant to the servant. This is love. "For love implies a distinguishing between two and yet these two are as a matter of fact not distinguished from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself but in another but this other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself".[6] The ability to practise this mutuality is the highest act of the Spirit. This is the meaning of existence; this is social justice and peace; this is Absolute Unity.

(b) *Influence by Feuerbach*

Feuerbach criticised the universality and absoluteness of the Hegelian system. For Feuerbach the individual cannot be encompassed in the metaphysical concept. "But reason knows nothing of real and absolute incarnation of the genus in a determiante individuality .. whatever becomes real, becomes real as something indeterminate. An incarnation of the genus in its whole fullness in one individuality would be an absolute miracle, a violent cancellation all laws".[7] Feuerbach introduces historical and sociological variables to Hegel's system. The Hegelian interpretation, says Feuerbach, makes communication and understanding between different cultures impossible.

As a materialist Feuerbach questions the metaphysical presuppositions of Hegel. "The idealist sees also in nature, life and reason, but only as his own life and his own reason. What he saw in nature, that he himself has imposed on nature".[8] Rather Feuerbach appropriated the Hegelian system and inverted it to suit his own materialistic doctrine. Instead of Nature realizing itself in the Absolute Spirit, man becomes the highest realization of Nature. The idea of God or religion as the realization of ethicality was thrown overboard by Feuerbach. "The task of modern era was the realization and humanization of God—the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology".[9] Feuerbach made concrete the idealistic love or charity of Hegel. From the development of techno-structure, he shows how the security once thought of as the prerogative of the divine can be given by organizations resultant from techno-structure. "We have shown that the substance and objective of religion is altogether human. We have shown that divine wisdom is human wisdom; that the secret theology is anthropology—the necessary turning of history is therefore the open confession that the consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species——Homo homini Deus est; .. this is the greatest practical principle .... The relations of child and parent, brother, friend, in general of man to man; in short all the moral relations are per se religion".[10]

BACKGROUND OF KARL MARX HUMANISM

Influenced by Feuerbach's interpretation of Hegelian ethicality and his material inversion of the Hegelian idealistic system, early Marx took a philosophical stand which improved greatly on Feuerbach's materialism while at the same time retaining the dialectic method of Hegel. Marx extricated himself from the philosophical idealism which characterized Hegel and acquainted himself with the historical situation of his time. He felt that speculative philosophy was also an alienation; he involved himself in practica investigations of how to cure the social evils of his day—the economic and soical issues.

Abstract notions such as 'Absolute Spirit', 'eternal ideas', 'heaven' and 'after-life' were attacked by Marx because he was convinced that these notions had been used as a cover to practise injustice and other social evils by the wealthy class. Taking an opposite stand against Hegel, Marx taught that the individual man should be given to the State. 'In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men imagine, conceive, nor from man as narrated, conceived, thought of or imagined in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real active men and on the basis of their real life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process.'[11] This is the basis for Karl Marx's philosophy being called naturalism or humanism as distinguished from both idealism and materialism.[12]

THE ASPECT OF MAN THAT CONCERNS MARX

There are many aspects from which man can be treated: the historical, the religious, political, economic, social, materiallistic and so on. Marx studies man in relation to the economic and social conditions under which he lives. He was primarily interested in historical materialism, which states that 'the way man produces determines his thinking and his desire' as distinct from psychological materialism which holds that the strongest motive in man is to gain money and to have more material comfort.[13] For Marx men are the authors and actors of their history. How does man make his own history? How does he find himself? The answer is found in Marx's incorporation of Hegel's thought in the *phenomenology of Mind* : "The outstanding thing in Hegel's Phenomenology of mind and its final outcome—that is the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle—is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-genesis of man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation, that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man—as the outcome of man's labour."[14]

Louis Dupre' expounds the above quotation from Marx by picking two elements of Hegel's thought which are basic for Marx :

i. Labour is conceived of as the activity through which man realizes his own essence. Labour is man's coming-to-be for himself."[15]

ii. This becoming oneself is realized within alienation; labour itself constitutes this alienation.

Marx criticizes the identification of labour itself with alienation. Marx feels that Hegel's erroneous concept of man is due to his idealistic philosophy by which man is essentially consciousness. Hegel implies that man does not express himself by external relation with the outside world.

On the contrary Marx holds that man is complete when he interacts with nature as part of the world. 'Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being, he is on the one hand furnished with natural powers of life—he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as impulses. On the other hand as a natural corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature like animals and plants.[16] Since labour is man's coming-to-be for himself i. e. since labour is man's proper channel of expressing his real life by contact with natural objects for the satisfaction of his needs, Marx regards labour as an essential property of man such that if it is taken away from man he would be in a state of bankruptcy and need.

HUMAN NEED AS THE ORIGIN OF LABOUR

Having shown the central position which labour holds in Marx's concept of man we will proceed to investigate why man has to labour and why labour is the means of self-expression. The reason is to be found in the concept of human need. Man has many needs, the acquisition of which means self-expression, self-realization and satisfaction. Man seeks clothing, sex, habitation, food, which are all realized by man's manipulation of nature.

Labour is this manipulation of nature carried on by man for the satisfaction of his basic needs. "We must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence, and therefore of all history, the premise mainly that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first "historical' act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself."[17]

The labour imperative does not exempt anyone whether one's needs are many or few. Even men leading a most austere religious life by separating themselves as much as possible from 'worldly pleasures', have some needs no matter how insignificant and they must labour to fulfil these needs. "The founder of the Trappists, wanting nothing more than a walking stick had to go into the forest in order to cut one from a tree. In this simple feat, St. Bruno was performing an act of material production. Few men are satisfied with so little, of course, for generally as soon as needs are satisfied, new needs arise. The only way to satisfy this incessant, unremitting claim of nature is through labour, for need in becoming passion, stirs man to action".[18]

This is the central position that labour holds in Marx's philosophy of anthropology. Hence the relevance of Marx's funadmental principle that the mode of production of the material life in general dominates the development of social, political and intellectual life. Man by his work determines the type of life he lives. It is interesting the extent Marx goes to identify the individual with his labour. Labour or the mode ,of production is a definite form of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. "As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are therefore coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce".[19] This makes clear the difference between materialism and the humanism or naturalism of Marx.

MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION

From the thoughts expressed in the preceding paragraph, it is easy to see the relevance of the treatment and emphasis which Karl Marx gives to the theory of alienation. Martin Milligan gives a detailed explanation of the meaning of alienation.[20] The Word is an English translation of the the German *entaussern* which has the following meanings : "to part with", "to renounce", "to cast off", "to sell" a right or property. "To alienate" best expresses the sense in which Marx usually uses the German term. For "alienate" is the only English word which combines in much the same way as does *entaussern*, the idea of "losing" something which nevertheless remains in existence over—against one. At the same time, the word entaussern has, more strongly than alienated', the sense of "making external to oneself", or estrangement.

The idea of alientation is however not original to Marx. He incorporated it from the writings of Hegel and Feuerbach. For Hegel "a consciousness which projects its substance outside itself or in other words, exteriorizes itself is alienated. In a vain attempt to reach this myth which it has projected outside itself whether in the form of a god or any other, human consciousness becomes unhappy".[21]

Feuerbach whose brand of materialism influenced Marx, (although criticised by Marx as not understanding human activity itself as objective activity, in that human activity (labour) deals with sensuous objects as distinguished from the objects of thought) presents a well-known example of alienation, in his Essence of Christianity "where a man is shown to embody each one of his main faculties — mind, will and heart — in a Superior Being. In positing his aspirations as fulfilled in the Deity, man deems himself to be by contrast weak and powerless. This conception of a Being which exists at a great distance in all the splendour of his isolation results in alienation for man. In an attempt to overcome this alienation, man loves God and through belief in the incarnation of his son, finds a means of sermon with the distant Deity. All this is in Fauerbach's opinion, not only deceitful but actually harmful. Man must confront the earth and make his happiness there, rather than live in the vain desire of a non-existent God. 'Homo homini Deus'—Man is God for himself."[22]

Marx went a step further than his predecessors in his application of the idea of alienation. He is interested in man as a concrete human being who is essentially producing the means of his subsistence. The type of alienation that Marx was interested in is the alienation of man from his personal activity, his labour, not the speculative and idealistic alienation of consciousness. If Hegel called the state of consciousness, which has projected itself outside, unhappy, Marx implied that the state of the man, whose proper activity has been alienated, is worse off; "for to him alienation has been an enormous source of grief far surpassing that of the unhappy consciousness".[23] Marx says that man has been alienated in all spheres of his concrete earthly life activities. The type of man for whose interest Marx poses as the spokesman, is the working man, who suffers the grief and poverty issuing from religious, intellectual, political and economic alienation. This is the proletariat in contradistinction from the bourgeoisie which inflicts this pain on the proletariat. Man's inhumanity to man !

CAPITALISTIC SOCIETY : MAN'S ALIENATION FROM HIS LABOUR

We saw in the section on Human Need as the origin of Labour, that Marx identified the idividual man socially with his labour. For him, labour was a definite form of expressing man's life. He made his stand more forceful by saying the following about man : "what they are therefore, coincides with their production; both with what they produce and with how they produce".[21] In the industrialised capitalist society, labour or the expression of man's life, is taken from him. Man is alienated in a threefold way, namely from the product of his work, from the act of producing and from his own social nature. The worker in a capitalistic society is used as an instrument of production. Whereas his production should be the very expression of his being, it now becomes a thing alien to himself. He externalizes his labour in the object of production over which he has no control as to its disposal and enjoyment. "The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him independently as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him; it means the life which he has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien".[25]

In the chapter on Wages of Labour,[23] Marx engaged himself in an imaginary dialogue with the political economist who would argue that the worker is compensated by a just wage. Marx contends that the idea of wage earning makes a slave of the worker who is thereby reduced to the status of a commercial object, a commodity which is paid for according to the quantity and quality of his production. In other words, according to whether his capitalist master gains more money out of his labour or not. His value as a human being is forgotten and unconsidered. As a man, "the worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and range. The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity, the more commodities he creates. With the increasing value of the world of things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of man".[27]

Marx points out the following disadvantages of the worker in a capitalist society.

i. The separation of Capital, ground rent and Labour is fatal to the worker. The lowest and the only necessary wage rate is that providing for the subsistence of the worker for the duration of his work and as much as is necessary for him to support a family.

ii. The demand for men necessarily governs the production of men, as of every other commodity. Should supply greatly exceed demand, a section of the workers sinks into beggary or starvation....The worker has become a commodity, and it is a bit of luck for him if he can find buyer. And the demand on which the life of the worker depends, is on the whim of the rich capitalist.

iii Thus in the gravitation of market price to natural price, it is the worker who loses most of all and necessarily.

iv. The worker need not necessarily gain when the capitalist does, but he necessarily loses when the latter loses. Thus the worker does not gain if the capitalist keeps the market price above the natural price by virtue of some manufacturing or trading secret, or by virtue of monopoly or the favourable situation of his property.

Another respect in which the worker is at a disadvantage : The labour prices of the various kinds of workers show much wider differences than the profits in the various branches in which capital is applied. In labour all the natural, spiritual and social variety of individual activity is manifested and is variously regarded, whilst dead capital always shows the same face and is indifferent to real individual activity.[28]

In the above points Marx spreads out clearly the dehumanization of man in a capitalistic society. He shows the cruel way in which man is laid off when the capitalist 'loses'; and by 'loss' we understand that the profit does not rise to expectation and not that capital is in any way affected. Thus man's value, like merchandise, is marked down to the value of his money. The demon, almighty money, destroys all authentic interpersonal rapport, christian love and compassion.

COMMUNISM : THE RE-VALUATION OF MAN

Equipped with his knowledge of French Proudhon's work *What is Property*? and its treatment of private property as theft; equipped with the scholarly incorporation of Proudhon's ideas into the German situation, by earlier German communists Hess and Lorenzo Stein, Marx became convinced that the one solution for the ills of capitalism is communism. He saw in communism, "the return of man himself as a 'social', i. e. really human being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth or previous development. Communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the solution".[29]

The strongly emphasized notes in the above quotation are "self-realization", "humanism", "resolution of antagonism between man and man", "solution of the riddle of history". Marx, as we saw earlier on in this paper believed that man realises himself by bringing nature to his auspices by labour. He accused capitalism of usurping man's labour and making a commodity out of it thus reducing man to the status of a slave by alienating him from his labour which is his definite form of expressing his life and a definite mode of his life. This causes antagonism between the "capitalist" and the "worker".

Communism, by doing away with active private property i. e. private ownership of means of production, resolves this antagonism between man and man. In communism, wealth or poverty in a community is shared by all with pride and dignity; whereas in capitalism some class of human beings enjoy the goods of this life while others merely subsist and lead lives below the level of dignified human beings. Communism will put an end to the stupidity of personal pride which comes from the sense of having instead of from a sense of being.

To further appreciate the Marxian idea of communism as humanism, it is necessary to clarify his notion of private property. The so-called communist and socialist nations have distorted Marx's idea of communism and popularised the information that in communism the individual can claim nothing as his own. This is contrary to the meaning of private property in the early Marxian sense. Eric Fromm explains : "By private property, Marx never refers to the private property of things for use (such as a house, a table etc.). Marx refers to the property of the 'properties class', that is of the capitalist who, because he owns the means of production, can hire the propertyless individual to work for him under conditions the latter is forced to accept. "Private Property" in Marx's usage, then always refers to private property within capitalist class society and thus is a social and historical category; the form does not refer to things for use as for instance in a socialist society".[30] From this it can be concluded that Marx is not against private ownership of things as such, but private property which, in one form or other, interferes with the interest and development of man; private property which occasions the enslavement and dehumanization of the worker.

CONCLUSION

We have seen in a rather short way how the humanism of Marx forms the pivot of his early philosophical enterprise. Whether Karl Marx is branded a communist, an atheist, a revolutionary, anti-religious, the one appellation that is appropriate to him is humanist. All other names correctly or incorrectly apply to him in the light of his humanism. As Ricour points out: "The anti-humanistic rules of Christians is the basis of Marx's attack on religion."

Marx is interested in man as a concrete being, not as an ideal speculative consciousness of Hegel. Marx's man is not considered in terms of what he has but in terms of what he is, his being, as a being of possibilities, who is able to surpass, transcend the givens of nature. He attacked the capitalist society for implementing a system that makes man a slave to the givens of nature by alienating man from his labour. Capitalism, by paying man a subsistence wage buries man's possibilities of realizing himself in the greatest possible degree.

Perhaps with the new wave of emphasis on the humanism of Marx by contemporary Marxist philosophers, the world will soon be able to understand Marxism in its true perspective. And who knows what great contribution Marxism can make towards religion, peace and prosperity.

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NOTES

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THE RATIONALITY PRINCIPLE : ITS ROLE IN SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION

I shall be concerned in this paper with a somewhat formal question regarding the rationality principle : the question of its logical status and role in social scientific explanation. I am centering my discussion around the formulation of the rationality principle (henceforward RP) offered by Popper[1] and of the Imperfect Rationality Principle (IRP) offered by Watkins[2] because both these writers have been specifically concerned with the methodological question of the status and role of the principles they offer as fundamental to social scientific explanation.

Assuming that scientific explanation is hypothetico-deductive in nature, Popper argues that an explanatory model for the natural sciences, gets animated by the socalled laws of nature. It is these that transform a static mechanical model into a dynamic explanatory system. In the social sciences this role is performed, so the claim goes, by the rationality principle: 'the principle of acting appropriately to the situation.' It is important to notice that in Popper's use, the term 'situation' already contains all the relevant aims and all the relevant knowledge, especially that of the possible means for realising these aims. For Popper, then, RP is the principle of acting appropriately to, or in accordance with, one's aims and knowledge in a given situation.

I wish to raise here the following questions :

Accepting the rationality principle as an animating principle of an explanatory model, what is its exact logical function in the model? Secondly, to what extent and in what manner is the rationality principle comparable to laws of nature in a physical model? In answering these questions I will reject some characteristics of RP that Popper attributes to it and show how other features are attributable only by assigning to it a role other than the one Popper actually credits it with. I will conclude that Popper's analysis of RP suffers from an equivocation in the use of 'rational'.

Let us eliminate at the start some possible misconceptions regarding Popper's formulation of RP. Firstly, it is not a normative principle, an injunction that men shall act in certain ways. Such an injunction can clearly not feature in an explanation of why people do act in the ways they do, any more than the ten commandments can explain the social phenomena of the Christian world. Secondly, RP is not a psychological law. It is not a descriptive generalization of the ways in which people actually do act. Situational analysis reveals as its components not individual or even social experiences, but 'abstract and typical situational elements' such as aims and knowledge. To leave no doubt as to Popper's intentions I quote :

> 'If you look upon the rationality principle from the point of view which I have here adopted, then you will find that it has little or nothing to do with the empirical or psychological assertion that man always, or in the main, or in most cases acts rationally.'

There must then be a third description under which we introduce the rationality principle, and it is in determining this that Popper's formulation faces, in my view, very real problems. If a principle is not a law of psychology, not a rule of conduct then we are faced with at least three other possibilities. It is either an empirical conjecture of some sort though non-psychological, or an analytic truth, or it is not propositional in nature but is a rule of inference. Popper's own view is the rather unusual one that though RP is an aspect of or a consequence of a methodological postulate, it is not itself a methodological principle but rather an empirical conjecture 'that is, an integral part of every, or nearly every, testable social theory.' Actually, it is not even a true conjecture since it is plainly not universally true that men act rationally; hence RP is just false, even if very nearly approximating the truth. Again, in spite of its empiricality, Popper regards it as 'a kind of zero-principle', almost empty. All this follows from the methodological rule enjoining us to leave RP unquestioned in any situation requiring explanation and to 'pack or cram our whole theoretical effort, our whole explanatory theory, into an analysis of the situation : into the model.' The effect of observing this rule is of course to treat RP as though it is unfalsifiable and to throw the entire burden of the task of explanation on the model itself—on situational analysis.

For in any comparison of two competing explanations, since they would both assume RP, it is pointless to question what they have in common. Far more interesting and informative would be an examination and testing of the remaining premises in their respective explanations.

Now it is true that in offering an explanatory model of human action, the agent's intention of acting appropriately to the situation as he saw it is hardly the first thing to cast doubt on. But given Popper's formulation of RP it is not at all clear, that his claim that it is an empirical conjecture can be substantiated. And this does not stem from the fact that he would like to treat RP as unfalsifiable, though it is related to it; it stems rather from his definition of rationality in terms of the logic of the situation. For it is important to remind ourselves that 'situation' for Popper is really 'situation-for-the-agent' or situation-as-the-agent-sees-it. This means that many actions that strike the on-looker as inappropriate or inadequate can be shown (by invoking RP) to be adequate in terms of the agent's perception of his own situation. To use Popper's own example : The inadequate actions of war leaders may nevertheless be shown to be adequate from the point of view of 'their limited experience, their limited or overblown aims, their limited or overexcited imagination.' If this is so then it is difficult to see how any action in the final analysis could be shown to be anything but 'rational'. If to act rationally is to act according to one's knowledge and information, given (where relevant) the appropriate skills to do so, then to say that RP is not universally true is to say that there are occasions when an agent having a given aim and possessing the relevant information, skills and opportunities still does not act according to his aim. Can such counterexamples be constructed within Popper's own theoretical framework? Popper gives as axample of the empirical falsity of RP, the case of a flustered driver 'desperately trying to park his car when there is no parking space to be found.' I am not sure what this example proves, since important conditions that Popper himself lays down are not fulfilled here, viz. the condition that the agent has made an appraisal of the situation, whieh it is most unlikely that a flustered driver would have done and that he has the means of realising these aims. In any case the example is offered altogether too casually for us to set much store by it, even in fairness to Popper.

At this point it might be useful to look at a variant of Popper's RP that has been advanced and defended by Watkins: the imperfect rationality principle. This principle was specifically put forward by its author to account for those unsuccessful or seemingly irrational, even crazy actions, in which the history of mankind abounds and which in any case are far more challenging from the viewpoint of explanation than the staid and orderly actions of 'normal' people. I am discussing IRP here, though, only from the perspective of what light it might throw on the question of the status of the rationality principle in social scientific explanation.

Watkins regards IRP as a fundamental principle (on a par with the conservation laws of physics) which is to be 'treated as *unfalsifiable* in the interest of the *falsifiability* of the whole system.'[3] This formulation makes interesting comparison with Popper's view which sees RP as comparable to laws of nature in the physical model rather than to theoretical principles from which laws are themselves derivable. True, there is no very clearcut conceptual distinction between the two; they can be more plausibly arranged in a continuum than in distinct categories. Still it would appear that the stipulation of treating IRP as unfalsifiable is more compatible with Watkins' view that sees it as a fundamental part of the theoretical framework of explanation than Popper's on which RP is regarded as a false empirical conjecture. There is after all a difference between empirical falsity and theoretical revisability. One might want to defend Popper's interpretation of RP by arguing that it is comparable to laws of nature in a physical model since these are also quite often merely assumed to be true, since within the framework of broad theory they might themselves be questioned. And I think if Popper made some such assumption, his position would be decidedly more acceptable. But this is not how he regards RP. He does say categorically that the principle is false and is willing to accept as a consequence that every explanation in the social sciences in false. I quote :

> 'the rationality principle seems to me clearly false...I think there is no way out of this...Now if the rationality principle is false, then any explanation which consists of the conjunction of this principle and a model must also be false, even if the particular model in question is true.'

Popper argues that even in physics 'any model. . . must be an over simplification' and hence false. But there is some equivocation here. If a law of nature is once clearly refuted, it is most unlikely to continue to get invoked in scientific explanation. (This is of course not to ignore the question of the *limits* of the operation of a scientific law.) Also, laws of nature get plenty of deductive support from more fundamental theoretical assumptions which RP does not, or at least, has not yet received.

To return to Watkins' interpretation—IRP was first advanced with a view to showing how seemingly irrational actions can be explained with the aid of a principle that can be used 'to *rationalise irrationality* and failure'[1] (italics mine). This expression is of some significance for my analysis; nor is it casually used by Watkins, for it reappears as part of the heading of a section of his paper : '6.3 Rationalising the irrational : a case study'. Now Watkins does argue very convincingly against the thesis that unsuccessful actions cannot be explained, by showing how with the aid of IRP, the explanation of one very tragic incident in naval history can be reconstructed. But I am at the moment less interested in this aspect of IRP than in the analysis of how precisely it is employed—what its role has been—in the reconstruction of events and the offering of a plausible explanation. And here again we find that the plausibility of the explanation rests entirely on the scientist's ability to show the inherent appropriateness of the action from the agent's point of view. So that whereas the notion of an explainable unsuccessful action is demonstrated by Watkins to be perfectly consistent, that of an explainable irrational action cannot be so easily demonstrated, at least not the way the concept is employed in the Popper-Watkins model. Yet Watkins along with Popper does see IRP as a synthetic principle; then it must be possible to find counter examples. We saw that Popper's counter example carried little weight; let us look at one of Watkins'. At one place Watkins constructs the hypothetical case of a man who is booked on a flight which for a number of reasons it is important for him to catch and which he fully intends to catch. Of such a man Watkins claims that 'It is *logically* possible that he will change his mind for no reason.' But I wish to show that this is far from the simple matter that it is made out to be.

It would of course appear to be madness itself to question the assumption that irrational actions are possible and I do not wish to appear to be doing that. Indeed it is the obviousness of this assumption that lends such a strong air of plausibility to the claim that RP is synthetic. What I wish to argue however, is that unless different senses of 'rationality' are kept apart, then on the logic-of-the-situation model 'irrational action' becomes synonymous with 'unintelligible action' and with 'unexplainable action'. Something like this is in fact admitted by members of the Popper school. For instance Jarvie says, 'We find not understandable those explanations of human behaviour which do not render it "reasonable" '.[5] But whereas Jarvie does seem to suggest that he is employing 'reasonable' in a rather special sense, Watkins talks without reservation of 'rationalising the irrational'. All this surely suggests that there are only *apparently* irrational actions, or at least that the only intelligible actions are those that can be rationalised. But then in what sense is RP synthetic? In what sense is the example of a man's not catching an important flight which he clearly could have, a counter example within the explanatory model suggested by this school? Would we say that we had explained the man's action by saying that he acted for no reason? Clearly not. We would rather continue to look for a reason which would explain his action. In a case like this we are likely to find that the man acted on impulse. Perhaps he had seen a pretty face at the party he had just attended and was driven by a wild desire to meet its owner again — [And we could (I suppose) call this an irrational action in the face of his more serious interests and commitments] [Certainly the action would be explained if some such discovery was made]. The point is that from the *agent's* point of view, *his* perceptions and situational appraisal (however momentary) the action of not boarding the plane is not 'unreasonable'.

Since the point is crucial I wish to discuss another example of irrational behaviour from Watkins' paper. This concerns a young woman who having come early and found a seat on the train justifies to herself not giving it up to an old lady who is standing. She decides not to get up, yet immediately after, does so and surrenders her seat. Watkins refers to this as an example of 'human inconsistency' and argues that it is instances such as this that necessitate interpreting RP as synthetic and non-necessary. What Watkins never tells us is how he decides when he has before him an example of 'irrational' behaviour that should be rationalised and when one of genuine irrational behaviour that is to be left 'just as it stands'.[6] Why should this example of the young woman's action not also be counted among the more interesting cases to which IRP could be successfully applied? There is something almost sinister about a conclusion (to which Watkins is forced) that would label a young woman's remaining in her seat while the old lady kept standing *rational* and would dub her act of kindness *irrational*. This is specially ironical in the context of Watkins' own plea at the end of his paper against the dehumanisation of persons by the social scientist.[7]

But I want to argue a point somewhat stronger than the previous one, which is that the example being discussed is clearly one in which the rationality principle would succeed. For though the young woman's perception of her situation included that of her own fatigue, of the fact that she had bothered to arrive earlier to get the seat, of her emotional problems and the need for physical comfort on a sweltering train, there is little doubt that her perceptions must also have included (possibly in a more profound sense) the awareness of the values of courtesy and of kindness. After all not every young woman would have behaved in this irrational (!) manner. Surely if we nod understandingly at her action, it is not because we accept it 'just as it stands' but because we recognise those other ends, those perceptions and values other than immediate ones, according to which we are at times impelled to act, sometimes at considerable cost in terms of pleasure and comfort. To invoke these as counterexamples to the rationality principle is to make the task of explaining human action a gratuitously cynical affair.

I have been trying to show that on their understanding of the rationality principle—which I hasten to add find unobjectionable per se—neither Popper nor Watkins has or can produce a real counterexample to rational action. For any non-mechanical explanation of human action must essentially involve rationalising it in their sense. The point is driven home somewhat more forcefully when Popper 'shows' how Freud's psychoanalytic theory, far from being a theory about the irrational, really reveals the inherent rationality of the psychotic's actions. For, Popper argues, given *his* assumptions, knowledge, aims, etc., the psychotic's actions are quite appropriate to his situation. Now it is well-known that mentally sick people are capable of very rigorous reasoning; it is quite often just their premises that are way out. They are also perfectly capable of acting consistently with their 'beliefs'. But can these actions be labelled 'rational' in any non-explanatory sense? I do not wish to be dogmatic here; still it is surely worth pointing out that psycho-analysis as a theory was offered by Freud to make psychotic actions intelligible, not to demonstrate that they are not really psychotic. What Popper really demonstrates is that RP is of the very essence of the explanation of action.

Enough has now been said to show that the Popperian analysis is not free of considerable confusion and that in any explanatory context the principle that men act appropriately to the situation as they see it does not appear to be synthetic in nature. This point has indeed independently been argued by Donagan who, commenting on Watkins' IRP, says :

> 'The principle of Imperfect Rationality presupposes nothing that is not analytic. It is therefore both true and logically redundant.'[8]

On Donagan's analysis, the acceptance of a certain practical conclusion on the basis of a situational picture and the apparatus for dealing with it *entails* that the agent perform or attempt to perform a certain act. But this is an arguable point. Certainly it is not immediately self-evident that performing an action is related to intending to perform that action in precisely the same manner as say, walking one mile towards home is related to walking two miles towards home. In other words, that it is a matter of mere conceptual unravelling. Consistent with his analysis of IRP as logically redundant, Donagan claims that 'an historian neither requires a methodological principle of Imperfect Rationality nor presupposes a synthetic principle to the effect that unless prevented by physical causes, agents act, or attempt to act in accordance with their decision schemes.'[9] But this again is misleading if it means that the notion of acting appropriately to a situation has no role to play in the explanation of action. Can we then steer clean between the Scylla of Popper's (and Watkins') indispensable falsehood and the Charybdis of Donagan's redundant truth?

We do appear to have reached an impasse. Certainly the devices used by the hypothetico-deductivists to accommodate the notion of rational action (in their special sense of 'rational') in their model of explanation are nothing if not Procrustean. An examination of these strongly suggests the need for an alternative analysis of the explanation of human action. Is there such an alternative? I believe there is and one incidentally that illuminates the very features that Popper attributes to RP though somewhat unconvincingly on his own analysis. This is to recognise the relevance here of the notion of practical inference as opposed to, or at least independent of, the well established concept of theoretical and formal logic. In this inferential framework I suggest that RP/IRP must be regarded as a prime rule of practical inference in social scientific explanation. To regard it in this way would be to see for instance the truth of Popper's statement that it is the animating principle of any model; it would also show that the question of its empirical truth or falsity is invalid and *co-ipso* the question of its analytic or synthetic nature. It would clearly not be dispensable in explanation though it would be logically redundant as a premise. Also according to at least one important school in the philosophy of science, it would still be comparable to the laws of nature. I refer of course to Instrumentalism that sees the latter as rules, or inference tickets, that enable us to make conceptual connections between one set of phenomena and another.[10] What I am suggesting is that the rationality principle operates in precisely this way. As a rule it *enjoins* the scientist to infer from the premise that X has a set of aims A and makes a situational appraisal S, that X acts appropriately to A and S. Watkins argues that since there is a logical gap between an appraisal and an action a synthetic principle is required to bridge it. Donagan argues that since the two are analytically related the principle can be dropped. But this is of course because both are working in the framework of formal logic which I am suggesting is not adequate to the explanation of human action.

Would the notion of situational logic have to be thrown out under the new dispensation? Not at all; RP which I would like to be allowed to rechristen as the Rule of Appropriate Action — RAA — is the logic of a situational logic model, and thus is even more appropriately viewed as a rule of inference. First, like all rules, it admits of no exceptions (which I have tried to show is the case anyway with the Popper/Watkins principles); at most there will be cases of failure of its application and consequently of explanation. In other words, to say that an action remains unexplained is to say that RAA could not be applied to the situation in which it was performed or that one could not discover the logic of the situation. Second, this interpretation, or rather modification of Popper's substantive notion of rationality as RAA, also provides a much needed rationale for various stipulations made by him : to regard it as unfalsifiable, as a zero-principle, almost empty, etc., which, on his 'empirical conjecture' view, is so unsatisfactory.

I will end by saying something about the other more primary sense of rationality from which the present one must be clearly distinguished. That is an evaluative sense in which we employ criteria and standards of judgement to decide whether actions are rational or not. It is in that sense that we may be inclined to label the practice of witchcraft irrational, that of science rational and so on. It is clearly not an explanatory sense since it does not enable us to understand why either science or witchcraft is practised. I say it is primary because clearly the notion 'rational from X's point of view' is parasitic on 'rational'.

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NOTES

1. Popper, K. R. 'La Rationalite et le statut du principe de rationalite' in *Les Fondements Philosophiques des Systemes Economiques*, 1967. All references to Popper's views are from an unpublished translated version of this paper. Hence there are no footnotes.
2. Watkins, J. W. N. 'Imperfect Rationality' in *Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences* ed. Borger and Cioffi 1970.
3. Watkins J. W. N. op. cit. p. 173.
4. Watkins J. W. N. op. cit. p. 167.
5. Jarvie, I. C. *Concepts and Society* p. 38.
6. Watkins, J. W. N. op. cit. p. 230.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
8. Donagan, A. "Comment of Watkins' 'Imperfect Rationality' " in Borger and Cioffi eds. op. cit. p. 226.
9. *Ibid.*
10. I think my interpretation (rather than Popper's) receives support from the following statement made by Jarvie : "The analogy between the rationality of actions and symmetry in nature may not be close, but their roles as standards of understandability are..." '*Concepts and Society*', p. 38. Rules rather than premises set *standards*.

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1978
Oxford University Press
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‘CAN POLITICS BE SPIRITUALIZED’

[This Paper was originally read in a Symposium held under the auspices of the Fergusson College Philosophy Association as part of its Golden Jubilee Programme. I have now supplemented it suitably so as to make it a systematic exposition of the stand I take. It would be interesting to survey the events in our country since Gandhiji's passing away and illustrate how they, on the whole, support the position taken by Gandhiji. That however will be a subject for another article of equal length and have its due place in a collection of Essays on Gandhiji.]

Let me start with a statement of my conclusions and I can best do so by giving briefly my reply to the main query. In reply, I would state that it is possible to spiritualize politics, and in principle there is no limit to such spiritualization. Indeed, all human progress, and the entire process of civilization mean just this. Politics can and ought to be conceived in the image of Ramarajya, the Machiavellian is only an elementary stage of polity and has to be superseded.

Ends and means together constitute moral life and attempts to talk of either as if they were self-sufficient are basically invalid. Both are interdependent and within limits affect each other. Goals being chosen, one has to use the best available means at every stage; these change according to circumstances but basically good means are means which are in harmony with what in totality is sought in the goals. Goals themselves are not abstractions but are concrete states of existence and experience related to the social and natural set up.

There is no substantial difference between the social and political spheres — the political is social and the social implies some political context. Morality has reference to human life which is both individual and social and if morality has relevance to individual life (in this matter, there is quite often a good deal of misunderstanding and very external and conventional notions of the moral often prevail)—equally well and in the same sense it is relevant to social life. Society is the individual writ large and therefore all the features of individual life are also present in social life.

To state the above position a little more elaborately :

I have no doubt at all that Politics can be spiritualized. We must clearly understand that to spiritualize anything, it is not necessary to de-materialize it. Indeed spirituality will have no meaning and content if it turns its back on the material or the natural. If it is true, that in individual life morality comes to fulfil, that in the long run and in a real sense virtue is prudence, that moral idealism is not a mere matter of sentiment, then there is no reason why this should not be equally so in the social sphere. Gandhiji's great achievement consists in maintaining this explicitly and in the practical efforts he made to realize it during his leadership of the struggle for Indian Independence.

Ends and means are parts of the same process and both affect each other. A clear conception of the ends leads to choice of current means, use of proper means alone leads to desirable ends. Ends independently of means are empty and unrealizable, means without reference to ends are meaningless and are merely mechnical activity. Ambiguity in the use of words such as force often leads to confusion. Force as violence is bad because its result can only be pain, resistance, opposition. But not all force is violence, indeed most of it is not and on the contrary, it is the vehicle and instrument for realizing all desirable ends.

While it seems at first sight that Ramarajya and the Machiavellian image of the State are two extremes, actually they are stages, the latter one being the lower, and the former the higher. It is not right to imagine that a person who stands for the way of persuasion and love, does not understand that human beings have to be gradually educated into these ways and in the interval, may temporarily need less refined methods for self-control and social harmony.

That the standards and categories of social life are, or have to be, different from those of individual life is commonly believed because of the complexity of the social situation, but the belief is not really vaild and inspite of grave errors and setbacks, human social life has on the whole been progressing on the same lines as the individual. Our notions of the socially right and good have deepened, widened and become more subtle. There have always been wars—but only recently we have had a League of Nations and now a United Nations Organization.

Let us try and understand what is meant by saying that moral principles are applicable to individual life! It is of course obvious that even in so-called individual life (if there is any such at all, for what we mean by the individual as distinguished from the social individual, is the individual in small social groups like the family—a completely isolated individual can really be neither moral nor immoral) people, do not always follow them; ought implies 'can' at the most, certainly not 'is'. Secondly, a thoughtful student of desirable moral practice and ethical theroy appreciates that man's moral life is inextricably bound up with his natural life (which also to some extent includes the social), that its content is determined by reference to his environemnt, to his status in life and so on. Virtue certainly is not expediencey in a narrow sense and one has often to turn one's back on pleasure or at least moderate one's search of pleasure in the pursuit of other ends of life. Nevertheless, virtue is both useful and pleasant in a sense and must be so. Moral principles tell us what in the long run is in the best interests of man's entire personality, and moral commands are accepted as reasonable and binding in the belief that they do so fulfil human aspirations. Of course, self-denial, some degree of discipline and self-control are the pre-requisites of a healthy moral and contented life. We quite often fail to observe moral principles, but do not, therefore, normally think of denying the validity of the principles. In strikingly different social and physical situations different moral principles prevail or at least different connotations of them are relevant and applicable although there is side by side a common stock on both sides of the situation.

The difference between individual and social life (of which latter, political life is a variety) is only that social life is 'writ large' and therefore the considerations and circumstances which in individual life are easy to spot and identify become complicated and seem transformed and different but cannot really be in principle different from or opposed to those which characterise individual life. If it is wrong as between individuals to practise untruth injustice or cruelty and violence, then it is equally so as between societies—and ultimately for the same reason, namely that it is not in the best and lasting interests of social groups, any more than of individuals to be unjust, untruthful or violent.

For guidence in this matter an acquaintance with the facts and laws of social Psychology and Economics is relevant and useful. The laws of Physics and Biology are common both to individual and social life and in their application to social events they have characteristic aspects and features. There is no evidence in any of these to suggest that there is any radical change in human nature when it functions in the social field. Nor is there any radical change between the social and the political for a state is only a society and no society is without a political context.

The most important practical reason of the belief that there is some basic distinction between individual and social (political) morals is the acceptance of nationhood as an ultimate entity, providing the standard of conduct for the individual in the socio-political context. As against that, we must now substitute the entity 'one world'—and/or humanity and realize that nations and their sovereignty within their geographical borders—are only a stage and and instrument towards the goal of human brotherhood. In fact, we in India have even included nature along with man and have believed in and aspired for a harmony of the two in their respective positions. There is nothing unscientific or visionary in this; modern science has made the world one for good or evil. It is for us to ensure that it is for good. If wars now are necessarily global, so is commerce, so is edcuation, and agriculture—and so must be peace and goodwill. We know that even today help in famines or cyclones or quakes anywhere comes from all corners of the world, although we have not yet succeeded in avoiding wars.

To appreciate what Gandhi meant by the spirtualization of politics one should not forget that in his opinion what applied to larger groups i.e. nations also applied to groups within the nation. In fact like charity, spiritualization must start at home. In order to ensure that the over-whelming of the individual by the state which charaterizes all centralized groups Gandhi pleads for decentralization of authority and has urged that we must make our village the normal unit of administrative power and economic self-sufficiency and go on to build up a central authority only for carrying out such functions as the samller units could not perform. Thus, on the one hand for him since all men were equal and essentially good, nationhood was itself only a stage towards universal brotherhood; on the other, within each nation, there would be numerous small units more or less autonomous and self-dependent as far as possible and coming together and constituting a hierarchy of wider units to carry out such tasks as they could not by themselves and also because of the sense of brotherliness which it had with all other units.

We must now also deal with another legitimate query as to how far Gandhiji himself practised what he was teaching and what is the extent to which he may be said to have succeeded. As far as his political activity in Africa is concerned one may say with confidence that he did succeed by using his special technique in the limited end he had there set to himself, of restoring for the Indians who had settled there at least the minimum rights of citizenship, and his method won for him appreciation from the British Government and even from his doughty South African opponent General Smuts.

In India itself, before coming on the national scene, Gandhi had succeeded by his method in two or three smaller problems in the Champaran tea labourers' just demand from their employers, in the dispute between the labourers and millowners at Ahmedabad, and in one other special grievance of famine-affected agriculturists in Gujarat.

The struggle for Indian Independence was a much bigger and more complicated task—for India is a vast country with a large and varied population different from each other in soical and econom ic status, in the languages they speak and although the bulk of the population was Hindu, there was a major minority community namely the Muslims, and there were also numerous Indian Christians, Parsees and Buddhists. To harness all these together in a common awakening and effective resistance to the British who were naturally reluctant to part with what has been described as 'the most precious gem in the crown of the British monarch' was a very important, difficult and complex undertaking. Of course, Gandhi could not possibly have succeeded unless a great deal of work of the awakening of the public had been done before him for about five decades by distinguished and able patriots like Dadabhai Nowrojee, Justice Ranade, Surendranath Banerjee, Lokamanya Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale and he himself had several able lieutenants like Pandit Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad and others. The changed international situation and the use of aeroplanes and modern destructive weapons, and the reduction of Britain to a second grade power with not enough able men to send out to administer a hostile population of thirty or forty crores, and Subhash Bose's heroic exploits in raising out of Indian war prisoners an Indian Army, all these also contributed. A heavy price had also to be paid in accepting the partition of the country for the achievement of Independence. Even so, it must be acknowledged that if one person more than another involved the masses of the country in the fight for freedom and made it well nigh irresistible, it was Gandhi.

Gandhi himself throughout stood for truth and non-violence and the carrying out of his constructive programme which through its various items sought to build up a just, industrious and friendly society and although he had to make or at least connive at numerous compromises in dealing with problems inside the party, at elections, and during the last and decisive struggle from 1942, there is no doubt that because of his leadership, the Indian Freedom Movement was carried on with the minimum use of force and it proved to be an infectious and inspiring example for many Asiatic and African dependent nations, so that Gandhi was looked upon by the leaders of those countries as a person who pointed out and successfully proved that even an armless nation can overthrow a mighty foreign nation chiefly by active awakening among the people, and their refusal to cooperate with the foreign power and being prepared to suffer hardships. It must also be understood that while spiritualizing meant primarily and normally appealing patiently to the opponent for one's just rights (and learning to be self-dependent and just and united) Gandhi was of the view that if injustice could not be corrected by the method of love and friendliness and persuasion, even the use of minium force was justified. Injustice must in no case be tolerated and cowardice was worse than violence. His plea really amounts to this that we must first and patiently try to resolve conflicts through persuasion and only if they fail, then use of minimum force is temporarily permissible.

Most readers will remember that Gandhiji considered himself a disciple of Gopal Krishan Gokhale who was the first modern Indian leader to say that 'Politics should be spiritualized'. Gandhiji considerably widened and deepened the connotation of Gokhale's utterance—but basically the Indian Liberal Leaders did believe that persuasion, fair play to one's opponent, making sure of one's facts before expressing one's grievances, the avoidance of personal hostility or even discourtesy to those who were ruling India were all indispensable in India's fight for freedom, at the other end and Gokhale also said in the first or second decade of the present century that failing everything even civil disobedience or non-payment of taxes were legitimate in a freedom struggle. I do not however think that any other Indian liberal would ever have agreed to go so far and Gokhale himself although he very earnestly admired and highly respected and even revered Gandhi, would not, one feels, have in actual life taken this principle to his heart as Gandhi did and *lived what he taught was right*, although Gandhi too had to make some compromises on practical grounds.

In this connexion Gandhiji had quite a controversy with the patriot philosopher—Lokamanya Tilak who stated that while saintliness is the guiding star and norm for all of us—the direction towards which even politicians must direct their activities, in the actual day to day conduct they have to and are justified in making compromises to achieve desirable results. Gandhi's rejoinder was to say that although he was no learned scholar and could not reply to the Lokamanya's learned and skilful arguments, he was quite certain that it was intellectual indolence (and moral timidity) to say that any field of human activity was outside the range of a saint. In fact it is obligatory for one who aspires to live a saintly life to try and prove that even so complex and complicated a field such as politics ought and could be guided by the universal principles of truth and love for which he stood. Having read all the correspondence in the matter between Tilak and Gandhi and in view of what in actual life was their practice I do not think that Tilak differed from Gandhi essentially and on the other hand

Gandhiji in actual life combined diplomacy with saintliness although he did say that it was only because he was an imperfect instrument, that he could not always abide by his principles. The real situation is that while Gandhi was referring to the goal, Tilak only supplemented it by saying that while proceeding to the goal one has to watch the ups and downs and winding in the road and adjust his movements accordingly. Gandhi himself has made it clear that he is no visionary but a practical idealist and that is exactly what Tilak meant. Rajaji in this connexion has very clearly said that Tilak who was known as a veteran and experienced political leader was in fact a very straightforward and simple-minded person and on the other hand, Gandhi known and ackonwledged as a saint had a good deal of shrewdness concealed diplomacy. In fact Gandhi himself said that he naturally was a shrewd *bania* whatever high ends he aspired to and his insistence on pure means. For he was not a visionary idealist but a person who desired and was determined to practise what he taught. Gandhi's insistence on simplicity, individual and social, and his plea for decentralization properly understood minimize the causes of conflict and enable the normal peaceful individual to assert himself, and not pulled into wars inspite of himself, Gandhi's ideal of spiritualizing politics would then be easily realized.

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COMMITMENT AND ACTION

According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, commitment is an 'engagement which restricts freedom of action'. This means that if I have committed myself to do something, say X, my freedom to do something other than X is restricted. If the action X is of a small duration — if, for example, I have told my friend that I would meet him at 3 p.m. — it would mean that my freedom to do anything else at 3 p.m. than meeting him is restricted. If, on the other hand, the action involved is of longer duration, my freedom is proportionately restricted. For example, if I have committed to my friend that I would go for a walk with him every morning, then my freedom to do anything other than going for a walk with him is restricted.

From the foregoing, it is clear that commitment has two aspects or implications. Every commitment implies something to be done and something not to be done during the same space-time situation. These may be called the positive and negative aspects of commitment respectively. If my commitment to meet my friend at 3 p.m. implies that I have not to do anything other than meeting him, it also implies, more clearly and directly, that I have to meet him. For, it is quite probable that I don't do anything else, but I don't meet him either—I may just sit idle. If this happens, then, though I don't do anything else, I still fail in my commitment. Thus what is significant is that the commitment is carried out. In other words, the positive aspect of commitment is more important than its negative aspect. So long as the positive aspect is carried out, the negative aspect has very little practical significance. The meaning of commitment viz., that it is an 'engagement that restricts freedom of action', quoted in the beginning, emphasises the negative aspect.

This is an important point. In the context of a commitment, we have to see whether the commitment has been carried out or not. In other words, it is the positive aspect of commitment which is more important. If, as in the illustration given above, I don't meet my friend at the appointed time, I fail in carrying out my commitment. That is a sufficient ground for passing a judgement about my conduct in the context of my commitment. It is comparatively insignificant what I do instead of meeting my friend, which I was committed to do. Thus it is clear that the positive and the negative aspects of commitment are not at par. In order to have a clear understanding of the nature of commitment, it is necessary to emphasise that it is the positive aspect which is more important. We have to judge the conduct of the committed person from this positive point of view. That every commitment has a negative aspect also is not a special feature of commitment; that is a common feature of all human actions. This point will become more clear as we proceed.

One can be committed in a variety of ways. One can be committed to a person for a specific purpose. My commitment to my friend to meet him at 3 p.m. is a commitment of this type. In a general manner, commitment in this context means promise to do or not to do something. One can also be committed to a particular political ideology. Commitment in this sense means that the person will work for the propagation of the political ideology to which he is committed. But two persons committed to the same political ideology may do different things to propagate it. Thus, out of two committed communitsts, one may study and write whereas the other may do field work. This difference is at the level of means only and such that it does not make any difference in the original or basic commitment of the person concerned. However, in some cases, the differences in the means employed is so significant that, notwithstanding the similarity in commitment, it cannot be ignored. During our struggle for freedom, for example, although almost all the persons involved aimed at the same thing, Gandhiji's insistence on the use of non-violent means only was so significant and basic that to miss or ignore it is to misjudge the entire situation. But the difference may not be about means only, it can be on other points also in the sense that two committed communists may be propagating different shades of communism. However, the difference in approach does not in any way absolve or reduce the responsibility of the committed communists from working for its porpagation. So long as one is committed, one has to do something to prove the commitment. A question that can be asked in this connection is : if a person, after he has committed himself to a particular political ideology, discovers that, in fact, it is not what he had thought it to be, can he withdraw his commitment? In other words, are commitments revocable? We shall attempt to answer this question in the sequel.

In addition to commitment to an individual or to a political ideology, there can be religious and other commitments also. There can also be commitments in which one is primarily answerable to oneself only. My commitment to tell the truth is such a one. If I am committed to tell the truth, I am answerable to myself only. If I tell the truth, I have the satisfaction that I am acting according to my commitment; if I don't tell the truth, I should have the feeling that I am not doing what I ought to do. It would appear that once a commitment is made, whether to oneself or to someone else, it ought to be carried out. Conversely, in general, whenever a commitment is not carried out, it ought to be condemned as undesirable. If making a commitment implies restrictions on one's freedom, it also makes one's choices clear and known. If a person has to act, in whatever way, his freedom is naturally restricted. This means that it is not the special feature of commitment that it restricts freedom; it is a feature of action as such. Whenever I act, my freedom to do something else is restricted for the simple reason that in any given space-time situation, I cannot do two things. If, for example, at a given time I am eating vegetarian food, whether by chance or as a result of my being committed to vegetarinism, my freedom to eat non-vegetarian food at the same time is duly restricted.

The various ways of being committed may be divided into two categories. The commitment to a person is usually for a particular purpose or action. My commitment to my friend to meet him at 3 p.m. is such a commitment. But the commitment to a person can also be for a purpose or action involving a much longer time. For example, I may be committed to help a widow till her eldest child gets a reasonably good job. But both these commitments are of a specific type in as much as they do not involve or touch my entire being. These may be called specific commitments. On the other hand, commitments to a political ideology or religion are not so specific; they are general and cover or involve the entire being of the person committed. These may be called non-specific commitments. Further, among the specific commitments themselves, there may be degrees of specificity for the obvious reason that, out of two specific commitments, one may be more specific than the other. This point is clearly brought out in the two illustrations of specific commitments given above.

In the context of commitments considered so far, the difference is about the object of commitment, i. e., to what one is committed. But commitments can differ from one another on other points too. In some cases, the commitment is such that the means employed to carry it out have no bearing on its character. If, for example, I am committed to reaching a particular place by a particular time, it is immaterial how I cover the distance. In this case, I am committed to the end only. But in some cases the role of means employed is significant and as such cannot be ignored. Gandhiji's insistence on non-violent means during our freedom struggle is such a case. In this case the means have great moral significance because freedom achieved through non-violent means is basically different from the one achieved through violent means. The means have moral significance not only by themselves but also because they have a bearing on the character of commitment in question. There can also be cases in which the means employed have all the moral significance and the relative commitment is almost insignificant. If, for example, I am committed to being rich, it would appear that the commitment by itself is morally natural. However, the means that I employ for becoming rich have moral significance in the sense that they can be desirable or undesirable.

From the foregoing, an importnat point emerges — can a commitment, once made, be changed? It is important that we consider this question because the answer we give to this question can be a fundamental point in determining the very character of and our attitude towards commitment. But before we consider this question, we must consider another question — are all commitments of the same type or, in other words, are all commitments equally valuable? In normal circumstances, is my commitment to accompany my friend for a movie as important as my commitment to marry a war-widow? The slightest consideration will show that, even considered as independent and not alternative commitments, my commitment to marry a war-widow is immensely more importnat than my commitment to accompany my frined to a movie. But why? Although it may appear obvious as to why it is so, it is necessary to formulate a criterion or basis for saying so. The criterion that appears relevant in this context is – what would be the consequences if I failed to carry out my two commitments? Would the consequences of my failing to accompany my friend to a movie and my failing to marry a war-widow be the same? Obviously not. The consequences of my failure in the second case are far more serious than in the first case. If this is agreed upon, we can say that a significant criterion for judging the relative value of various commitments is: what would be the consequences if we failed to carry out our commitments ?

It may be objected that the criterion being suggested here is negative because it draws our attention to the relative significance of two commitments not being carried out. But that is not the case. Basically, commitment is something positive only. However, there may be situations in which *one* is genuinely perplexed or is in a dilemma. In such situations one of the ways of knowing the relative significance of two commitments is to see what would be the consequences if one failed to carry them out. It may be further objected that the criterion is subjective in as much as it leaves to the individual to judge the significance of consequences. But that is not a unique feature of commitments; that would be the case in respect of most of the moral questions.

To know whether or not a person carries out his commitment is not to know something in isolation; it is to know his character as well. It is reasonable to expect that a person of 'good' character would carry out his commitments. On the contrary, if a person usually fails to carry out his commitments, it is definitely a reflection on his character. When we enumerte his good qualities, it may not be one of them.

The preceding consideration regarding the significance of various commitments is applicable in general circumstances, that is, when we consider various commitments as independent of one another. But there are situations in which we are to make a choice between two alternative commitments. In other words, in a given time-space situation, we have to make a comparative assessment about the value of two commitments and take a decision about what we have to do. A doctor, for example, may have to choose between his commitment to tell the truth and saving his patient's life. Or a person may have to choose between his commitment to his beloved and his father's whishes — if he marries his beloved, he earns the displeasure of his father and if he obeys his father and consequently does not marry his beloved, he breaks his promise and earns her wrath. Situations like these are complicated but not uncommon. How should we resolve such conflicts between alternative commitments ? Obviously, the choice cannot be left to the likes and dislikes of the individual.

A general and safe criterion in situations which call for a choice between two alternative commitments can be this—other factors being the same, the choice of which commitment is likely to bring about more happiness or a more agreeable state of affairs? For example, the person who has to choose between keeping his commitment to his beloved and obeying his father may very well ask himself—choosing which alternative is likely to result in overall better consequences ? If, on cool reflection, he finds that his father's objection to his marrying his beloved is superficial and primarily sentimental and that by marrying his beloved he is likely to bring about an over-all better situation, he should go ahead. This criterion can also be applied for examining any other situation, choice or conduct from the moral point of view. Since the situations are human and complicated, involving a variety of factors or circumstances, precise mathematical calculations are not possible (it can only be regretted that such precise results should be expected at all). But if the criterion suggested above is honestly applied it will be found that it gives us fairly reasonable results—both in moral evaluation of what has happened and in helping us to decide what to do in a situation where we have to choose between two alternative commitments.

We can now consider whether commitments once made can be changed. It appears difficult to give an answer which would have universal or even near universal application. But this much can be stated—commitment once made can be changed if, generally speaking, the change is for the better. In the same way when I fail to carry out my commitment, I should be excused if, by not carrying out the commitment, I have behaved in a better manner. If, in the context of my movie commitment, on my way to the theatre, I find a person bleeding after an accident, help him by taking him to the hospital or to his place and thus fail to reach the theatre, I deserve not only to be excused but even to be patted. My duty to help a bleeding person is obviously more important than my commitment to reach the theatre. Here again, if we see what would be the consequences if I failed to accompany my friend to the movie and to help the bleeding person, it would be obvious that the consequences of failure in the second case are more significant.

A commitment is made in and is relevant to a context. When the context has changed and it is reasonably clear that the commitment has become outmoded or unnecessary, there is no harm in giving it up. In quite a few cases, it will die a natural death. In other cases, the person committed will change, and so on. Our commitment to work for the freedom of our country was relevent till the 15th August, 1947. After that date it has become redundant so that it is natural that this commitment should be considered unnecessary and given up. This, of course, does not mean that we cannot work for the progress of our country. We can; but so far as our commitment to work for the freedom of our country is concerned, that has become clearly unncessary. When this commitment is not there, naturally the responsibilities it entailed are also not there.

We thus arrive at the position that in quite a few cases, when the context has changed, the relative commitment also changes or becomes unnecessary. But there are other points which have to be considered. Can a person, who has committed himself to a certain pattern of behaviour opt out of it ? On what grounds can such a change be justified ? In order to understand this point let us consider the following two cases. If a perosn makes a commitment without knowing the situation thoroughly—either because of ignorance or because he has been intentionally kept in the dark —then it appears reasonable that when he comes to know the situation well, he should have the freedom to review his commitment.

If a girl makes commitment to marry a particular boy and subsequently learns that his family has a history of tuberculosis, she has, I think, a right to opt out of the commitment. This is so because at the time of making the commitment, she was either ignorant, or was not knowingly told, of this vital fact. I feel that it is only reasonable that she has a second look at her commitment. If she now decides not to go in for this marriage, she is morally justified in doing so. On the other hand, if she sticks to her commitment notwithstanding the additional information and subsequently contracts tuberculosis, she alone is to be blamed for this. However, there are cases where a person thinks of a change in his commitment without there being reasonable ground for doing so. If a boy has second thoughts about his matrimonial engagement because he now has a proposal with a larger dowry, his action cannot be justified. This is so because there is no material change in the particulars of the first proposal. If he insists on a change in his commitment he is taking only his own advantage into consideration. His insistence on a change also proves another point. Evenf if the amount of dowry in the first proposal were not a significant consideration, his insistence upon a change in favour of the proposal with a larger amount of dowry shows that he approves of the dowry system. This in itself is undesirable. But to make the amount of dowry the deciding factor in matrimonial alliances is all the more undesirable. A change in commitment in a case like this cannot therefore be approved of.

The problem of changing or opting out of commitment is important. It is, therefore, necessary to find out or establish some objective criterion for determining whether a change can be approved of. In the case of the boy's marriage, given above, it may be maintained that if he has a better proposal now, he has a right to opt out of the previous engagement (commitment). However, as already pointed out, this is a narrow view of the situation. Further, if a larger dowry is considered to be a valid criterion for changing one's matrimonial commitments, there may be no end to the process. Even in business, where the primary, if not the only, motive is profit in terms of money, one is supposed to stick to commitments once made irrespective of the subsequent fluctuations in price. A change in commitment can be considered to be valid or authentic if, and only if, the party which suffers loss after the change also finds, on cool consideration, the circumstances warranting changing, valid. In the case of the girl's marriage to the boy suffering from tuberculosis, discovered subsequently by the girl, even the boy, on cool consideration, should find the change justified. At least disinterested persons will find the change in this case justified because in normal circumstances, commitment or no commitment, a girl cannot be expected to marry a boy having a family history of tuberculosis. Howerver, if may appear that we are asking for too much. It may be argued that whatever be the grounds for the girl's opting out of commitment, it may be quite difficult for the boy to appreciate them. But there does not appear to be any way out. Constituted and used as we are, it may be difficult for most of us to agree with a decision or judegment (in the case under consideration, the girl's decision to opt out of her matrimonial commitment) which goes against us. In such a situation one can only hope that we are so educated and trained that we can appreciate and judge situations, in which we are ourselves involved, in an objective and unbiased manner. Moreover, I think it is not just a case which involves a boy and a girl. If the girl marries the boy she is not only exposing herself to the danger of contracting tuberculosis, but also the children that she may give birth to. Even if, for the sake of argument, we say that she has a right to decides the future course of her own life the way she likes, she has no moral right to expose her expected children to such a serious and distinct danger as contracting tuberculosis.

We thus come to the position that a change in commitment can be approved of only if a disinterested person also approves of it. This may appear to be a vauge and inapplicable criterion. It may be asked, expectedly, who is a disinterested person ? But in fact, the criterion is neither vague nor inapplicable. Hidden in this is the element of universality to which Kant drew our attention, or the Christian principle— do unto others as you wish them to do unto you. If, in a given situation, a person changes his commitment and I want to know whether it can be approved of or not, then I can very easily ask myself the question— if I were in his situation, would I change the commitment ? In normal circumstances, an exercise like this should give us a fairly resonable assessment. Of course, it may be said that this criterion will not work because no two human situations are absolutely identical. But that much can be said about all ethics. However, if there is an element of objectivity in ethics, if we can learn from the experience of other persons in the moral field, if we have to pass moral judgement at all, this is a fairly reasonable criterion for determining whether a change in commitment in a given situation can be approved of or not.

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A NOTE ON ROSS

Sir David Ross in his "*Foundations of Ethics*" seeks to vindicate an Objectivist or Realistic Ethics i. e., the view that rightness and goodness are objective properties of actions and motives etc. respectively, rather than subjective ascriptions to these.

Basic to this view is the conviction that there can no contradictory moral statements. For to correctly predicate of the same action both rightness and wrongness, is evidently impossible, if it is assumed that its moral character is an objective property of the action. On such a view, a morally significant action must be right *or* wrong, but not *both* right and wrong.

To substantiate his contention, Ross cites two sets of examples mentioned by Taylor. Each of these appears to show that there *are* contradictory moral statements, i. e., that there are statements which (a) predicate a moral property of an action, and (b) which contradict each other. To each case, Ross will show that although the two statements statisfy (a), they fail to fulfil (b) as the contradiction involved is not real but only apparent and really due to an extraneous factor such as difference of opinion regarding matters of fact or differences in circumstances prevailing in different societies.

(1) Some assert that it is right to vaccinate children, while others judge this action to be wrong. While both assertions predicate a moral quality (hence satisfy (a)), they really turn only on a difference of opinion, as to the question of fact whether vaccination does or does not prevent small-pox, while both parties accept the more basic principle that parents should try to protect their children from disease. Hence (b) is not satisfied.

(2) In some societies, blood-feud is considered right while in other societies it is judged to be wrong. This apparent contradiction may be explained by the simple fact that in many early societies there is no other means to punish criminals and to secure respect for life—while in a more organised state of

society there are public agencies and institutions to fulfil these functions—while again, both parties agree on the more basic principle that life must be respected. Hence, though fulfilling (a), this example again does not satisfy (b).

Now, Ross' position that there are no contradictory moral statements may be challenged in the context of the controversy as to whether the goodness of an end justifies the adoption of *any* end or not. To state the two positions more accurately: (i) An action which is an end is right, if it is right, if and only if all the actions, which are means to its realisation, are right, too. (ii) An action which is an end is right, if it is right, even if some of the means to its realisation are wrong.

Now, both propositions satisfy (a), as they ascribe a certain moral property. But they also satisfy (b) as the same action, X, may be judged wrong by one person, *because* it involves a wrong action as a means, while another person may consider X right *even though* it involves a wrong action as a means. This contradiction cannot be resolved as in the previous cases as due to factual circumstances or considerations, for this controversy contains no factual but only valuational elements. Nor can the contradictory views be reduced to a common ground, such as e. g., the common view that the good end should be sought or realised—for it is precisely this evaluation of the end vis-a-vis the moral character of the means leading to its realisation that is of concern here.

It would seem to follow that there *are* contradictory moral statements, but as no action or motive can both have and not have a certain moral property at once, it would follow that *some* moral statements at least do not ascribe objective moral properties but express subjective attitudes or reactions. This conclusion is of course not acceptable to the Moral Realist, for he claims that *all* moral statements refer to objectively real moral properties.

Alternatively one may fall back on a view closely connected to moral realism, namely the contention that moral statements are cognitive in character, rather than merely expressing a feeling or command. On such a view, a moral assertion is a proposition and as such must, by definition, be either true or false, i.e., it is either true or false to ascribe a certain moral property to an action or motive. Consequently only one of the contradictory propositions (i) and (ii) can be true and prima facie the true proposition seems to be (i) as the wrongness of the means would appear to affect the rightness of the end.

Perhaps Ross could easily have ruled out the possibility of contradictory moral statements by simply pointing to the cognitive nature of moral assertions and the definition of cognitive statements or propositions as statements which are either true *or* false thereby implying that contradictory moral statements cannot both be true. To take recourse to examples and to proceed inductively, may rather have weakened than strengthened his case, and moreover, the examples chosen carried little weight.

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REVIEWS

A SYNTHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Harold J. Dumain. 185 pages, Philosophical Library, New York. $ 6.00

Hegel was once asked to explain his philosophy while standing on one foot. In this wide ranging serious study the author has attempted a task of like difficulty. He begins with a valuable criticism of the crisis of civilization and the retreat of much modern thought from true metaphysics. Philosophy, he writes, "has turned its back on metaphysics, oftentimes concerning itself mainly with problems of logical analysis." He goes on to point out the importance of knowledge of the past, the misunderstanding of modern science, that there is no need of it, that everything has begun anew. A thread of Platonism runs through his thought.

In chapter two, a search for solutions, mention is made of Communism as an important factor in the intellectual dilemma of Modernity. But of greater importance by far is the much earlier Cartesian revolution which Hocking rightly stresses at length in his COMING WORLD CIVILIZATION, for Descartes is nfinitely more important for philosophical understanding than Marx, especially in a brief survey such as this one. Descartes is, of course, later discussed in chapter three, "Theory of Knowledge And Reality," perhaps the most rewarding part of the book.

We are indebted to the author for his important remarks on Greek science and wish he had extended his study of Heisenberg's now rather famous Atlantic article "From Plato To Max Planck" which every student of Greek philosophy should read. It first appeared in the "Birthday issue" of Atlantic, Nov. 1959. This section abounds with great insights. To quote one: "The divine mind to the extent that it is incorporated into culture may directly influence human behaviour and build human values." Here the author agrees with John Boodin that the structure of value is eternal Again he seems to approach Boodin's concept, mind and matter as aspects of some higher Being, in this case Deity. It seems singuar that Dumain omits mention of any important recent American philosopher. In his chapter on Ethics he is close to J.S. Mill's ideas yet does not refer to him.

Critical Idealists will take exception to the attempt to build a road to Cosmic Theism on a synthesis of materialism and idealism. For mind is the truth of nature and Theism more securely rests on a thorough and corrected Idealism, freed from the vagaries of 19th century Romanticism.

We have here a reasoned case for what might be called a theistic Naturalism, freed of the fallacies of materialism. The idealist school must agree with him: "The success of the Platonic philosophy and of science thus far does give at least a glimmer of hope."

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Bernhard Mollenhauer

IDENTITY AND THOUGHT EXPERIMENT By Suresh Chandra, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, (pp. x + 108) Price Rs. 18.50.

The book under consideration is a piece of good and shrewd philosophy. It is a good piece of philosophy for it tells the philosophers to pull the reigns of their imagination, it tells them not to mix up what is scientifically possible with what is imaginatively possible. It is a shrewd piece of philosophy for it does not discuss anything more than what is required.

It is a collection of four independent essays, namely, "Scepticism, Identity and Interrupted Existence"; "Seeing and Tasting after-images"; "Man in Science Fiction"; "Personal Indentity and Medical Possibility". The first two articles are the revised versions of the articles already published in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* and *Knowledge, Culture and Value*. The original versions of the last two articles were read at the seminars held at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla and the Visva Bharati University, Shantiniketan, respectively. What unites all these articles into one organic whole is the fact that all of them directly or indirectly are concerned with the problem of identity.

In the first chapter the author has successfully refuted the view, that identity is the same as spatio-temporal continuity, held by Strawson, Hume, Price and a host of other contemporary British philosophers. He has, with the help of the examples of "drum-world" — a world in which no other sorts of particular except drums find a place, and of hallucinatory objects and after-images proved (i) negatively that any philosopher who reduces the concept of identity to that of continuity commits a mistake, and (ii) positively that the concept of identity is consistent with both the concepts—the concept of continuity and that of discontinuity. One is here reminded of Thomas Reid who also, in chapter IV entitled "Identity", of *Essays on the Intellectual Power of Man*, tries to show by taking the example of pain and time that the concept of identity is compatible with the concept of interrupted existence. However, in this chapter, the author has examined in details the arguments put forward by Strawson alone. One would want him to examine the arguments put forward by Hume and Price also in details.

The second chapter in the words of the author is "a by-product of the first chapter". Here he refutes the views held by some philosophers that after-imgaes are bodily senstations. To do so he examines in details the general status of after-images. The originality and novelty of this chapter lies in the fact that in his discussion he does not confine himself only to the analysis of the after-images of seeing alone to which the British philosophers have generally paid attention, but also analysed "after-taste" in terms of "tasting after-image"—a field in which no work has so far been done. In this analysis, he claims, he has not confined himself to abstract thinking but has made actual experiments with different varieties of wines and other food-stuffs, and invites everyone to verify his results.

In the third chapter the author points out the fact that the modern science fiction exaggerates the potentialities of science. He has by taking the examples of Mary Shelly's *Frankestien* which is supposed to be the pioneer work in science fiction, Geogre Orwell's 1984, H. G. Well's *Russia in the Shadows*, *The War of Worlds*, *The Time Machine*, Aldous Huxley's *The Brave New World*, and Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* shown that these works of fiction have tried to give their uncontrolled flights of imagination the respectability of science by importing a few terms of science dictionary in their works. He has shown that all that is imaginable is not scientifically possible. One, however, fails to appreciate why he should have attempted to answer some of the problems like "How long are we going to retain the institution of amily?", "Should we have the institution of marriage?" etc., which have no bearing on the problem of identity. He could have either shortened this chapter, or alternatively restricted himself to the science fiction which deals with human psychology, and therefore, has a direct bearing on the contemporary philosophical discussion of identity.

There is a tendency in the modern philosophers to ignore the simple common-sensical facts and construct and live in some complex world of their own fantasies. The result is that they are caught in their own web. The problem of personal identity is the living example of such a tendency. In the fourth and the concluding chapter the author has taken up the imagined cases of brain-transfer, fusion of bodies, division of bodies, memory duplicators put forward by Shoemaker, Wiggin, Porfit, Williams, Miri, Long and Perry and has shown that all these examples rest on the ignorance of the distinction between scientific and medical possibility, and miraculous and magical possibility. The facts which these philosophers imagine could be performed by a surgeon, or a physician or a chemist, can only be performed by a *Messiah* or a prophet or a magician.

The book is uniformly interesting and stimulating. As a whole it contains much of value, though it may not greatly excite those who believe in having philosophical problems for their own sake. But it contains a hint for them too. It is, that there is no necessity for them to construct out of their imagination fabulous creatures or fabulous machines; instead they can take cases of actual scientific achievements like the sex-change and discuss their philosophical repercussions. The other theme of the book which is not explicitly mentioned by the author but is implicity contained is that the philosophers should not try to create problems where there are none. They should try to see things as they actually are, not as they might, could or should be.

So much about the content of the book; now a word about its form. The book, though, has an elegant get up, it is full of typographical errors. These errors casue an obstruction to a smooth reading.

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the review of
metaphysics

a philosophical quarterly

December 1978 Vol. XXXII, No. 2 Issue No. 126 $5.00

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LOKHANDE, Ajit, *Tukārāma, His Person and His Religion*, a religio-historical, phenomenological and typological enquiry, Bern: Herbert Lang, and Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976, 208 pages photo-mimeograph, cms 15 × 21, no price. (European University Papers, Series XX: Philosophy, Vol. 22.)

This informative and comprehensive study of Tukārāma and his theology by a Maharashtrian scholar now settled in W. Germany deserves consideration. Tukārāma, indeed, is a central figure of the *bhakti* tradition at a time of transition and reorganization, when Hinduism begins to reassert itself as a religious, social and political force over against the waning Moghal power, and his mark on the religious and literary heritage of the Maratha people is indelible. However, relatively little critical study has been done concerning his person and his religious thought. This monograph is an important step in that direction.

After a first chapter about the background of Tukārāma (*bhakti* movement in Maharashtra, achievements of Dnyāneshvara, Nāmadeva and Eknātha, leading personalities and poet-saints of the Vārakarī Pantha) the second chapter investigates the sources of Tukārāma's life and gives a critical account of various manuscripts of his compositions. His life is presented against the backdrop of the religious forces (Vaiṣṇava *bhakti*, *Vārakārī*, *Mahānubhāva*, Jainsim and to some extent Islam) and the socio-political situation of his time, including King Sivaji's relationship with the *Vārakarī* movement and with Tukā himself.

Chapter three analyzes his idea of God and the implications of image-worship. Unlike some authors, Lokhande makes no attempt to reconcile the contrary trends of formulation (non-dualistic, theistic, polytheistic present in Tukā's hymns (*abhaṅg*)), but rather awakens an understanding of the complex tradition inherited by Tukārāma and of the existential setting of his hymns. Concluding this analysis, the author says: "Tukā is convinced that God is one and a personal Being although he is above and beyond the world (not identified with it). For Tukā there are not many gods as the highest Beings but just one: Viṭṭhala, the incarnate Viṣṇu. All the other gods are false gods. Stones or metal images cannot be identified with God. They point to God. They are his vicarious representations. They deserve special respect because they are in a special way related to God. But they do not replace Him. One can serve God and love him even without these images. One can contemplate and meditate upon Him and reach Him without the help of images. But for Tukā himself and other simple people God has made himself manifest; he is become incrnate. Tukā remains, first and last, a *Bhakta*. Almost all the *abhaṅgas* are a colloquy with, a comtemplative prayer to, or praises of the *saguṇa* God". (p. 103)

The same chapter shows how from this conception of God Tukā dervies a very humble view of himself as a sinner ever begging for divine forgiveness and a sense that his very need for it enriches God with the title of saviour. It further explores his consequent idea of the world. This is on the whole a positive idea rarely found in the older Hinduism. The world, no doubt a stormy sea to be crossed with detachment but "on its farther side stands the generous one with his hands upon his hips". Living creatures and material goods could lead us astray but in themselves they are valuable and have their own place and role appointed by God. Tukā says, "To use the world according to the divine rules is equal to renouncing it". His apprehension of the world is marked by the duality of use-and-renunciation. "As a bhakta Tukā wants and needs the world as a means to serve and love his God. As a mystic he feels apathy towards it when religious and moral values are concerned". (p. 114) Yet, it is never for him a play of māyā (illusion), a mere līlā (play) of god.

Chapter four continues these considerations. Tukārāma accepted meekly enough the four-varṇa system of society and his lot in it as a mere Śūdra. He performed his caste-duties faithfully but he took his real refuge into the casteless Vārakarī Pantha. "A Vaiṣṇava is one who loves God alone" – Tukā says, "His caste may be anything at all". Among the Vārkarīs alone he found the true society of saints, the moral rather than legal society that mattered to him.

Chapter five is devoted to the phenomenological study of the personal religion of Tukārāma. Lokhande examines here the numinous experiences of Tukā, his belief in the coming of God as the Viṭṭhala of Paṇḍharpura and his iconographic description in the language of the *abhaṅgas*. He analyses also his view of the Vārakarīs as a group, as a 'discipleship' and a 'brotherhood'.

The final chapter contains a typological study of the personality of Tukārāma as mystic and prophet. As a mystic of the most intimate union of man with God, Tukā uses at times non-dualistic expressions but his mysticism is not a mysticism of knowledge (*jñāna*) or even of vision but of devotion and touch. It can be seen as 'bride-mysticism' but without the overtone of emotionaliam. Compared to the Kṛṣṇa-*bhakti* of the Caitanyas or the Vallabhas, it is quite sober. It is a theistic and even monotheistic mysticism of union with God as master, lord, mother, father, brother and friend, a perfect 'I-Thou' mysticism which, yet does not shun such expressions as 'I have become the pervading spirit.' And the union it tends to and experiences even now is a unique and ineffable experience of sweetness, pleasure ever new, innermost perception. For Tukā, all creatures and the world around him are included in this experience of union so that he is filled with happiness from within and from without. Yet, although nature is involved in his mysticism, Tukārāma is not a nature-mystic. "Tukārāma's commerce is directly with God; he *meets* his God and experiences *Him*; or rather he experiences himself in God. In other words, he experiences the mystical union of the spirits. It is far different from being happy in the company of God as 'revealed' in nature."(p.187) As to his personal attitude in prayer it is more contemplative (cintana) than meditative (*manana* or *dhyāna*) and it culminates in an innermost mystic union which he does not analyse but just relishes.

Typologically, Tukārāma is also a prophet, i.e., a messenger of God, an organ of his revelation. He has experienced a call and puts the whole responsibility for his speech on God: "I speak only as God sets me speaking." However unworthy and unqualified he feels to be, he speaks boldly as the mouthpiece of God. He speaks of himself as Viṭṭhala's 'branded slave', 'stamped servant' and 'sealed' as Viṭṭhala's own. As such he suffers no rival to his God and rebukes those who turn their faces away from Viṭṭhala.

Dr. Lokhande's book is not only a finely written and solidly grounded introduction to Tukārāma but it offers lovers and scholars of this great poet-saint a rewarding and at times challenging study conducted with critical understanding but also with appreciative sympathy throughout.

Dnyānadeepa Vidyāpeeth, Pune 14. R. V. DeSmet

CORRECTIONS

(1) In the October 1978 issue of this Quarterly read the 22nd line in the last paragraph on page 123 as follows: We use "our bodies and their natural powers....". Similarly the address of the writer should be read as "Bhairab Ganguly College, Calcutta".

(2) In the October 1978 issue of this Quarterly the name of our Individual Life Member Dr. (Miss) B. Mukherji has been printed. Her address is as follows:

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CHEMPARATHY George, *An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusmāñjali*, De Nobili Research Library, Vienna, 1972, distributed by Gerold and Co., Vienna; E.J. Brill, Leiden; M. Banarsidass, Delhi, 204 pages, Rs. 40.

The pioneer of modern studies of Udayana was E.B. Cowell who knew only the verse portion (*kārikā*) of his N. Kusumāñjali He was followed by Faddegon, Jacobi, K. N. Jha, U. Mishra, S. Mookerjee, M. Hiriyanna, L. Suali, G. Tucci, Radhakrishnan, E. Frauwallner, S. V. Sastri, A.S. Kuppuswami Sastri and D. C. Bhattacharya. Taking up from the results attained by them, Dr. Chemparathy has devoted many years of research on Udayana's seven works the mature fruit of which he now offers us in this introduction to N. K.

Unconvinced by D.C. Bhattacharya's arguments for placing Udayana in 1050-1100 A.D., he retains the generally upheld date (between 950 and 1050) but hopes to carry on further research on this point. He is able to provide (p. 23) the probable chronological order of U.'s 7 works. His estimate of U., a Maithilī Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (who, however, does not mix the two darśanas) is high on good grounds he sets forth on p. 26. Apart from being a respectable logician whose contributions to Indian epistemology are not minor, U. is the staunch defender of N.V. theism who, besides commentatorial works, composed independent treatises which reveal him to have been a systematic thinker, an indefatigable controversialist but also a man of deep faith in Śiva's grace whose saving effect he hoped to see extended even to his atheist opponents.

Indeed, the concluding prayer of the fifth *stabaka* (chapter) of his N.K. is worth quoting in this regard: "Thus, O Lord, kind and compassionate, although their hearts are bathed again and again by the overflowing waters of the Vedic and ethical teachings, you can find no place in the hearts of those men and they remain hard as rocks; still, because in the very act of opposing your existence they have sincerely thought of you, may they in time solely through your kind mercy cross over to the shore of salvation." And the verse that follows which recealls the *inquietum est cor* of St. Augustine: "Thou art beautiful by nature; although our minds are, indeed, since long immersed in thee, O Source of bliss, still they are even today restless and unsatisfied. Hence, O Lord, hasten to show thy mercy so that, our minds being fixed solely on thee, we may not attain a hundred times the torments of Yama." (see-29-30)

As an ardent devotee of Īśvara, he wrote more as an act of worship than as pure philosophic speculation. This is seen in the introductory and concluding verses of his works, especially those of the five stabakas of N.K. But as a controversialist, he handled his logical weapons with utmost skill and did not spare his opponents towards whom he could be caustic or even sarcastic. In N.K. he rarely mentions them by name or quotes from their works so that there is difficulty in identifying them. But he often uses an opponent's formulation to refute him step by step. While many of the atheists from the past, especially Sāṁkhyas and Mīmāṁsakas, were then tempering their opposition, he still had to face the quite lively Buddhistic atheism of a Jñānas'ri and a Ratnakīrti.

Up to the 7th century, commentators of N. S. IV, 1, 19-21, treated of Īśvara's existence, nature, attributes and motives of activity and established proofs based on different middle terms (*hetu*). The grounds of opposition of their adversaries were chiefly the fact of suffering, the inequality of living beings and the inconsistencies of theism (summarised in note 95, p. 77). Then, Dharmakīrti in line with developments in logic inaugurated by Diṅnāga made his famous radical attack against any possible logical argument for the existence of a Lord. Hence, the consequent emphasis of the Naiyāyikas, especially Trilocana and Vācaspati, on overturning this attack. Udayana's concern is similarly to prove īśavra's existence rather than to expatiate on his nature and attributes. His main thrust is directed against Kumārila Bhaṭṭa probably because Mīmāṃsā belongs to orthodoxy and, hence, deserves special refutation. He wages no controversy with Vedānta but he is not a Vedāntin.

U. establishes a clear plan for each stabaka and follows it with occasional excursus. His fivefold division refers to 5 erroneous opinions (*vipratipatti*) rather than to 5 schools and within his treatment of each such opinion he considers the relevant schools. The subject of N.K. is Paramātman "whose worship the wise consider to be the path towards heaven and liberation." Scriptural belief in this Lord is not sufficient; he is to be made the object of rational reflection (*manana*) so as to invalidate the atheistic objections (in the first 4 stabakas) and positively prove his existence (in the 5th).

U.'s "ecumenical" attitude is patent in his prose introduction where he suggests that practically all Indian religious sects and philosophic schools of his time actually believe in the Lord interpretatively insofar as they worship some ideal figure or idealised founder (see 81-82). Yet many fail to recognise the true aim of their veneration and reject explicitly the Śaiva belief in the one supreme Lord.

In the first stabaka, U. discusses mainly with the Cārvākas who deny the *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva*, i.e., the metempirical and unprecedented power of action (*karma*) to produce its fruit through a series of rebirths. By refuting them U. obtains a ground for his theistic argumentation since *adṛṣṭa* being unconscious needs to be guided by a conscious agent who could be none other than Īśvara. The latter alone, indeed, is the supra-mundane (*lokottara*) person directly perceptive of all things (*sarvānubhāvī*) including those no man can perceive. (82-83)

The second stabaka follows up with a discussion of the means of accumulating meritorious *adṛṣṭa*. This means consists of the rituals and sacrifices prescribed in the Veda. The latter, however, cannot be eternal (as upheld by Mīmāṁsā) because of the non-eternal nature of speech and the periodic recurrence of cosmic dissolutions and creations. Hence, it must be produced anew with each new creation, and who but the Lord could be its utterer? (83)

In the third stabaka, U. shows that none of the accepted pramāṇas could ever disprove the existence of the Lord who, being imperceptible, escapes the scope of the first five; as to *Śabda* (scriptural authority) its explicit assertions amply counterbalance some apparent denials allegedly found in the Veda. Further, he establishes (in the footsteps of Trilocana and Vācaspati) that the necessary relation between effect and agent can be determined beyond all doubt and, hence, inference (*anumāna*) from the visible cosmic effect to its invisible agent, the Lord, is valid. (83-84)

The fourth stabaka corrects the opponents' erroneous idea of valid cognition so as to show that authentically valid cognition is possible in Īśvara. Thus the first 4 stabakas pave the way for the 5th which works out their results and formulates directly U.'s theistic arguments. (84) A few of these arguments are also found in another two of U.'s works. For U. all the arguments he proposes in N.K. are valid and "it is not the fault of the post (*sthāṇu*, also a name of Śiva) if the blind man (*andha*) does not see it".

In the first verse of the fifth stabaka, U. clearly sets forth the probandum (*sādhya*), namely, an omniscient and immutable Lord, and the logical reasons (*hetu*) of these arguments. There are 9 *hetus*. The Lord is proved (1) from the existence and nature of effects (*kāryatvāt*); this ancient proof is reformulated carefully in the line of Vācaspati (86-90); (2) from the combining (*āyojanāt*) of the unconscious atoms (90-92); (3) from the need for a support (*dhṛteḥ*) of the weighty earth, etc. in space (92-94); (4) from the dissolution of the universe (*saṁharaṇāt*) (94-95); (5) from the skill of speech, etc. (*padāt*) in which men have to be instructed at the beginning of each creation (95-97); (6) from the authoritativeness (*pratyayāt*) of the scriptural tradition (97-98); (7) from the general acceptance of the Veda (*Śruteḥ*) in spite of its having no empirical basis (98-99); (8) from the connection (*anvayataḥ*) of its words into meaningful sentences (99-103); (9) from the difference in number (*saṁkhyāviśeṣāt*) of the atoms required to form dyads, triads, etc. (104-108). These *hetus* lead to the existence of Īśvara as creator or more exactly as combiner of simple and timeless constituents into a complex universe (1,2,9,), as preserver (3), as destroyer (4), and as primordial teacher (5,6,7,8).

The same 9 *hetus*, interpreted differently, thanks to the *śleṣa* or *double entendre* of Sanskrit words, are made by U. to provide another series of 9 proofs. The reader will find its elucidation pp. 109-132. All these 9 *hetus* aim at proving against the Mīmāṁsakas that the Vedas have necessarily Īśvara as their author.

In examining the convincing value of both series of proofs, the author rightly remarks that they are time and culture-bound. They represent the end-product of centuries of reflection by eminent thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika darśana. I may be permitted to remark that this rational theodicy is often thought to contain all that Indian thought has elaborated on this subject. But from Śaṅkara onwards the theologians of the Vedānta have proposed

078686

arguments of another type whose probative force deserves careful assessment; and apart from Madhva they have centered them on a Paramātman who is not only the *Nimitta-kāraṇa* arranging pre-existing constituents into an orderly universe but is the total Cause, both *Nimitta* and *Upādāna Kāraṇa*, of the cosmos.

U. holds with his own tradition that the Director (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) of the cosmos is conditioned by Time, Space, the souls' merits and demerits. This limits his ominpotence but offers an easy solution to the 'problem of evil'. He directs living beings so that in accordance with their past *karma* they can exercise their own causality and thus experience (*bhoga*) the fruits of their merits and demerits. (140 and 148)

He is bodiless (*aśarīrin*) because in spite of the opinion of any past Indian thinkers agency does not demand the possession of a body. The Lord can act 'through mere thinking' (*abhidhyānamātrāt*) which U. explains as *saṁkalpamātrāt*, 'through mere volition' (140-147). But to teach beings at the dawn of a creation he takes up a merely instrumental body (*upakaraṇaśarīra*) which is only a 'body of artifice' (*nirmāṇakāyā*); interestingly this is a term borrowed from Buddhism. The theoretical reasons why Naiyāyika could concede this are conjectured pp. 152-153. Of the specific qualities of *ātman*, only cognition, desire and effort are applicable to Īśvara. Mere desire does not suffice for his causing, there must be effort (*prayatna*) in the from of an outburst of volition. Of these qualities he is the substrate (*āśraya*), [not the causal *samavāyi kāraṇa*, and his eternal, non-plural cognition is in *samavāya* relation to him. The apparent multiplicity of his desire (in itself one, *eka*) comes from the diversity of its terms, i.e. from the difference of its *upādhis* (a term favoured in similar regards by Śaṅkara). (140-175)

The qualities *dharma* (merit) which both Pakṣilasvāmin and Jayanta admitted, and *sukha* (pleasure), admitted by Jayanta, are not really found in Īśvara because they depend on *karma* of which he is free; yet he is the repository of bliss (*ānanda-nidhi*) understood as total absence of pain. (177-178) His immutability i absence of all adventitious specific *guṇas* or accidents. (179) The Lord's relation to generic qualities (*sāmānyaguṇaḥ*) is discussed pp. 179-182. The case of *saṁyoga* (conjunction) deserves mention since it seems to be demanded by the Lord's all-pervasiveness. Although the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara admitted an eternal 'unproduced conjuction' (*aja saṁyoga*) between all-pervasive substances' U. follows the Vaiśeṣikas who, beginning with Praśastapāda' denied such a possibility. The Lord can only be in indirect conjunction with the souls through the intermediary of substances of limited size, such as the atoms. (181-182)

In his concluding remarks, the author, while admitting the large debt of U. to his predecessors, denies that he simply reiterated their arguments and shows in detail his originality in rethinking, understanding anew and updating them against new opponents, besides formulating arguments of his own (such as 3 and 4 and the whole second series). (183-185) Then he fittingly concludes his study with a quotation from U.'s *Ātmatattvaviveka* which is an epitome of his doctrine:

"Salutation to that Father, the Lord of the worlds, the foremost of the ancient teachers, whose lordship is innate; who, having at the beginning created the worlds, thereafter maintains [them]; who causes [in the living beings] proficeincy [in the usage of words, etc.]; who effects the injuctions with regard to what is salutary and the prohibitions with regard to what is not salutary; whose truthfulness of speech is congenital [i.e., natural to him]; whose compassion is unconditioned; whose effort has [only] that [i.e., the worlds, especially the living beings] as its aim".

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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

A. P. SINHA : On Sidgwick's Reconciliation Of Ethical Theories 149
J. S. SHRIVASTVA : The Role Of Reason And Experience In The Constitution Of Human Knowledge 159
FREDERICK SONTAG : The Concept Of 'Alienation' In Recent American Thought 167
RAMLAL SINGH : An Advaitic Emendation Of Kant : A Study In Comparative Metaphysics 175
V. S. SHRIVASTVA : Prof. Ayer's Cenception Of Sense-Data 185
ILMAR TAMMELO : A Jurisprudential Panorama Of Deontic Logic 197
ASHOK GANGADEEN : Comparative Ontology And The Interpretation Of Karma 203
WILLIAM GERBER : A Typology Of What There Is 257
DAVID KIPP : What Is Philosophy Of History? 271
S. S. DESHPANDE : A Conceptual Layout Of Gaudapadakarikas 281
CHANDANA CHAKRABARTI : Anti-Cartesianism And James 289
INNOCENT C. ONYEWUENYI : The Concept Of Man In The Philosophy Of (Early) Marx 297
MOHINI MULLICK : The Rationality Principle: Its Role In Social Scientific Explanation 313
P. R. DAMLE : Can Politics Be Spiritualized 325
A. K. MONGA : Commitment And Action 333
A. PATHAK : A Note On Ross 343
Reviews etc. : 347-363

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Edited and Published by Dr. S. S. Barlingay, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona, Pune 411 007 and Printed by him at Sangam Press Ltd., Pune 411 029.

Compiled
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